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In Homage to the Author’s Preceptors  




The subject matter of this book is a recapitulation of the author’s achieve-
ments (Zdzisław Wąsik, born 1947) in the domain of general linguistics 
and semiotics considering the language as a system of signs. Some rele-
vant words on the genesis of the following chapters, including his indebt-
edness to his professional masters and scientific associates, will therefore 
be expressed in the first person. A preliminary sketch for their foundation 
were elaborated between the late 1970s and 1980s in the Chair of General 
Linguistics at Wrocław. Subsequent outlines of the theme were continued 
in the Institute of English Philology at Opole and in the School of English 
at Poznań over the last five years. 
 Between 1972 and 1999, I worked, advancing from a Teaching Assis-
tant to a Professor position, at the University of Wrocław, respectively, in 
the Chair of General Linguistics (1972–1976, and 1981–1999), Interfacul-
ty Studies of Culture (1976–1980), renamed later as the Institute of Cul-
turology (1980–1981). My academic experience has been enriched through 
additional employments at the universities in Opole (1987–2008) and 
Toruń (2001–2007), and lately also at three vocational schools of higher 
education in Silesia, in Wałbrzych (2000–2004, 2010–2012), Jelenia Góra 
(2002–2012), and Wrocław (2002 until today), and the Teachers’ Training 
College in Wrocław (1993–1997). In 1999, I moved to the first position at 
the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, and in 2009 to the Philologi-
cal School of Higher Education in Wrocław. 
 Every attempt, such as this, to present a synthesis of the sciences of 
signs from the standpoint of linguistics is indebted to many people and 
many publications as the bibliography shows. For particular insights and 
stimulations, I owe a heavy debt of gratitude, first of all, to my teachers 
from the University of Wrocław. The first fascination for a linguistic theo-
ry of language involving the question of the opposition between a mental-
ist concept of a bilateral sign and a functionalist concept of a unilateral 
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sign were evoked by the lectures given by Professor Dr. habil. Leon 
Zawadowski (born 1914) for the Faculty of Philology in the academic year 
of 1968/1969. Decisive for the origination of my interest in the interdisci-
plinary position of linguistics among the other sciences of language was 
Professor Dr. habil. Antoni Furdal (born 1928), who employed me in his 
Chair of General Linguistics as a Teaching Assistant acting as a supervisor 
of my doctoral dissertation devoted to a structural typology of interroga-
tive utterances on the basis of contemporary Indo-European languages, 
and then as a reviewer of my D.Litt. dissertation and a monographic trea-
tise for the attainment of my professorial title. To my spiritual masters 
belonged afterwards Professor Dr. habil. Stanisław Pietraszko (1928–
2010), the founder of cultural studies in Poland, who exerted an enormous 
impact on my ways of reasoning as regards the heteronomy-and-autonomy 
distinction with reference to the functioning of language as a social means 
of communication and the division of academic disciplines.  
 The year 1980 was a milestone in my future career in semiotic and 
communication sciences abroad. It started, nota bene, as early as January 
20–February 18, 1980, the most fruitful long-lasting cooperation with 
Professor Dr. Richard Leo Lanigan (born 1943), who was appointed as my 
Research Associate by the Vice-Dean of the College of Communications 
and Fine Arts, Southern University at Carbondale, USA, Professor Dr. 
Richard Mitchell Blumenberg (1935–1997). Three of the lectures conduct-
ed there at that time deserve to be mentioned here, namely, (1) Three No-
tions of Signs: Saussure, Bühler, Ogden and Richards. Chair of Speech 
Communication Proseminar, on January 28, 1980; (2) Classification (Ty-
pology) of Signs. Linguistics Chair Colloquium on January 31, 1980; 
(3) Functions of Language Text According to Karl Bühler (and Leo 
Zawadowski). Class Lecture: SPCH 445 Semiology and Semiotic Commu-
nication, on February 4, 1980. Special thanks are due to Dr. Lanigan’s 
generosity because at that time he had collected above 70 books and sent 
them to me in Wrocław, so that I could conduct my future MA seminars 
while applying the methodology of communication and semiotics to the 
analyses of literary and journalistic works. They have played an invaluable 
role in my becoming a semiotician and a phenomenologist of communica-
tion. As a result of frequent meetings at various semiotic conferences our 
mutual cooperation has been crowned with the initiatives of organizing 
common enterprises in Poland and the United States, among which such 
events deserve to be mentioned: the Fifth ICI Summer Conference: Sym-
posium: “Human Understanding: The Matrix of Communication and Cul-
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ture”. Seminar: “Communicology: Applied Pedagogy and Research”, at 
Jelenia Góra, Poland, on July 15–22, 2011, and “Philosophy of Communi-
cation”: 6th International Communicology Summer Conference—First 
Biannual Duquesne Conference, at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, on 
July 3–17, 2013. 
 The next turning point in my way to the gatherings with world-famous 
semioticians was my participation in the International Semiotic Symposi-
um: Philosophy of Sign, Puławy, on Sept. 25–26, 1980, where I had been 
very privileged to be engaged in a broad-minded and stimulating chat with 
Professor Dr. Max Harold Fisch (1901–1995), the founder of the Peirce 
Edition Project in 1976, which had become since 1983 an integral part of 
the School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University-Purdue University Indian-
apolis. It was also in Puławy where I had a chance to walk with Hans-
Heinrich Lieb (born 1936) along the Vistula-river bank while discussing 
the idea of his Integrational Linguistics (cf. Lieb 1983). 
 From August 1982 until June 1983, I had received a ten-month stipend 
of the Fulbright Fellowship for Senior Scholars with an appointment in the 
State University of New York at Buffalo where my Research Associate 
happened to be Professor Dr. Paul Lucien Garvin (1919–1994), the found-
ing father of a Graduate Group of Semiotics from the Department of Lin-
guistics. To his crucial merits belonged his views on epistemology that 
had deeply influenced my direction of inquiries into the philosophical 
foundations of science. Moreover, at that time I had an opportunity to take 
part in the 7th Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, orga-
nized in the Statler Hotel at Buffalo, NY, on October 21–24, 1982, where 
I met Professor Fisch for the second time. In a salutation talk, he outspo-
kenly expressed his wonder what I was doing at Buffalo with a peripheral 
links to semiotics. Following his opinion, the best place for conducting my 
research would be if not the Department of Linguistics at Yale University 
in New Haven, Connecticut, than the Research Center for Language and 
Semiotic Studies at Bloomington, Indiana, under the direction of Distin-
guished Professor Dr. Thomas Albert Sebeok (1920–2001).  
 With the view of a prospective invitation to Bloomington, I asked 
Professor Lanigan to introduce me to Professor Sebeok. Initially these 
consultations were only meant to be conducted over a short visit for one 
month. But after negotiations with the Department of State of the United 
States, I had received an approval to move there with my family for the 
second part of my stipend to the Indiana University, starting from Febru-
ary 1983, to work under the guidance of the eminent founding father and 
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true promoter of semiotics in the whole world. As regards my first find-
ings, I had presented there my paper on the “Methodological Status of 
Linguistics as a Science of Signs” at the Visiting Scholars Evening Lecture 
Series. Fourth International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural 
Studies, held at Bloomington, Indiana, on May 30–June 26, 1983. Under 
the influence of Professor Sebeok’s lectures given at this School in the 
Indiana University Library, I became one of the adherents of Jakob Johann 
von Uexküll (1864–1944), a Baltic German biologist, the founder of Um-
welt studies in Hamburg (cf. Sebeok 1979/1989). My stay in Bloomington 
had been supplementarily extended, at first for two months and then, due 
to supportive opinions of Dr. Michael Herzfeld, Associate Chair and 
Thomas A. Sebeok, Chairman of the Center, for an additional period of 
five months. Having spent a year in Bloomington, I was able to collect 
complete investigative materials for my future habilitation on the semiotic 
paradigm of linguistics and several consecutive books and articles devoted 
to the subject-oriented conceptions of sign and meaning bridging the sci-
ences of biology and anthropology. In subsequent years, we occasionally 
got together at various semiotic congresses, conferences and symposia in 
America and Europe. As a frequent participant of Toronto–Imatra Summer 
Schools of Semiotics, organized by Professor Dr. Eero (Aarne Pekka) 
Tarasti (born 1948), Director of the International Semiotics Institute at 
Imatra, I had a chance to meet him mostly in Finland and hear his brilliant 
lectures perfused with traces of his personal and professional life-history. 
I felt the extraordinary distinction of being fortunate enough to take active 
part in the festivities of Hommage à Thomas A. Sebeok, 80 Years—From 
Fennougrian Studies to Biosemiotics, celebrated during the Nordic-Baltic 
Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies and 19th Annual 
Meeting of the Semiotic Society of Finland, held at Imatra, Finland, on 
June 12–21, 2000. Throughout the last four decades, his inspiring spirit 
permeated not only my activity but also the scientific labor of the centers 
he had promoted or brought to life in Warsaw, Tartu–Moscow, Helsinki–
Imatra, or semioticians he had cooperated with, as in Budapest, Vienna, 
Paris, etc. Thomas A. Sebeok may be thus regarded as an embodied sign of 
the whole solipsistic conceptual and methodological framework of new 
semiotics.  
 To the direct achievements of my stay in the US belonged my habilita-
tion dissertation Semiotyczny paradygmat językoznawstwa (A semiotic para-
digm of linguistics, Wrocław 1987), written in Polish and then popularized 
through numerous papers and lectures delivered at international congresses 
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and conferences, which had contributed to the elaboration of: (1) the con-
ception of epistemology as a set of investigative perspectives, and (2) the 
typological survey of sign conceptions based on their existence modes and 
manifestation forms, and (3) the introduction of a solipsistic (subjective-
self-oriented) paradigm into the investigative domain of language sciences.  
 My contribution to the epistemology of linguistics had obtained a vivid 
acceptance when I presented a paper on “Investigative Perspectives in 
Linguistics and Other Sciences” at the XXIst Annual Societas Linguistica 
Europaea Meeting: “Modalitäten linguistischer Empirie”, held at Freiburg 
im Breisgau on June 12–15, 1988. The principal organizer of the SLE 
meeting, Professor Dr. Herbert Pilch (born 1927), not only discussed the 
topic of my presentation and mentioned it in his presidential address, but 
also invited me personally to his office after the conference to continue the 
discussion on the usage of cognitive perspectives in the sciences of lan-
guage. He notified me about the publications of his own Professor Eber-
hard Zwirner (1899–1984)—well known due to his multilingualist posi-
tion towards the object of linguistics studies—who had also referred to the 
same famous dictum of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) as myself, name-
ly, « C’est le point de vue qui crée l’objet ». (cf. Saussure 1916/1922; 23). 
 The next very important personality, in the context of Zwirner, was 
Professor Dr. Sydney MacDonald Lamb (born 1929)—as a proponent of a 
monolingualist panmentalism—who had agreed to be my Research Asso-
ciate and had taken care of my accommodations and well-being there 
when I came for a two-months placement as an International Research 
Exchange Scholar to the Chair of Linguistics and Semiotics, Rice Univer-
sity, Houston, Texas, from August 28 until October 30, 1991. The im-
portance of Lamb for the advancement of my training in cognitive semiot-
ics was marked in two spheres. Firstly, I was given his book of freshly 
published lectures: Language and Illusion. Toward a Cognitive Theory of 
Language (cf. Lamb 1991). Secondly, I was invited as a discussant to 
Philosophical Luncheon Meetings conducted regularly on Fridays between 
12 a.m. and 1 p.m. Significant were my lectures given there, and an-
nounced in a special news gazette of the Rice University sent to different 
countries abroad, available, among other places, in Australia. To my semi-
otics-related presentations belonged: (1) “The Concepts of Sign and Mean-
ing in Linguistics”. Class Lecture for Graduate Students in Semiotics 
(Dr. James Copeland), on September 24, 1991; (2) “The Concepts of Sign 
and Meaning in the Theory of Culture”. Class Lecture for Graduate Stu-
dents in Semiotics (Dr. James Copeland), on September 24, 1991; (3) 
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Investigative Perspectives in Linguistics and Other Sciences of Language. 
Linguistics and Semiotics Colloquium, on October 3, 1991, and (4) “To-
wards the Idea of an Axiosemiotic Science of Language”. Linguistics and 
Semiotics Colloquium, on October 29, 1991. 
 However, the largest part of my conclusive conceptions pertaining to 
the epistemology of semiotics and the multipolarity of the linguistic sign, 
have been developed in cooperation with Professor Dr. habil. Roland Pos-
ner (born 1942), the Director of the Research Center for Semiotics at the 
Technical University in Berlin. I had an occasion to be acquainted with 
Professor Posner when I delivered a lecture on “A Contribution to the 
Theme: The Interdisciplinary Position of Linguistics”, at the Session of the 
Selection Committee for the Culturological Faculty of the European Uni-
versity Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) at the Free University Berlin, Institute 
for Romanist Philology [„Ein Beitrag zum Thema: Die interdisziplinäre 
Position der Linguistik und die Kulturwissenschaften”. Sitzung der Beru-
fungskommission für die Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Europa-
Universität Viadrina Frankfurt an der Oder. Freie Universität Berlin, Insti-
tut für Romanische Philologie], on December 15, 1992. Soon afterwards, 
I was invited by Prof. Roland Posner to deliver a special lecture on “The 
Multipolarity of the Linguistic Sign” for the Research Center for Semiotics 
at the Technical University of Berlin, the Series of Lectures in the Institute 
for Linguistics [„Mehrpoligkeit des sprachlichen Zeichens“. Technische 
Universität, Arbeitsstelle für Semiotik, Berlin, Vortragsreihe am Institut 
für Linguistik], on December 19, 1994. 
 A separate account of these investigative novelties was summarized in 
my book An Outline for Lectures on the Epistemology of Semiotics (1998). 
Enriched by the selected contents of the book on systemic and ecological 
properties of language in interdisciplinary investigative approaches (Sys-
temowe i ekologiczne właściwości języka w interdyscyplinarnych podej-
ściach badawczych, 1997) and several papers published later, the next 
monograph Epistemological Perspectives on Linguistic Semiotics (2003) had 
received its final shape as a contribution to linguistic semiotics. It included 
some parts of elaborated articles: “On the Axiosemiotics of Postcards” 
(1992), and “Verbal Means as Signs of Human Needs” (1997), “Jakob von 
Uexküll’s ‘Umwelt-Theory’: A Link Between the Semiotics of Nature and 
the Semiotics of Culture”, delivered at a special session to Honor Thomas 
A. Sebeok’s 80th birthday in Imatra, Finland (2000). It comprised also an 
extended version of the latter having been published, thanks to the editori-
al elaboration of Professor Dr. Winfried Nöth, as “On the Biological Con-
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cept of Subjective Significance: A Link Between the Semiotics of Nature 
and the Semiotics of Culture” in the journal Sign Systems Studies of Tartu 
University (2001).  
 Among scholars who have played a pivotal role in my curriculum 
vitae, special expressions of gratitude are due to Professor Dr. habil. Jacek 
Izydor Fisiak (born 1936), a Polish Philologist of the English Language, 
a world-famous specialist of the History of English from the Adam Mic-
kiewicz University. He not only introduced me to the world of internation-
al conferences in linguistics at the forum of Societas Linguistica Europaea, 
but also supported me in my way to the domain of human-centered science 
so that my works became known not only among outstanding members of 
the International Association of Semiotic Studies, but also among mem-
bers of the International Communicology Institute. Consequently, in the 
year 2005 I was elected as Fellow of the International Communicology 
Institute on the recommendation of its Director, Professor Richard L. Lan-
igan. Moreover, my Department of Linguistic Semiotics and Communi-
cology was officially certified as a Research Group Affiliate of the Interna-
tional Communicology as of November 1, 2009. In turn, on November 15, 
2009 I was appointed as Member of the ICI Bureau, and in Autumn of 
2011 as Director of Regional-Continental Coordinators for Europe. These 
earlier and later recognitions contributed in the last years to my becoming 
a Nominated Member of the Romanian Association of Semiotics (2007), 
a Nominated Member of the Semiotic Society of America (2011), and an 
Honorary Member of the Semiotic Society of Finland (2012). 
 I feel also obliged to express my thankfulness to Professor Dr. Daina 
Teters (born 1963) from the Latvian Academy of Culture in Riga, appreci-
ating her inspirational encouragement in the preparation of my paper “The 
Word as a Trace of Man” presented at the international conference Meta-
morphoses of the World: Traces, Shadows, Reflections, Echoes and Meta-
phors in 2008 and then published in the proceedings of 2010.  
 

















Mission and Scope of the Monograph 
 
From Grammar to Discourse: Towards a Solipsistic Paradigm of Semiot-
ics aims at presenting a metascientific account of research conducted from 
a bird’s eye view in the domain of semiotic objects, which embrace, on the 
one hand, the language- and culture-centered conceptions of sign and its 
meaning and, on the other, human-centered ecosemiotic systems of com-
municating selves who aggregate into discursive communities on the basis 
of observable interpersonal and inferable intersubjective groupings when 
they send and receive as well as process and interpret similar messages. 
 It is the first academic monograph that exposes linguistic semiotics 
within the framework of epistemology as a theory of knowledge about how 
scientific objects exist (ontology) and how they can be cognized in explorato-
ry approaches (gnoseology). Combining linguistic, philosophical, logical 
and anthropological inquiries into sign- and meaning-related issues, which 
have been hitherto conducted within the span of the last fifteen years, it 
puts forward a proposal to merge the domains of biological and cultural 
studies into the investigative paradigm of linguistic semiotics. 
 Regarding its aspects of novelty and originality, at least five main areas 
of research provide entirely inventive resolutions and creative proposals, 
namely, (1) an outline of metasemiotics as a network of epistemological 
paradigms, (2) a systemic-structural approach to the semiotic universals of 
language, (3) an epistemological modeling of sign-and-its-referent relation-
ships, (4) a solipsistic conception of subjective significance in the value-
and-need- or function-and-purpose-oriented domains of human activity, 
and (5) a reflection on discursivism from the viewpoint of its applicability 
to the context of human competence. In this particular study, the main 
emphasis is put on analyzing and explaining the role of human individuals 
as signifying and communicating selves who take part in the formation of 
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discursive communities linked through praxeological and axiological 
means of interpersonal message transmission and intersubjective message 
comprehension. 
 This book offers to an adept in semiotic and linguistic studies at best 
three methodological benefits, deducible from the conviction: firstly, that 
semiotic objects are multiaspectual, secondly, that the subject matter of 
semiotic investigations can be reached through the choice of respective 
epistemological perspectives and, thirdly, that, on the metascientific level, 
all investigative approaches are equal in right. It is a work that any scholar 
conducting specialized seminars or student in linguistics, semiotics and 
communicology would welcome as a source of inspiration as far as it pro-
vides a fresh account of the most challenging topics predominant in the 
professional literature of recent times. However, the prospective distribu-
tors of academic books in the international forum have to take into account 
that the subject of this monographic book written in English is addressed 
to advanced recipients working and studying at the university level. 
 
 
Outline and Focus of Particular Chapters 
 
The following book consists of sixteen chapters pertaining to theoretical 
issues subsumed under four parts regarding the metascientific status of 
semiotics, aspects of language as a semiotic system, inquiries into the 
nature of semiotic objects, and the semiotic self in the discursive domains 
of everyday life. Separately attached, apart from the preface and table of 
contents, are informative parts comprising a bibliography of works cited 
and consulted, notes to certain chapters, indexes referring to names of 
authors and selected terms from the main text, and a summary in Polish. 
 To answer the question of how to delimit the investigative domains of 
linguistics and semiotics, Chapter One starts with a discussion of the most 
controversial issues connected with the status and nature of the semiotic 
object usually equalized with the sign as an entity, or the unity of the sign 
and its meaning or reference. To grasp the semiotic nature of language, it 
starts with explaining the relationship of the discipline, the object of which 
is signs in general, to one of the linguistic disciplines, the object of which 
is verbal signs in particular. As it is shown, the objects investigated in the 
domain of semiotics are not homogeneous. In the first dimension, semiot-
ics, as a scientific discipline, investigates the sign- and meaning-related 
objects that are found in the realm of nature and culture. In the second, 
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semiotic objects are investigated with regard to their meaning-indicating 
functions either as facts or processes. Formulating, therefore, the idea of 
general semiotics, one has to consider the extremity of such views on the 
scope of its investigative domain.  
 The aim of Chapter Two is to consider the applicability of the notion 
of paradigm, which presents the history of ideas as a succession of investi-
gative and methodological convictions of particular communities of schol-
ars resulting from scientific revolutions caused by extraordinarily out-
standing individuals, to the past and present state of linguistic thought. It 
ends with the statement that the development of linguistics is not to be 
described in terms of paradigms that replace each other. What the histori-
ans of linguistics can distinguish are heterogeneous traditions of formation 
and growth of divergent approaches to language that have their own rec-
ords of continuity, breaks and returns. With the assumption that the term 
paradigm might be useful for appreciating the investigative approaches in 
the history of linguistics, it is proposed that the term paradigm is not to be 
applied to the convictions or beliefs characterizing certain individuals or 
communities of scholars but rather to the sets of propositions and notions 
expressed in their texts, i.e., in their objective utterances, and other means 
of communication that are exhaustive, simple and verifiable in praxis. In 
such a reduced scope, paradigms might be seen as encompassing all 
frames of reference organizing the human experience and theorizing the 
human cognition. In other words, the term paradigm is said to denote 
every possible framework that systematizes the human experience in a 
scientific way as any epistemological frame of reference, i.e., a set of 
conceptual and cognitive-methodological assumptions about the nature of 
the object of study, and about the way to approach it while applying inves-
tigative tools, why formulating postulates and operational definitions. In a 
very broad sense, the notion of paradigm is considered as a synonym of an 
investigative approach, including methodological standpoints, cognitive 
perspectives, heuristic models and concepts, and, furthermore, also trends 
or theories propagated either by individual scientists or scientific commu-
nities, united within the so-called schools of scientific thought. As a result, 
the paradigm does not present itself as a closed system. It might be regard-
ed as composed of paradigms, constituting parts of the systems of higher 
or lower range. It could be distinguished as standing in relation to appro-
priate levels of reference. In view of that, a given type of science, as a 
system situated within other systems, does not necessarily need to have all 
places occupied by previously-existing actual paradigms. It could have also 
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some slots open for new potential paradigms, in the traditional understand-
ing of the term in question, for other new subsystems, models, concepts, 
and investigative approaches to various sides, forms of manifestation, and 
levels or structures of the investigated object. While appreciating the rela-
tional value of paradigms, practitioners of historiography should consider 
whether the disputed frames of reference occupy the same place, or not the 
same, within the whole system of science. Eventually, they may be inter-
ested in paradigms that exclude each other or overlap, that belong to a  
superior, or ulterior, level, thus forming constituents of other paradigms of 
higher or lower order. 
 Chapter Three departs from the notion of epistemology as a branch of 
philosophy that studies the nature and the grounds of knowledge regarding 
the limits and functional validity of diverse investigative approaches used 
in particular scientific disciplines in order to determine their subject mat-
ter. It is assumed that an epistemological analysis of a given discipline 
consists in the examination of its ontological and gnoseological founda-
tions. Thus, the aim of epistemology is to answer how far the commitment 
of scientists to their attendant views on their object of study corresponds to 
its investigative approachability. The examination of epistemological posi-
tions occupied by representatives of a given discipline is based on a guid-
ing principle that the choice of a selected investigative approach should 
determine their outlook upon the nature of their object of study. In conse-
quence, this outlook should initially determine the choice of conceptual 
and operational investigative apparatus offering a basis for the formulation 
of eventual investigative postulates. As regards an epistemological approach 
to the positions held by semiotics among the other scientific disciplines, 
the author is of the opinion that it should focus on answering the questions 
of how the knowledge of the relevant properties of its object, or its domain 
(as a set of objects) of study, is formulated and ordered. As he adds, the 
properties of the objects, being homogenous or heterogeneous, coherent or 
incoherent in the domain of semiotics, may be revealed through different 
philosophical and logical positions providing metascientific or metadisci-
plinary foundations for the methodology of particular scientific disci-
plines.  
 Thus, having stated, in this framework, that the epistemology of semi-
otics is shaped by various scientific paradigms, discussed in Chapter Two, 
the author is of the opinion that the properties of its objects may be studied 
inter alia through a set of meta-, hypo-, inter-, intra-disciplinary and disci-
plinary perspectives, useful for distinguishing its relevant categories and 
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notions. In the end, he puts forward a postulate that the epistemological 
assessment of specific disciplines of semiotics may aim at the elaboration 
of a typological matrix that allows one to go through all distinctions be-
tween ontological and gnoseological positions with which the theoreticians 
and practitioners representing particular schools of semiotic thought have 
aligned themselves. 
 The focus of attention in Chapter Four is put on the characteristic fea-
tures of language regarded on the one hand as the subject matter of the 
principal object of scientific study and, on the other, as the aspects of the 
subject matter of the adjacent objects being studied from either discipli-
nary or interdisciplinary perspectives. Its special objective is to expose the 
idea of epistemological awareness of scientists in the division of their 
investigative labor. Hence, crossing the boundaries between isolationist 
and integrationist approaches, it is important to specify which of the mani-
festation forms and the existence modes of language are autonomized as 
the subject matter of linguistics and which belong to the heteronomous 
conditionings of the objects studied by its neighboring disciplines. To 
separate the investigative domain of linguistics from the domain studied 
by non-linguistic disciplines, this chapter suggests to observe the distinc-
tion between language “as an object” of study and language “as a relation-
al property” of other objects. In consequence, the practitioner of language 
sciences is expected to be aware when he observes the extra-systemic 
properties of language conditioned by its environment and when he de-
taches the systemic-structural properties of a particular language from its 
environment. In keeping with an appeal to their disciplinary awareness, 
scientists are advised to remember that language as an object of study is 
indivisible while the investigative boundaries of the disciplines depend on 
the choice of viewpoints. And so, from a structural-systemic perspective, 
the following three conceptual levels of language will be distinguished: 
(1) in general and in particular, (2) as a definitional model, as an abstract 
and concrete object, and (3) as a theoretical construct, as an inductive 
generalization, as an autonomous sociolect, or as a heteronomous idio-
lect. To summarize the whole discussion about the heteronomous exist-
ence modes of language and its autonomization in use and cognition, it is 
explicitly noted that not only the linguists are able to autonomize their 
object of study. In investigative practice, any heteronomy of language can 




 Within the framework of distinctions introduced in Chapter Five, the 
properties of language have been discussed in relation to communicating 
individuals as a dynamic (processual) and static (factual), social and indi-
vidual phenomenon. The core of such distinctions constitutes, on the one 
hand, the notion of: speech as a species-specific faculty of humans to com-
municate by using vocal signs while implementing articulatory-auditory 
physiological skills; language as a system of vocal signs referring to ob-
served and concluded extralingual reality; text as a realization of language in 
the acts of thinking and speaking simultaneously, and, on the other: 
competence as a linguistic ability of an individual to create and recognize 
verbal means of communication as mutually distinguishable, grammatical-
ly correct, semantically logical, and pragmatically appropriate to a given 
situation, and performance as an execution of linguistic abilities in gener-
ating an infinite number of textual utterances, which serve the purposes of 
interpersonal communication, both commonly known ones and new ones 
never heard before. While considering the question whether language is not 
a ready-made product but an uninterrupted process, the view is that lan-
guage is both a social activity and a social fact. Against the usage reducing 
the linguistic object to the oppositions between system and text, the dis-
tinction between dynamic and static aspects of language and its realization 
in texts, has been presented in four phases of speech: “text as an action”, 
“text as an act”, “language as work” and “language as a structure”.  
 It is emphasized that the notion of language as a social feature of hu-
man speech, which is relatively independent of the will of its individual 
speakers and listeners, assuming that nobody is allowed to create the lan-
guage as a personal property of him- or herself and to transform it into a 
means of communication when it is not accepted by the power of a social 
contract established by members of a given communicative community. 
An individual has to learn it in order to cognize and to obey its rules. 
A child, for example, acquires it for himself gradually. Language exists 
even in the form of a capability, as in the case of a person who has lost the 
ability of speaking. One can say, by way of illustration, that someone 
possesses the language when he/she understands only the texts of a deter-
mined language, while conceiving them as verbal, spoken or written signs. 
The problem with the so-called proprietorship of language is connected 
with the social character of verbal means. Individual uses of language are 
sanctioned by social norms, sometimes imposed by authorities. They are 
governed by the principles of common acceptability, which the particu-
lar members of speech communities have the duty to conform to. Anoth-
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er form of possessing speech as “the linguistic faculty proper” concerns 
two kinds of human abilities; in one sense, it means the ability to acquire 
the language of an ecologically determined community during the so-
called “critical period” in the development of a child, and, in the other, it 
may also indicate the ability of an individual to construe his/her inter-
individual communicative means, established even on the neighboring 
areas between different varieties of one and the same language or diverse 
languages spoken by regional communities, ethnic minorities or national 
majorities in a given environment. 
 Chapter Six—paying special attention to metaphorical devices—deals 
with the educational modes of explaining the notion of form in correlation 
with the notion of substance as encountered in the academic handbooks by 
the students and practitioners of language sciences. Against the back-
ground of the development of philosophical thought, it has been stated that 
the application of term form in linguistic writings along with its lexico-
graphic usage do not stand in one-to-one correspondence. In the modern 
usage, “form” has been placed in opposition to “content”, i.e., to sense or 
meaning. The notion of form has been, for example, equalized with gram-
matical entities and structures distinguished from lexical (and stylistic) 
ones on the basis of their category-related features. Accordingly, the ele-
ments of form have been discussed within the framework of a functionalist 
structuralism as text elements that correspond to the elements of extra-
textual content. For this reason, “form” has been either counterpoised or 
placed in relation to “function” or “meaning”. Another point must be made 
about the interrelationship between form and substance. A linguistic sub-
stance has been mostly defined in a negative way. Everything, which may 
be defined as a substance, has been considered as not a form, i.e., as not 
belonging to the system of interdependencies that constitute the structure 
of each of the given objects. In consequence, paying more attention to 
form than to substance, some linguists prone to this way of thinking be-
lieve that form is independent of substance. Assuming that the elements of 
language are interchangeable because they can be expressed in different 
substances, they have treated the form of language as a system of pure 
values. The form thus constitutes, in abstractively conceived reality, the 
system of relations between the values of linguistic elements. One can say, 
therefore, that the form, as a systemic network of relations, superimposes 
itself upon the substance, as the textual realization in speech or writing. 
The adherents of a formalist structuralism, on the other hand, have spoken 
in favor of such a definition of the term form, which appears to be synon-
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ymous with the relational value of substance. Thus, linguistic form is im-
plied to operate, as a specific carving pattern, on amorphous non-linguistic 
matter giving in the output a network of relations, into which the elements 
of linguistic character enter mutually among themselves. 
 The subject matter of Chapter Seven consists of the views on the 
changeable nature of language resulting from its relation to the time-bound 
character of the environment, in which it is generationally transmitted as a 
means of interpersonal communication. These views take into considera-
tion, among other things, such semiotic properties of language as conven-
tionality, learnability and forgetability. The approach to language as a 
system of pure values, which are determined by nothing other than the 
arrangement of text elements in a given moment of time, means that lan-
guage should be considered on “the axis of simultaneity” and not on “the 
axis of succession”. The language as such exists only as an organized 
system in the consciousness of its individual users, in the collective con-
sciousness of given communicative communities, and by virtue of this also 
in the individual acts of speaking and understanding only in a synchronic 
cross section. The users of a determined language are not interested in the 
history of its constituents, when they utilize it as a tool of communication 
nor, indeed, when they intend to evoke the behavior and reactions of re-
ceivers and to express their own feelings and emotional states. From a 
diachronic perspective, the properties of language are studied mainly by 
historians and to a lesser degree by those who speak it, since the evolution 
of language phenomena is a slow process, which is rarely perceivable by 
its users. Each of the levels of language, each structure or each of its con-
stitutive elements can have their own separate history. Research into their 
nature is therefore never ultimately complete. It is rather partial when one 
takes into account the fact that the particular, simultaneously functioning, 
elements of the system of a determined language, which is present also in 
the consciousness of different users, can be situated on different levels of 
the development. In such a context, a remarkable opposition regarding the 
sources of changes and differentiation of languages is presented by repre-
sentatives who reject the assumption that languages are to be reduced to 
“stages” and stages should be identified with “systems” while showing 
that they exist in the usage of human individuals as members of a given 
society. Therefore, the practitioners of linguistics are advised to give cre-
dence only to source materials being collected from the speakers of actual-
ly spoken languages. They should pay attention to the fact that this per-
sonal language in question can simultaneously or interchangeably adhere 
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not only to one or more varieties of one and the same language but also to 
the varieties of two or more either neighboring or distant languages. As 
regards the changeability and variability of languages, extreme positions 
of theoreticians are confronted of those who accept the existence of multi-
lingualism in the world as an accomplished historical fact which is not to 
be altered by legal acts or scientific declarations, and who see language as 
a dialectal continuum in the collective sense. 
 Chapter Eight exposes the notion of word denoting the textual object 
of philological studies and the notion of trace specified against the classi-
ficatory background of semiotic objects. Turning attention to the word as a 
trace of humans, the author has considered, on the one hand, the metamor-
phoses of the human universe resulting from the linguistic-communicational 
activity of social groupings on ethnic or national, regional or professional, 
global or local levels, and on the other, the changes taking place in the 
environments of human individuals on a uniquely personal level. In the 
first case, there are two trace-leaving processes that come into being, first-
ly, “the wording of the world” realized through naming and the termino-
logical ordering of things and their states of being, and in the second case, 
a constructivist “objectification” of language, in which its users know 
“how to do things with words”. Considering the theory of memes, the word 
might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited features of 
languages or as an exponent of motivational preference of humans in their 
creation of new meaning-bearers. Execution of linguistic abilities may 
show the tendencies of minimizing the communicational effort of lan-
guage speakers or provide evidence for their communicational proficiency 
and knowledge of cultural tradition. The word is considered here not only 
as an expression of intimate spirituality of communicating individuals but 
also of speech communities to which they belong. Relevant also is the 
style of the word choice as reflecting the cultural tradition of humankind. 
Its traces are especially visible in literary works, in translations from a 
determined language into other languages, in the usage of expressive 
and/or impressive means. Likewise, preceptor-oriented studies may reveal 
traces left by other authors as a source of inspiration when they are anon-
ymous or intentionally omitted. It is noticeable that the word as a property 
of its creators is changeable by nature when considered in terms of a 
meaning-creating activity in opposition to a meaning-bearing fact. There-
fore, the subject matter of a trace-related study is seen in the typology of 
verbal meaning-bearers to be observed in the products resulting from the 
species-specific behavior of people who create and interpret the universe 
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of meanings as communicating individuals and participants of interperson-
al communication. Researchers are principally interested in conditions 
under which words might be treated as vestiges of man’s communicational 
customs, assuming that the basic function of language is to form interper-
sonal and intersubjective communities of speakers and receivers who send 
and receive, produce and understand messages in a similar way. These 
conditions of word-processing acts, as inherent and relational properties of 
language in use, constitute, in one dimension, the levels of particular lin-
guistic systems and, in another dimension, the domains of human life in 
which they function as a means of communication. 
 Chapter Nine raises the question of semiotic properties of language. 
Summing up the research on the universals of language conducted hitherto 
by practitioners of linguistics and its neighboring disciplines, the author 
concentrates on the defining characteristics of speech derivable from the 
contrast between nonverbal and verbal means of communication used in 
the world of man and animals. The subject matter of the study presented in 
details comprises the semiotic universals of language specified as sign- 
and meaning-related properties of verbal means deduced from the contrast 
between human and the non-human means of communication. Conse-
quently, the author takes into consideration the interdisciplinary search for 
“the defining characteristics of language”. On the basis of knowledge accu-
mulated in academic handbooks, he has stated that the defining properties 
of language are neither sufficiently substantiated nor exhaustively ordered. 
To identify which of the discussed semiotic universals are relevant for the 
investigative domains of the neighboring disciplines of language sciences 
and linguistics proper, he proposes therefore to observe the boundaries 
between the properties pertaining to: (I) form and structure of language as 
a codified system of verbal signs used for cognitive and communicational 
purposes, (II) substance of codes and communication channels, (III) cog-
nitive faculties and communicational abilities of humans determining the 
ways of language acquisition and language attrition across cultures and 
generations, and (IV) relationships between the verbal signs of a determined 
language and their referents, as well as between language speakers and 
their knowledge of extralingual reality. Those four groups of properties have 
been correspondingly subsumed under the separate classes of (A) extrasys-
temic and relational properties of language (groups II–IV) that belong to 
the investigative domain of the neighboring disciplines of language sci-
ences, and (B) systemic and inherent properties of language (group I) 
that constitute the subject matter of linguistics proper.  
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 The detachment of systemic-structural properties of the verbal means 
of interpersonal communication from all their inherent and relational proper-
ties has allowed, against the background of the preceding discussion, to 
postulate a classificatory approach to the semiotic universals of language 
which bears in mind the specific nature of language in the context of its 
systemic and non-systemic properties constituting the subject matter of 
linguistics proper and the non-linguistic sciences of language. In such a 
view, the systemic properties of language are to be deduced from the com-
parison between nonverbal verbal and means of communication in the 
light of linguistic semiotics itself and not necessarily from the perspective 
of man’s place in the environment of other living species. 
 Research questions posed in Chapter Ten are connected with the ori-
gins of the conception of language as a system of signs. The most disputa-
ble issues presented here relate to the ontological status and cognitive 
approachability of the category of sign. As it has been noticed, the views 
of theoreticians and practitioners of semiotic disciplines are not unanimous 
as to whether the sign is a concrete or mental entity, being cognized as a 
real or ideal object. Further questions about the forms of manifestation of 
signs refer to whether their material shapes, possessing a spiritual replica in 
the mind of their users, are sensible or intelligible, concrete or abstract, 
extraorganismic or intraorganismic forms of being, which might be exam-
ined subjectively or objectively. What is more, semioticians still argue 
whether the sign is to be treated as a separate or as a multifaceted phenom-
enon consisting of related features. To answer these and other related 
questions pertaining to the explanation of the concrete and mental nature 
of language in relation to reality the author proposes to scrutinize the an-
tique provenance of three philosophical traditions, namely Platonism, 
Aristotelianism (modified through Cartesianism), and Stoicism. He takes 
for granted that the conception of the sign as a oneness of two inseparable 
psychic sides expressed in Saussurean category of parole, which means 
both thinking and speaking simultaneously, might have been influenced by 
the Platonic idea of logos. But the same cannot be said, as the author ar-
gues, with respect to the conception of the bilateral sign as mental unity, in 
which both parts of the sign are considered as being in equal degree psychic. 
In his view, this absolute psychologist definition of the sign as a two-sided 
entity, which unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound 
pattern, probably originates in the late rationalist phase of Aristotelian 
heritage, developed under the influence of Cartesian thought. In turn, lan-
guage in a triadic sequence or a unified triangle is seen as derived from the 
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philosophical reasoning of Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, who introduced the 
third element to the original dyad, consisting of sound and thought of man, 
namely human intellect expressed in words, which play a mediating role in 
speech. As the subsequent searches for historical roots have indicated, the 
Aristotelian triadic sequence of thing—intellect—voice, initially replaced by 
three constituents, thing—concept—term of a triangular scheme, and modi-
fied by various conceptions of a semantic triangle and a trilateral sign or 
the sign as a triadic relation, tends in the direction of detaching four con-
stituents of a semantic quadrangle, including the concrete manifestation of 
the sign and its referent as well as their separate reflections in the mind. 
The detachment of the sign from its referent has its roots in Antiquity 
going back to the heritage of Stoics who have treated signs as corporeal 
phenomena which reveal something that is real but non-evident through 
conditional implications. 
 Chapter Eleven puts forward an idea of epistemological equivalence to 
be achieved in translational praxis. It concentrates around the question of 
how the translations of sign-related terms selected from Cours de linguis-
tique générale (CLG) of Ferdinand de Saussure reflect the ontological and 
gnoseological awareness of their translators. On the basis of selected quo-
tations excerpted from the French original of CLG with their two distinct 
translations into English against the background of an earlier German 
translation, various connotations of analyzed terms have been evaluated 
regarding how they may exert an impact upon the recipients of educational 
discourse in semiotics. The following three groups of examples illustrate 
the search for translational equivalence in rendering the French terms of 
(1) the mental representation of linguistic signs in concepts and images 
acoustiques, (2) the definition of the bilateral sign: « Le signe linguistique 
unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique », 
and (3) the replacement of concept et image acoustique respectively by 
signifié et signifiant. In concluding remarks, the author submits a postulate 
for an ecumenical translation where the knowledge of scholarly traditions 
and the epistemological connotations of discipline-specific terms should 
constitute the central aim of translators’ schooling. Hence, readers are ad-
vised to critically accept the results of translational practices with aware-
ness of their interpretative consequences. 
 The interest sphere of Chapter Twelve consists of the status and nature 
of the semiotic object which is equalized with the sign as an entity, or the 
unity of the sign and its reference. As it has been deduced from historical 
searches, popular conceptions of the sign (and its reference) are formulat-
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ed either in terms of a unilateral sign in which the sign-vehicle and its 
referent are treated as separate entities, or a bilateral sign whose two parts, 
the signifier and the signified, comprise a twofold psychical unity. Some 
semioticians adhere to the concept of a semantic triangle in which the 
sign-vehicle, its meaning (thought or notion), and its referent form sepa-
rate parts, and some prefer a trilateral sign concept where the sign-vehicle, 
its meaning (the interpretant generating one or more signs), and its object 
of reference form a threefold unity. Separately noted are also the concepts 
of the sign as a dyadic relation and the sign as a triadic relation. As far as 
these sign conceptions exhibit not only differences in the usage of termi-
nology but also in the formation of their visual representations, the pro-
posal is put forward to find an appropriate parameter or matrix that would 
contain features and constituents specific for particular approaches to their 
forms of being and manifestation. Having noticed that the constituents of 
all hitherto known sign conceptions are to be found within framework of a 
semantic quadrangle, the author proposes to consider the usefulness of a 
typological matrix, which encompasses unified explanatory and illustrative 
primitives. A survey of actual sign conceptions, brought to the common 
denominator within the framework of a semantic quadrangle, demonstrates 
how its two main constituents, the sign and its referent, as a token and a 
type, with their collective and individual properties exclusively and inclu-
sively, may be modeled as oscillating between logical positivism, rational 
empiricism, empirical rationalism and absolute rationalism.  
 While putting together the anthropological and phenomenological mod-
els of the human life-world with the biological and semiotic conceptions of 
subjective universe, Chapter Thirteen extends the concept of the semiotic 
self, initially referred to an organism that recognizes and produces envi-
ronmental signals as significant for its functioning, through the notion of 
the signifying and communicating self who emits and receives as an ob-
servable person the sensorially perceivable meaning-bearers and who 
processes and interprets as an inferred subject these mentally apprehensi-
ble meaning-bearers for the sake of intersubjective understanding. In such 
a viewpoint, the interpersonal life-world of an outer self who produces and 
receives concrete signs as meaning-bearers is regarded as a counterpart of 
the subjective universe of an inner self formed by the sensual knowledge 
coming from individual experiences and consensual knowledge of the 
meaning being derived from the contents of collective communication. 
Consequently, the anthropological foundations of subject-centered semiot-
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ics, in the realm of culture, are discussed with respect to a biological need-
oriented conception of meaning in the natural environment of organisms. 
 Within the framework of Chapter Fourteen, which departs from the 
viewpoint of individual and social selves, a nature- and culture-centered 
conception of subjective significance in the realm of the human life-world 
is combined with the conception of intersubjective understanding. The main 
interest focus of a scientist working in the investigative field of human se-
miotics, which encompasses the sign- and meaning-related properties of 
signifying and communicating selves, is placed on the fulfillment of pur-
poses or the satisfaction of needs of real persons who take active part in 
interpersonal communication. In alluding to the conceptions of subjective 
significance borrowed from anthropology and biology, which unites hu-
man and non-human selves in the semiotics of culture and nature, specially 
exhibited are the communicational practices and patterns of meaning-
creation and meaning-utilization in interpersonal interactions and intersub-
jective understanding.  
 Accordingly, the investigative domain of human-centered semiotics 
has been delimited by the nature of sign- and meaning-processing and sign- 
and meaning-interpreting activities of communicating selves who utilize the 
objects found in their personal-subjective universe as functional tools or 
valuable goods of culture. The sources of such subject-oriented concep-
tions of sign and meaning are identified in the praxeological, i.e., function- 
and purpose-oriented view of culture, on the one level, or the axiological, 
i.e., value- and need-oriented view of culture, on the other. Understood in 
semiotic terms, culture is presented thus as a set of praxeosemiotic and/or 
axiosemiotic regularities that occur between the meanings of functions or 
meanings of values fulfilled through meaning-bearing processes and prod-
ucts of human selves, as communicating persons and signifying subjects, 
which co-determine and condition the socially constructed realization of 
their interpersonal and intersubjective life-worlds. Exposed, in this human-
centered theory of culture, is the role of a cultural subject who acts as a 
meaning-utilizer or meaning-evaluator while nominating and subsuming 
the objects of culture as signs of his/her purposes or needs. On account of 
two semiotic spheres of culture, one from the viewpoint of praxeology and 
another from the viewpoint of axiology, there are two forms of meaning-
nomination and meaning-subsumption: praxeosemiotic nominations and 
subsumptions involve the ascription of functions to cultural objects being 
not useful for preceding purposes, whereas the axiosemiotic ones result in 
the transfer of products and behavior of people to the realm of objects, 
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which have not been included as cultural goods before. To underline the 
differences between persons and subjects, interpersonal and intersubjective 
relationships, it has been indispensable to introduce a distinction between 
the features, aspects or constituents of the physical domain, being empiri-
cally tested with experimental methods, and the features of the logical 
domain, being rationally concluded through shared knowledge of social 
communication. Thus, these properties of signifying and communicating 
selves, which are realized in observable meaning-bearers, will be consid-
ered as features of the physical domain of investigation. However, semiot-
ic properties, which are only assumed in terms of conceptual and proposi-
tional contents, inaccessible to direct observation, will be qualified as 
aspects or constituents of the logical domain of inference. In reference to 
the latter distinction, this chapter ends with constructivist theories, eluci-
dating that the personal-subjective contact of signifying and communi-
cating selves with their natural, social and cultural environments is medi-
ated through language, which is said to “objectify” the experiences shared 
by members of particular speech communities. In such a way, the individ-
ual semiotic selves functioning in the role of social selves construe their 
everyday reality composed of typical contents while becoming not only 
the source but also the tool of interpersonal communication and creating 
the intersubjectively comprehensive knowledge.  
 In support of the idea of an individual signifying and communicating 
self, functioning in the realm of social and cultural semiotics, Chapter 
Fifteen presents the language-related concept of an individual monolingual 
self, embedded into a collective multilingual world, where the epistemo-
logical perspective of solipsism, being as a rule opposed to collectivism, is 
consequently discussed under the label of “collective solipsism”. On the 
basis of a phenomenological claim that objective reality does not exist 
beyond the sphere of subjective experience, reported is here a cognitive 
theory localizing language as a mental system within the brain of human 
individuals, which is accessible only during their speaking activities. It is 
sustained by a belief that the mental contents of the communicating self, 
founding the primary object of linguistic investigations, may be revealed 
through the mediation of empirical texts regarded as the extensions of the 
minds of all human individuals, which constitute parts of a general human 
mind exposed through communication. Supporters of this panmentalist and 
monolingualist attitude call for investigating language as a mental system 
located within the brains of individual selves as such by unfolding their 
verbal performances in order to find out how this intraorganismic mind of 
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all social selves in the terrestrial world operates. So far, what enables the 
direct accessibility of verbal texts makes up the investigative domain of 
descriptive semiotics, which is engaged in answering the question of how 
extraorganismic information structures are processed while involving signs 
of facts and events existing in the real world accessible to cognition. How-
ever, descriptive semioticians must be aware that their sensory experiences 
are filtered through perceptual and conceptual information, which form the 
cognitive networks of relationships in their mental sign-processing and 
sign-interpreting activities as the source of immediate experience. Chapter 
Fifteen ends with a solipsistic view of the investigative object of neosemi-
otics, which takes as a point of departure the backgrounds of existential 
phenomenology. The objects of scientists’ interest consists here of the 
verbal exponents of the distinction between the existence of organismic 
forms of being “in itself” and “for itself”, expressed in the terminology of 
respective authors, German and French in particular. What is relevant for 
the existential aspects human individuals and as members of society is the 
opposition between “I” and “Me” and the “Self” in group encounters. 
Hence, it is evident why it is reasonable to state that human individuals 
appear in two existence modes as real persons with sensible qualities and 
as rational subjects with intelligible qualities. 
 Chapter Sixteen concentrates on the methodological assessment of dis-
cursivism as an investigative perspective from the viewpoint of its applica-
bleness to the context of human competence. Investigating the communica-
tional aspects of human competence, it will specify the understanding of 
discourse as the realization of language and culture in human interactions, 
which contribute to the formation of ecologically determined systems of 
communication. The notion of discourse is explained there in terms of 
relational properties of meaning-bearers or meaning-processing activities 
embedded into the social roles of communication participants, depending 
upon the rules of language and culture. Seen against the background of the 
distinctions made by philologists, the domain of discourse studies is thus 
placed in a broader context of social sciences. Accordingly, it has been 
noted that the practitioners of philological sciences, linguists and theoreti-
cians of literature, refer the term discourse above all to the socially and 
culturally determined properties of the types of texts or text-processing 
activities characterizing the respective domains of language use in the 
universe of human life. However, those scholars who study the semiotics 
of human communication see discourse as a material manifestation of 
language and culture in sensible meaning-bearers, equated with text-like 
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objects, which perform the semiotic functions of indicating, signaling, 
appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e., pictorial or mimetic signs in the nonver-
bal and verbal behavior of communication participants. From the perspec-
tive of sign-communicational sciences, dealing with the domain of culture, 
discourse will be, at this point, considered in terms of semiotic codes and 
processes, which link the individual communicating selves who take part 
in group interactions as observable persons and inferable subjects into 
interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities when they create and inter-
pret the meanings that are embodied in material bearers forming the non-
verbal or verbal means and modes of human understanding. In conse-
quence, against the background of terminological apparatus of language-
centered communicational sciences, the author introduces appropriate 
distinctions between linguistic collectivities and linguistic communities, 
on the one hand, and discursive collectivities and discursive communities, 
on the other. This distinction between the two extents of social groupings 
in which individuals are taking part depends, in the first instance, upon a 
“modular” view of language as embedded into the culture or, in the sec-
ond, upon a “holistic” view of culture as including language among the 
other systems of meaning-bearers belonging to the realm of human semiot-
ics. To establish a typology of discursive communities as aggregations of 
communicating selves who interact in various domains of human commu-
nication, it is advisable to specify the common tasks they realize for the 
satisfaction of their survival needs and cultural values, as well as for the 
fulfillment of public requirements and environmental conditionings. 
 The notion of human competence, in turn, is considered here as a dis-
positional property of individual communicating selves, which enables 
them to effectively interact with other individuals while performing their 
role-oriented tasks in speech acts under the pressure of collective sanc-
tions. Correspondingly, it is argued that some aspects of human compe-
tence are connected with the modeling of personality traits, which foster 
the development of interdiscursive competence of communicating selves 
in cultural and educational domains of human communication, governed 
by the rules of generationally transmitted traditions and socially construed 
norms.  
 In search of the genus proximum of this human property of being com-
petent, which implies the possession of a required capacity, such as skills 
and knowledge, the original concept of idealized linguistic competence is 
confronted with the extended scope of communicative competence, which 
has been productively lent to the domain of language pedagogy and devel-
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oped as a pre-constructed set of individual qualities under the influence of 
the neighboring disciplines of general and applied linguistics, such as 
psycho- and sociolinguistics, text linguistics, pragmatics, discourse studies 
and semiotics of communication. It is observed that such related disci-
plines as psychology and sociology, providing their own frameworks, have 
also contributed to the extension of the concept of communicative compe-
tence within the scope of general competence. Thus, the term “metacompe-
tence” is not to be omitted for relating to referential characteristics of 
particular types of human competencies. The summarizing statements of 
the chapter establish that personal competence is a theoretical construct, 
which can be judged, measured, designed or imposed and controlled when 
it becomes visible through concrete realizations in the particular domains 
of human communication. 
 This book ends with a wide-ranging list of reference works which have 
been not only cited within the text of particular chapters and notes attached 
separately but also selected for further consultations. In the same manner, 
a curious reader may find the penetrative index of names and terms ap-
pearing in the main text of the whole book as a useful guide to particular 
topics organized around the thematic contexts of communication, culture, 


























The Subject Matter and the Object of Semiotic Studies 
 
The subject matter presented in this chapter is determined by the view of 
language as a semiotic system. Semiotics is treated here, in a much-
generalized way, as a domain which encompasses any meaning-bearers 
(i.e., semeia) and/or processes of meaning-creation (i.e., semioses) and, 
furthermore, meaning-interpretation in the realm of communicating sub-
jects. Included into the domain of semiotic objects, the signifying products 
or communicational events, distinguished by a researcher as relevant for 
his/her investigative purposes, may be treated either as correlates of cer-
tain functions, values of their objects of reference, expressions of subjec-
tive needs or as motives of communication participants. Thus, semiotics in 
itself appears to an adept scientist as an interdisciplinary or multidiscipli-
nary theory utilizing the achievements of all those traditionally recognized 
academic disciplines which deal with the concepts of—very broadly tak-
en—sign or meaning, communicative means or communicational events, as 
their descriptive categories. 
 The task of linguistic semiotics is to search for meaning-bearers in the 
domain of spoken and written texts, their social and cultural contexts and 
extra-textual reality. Analyzed in terms of indices (indexes or indicators), 
symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols, icons (iconic or mimetic symbols) as 
well as nonverbal and verbal signs, those meaning-bearers, occupy a 
unique place among other variables found as constituents in various 
schemes modeling the ways and means of human understanding. To relat-
ed varieties of communication constituents featuring diverse types of hu-
man communication, one may include, inter alia, the source and destina-
tion of information, channel of communication, communication media as 
well as contexts and situations accompanying the mutual understanding of 
people, and the like. The typology of interpersonal relationships in dyadic, 
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small group, public or mass communication belongs, however, to the sub-
ject matter of the neighboring disciplines of linguistic and semiotic stud-
ies, which are usually discussed within the framework of a general com-
munication theory. 
 Language is localized within the broadly understood systems of com-
munication in order to show how the verbal means of communication 
should be understood in the sign-and meaning- or sign-processes-related 
terms. The interest sphere of this study situates itself on the level of meta-
scientific investigations. As such, it does not deal with applicative prob-
lems, but focuses on the state of the art within semiotics as it is. Therefore, 
it classifies different approaches to semiotic objects and to the domain of 
semiotics, without taking any standpoint towards them. It concentrates 
rather on the consequences resulting from a particular epistemological 
position, taken for granted in accordance with a certain investigative goal. 
 For grasping the nature of language as a semiotic system, it is indis-
pensable to explain the relationship of the discipline, the object of which 
are the signs in general, to one of the linguistic disciplines, the object of 
which are verbal signs in particular. As it appears, the objects investigated 
in the domain of semiotics are not homogeneous. In the first dimension, 
the domain of semiotics embraces both natural and cultural objects. In the 
second, semiotic objects are investigated with regard to their meaning-
indicating functions either as facts or processes. Formulating, therefore, 
the idea of general semiotics, one should consider the extremity of views 
on the scope of its investigative domain.  
 From a broad perspective, semiotics is characterized as studying all 
sign-processes in the realm of living organisms together with evolutionary 
changes and metabolism. Within a narrow scope, the semiotic domain is 
reduced to arbitrary sign-systems used intentionally for cognitive-
communicational purposes of human agents. Intermediating positions 
occupy semioticians interested in everything that performs a significative 
function and serves for the fulfillment of communicational tasks. Hereto 
belong also opinions that semiotics should include the whole sphere of 
knowledge, i.e., all cognitive and descriptive means, by which humans 
conceive, memorize and make meaning. There are also views limiting the 
domain of semiotics only to the inferred objects of interpretation or to 
everything that is purposeful and conventional in human communication 
or solely to objects organized into the systems of interpersonal significa-
tion and communication.  
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The Nature of the Semiotic Object 
 
Before going into details about the discussion as to what constitutes the 
subject matter of semiotics, one has to state, in the first place, that its do-
main comprises both the objects of culture and the objects of nature. As 
such, it may be studied with respect to their sign- and/or meaning-related 
properties, either from factual or processual viewpoints. Formulating the 
idea of general semiotics some authors commit themselves to a wide 
scope, some to a medium, and some others to a very narrow scope of their 
domain of investigation.  
 The history of the term semiotics and its investigative object goes back 
to antiquity. It was Hippocrates (460–367 B.C.), the founder of medical 
sciences, who supposedly coined the term semieiotiké, as a branch of med-
icine studying semeia, i.e., symptoms of illnesses (cf. Danesi 2002, 29). 
As John Deely (2000, 23–26) points out, the Greek term  [semei-
on] has been equalized with the Latin signum since the Middle Ages. From 
this time, a broad understanding of the term sign was due to St. Augustine 
(Augustinus Aurelius, 354–430), the bishop of Hippo, distinguishing both 
signa naturalia and signa conventionalia while counterpoising signa data 
in the realm of man to signa sacra. ή [semiotiké] ap-
peared as a synonym of “the doctrine of signs” for the first time in the 
writings of John Locke (1632–1704), Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing of 1690 who omitted epsilon separating mu from the iota in the 
Greek word ή [semieiotiké] (cf. Deely 2000, 37). 
 Less conservative philosophers of modern semiotics, as, for example, 
Georgio Prodi (1977), discussed by Felice Cimatti (2000) and Winfried 
Nöth (2001), as well as John Deely (2001), propose to consider the exist-
ence of protosemiosis or physical semiotics in nature, which refers to an 
assumed pre-biological world, asking whether there is final causality also 
outside of the mind of an interpreting subject in objects that serve as a 
potential sign. Moreover, another question is raised as regards the inter-
course between metaphysical and physical semiotics derived from the 
belief that there is continuity between mind and matter, according to which 
“semiosis is … the origin, matter the end of cosmic evolutions” (Nöth 
2001, 23).  
 However, considering the views of traditional theorists (Garvin 1977, 
1978; Baron 1979; Douglas 1982; and Halliday, Lamb & Regan 1988, as 
discussed by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 97–98, 102–104; 2003, 14–15; 2014, 48–50) 
who reject or accept the presence of sign- and meaning-related domains in 
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the world of all living organisms, at least seven positions as regards the 
delimitation of semiotic thresholds (an outline of which is based on the 
distinctions of Morris 1964, 1; Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 7–13; Regan 
et al. 1982/1987, 2–6; Pelc 1982, 200–222) might be distinguished (cf. 
also Hervey 1982, 3–4): 
 
(1) Broadly defined, the scope of semiotics, as an investigative domain, 
encompasses sign-processes in the realm of all living systems, includ-
ing the cell, from the viewpoint of evolutionary changes and metabo-
lism (Thomas Albert Sebeok, 1920–2001);  
(2) To the domain of semiotics belongs everything that signifies and is 
used for the purposes of communication in the realm of animals, men 
and machines (Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839–1914, Charles William 
Morris, 1901–1979);  
(3) Semiotics studies only information systems and information structures, 
both cognitive and descriptive by nature, including the whole sphere of 
human knowledge and the network of relationships between language 
and other means with which humans memorize, think, learn and make 
meaning (Sydney MacDonald Lamb, 1929– );  
(4) The domain of semiotic studies is limited by logical inferences occur-
ring in human interpretation and communication processes (Jerzy Pelc, 
1924– );  
(5) Semiotics should be interested in everything that is deliberate and 
conventional in human communication (John Langshaw Austin, 1911–
1960, John Rogers Searle, 1932– ); 
(6) Semioticians devote their attention mainly to objects guided by organ-
izing principles that form systems of interpersonal signification and 
communication (Roland Barthes, 1915–1980, Algirdas Julien Greimas, 
1917–1992);  
(7) Exclusively arbitrary conventional systems of signification used con-
sciously and intentionally by human beings for the purposes of cogni-
tion and communication are regarded as true semiotic objects (Ferdi-
nand de Saussure, 1857–1913, Louis Trolle Hjelmslev, 1889–1965).  
 
Without having a general model that specifies, by way of a logical defini-
tion, the genus proximum and differentia specifica of the objects studied 
within its domain, the practicing semiotician has sometimes at his/her 
disposal only a list of specific fields in which they occur. Following Um-
berto Eco (1932–2016), he/she may identify here: zoosemiotics, olfactory 
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signs, tactile communication, codes of taste, paralinguistics, medical semi-
otics, kinesics and proxemics, musical codes, formalized languages, written 
languages, unknown alphabets, secret codes, natural languages, visual 
communication, systems of objects, plot structure, text theory, cultural 
codes, aesthetic texts, mass communication, rhetoric, etc. (cf. Eco 1976/1979, 
9–14).  
 The explanation of the very fact that semiotics does not create a uni-
form system of investigation but rather a network of different approaches 
should be found in the provenance of its basic concepts and methods. The 
frames of reference encountered in semiotic writings are usually formed 
on a primary level by different disciplines, such as philosophy and logic, 
linguistics and the theory of literature, natural sciences and mathematics. 
On a secondary level, they are derived from different layers of the extra-
disciplinary traditions of study, distinguishing, for example, the focus of 
interest characteristic of European science from the interest sphere speci-
fied in American scientific works. Semiotic terms and categories are de-
rived, henceforth, from incommensurable paradigms that confront the 
pupils of Ferdinand de Saussure with the adherents of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, the followers of functional structuralism with the followers of 
biological behaviorism, the theoreticians of culture with the theoreticians 
of nature (cf. Hervey 1982, 1–8, discussed also by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 97 and 
2003, 16).  
 
 
Semiotics and/or Semiology as a Domain and a Discipline 
 
Incommensurable traditions are reflected also in the alternative, exclusive, 
inclusive or discriminate usage of the terms semiotics and/or semiology. 
Due to their interdisciplinary or inter-continental source of origin, semiot-
ics and semiology are treated as synonyms (discussed by Pelc 1982, 10–
14, and 29; cf. also Sebeok 1974, 211–264, mainly 211–213 and 239). 
However, some practitioners observe distinctions between semiotics 
studying natural signs in the realm of organisms and semiology being 
interested only in the social life of conventional signs (mainly Christian 
Metz and Algirdas Julien Greimas, cf. Pelc 1982, 15).  
 Not widely known is the claim of Peter Wunderli (1976, 33–68, mainly 
57 and 68) that semiotics, as a doctrine of all signs, should embrace semi-
ology limiting its interest sphere to artificial, partly conventionalized 
signs. A well-suited proposal has resulted from the distinction between 
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semiotics as an investigative domain and semiology as a scientific subject 
(Louis Hjelmslev and early Umberto Eco, for a discussion see Wąsik, Z. 
1987, 100–101 and 2003, 16–17). 
 Different backgrounds of scientific traditions are reflected in the use of 
the terms semiotics and/or semiology, referring to both the investigative 
domain and the discipline of study, alternatively, separately, inclusively or 
exclusively, as presented in the following more detailed statements.  
 
(1) Semiotics and semiology are synonyms. Independently of their defini-
tional content and range of validity, semiotics and semiology are 
viewed as being concerned with the domains of signs. The use of 
whichever of them depends upon the choice of a particular mode or di-
rection of study. It may be either European or American, linguistic or 
logical and philosophical, structuralist or behaviorist in provenance 
(see, in particular, Pelc 1982, 10–14, and 29; cf. also Sebeok 1974, 
211–264, especially 211–213 and 239);  
(2) Semiotics and semiology deal with different domains of signs. Semiot-
ics is concerned with signs as investigative objects of natural sciences, 
and semiology as objects of humanities (cf. Pelc 1982, 15);  
(3) Semiotics, being originally a wider term, encompasses semiology. 
According to this standpoint, semiology is to be considered as a sepa-
rate kind of semiotics interested in artificial and partly conventional-
ized signs (following the interpretation of Peter Wunderli (1976, 33–
68, especially 57 and 68);  
(4) Semiotics is a particular domain of signs, and semiology is a scientific 
discipline dealing with all types of sign-related domains. Considering 
this fourth standpoint, one can say that there are various kinds of semi-
otics that make up the investigative field of semiology (for details see 
Wąsik, Z. 1987, 100–101).  
 
One has to consider the fact that the domain of semiotics, estimated on a 
methodological plane as obiectum reale, possesses various aspects and 
forms of manifestation occurring in the realm of man, animal and plant or 
even in the realm of all living systems. Hence, the properties of semiotic 
objects can be studied not only from the perspectives that contribute to the 
disciplinary subject matters of linguistics, sociology, psychology, anthro-
pology, biology, and the like. They may be exhibited also in the light of 
interdisciplinary theories, such as, e.g., the theory of communication, the 
theory of systems, the theory of being, etc. Such a statement might be 
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supported by the assumption that the object or the set of objects studied by 
semiotics in sign-related terms is to be viewed as a partial system situated 
within the other systems of higher rank. Since the semiotic object simulta-
neously enters the composition of various dependencies in the external and 
internal reality, it can be approached with regard to its multiaspectual 
nature expressed through its inherent and relational properties from vari-
ous perspectives and formulated as subject matter, i.e., as obiectum for-
male, of various definitional models.  
 It is clear, therefore, and not controversial, as some beginners in this 
field might claim, that semiotics is both an interdisciplinary theory and a 
multidisciplinary scientific discipline. In the latter case, it is composed of 
those subparts of academically recognized disciplines, which use the con-
cepts of sign and meaning or the concept of sign-processes, as one of their 
descriptive categories characterizing their object of study, although not 
necessarily their subject matter proper. The evidence for such a statement 
may be found in the opposition between the general and particular scope 
of related inclusive disciplines, as in the case, for example, of:   
 
 Linguistics, which studies language(s) and semiotics of language, which 
studies language signs (or language sign-processes);  
 Culturology (a theory of culture proper), which studies culture(s) and 
cultural semiotics (or anthroposemiotics), which studies cultural signs 
(or cultural sign-processes); or 
 Biology, which studies living beings and semiotics of nature (or bio-
semiotics), which studies natural signs (or natural sign-processes), both 
intraorganismic and extraorganismic in character, etc.  
 
 
On the Investigative Scopes of Linguistics and Semiotics 
 
The relationships between linguistics and semiotics can be viewed from 
two-dimensional perspectives. With reference to their place among other 
sciences, in relation to anthropology, ethnology, sociology, philosophy, 
psychology, and biology, one should treat linguistics and semiotics as 
parallel disciplines, but as to their common sign-communicational perspec-
tive—as disciplines overlapping with regards to their respective scopes. 
Very often, the latter view is located, in the fourth place, among the opin-
ions of linguists, deducing their positions from semiotics or the opinions 
of semioticians deducing their positions from linguistics, while discussing 
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who borrows from whom terms and investigative procedures. These opin-
ions (summarized after numerous consulted authors by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 
102–105; 2003, 59–62; 2014, 57–60) may be grouped as follows:  
 
(1) Semiotics is descended from linguistics. Semiotics utilizes categories 
and terminological distinctions, elaborated on the ground of linguistics, 
describing the ways of verbal communication to present other ways of 
communication in which non-linguistic or non-language-like semiotic 
systems are applied. 
 
 Linguistically oriented semioticians formulate their attitudes towards 
the priority of language studies for the elaboration of semiotic categories 
based on two generally held beliefs. The first attitude refers to the convic-
tion regarding the leading role of linguistics in all domains in which the 
interdisciplinary perspectives, such as, structuralism, functionalism, for-
malism, generativism, tagmemism, stratificationism, or cognitivism, de-
rive their descriptive terms from the analysis of the linguistic system of 
signs. The second one is based on the premises of the metadesignational 
nature of language, which takes for granted that every semiotic system, 
including also every natural and artificial language, is translatable into 
every (hitherto existing) ethnic language.1 
 The assumption regarding linguistics as “a pilot” science was vigor-
ously expounded, predominantly during the period of structuralism when 
this discipline reached its highest stage of development as far as the no-
tional and methodological apparatus in the domain of systemic studies was 
concerned. Scientists had, therefore, acknowledged that linguistics was a 
more mature science in comparison to semiotics, which had been still in 
the state of being created. This opinion had been grounded as long as the 
terms and categories determined for a narrow scope of linguistics as a 
science of verbal signs were applicable to all domains of semiotics as a 
science, which were seen as dealing with all potential signs, satisfying in 
that way all representatives of respective specific disciplines. One should, 
however, recall the fact that the general principles embracing all semiotic 
facts within the scope of its investigative domain might be sometimes 
either irrelevant or too reductionistic against the background of the facts 
studied in natural languages. 
 There is no absolute certainty whether the anthropocentric belief is 
correct that the capability to communicate by using verbal means in the 
realm of man could guarantee understanding every form of communica-
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tion, not only among humans. Hence, one should relegate to the metaphor-
ical ways of saying an ungrounded conviction that semioticians would be 
able to successfully utilize methods of linguistic studies in the description 
and interpretation of the so-called language of painting, music, sculpture, 
architecture, inter-human relations, kinship, or genetic relationships, etc. 
 The practice of misusing linguistic terms and categories or of conduct-
ing such analyses that resemble linguistic methods in application to non-
language-like objects, or also of searching for parallelisms between heter-
ogeneous objects, does not guarantee that the results of such investigations 
can be accepted as valuable every time and everywhere. The fact that such 
investigations are performed where one imitates linguistic approaches does 
not necessarily mean that they should be recognized as relevant for all 
remaining aspects of investigated and described objects which belong to 
the domain of respective scientific disciplines. 
 
(2) Semiotics constitutes a superordinate discipline for linguistics. This 
statement results, in the first instance, from the praxis of placing lan-
guage among other semiotic facts. It starts from a semiocentric point of 
view.  
 
 However, taking for granted that the investigative domain of semiotics 
has been properly specified, one should remember that linguistics in the 
broadest sense contains not only semiolinguistics within its domain. There 
are also other linguistic disciplines, which aim at describing the remaining 
non-semiotic heteronomies of ecologically determined languages in par-
ticular and the definitional model of language in general. Therefore, one 
has to reject many of “pansemiotistic” claims of certain promoters of se-
miotics, according to which this field should embrace all domains of hu-
man activity and knowledge. 
 
(3) Linguistics and semiotics are regarded as separate disciplines with 
mutually exclusive scopes when the role of linguistics is exclusively 
limited to the studies of language, and the investigative domain of se-
miotics encompasses only semiotic facts, which are non-linguistic by 
nature. 
 
 The investigative praxis and mutual relationships among representa-
tives dealing with theoretical connections between the two disciplines 
show, however, that the fourth opinion has won, namely:  
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(4) Linguistics and semiotics have investigative scopes, which are partly 
overlapping, and partly mutually excluding.  
 
 Both the former and the latter disciplines pose investigative goals 
which are not to be placed under a common denominator, and which are to 
be mutually separated in the core of its interest sphere. Linguistics inter-
sects with semiotics mainly within the scopes of the theory of system, 
theory of sign and theory of communication. Both disciplines have also 
different goals, methods and investigative boundaries that result either 
from the various heteronomies of language, irrelevant for semiotics, or 
from the nature of other semiotic objects, which do not belong to the in-
vestigative domain of linguistics. 
 From the viewpoint of the sciences of language, there is no need to 
pursue the results of all semiotic investigations achieved in the domains, in 
which the non-language-like objects are retrieved, when they are irrelevant 
for linguistic studies. As far as semiotics is concerned, one should also 
remember that not all the investigative aims and results of linguistic inves-
tigations and not all the investigative techniques and procedures applied in 
various linguistic disciplines and non-linguistic sciences of language, can 
be treated as useful for the methodology of semiotic studies. 
 When semiotics and linguistics are placed on the opposite poles with 
regard to the scopes of their investigative domains, then it is enough to 
bear in mind the distinction between the inherent properties and the rela-
tional properties of the investigative objects of respective disciplines, i.e., 
one should define what the main object of study is and what its aspects 
under investigation constitute. That means that intermediating positions 
between the investigative domains of semiotics and linguistics are occu-
pied by linguistic semiotics and semiotic linguistics. Semiotics is interest-
ed in the sign as the main object of study in relation to or independently 
from the aspects of objects belonging to the investigative domain of other 
disciplines. Linguistic semiotics, or the so-called semiotics of language, 
studies the sign as an investigative object principally in relation to lan-
guage as a verbal means of signification.  
 Semiotic linguistics, in turn, called also as semiolinguistics, studies the 
language as a principal investigative object mainly in relation to its signif-
icative properties. And, linguistics proper studies language as a principal 
object solely with regards to its systemic structural properties, sometimes 
independently from its semiotic functionality. 
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 Theoretical reflections over the status of semiotics are affected by its 
interdisciplinary character, which practically means that there exists a 
multiplicity of voices on the level of a metasemiotic discourse. In order to 
take part in this discourse, one has to undertake the endeavors towards a 
systematization of conceptual and methodological frameworks being use-
ful for a given disciplinary field of study, which are specified from the 
beginning. For a linguist, it means starting with semiotic investigations 
within the standardized context of linguistics.  
 Researchers who arrive at semiotic deliberations on the ground of 
language sciences have to be aware of the need for the unification of terms 
which are utilized in the bordering zones between linguistics and semiot-
ics. They should also bear in mind the requirement for the choice of those 
theories, basing on which they could order the interrelationship between 
different methodological procedures applied in both domains. Striving for 
a unity of theory and method, they must possess full knowledge about the 
peculiarity of the investigative domains characterizing both disciplines in 
question, namely, semiotics and linguistics, when they choose only one 
aspect connected with the sign- and meaning-related nature of language. A 
“pilot-oriented” approach to his or her own investigative domain necessi-
tates for the researcher of language sciences that he or she assesses the 
complexity of problems connected with the theory of sign, in order to 
avoid eclectic operational tools or procedures marked by one-sided reduc-
tionism, which is sometimes characteristic of contemporary human scienc-
es. Consistent with their investigative aims, they should then differentiate 
between semiotic and non-semiotic aspects of their object of study. 
 
 
Defining the Domain and the Tasks of General Semiotics 
 
In the context of multifarious understandings of the semiotic object, it 
would be worth pondering the introduction to the methodological duties of 
integrational linguistic semiotics the following investigative tasks: (a) to 
determine the epistemological status of linguistics as a science of verbal 
signs among the other sciences dealing with interpersonal communication 
from the viewpoint of anthropology, psychology and sociology, (b) to 
inquire into the sign-communicational role of language in the cognitive 
activities of individuals and interpersonal relationships, (c) to explain the 
provenance of semiotic terms functioning in current theories of language, 
methods of observation and validation of investigative techniques in lin-
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guistics, as well as, (d) to conduct studies on the epistemological aware-
ness of linguists in the educational discourse and translational praxis. 
 In the investigative domain of semiotics to be found are various mean-
ing-bearers, produced and interpreted by communicating subjects. As 
such, semiotics has a status of an interdisciplinary investigative perspec-
tive, utilizing the achievements of traditionally recognized disciplines, 
which place among their descriptive categories the notions of sign and 
meaning, and, more broadly, means and processes of communication. 
Included into the realm of semiotic objects, verbal expressions that bear 
certain meanings are to be considered from the perspective of their users, 
producers or receivers as correlates of certain functions, values or contents 
deduced from the domain of their references. 
 To the tasks of linguistic semiotics belongs the search for meaning-
bearers in the domain of language texts, social and cultural contexts and 
extra-textual reality. These bearers of meaning, analyzed as indicators, 
symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols or icons, or as nonverbal or verbal 
signs, enter the composition of variables constituting the model of inter-
personal communication. Among such constituents of various schemes 
modeling different types of human communication, to be distinguished are 
also variables which are oriented towards the source and destination of 
information, towards the channel of communication and media, and the 
contexts and situations accompanying the processes of mutual understand-
ing between individuals and groups of people. People usually communi-
cate in dyadic and small groups extending to public and furthermore to 
mass aggregations. Separate types of communication, occurring in the 
realm of man, form intrapersonal (solipsistic) and organizational (collec-
tive) communication. The subject matter of semiotic-communicational stud-
ies constitutes interpersonal relationships, deduced from nonverbal and 
verbal behavior of people participating in communicational events, which 
are analyzed in term of interactions and/or transactions.  
 Relations described as interactions among participants of communica-
tional events are characterized, by the mutual exchange between sources 
(authors, senders) and destinations (addressees, receivers), that is, each 
communication participant functions in interchangeable roles, sending or 
receiving, processing or interpreting appropriate messages. The notion of 
transaction implies that people are not always identical in different social 
relationships and communicational situations. They change and adapt 
mutually to themselves in dependence of social, cultural, natural and per-
sonal conditionings of communication. 
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 The ontological status and gnoseological approachability of the semiot-
ic object in accordance with the assumptions of its forms of manifestation 
belongs, without any doubt, to the central problems that should be ana-
lyzed in the light of epistemology. Such a reconstruction has to concen-
trate on the search for investigative perspectives, which form the back-
ground of different sign and/or meaning conceptions and their applicative 
consequences.  
 Given the plurality of approaches that descend from various disciplines 
dealing with methodological tools of semiotics, one has to be very careful 
in posing demands for a restrictive use of the terms introduced by some 
theoreticians of general semiotics. Acknowledging the autonomy of every 
specific discipline of semiotics, one should be aware not only of the diver-
sity in classificatory approaches to semiotic objects, but also of the “cli-
mate of opinions” that has influenced different ways of thinking and con-
tributed to the formations of different methodological and conceptual 
frameworks.  
 A number of contemporary disputes over the relevant properties of 
semiotic objects have undoubtedly found their origins in the different 
traditions of studies carried out in philosophy, logic and the methodology 
of sciences: 
 
(1) whether the semiotic objects are material or spiritual (corporeal or 
intelligible, physical or mental), concrete or abstract, real or ideal, sub-
jective or objective, extraorganismic or intraorganismic by nature; 
(2) whether the semiotic objects manifest themselves in the form of a 
monolateral entity or a plurilateral unity of related (two, three, or four) 
constituents, a relation or a network of relations between constituents; 
and furthermore 
(3) whether the semiotic objects should be studied extrospectively or in-
trospectively, in relation to meaning-creators or meaning-utilizers, as 
implicative phenomena, non-artificial or artificial, non-inferred or in-
ferred, non-conventional or conventional, non-arbitrary or arbitrary in 
character, through tokens as variants of a general type or through types 
as invariants encompassing common features of tokens, in individual 
or collective occurrences, in the realm of man only, in the realm of all 
living systems, or in the universe of all possible mortal and/or immor-
tal forms of beings and creatures, including the extraterrestrial and the 
divine. 
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 To resolve these and related problems it is necessary to state, in the 
first instance, what kinds of semiotic objects one is interested in. Then one 
should specify the domain in which they occur. The search for investiga-
tive perspectives that characterize the epistemological foundations of gen-
eral semiotics, as unified subdiscipline dealing with theoretical statements, 
and of specific semiotic subdisciplines, formulating their conclusions on 
the basis of observational statements, belongs to the domain of metascien-
tific studies.  
 The task of metascientific investigations is to be viewed in finding 
parameters and construing general models or schemes that could serve as a 
matrix thereby allowing one to reduce to a common denominator and to 
classify all specific concepts and approaches that characterize the diversity 
of particular semiotic subdisciplines. From the viewpoint of metascience, 
all epistemological positions that contribute to the formation of terms and 
concepts subsumed to general semiotics should be seen as equal in right 
when they do not contradict each other with reference to aims and methods 
of investigation elaborated in the disciplinary-specific subdivisions of 
semiotics. Definitions of specific concepts, classifications of specific ob-
jects can, however, be taken into account only when they respond to the 
cognitive standpoints of semioticians without imposing on them any cog-
nitive attitude which would lead them to fruitless modes of investigation 
or valueless directions of study.  
 General semiotics has to follow such a perspective or sets of perspec-
tives that distinguishes and/or that distinguish its subject matter as an ag-
gregate of characteristic properties of its objects studied in its domain 
against the background of the investigative domains of other scientific 
disciplines. However, terminological distinctions made on the grounds of 
general semiotics should be general enough in order to avoid forcing the 
practitioners of semiotic subdisciplines to make commitments to any epis-
temological position that might appear to them as too reductionistic or 
irrelevant. To be mentioned here is the practice of oversimplifying the 
complex nature of semiotic objects as well as sign- and/or meaning-related 
issues to the point of minimizing their importance or distorting their im-
age. Anyway, as to the present state of the art, semiotics is a heteronomous 
field of scientific activity. Its striving for autonomy does not need to mean 
a struggle against diversities in opinions, but rather a pursuit of knowledge 
towards the explanation of positions and criteria that have contributed to 
the development of different conceptions concerning its subject matter 











The Notion of Paradigm as a Set of Epistemological 
Commitments of Scientists to Theoretical and Practical 
Positions in Their Research Activities 
 
In this chapter, it is the notion of scientific paradigm which constitutes, 
first and foremost, the subject matter of a thorough discussion in relation 
to the understanding of epistemology of semiotics as a set of investigative 
perspectives elaborated in Chapter Three. It takes for granted that nowa-
days the term paradigm has been accepted, without any precautionary 
grounding, as a conceptual or methodological framework which unites 
practitioners of science at a determined period of time providing them with 
modeling research questions and postulates. Undoubtedly, the reasons for 
the selection of an investigative frame of reference have been equated with 
the initial choice of investigative perspectives performed by scholars when 
they are interested in the existences modes of their investigative objects 
and in the investigative methods they are supposed to apply for reaching 
their relevant features. Thus, by placing the conception of the paradigm as 
a parallel, an equivalent or an antecedent conception of the investigative 
perspective, it is meant that epistemology as a theory of knowledge, which 
deals with questions of how the objects of scientific study exist and how 
researchers can experience them in cognition, is a decisive constituent of a 
disciplinary plane of scientific reasoning along with the domains of analy-
sis, description .and investigation. It is worthwhile to express that the 
epistemological, i.e., ontological and gnoseological, commitments of sci-
entists to the choice of investigative perspectives are based either on infer-
ences, which involve conjectural speculations and unconditionally ex-
pressed convictions, and, on the other, on observable statements, which 
require empirical evidence through experiment. Seeing, in a very unre-
strictive sense, the structural parallels between the science as a set of in-
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vestigative paradigms with the epistemology of semiotics, it is proposed to 
regard the properties of its objects in terms of set of meta, hypo-, inter-, 
intradisciplinary, and disciplinary perspectives in synchrony and diachrony 
on macro and micro-levels. 
 
 
The History of Linguistics from the Vantage Point 
of Kuhn’s Conception of Paradigms 
and Scientific Revolutions 
 
To evaluate the history of language sciences, the following report shows 
how the theoreticians of linguistic thought have taken a stand on the ap-
plicability of the term paradigm introduced by Thomas Samuel Kuhn 
(1922–1996) in a widely known book The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions. This seminal work, which was published for the first time in Chica-
go in 1962 as one of the subsequent volumes of the International Encyclo-
pedia of Unified Science, had found its reflection in critical or favorable 
opinions of sociologists of knowledge, anthropologists and philosophers of 
science, summarized in 1965 by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (cf. 
Masterman 1970). The results of two major conferences, the first orga-
nized by the historiographers of language sciences in Burg Wartenberg 
near Gloggnitz in Austria 1964 and the second in Chicago in 1968 re-
vealed that not all linguists had given as much approval to Kuhn’s concept 
of science as his followers or the author himself expected (for a detailed 
discussion see Wąsik, Z. 1986, and 1987, 24–41).  
 Kuhn (1962/1970, 13–15) had departed from the assumption that there 
was a determined point in time when a scientific discipline had achieved 
its maturity by acquiring its “first paradigm”. Prior to that event, there had 
been the so-called “pre-paradigm” stage characterized by the lack of a 
common framework uniting practitioners who usually allocated their time 
and energy to the accidental collecting of empirical data and endless 
theoretical discussions about the scope of the investigative domain of 
their discipline. In the light of this criterion of maturity, some research 
fields, as, for example, the social and behavioral sciences, were considered 
by Kuhn (1970, 15) as those disciplines which had never acquired their 
“first paradigm”, and in which, as a consequence, their practitioners re-
mained locked in a continuous state of disagreement about the legitimacy 
of scientific theories and methods. 
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 In reviewing Kuhnian theory, which had relegated linguistics to the 
same non-scientific status as that of social and behavioral sciences, Walter 
Keith Percival (1976) stated, while summarizing the opinions of historiog-
raphers, that it is not applicable either to the contemporary state of linguis-
tics or to the past one.  
 In the assessment of Percival, if there were linguists who still tended to 
search for paradigms of a mature scientific community in the Kuhnian 
sense, they had to conclude that modern linguistics had not been a sci-
ence from its inception. Having concluded that the application of Kuhn’s 
theory had failed to succeed, Percival (1976, 291) warned the practitioners 
of language sciences against its naïve recognition while arguing that it 
could rather lower than raise scientific standards within the domain of 
their study. In consequence, as he argued, it could be better, especially for 
adept practitioners of linguistic disciplines, not to evaluate their own activ-
ity from the perspective of Kuhn’s distinctions as they might feel obliged 
to accept premature assent to any new paradigm of scientific reasoning 
and research, which they observed as gaining a broader support, for fear of 
being isolated as adherents of an older paradigm.  
 Appreciating the importance of Kuhn’s theory W. Keith Percival 
(1976, 285) admitted that there were two basic theses, which had attracted 
the attention of linguists in their discussion of the history of linguistic 
ideas. The first thesis referred to the nature of science and the second one 
to the question of how the scientific disciplines develop.  
 
 
Relativism in the Understanding of Science 
 
According to Kuhn, a science cannot be identified with a collection of 
facts, theories and methods as exhibited in books and in various forms of 
knowledge. It is not to be regarded as a cumulative enterprise, in which 
more and more successful generalizations are achieved on the basis of 
more and more successful measurements and calculations. The notion of 
what is to be accepted as scientific or unscientific in the practicing activity 
of scholars is a matter of a relative point of view.  
 Thus, Kuhn assumes that outdated theories are no less scientific than 
those which are current today; and all that one can say about them is the 
fact that the canons of scientific theory and practice may vary from period 
to period. Scientific disciplines, as Kuhn ascertains, do not develop solely 
through the accumulation of discoveries over time. The line of the devel-
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opment of science, when drafted on a diagram, may be seen not only as a 
smooth upward-going curve but also as a curve interrupted by quantum 
leaps (sudden jumps) showing the discontinuity of changes. Kuhn propos-
es to regard those periodic quantum leaps as scientific revolutions, while 
the smooth portions of the curve—as a “normal science” (rendered in 
Stefan Amsterdamski’s translation of 1968 into Polish as an “institutional 
science”). Kuhn does not see, however, the scientific revolutions literally 
as a break in the continuity of particular scientific traditions, but rather as 
events brought about by certain striking achievements of a single genius.  
 
 
Single Innovators and Scientific Revolutions 
 
The role of a single innovator is crucial to Kuhn’s concept of scientific 
revolutions. His favorite examples (cf. Percival 1976, 286) form theoreti-
cal upheavals associated with such names as Nicolaus Copernicus (Miko-
łaj Kopernik, 1473–1543, a Polish astronomer), (Sir) Isaac Newton (1642–
1727, an English physicist and mathematician), Antoine Laurent Lavoisier 
(1743–1794, a French chemist), and Albert Einstein (1879–1955, a Ger-
man physicist, and a citizen of the United States from the 1940). 
 Speaking about the intervals between scientific revolutions, Kuhn 
maintains that each period of a normal science in the development of a 
given scientific discipline is accompanied by only one framework that 
unites the community of scholars, i.e., a scientific paradigm. This frame-
work is founded on the widespread scientific achievements being acknowl-
edged at a given stage of the development and providing the community of 
scholars with modeling problems and solutions.  
 As it results from the analyses of Kuhn’s ideas, the term paradigm may 
encompass not only all the internalized convictions of a scientific group or 
a common feature or belief of all the people who deal with a given branch 
of knowledge. As summarized by Margaret Masterman (1970), it may as 
well be referred to a set of scientific habits, methods, and traditions to-
gether with actual instrumentation governed by a general epistemological 
viewpoint or an organizing principle, or a new way of seeing the world.  
 Kuhn himself has devoted more attention to the sociological dimension 
of his theory. In an answer to his critics in 1969, opposing his theory, he 
has proposed to speak about the frameworks that unite communities of 
scholars not in terms of, ambiguously understood, “paradigms” but rather 
“disciplinary matrices”. In his explanation, disciplinary matrices should 
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contain four components: symbolic generalizations, models, values and 
exemplars (cf. Percival 1976, 286).  
 Symbolic generalizations are formal elements of a disciplinary matrix, 
in other words, phrases which can straightway be expressed in logical 
molds. Models are conceptual approximations to the ontological frame-
work of investigated reality. Values influence the criteria used by the 
members of a paradigm to judge between opposite theories, distinguish 
fixed schemes, and validate the particular modes of conducting research. 
Finally, exemplars are the concrete problem-solutions that students come 
across during their scientific schooling when they work in laboratories, 
pass examinations, or study the summaries of the chapters in handbooks. 
 The term disciplinary matrices has been not so widely accepted as the 
term paradigm. It has been criticized for its ambiguity and incompleteness 
concerning its conceptual content; and some theoreticians of science, as 
(Sir) Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994), Ernest Nagel (1901–1985), Imre 
Lakatos (1922–1974), Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924–1994), and others, 
have tried to replace it with other terms (cf. the discussions summarized by 
Masterman 1970).  
 Returning, therefore, to the more familiar and popular term paradigm, 
one should devote attention mainly to the relationships between paradigms 
and scientific revolutions, as it has been formulated in the original work of 
Kuhn. As Kuhn (1970, 91) points out, scientific revolutions are to be taken 
as those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an incompatible 
new one replaces an older paradigm in whole or in part. Thus, one could 
say that the revolution uniquely determines the character of the paradigm, 
which has been adopted in the aftermath, because each scientific revolu-
tion introduces, in consequence, a new paradigm and vice versa. 
 
 
The Uniform Assent as a Defining Attribute of a Paradigm 
 
There seems to be an important difference (as Percival states in 1976, 287) 
between the two discussed notions. While it is single innovators who per-
form revolutions, paradigms are social phenomena, namely—in accord-
ance with Kuhn’s account—systems of beliefs, opinions and group en-
gagements shared by all the practitioners of a given scientific discipline 
without exception.  
 A uniform assent of all the members of a scientific community is a 
necessary defining attribute of any genuine paradigm in Kuhn’s stipula-
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tions. Knowing that this consensus omnium of scholars is, in reality, not 
achieved at once, one should go back to the prerequisites of revolutions in 
order to explain the reasons for paradigm shifts. One should remember that 
the source of scientific revolutions, according to Kuhn, is the conviction of 
the practitioners of science that the hitherto existing paradigm has ceased 
to function adequately in the explorations. Moreover, this prerequisite 
conviction leads to a crisis, and each crisis—as a natural consequence—
weakens the role of a still existing paradigm (cf. Kuhn 1970, 91–92).  
 Kuhn (1970, 92–93) is of the opinion that each crisis deepens when an 
increasing number of practitioners becomes increasingly estranged from 
one scientific tradition and behaves more and more eccentrically within it. 
Soon afterward, it happens that many individual scientists commit them-
selves to concrete proposals for the reconstruction of an existing tradition 
in a new institutional framework or paradigm. At that point scholars are 
divided into competing groups, some seeking to defend an old institutional 
order and some others seeking to institute some new ones. Though a nor-
mal science often suppresses fundamental novelties, as they are subversive 
of its basic commitments, nevertheless, these commitments usually gain 
priority as the very nature of normal research ensures that the novelty shall 
not be suppressed for very long. 
 And what happens when this consensus omnium is not achieved at the 
very beginning. Kuhn points here out that (1970, 19):  
 
[T]here are always men who cling to one or another of the older views, and 
they are simply read out of the profession which thereafter ignores their 
work. The new paradigm implies a new and rigid definition of the field. 
Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in 
isolation or attach themselves to some other groups. 
 
A new paradigm meets during the period of a scientific revolution with an 
uncompromising resistance of many specialists because, entering into their 
domain, it causes deep changes in the rules governing the practice of a 
normal science. Kuhn sees the grounds of this conflict not in the difference 
between particular schools of thought, but in what he calls dogmatically 
“incommensurability of world views”.  
 Between the propagators of a new paradigm and the followers of an 
old one, it comes to a break of mutual understanding, since both sides 
represent different viewpoints and even the terms which they use possess 
different meanings. Following Kuhn, such a situation may be compared to 
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a gestalt-switch. Being members of different communities, the scholars 
have to become interpreters of their new paradigms. 
 Another very important element of the Kuhnian theory is the criterion 
defining the maturity of scientific disciplines. Kuhn hypothesizes that every 
scientific discipline has a chronologically earlier paradigm. In other words, 
there is a definite point in time when a field achieves its scientific maturi-
ty, and it does so by acquiring its “first paradigm”. Prior to that event, 
there is a jungle of competing schools of thought. It is just the so-called 
“pre-paradigm” period characterized by the unavailability of a common 
framework that could unite practitioners. Since they lack a universally 
shared framework which may determine the character of their research, the 
scholars waste their time and energy in random data-gathering and fruitless 
controversies about the fundamentals of their discipline (cf. Kuhn 1970, 
13–15). According to this criterion of maturity, some research fields have 
never acquired their “first paradigm” and, in consequence, their practition-
ers remain locked in a chronic state of disagreement about the nature of 
legitimate scientific problems and methods. Kuhn (1970, 15) means here 
the social and behavioral sciences (cf. also the summary of this fact in 
Percival 1976, 288). 
 What characterizes, in turn, the period in which a given discipline has 
acquired its first paradigm? Kuhn’s (1970, 19) answer has been that it is 
the reception of a paradigm which transforms a group, previously interest-
ed in the study of nature, into a profession or at least a separate discipline. 
He adds that the reception of the first common paradigm in whichever 
discipline is usually connected with the foundation of specialized scientific 
societies, with the formation of professional journals, and the claim for a 
special place in the curriculum of subjects being taught at schools. 
 
 
Applying of the Notion of Paradigm to the History 
of Linguistics  
 
Kuhn’s view of the history of science had found its reflection in the writ-
ings of the historiographers of language sciences, as Peter A. Verburg (1974), 
Paul Diderichsen (1974), Dell Hathaway Hymes (1974), Paul Kiparsky 
(1974), Ernst Friderik Konrad Koerner (1975, 1978), Walter Keith Perci-
val (1976), and Dell Hymes and John Fought (1975). Having reviewed the 
development and the present state of linguistic ideas in search of para-
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digms and scientific revolutions, they focused on the following issues of 
interest:  
 
(a) When was the first linguistic paradigm established?  
(b) What kind of theoretical and methodological changes in linguistic  
thought might be regarded as indices of scientific revolutions?  
(c) Who were those single innovators who had contributed to bring about 
the development of linguistics in Kuhnian terms? Furthermore, the 
mentioned historiographers wanted to inquire:  
(d) Had the history of linguistics confirmed, in general, the main principles 
of Kuhnian tenet about the history of science?  
 
 
Controversies in the Historiographic Understanding 
of Kuhnian Distinctions 
 
Particularly serious problems were connected with the proper understand-
ing of the notion of “paradigm” and its relation to other elements of 
Kuhn’s theory, as, e.g., to the notions of “normal science”, “crisis in sci-
ence”, “scientific revolutions”, “consensus omnium of scholars” (scientific 
communities with a uniform assent), and “single genius in science”. Perci-
val (1976) had noticed, for example, that Kuhn’s notion of revolution 
borrowed from the history of non-scientific fields could be applied to the 
analysis of the history of linguistics. However, the same would be not true 
with regard to his key-notion of paradigm when it had to be treated as 
resulting from an outstanding scientific achievement on the part of a single 
innovator commanding a uniform assent among all practitioners of a disci-
pline. If these two requirements ought to be fulfilled, as Percival had stat-
ed, then the Kuhn’s concept of paradigm could not be applied either to the 
history or to the present state of linguistics. 
 In a very broad sense, Peter A. Verburg (1974) proposed, among the 
other things, to apply the notion of paradigm to the analyses of changes in 
the development of linguistic thought. Stressing their doctrinal character 
and/or disciplinary provenance, he tried to reconstruct the occurrence of 
such paradigms taking into account all approaches to language from An-
tiquity to the present time (cf. Verburg 1974, 191–230). Verburg was 
aware of the fact that when linguistics became an independent discipline 
with its own subject matter, the number of paradigms was increasing and it 
might be difficult to arrange them both chronologically and systematically, 
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for more and more novel disciplines were entering language studies in 
modern times. 
 Quite all of the linguists who examined the history of their discipline 
within the framework of Kuhn were unanimous in their opinion regarding 
the fact that the proper paradigm of the sciences of language had been 
inaugurated at the beginning of the 19th century. The real problem emerged, 
however, when the question was raised who should be given the role of a 
single innovator being responsible for the formulation of the first linguistic 
theories and the development of the first methods of comparative historical 
studies applied later to all languages of the world. Some (cf. Hymes 1974, 
1–34) pointed at Franz Bopp (1791–1867) and some others Rasmus Kris-
tian Rask (1787–1832), or both philologists along with Jakob Ludwig Karl 
Grimm (1785–1863). Some historiographers (as, e.g., Kiparsky 1974) were 
of the opinion that the comparative paradigm had formed itself not earlier 
than between 1860s and 1870s thanks to the activity of August Schleicher 
(1821–1868), i.e., simultaneously with the growth of the positivistic meth-
odology initiated by the Neogrammarians (Germ. Junggrammatiker).  
 Yet, research on pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic periods in linguis-
tics had revealed that the persons who were depicted as revolutionizing in 
the Kuhnian sense had their antecedents at various epochs in the past. For 
instance, Paul Diderichsen (1974) was the one who came to this conclu-
sion in a penetrating study on Rasmus Rask and the background of the first 
comparative grammars. He was certain about the existence of a scientific 
tradition, which must have preceded the works of Rask, Bopp and Grimm, 
and tried, in this way, to turn away the historians of science from the at-
tribution of the term paradigm to the evaluations of their achievements in 
question.  
 While speaking about Rask, Diderichsen claimed that Rask merely 
“applied the theories and methods of the eighteenth century philosophical 
etymology and grammar to all the main languages of Europe, Indo-
European as well as others” (Diderichsen 1974, 301). He went even fur-
ther stating that “the philosophical grammar of the eighteenth century, by 
integration and extension of some ancient ideas, worked out a paradigm of 
research, in Kuhn’s terms, such that continuous scientific progress could 
be made by problem solving” (Diderichsen 1974, 301). Thereupon, in 
Diderichsen’s view, Rask did nothing more than mopping up after Anne 
Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781), one of the collaborators on a French 
encyclopedia published in the 18th century. Of course, for the lack of 
criteria, which might be accepted by all, it is hard to decide whether it was 
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Rask who had created his own paradigm or whether he had only improved 
an earlier paradigm worked out by his forerunners.  
 Another participant in this discussion, John Greene (1974, 498) reject-
ed the opinion of Diderichsen while concluding that, as far as the encyclo-
pedist Turgot had not demonstrated his own method in the actual research, 
one could not say about him that he was the one who had founded a new 
discipline. It was also Yakov Malkiel (1974, 315–330) who came to a 
similar conclusion as Diderichsen with reference to Rask when he wrote 
on “Friedrich Diez’s debt to pre-1800 linguistics”. In his view, Diez’s 
monumental work Grammatik der romanischen Sprachen I–III (1836–
1844), despite the fact that it had contributed a lot to the development of 
Romanist studies, did not differ remarkably from earlier scientific tradi-
tions. Therefore, it could not be viewed as a paradigmatic breakthrough. 
 Probably as problematic, the historians of linguistics might treat also 
the statement of Paul Kiparsky concerning the existence of two paradigms 
within the comparative linguistics (cf. Percival 1976, 291 or Hymes 1974, 
340), the so-called “Paleogrammarians and Neogrammarians”. Kiparsky 
noticed, namely, a fundamental difference between Bopp’s generation inter-
ested in the reconstruction of proto-languages and the age group of lin-
guists who came to the fore of science in the 1860s and 1870s, turning their 
attention to the explanation of derivatives.  
 As to the Neogrammarians, Kiparsky departed from a simple view that 
the revolution had been initiated a good decade earlier before they arrived 
on the scene and that the new conceptual and methodological framework, 
which united them, had been accepted both by the Neogrammarians and 
by their opponents. In fact, Kiparsky’s concept of the development of 
linguistics had deviated from Kuhn’s point of view in that he diminished 
the role of a single genius in science, admitting at the same time the exist-
ence of alternatives within the same paradigm. 
 
 
Delimiting Paradigmatic Stages and Scientific Revolutions 
as Resultant from the Achievements  
of Single Innovators in Linguistics 
 
Subsequently, one should make known the position of E. F. Konrad Koerner, 
a historiographer, who proposed the division into periods of the develop-
ment of linguistics from the perspective of a single innovator. However, 
Koerner’s understanding of the notion of paradigm was narrower than that 
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which could be deduced from the Kuhn’s theory. Stressing the social and 
professional nature of ideas uniting the community of scholars, he pro-
posed a new complementary term, namely, climate of opinion referring to 
interests and goals, as well as to intellectual currents of a given period. In 
his own depiction (Koerner 1975, 720): 
 
[C]limate of opinion denotes the particular atmosphere prevailing at a 
given period of time, whereas ‘paradigm’ is used to characterize the 
particular achievement of one individual working in a branch of scientific 
activity who puts forward a comprehensive theory developed within the 
‘climate of opinion’, but which leads to new interests in a given discipline 
and possibly also outside its immediate concern.  
 
In the early years of his fascination for the study of scientific trends within 
the framework of Kuhn’s theory, Koerner (1975, 717–827) opted for dis-
tinguishing paradigmatic stages in the development of language sciences 
taking as a criterion the achievements of selected innovators. He believed 
that the history of linguistic ideas might be divided into three subsequent 
paradigmatic periods marked by the theoretical and methodological achieve-
ments of three scholars responsible for revolutionary changes in linguis-
tics, namely August Schleicher, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), and 
Noam Avram Chomsky (1928–). In Koerner’s view, they had influenced 
and attracted many adherents and supporters, being, as he said, “members 
of a particular scientific credo” (Koerner 1975, 720). However, as Koerner 
stressed, it was not the originality or novelty of Schleicher’s, Saussure’s 
and Chomsky’s ideas because they really did not work without anteced-
ents. The merit was credited to them because they had systematized the 
whole of linguistic knowledge accumulated at their epoch.  
 Schleicher, for example, had worked out a theory of language based on 
the conviction that the object of linguistics should belong to the domain of 
natural sciences and, therefore, it had to adopt a methodology as rigorous 
as that of botany or comparative anatomy. The fact, however, that Schlei-
cher regarded language as a natural organism, which could be classified 
into genera, species and subspecies, indicated against background of the 
climate of opinion that it might be considered within the framework of 
evolutionism. This concept, being considered as a novelty, was shared not 
only by the generation of first comparatists, especially by Bopp, Grimm 
and Rask, but also by August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767–1845), and his 
brother Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), as well as by 
(Friedrich) Wilhelm (Christian Karl Ferdinand) von Humboldt (1767–
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1835). A structural approach to languages had been influenced by the 
classification of plants, widely applied in botanical works since the publi-
cation of Genera plantarum by Carolus Linnaeus (Carl von Linné, 1707–
1778, the Swedish original name: Carl Nilsson Linnæus) in 1742. It was as 
early as in the year 1848 when Schleicher proposed to compare languages 
to living organisms, on the account of which his biological naturalism 
should have been explained rather through the climate of opinion than the 
direct influence of Charles Robert Darwin’s (1809–1882) theory of evolu-
tion.  
 As Koerner had pointed out, Schleicher made known his assumption 
about the Indo-European languages in terms of cognate family members, 
i.e., related by kinship, in 1850, and then he developed his concept of the 
genealogical tree in 1858. Schleicher’s next work of 1860 Die deutsche 
Sprache, in which he confronted three genealogical families of Indo-European 
languages, had been undoubtedly finished and conveyed to the publisher 
before he got in touch with Charles Darwin’s opus magnum, On the Origin 
of Species, edited in London in November of 1859. August Schleicher 
himself, as Koerner brought to light, denounced this widespread opinion 
that he had been indebted a lot to the Darwinian thought in the introducto-
ry words to Die Darwin’sche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft: offenes 
Sendschreiben an Herrn Dr. Ernst Haeckel. In this work of 1863, unfortu-
nately with a suggestive title for future historiographers, he informed his 
friend Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), a biologist and co-founder of the bio-
genetic law in onto- and phylogeny (cf. Haeckel 1866), that he did not see 
On the Origin of Species before he had written his own work. Just the 
opposite, he expressed his indebtedness to the antecedents of evolutionism 
in botany and geology (cf. Koerner 1975, 754–755). 
 As for the next paradigm, which might have replaced the Schleicherian 
framework permanently, Koerner expressed his conviction that Ferdinand 
de Saussure should not be seen as the only innovator who initiated the 
scientific revolution in linguistics. What he had done was that he had pre-
sented only a coherent theory of one of the alternative approaches to lan-
guage. Such conceptual categories, as, for example, structure, system, sign, 
value, social character of language, psychological qualities of individual 
speech acts, arbitrariness of language signs, synchrony vs. diachrony, and 
the like, did not belong to the new findings of Saussure, because they had 
appeared also in some philosophical works of his contemporaries.  
 Searching for sources of inspiration made upon the work of Saussure, 
Koerner disagreed with opinions suggesting that the Swiss linguist had 
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owed many insights of his theory to such scientists as the philosopher 
Anton Marty (1847–1914) and the philologist Adolf Gotthard Noreen 
(1854–1925). He gave rather priority to Hermann (Otto Theodor) Paul’s 
(1846–1921) Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (1880), taking for granted 
that Saussure must have studied it during his formative years he spent at 
Leipzig and Berlin. Moreover, Koerner strongly opposed also the convic-
tion of Witold Doroszewski (1899–1976) that Saussure’s Cours de linguis-
tique générale (1916) had been influenced by the work of French sociolo-
gist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) Les règles de la méthode sociologique 
(cf. Durkheim 1894/1895). Made popular in the 1930s (through the articles 
of 1933, “Sociologie et linguistique, Durkheim et de Saussure” & “Durk-
heim et F. de Saussure”), Doroszewski’s (1933a, 1933b) claim, as Koerner 
(1975, 787 and 795–796) noticed, became quite a dogma in the historiog-
raphy of linguistics. The fact that many important parallelisms between the 
two authors existed did not necessarily imply that Saussure was strictly 
dependent in his views on Durkheim. As Koerner remarked, such theoreti-
cal assumptions about non-historical, static and structural nature of lan-
guage, as well as sociologism and psychologism, had existed also in the 
“climate of opinion”, prevailing at that particular epoch. The same might 
be said about the notion of valeur. Having been introduced into the politi-
cal economy as valeur d’échange by Léon Walras (1834–1910) through 
the mediation of Eléments d’économie politique pure, ou Théorie de la 
richesse sociale (1874), it supposedly found its reflection in Saussure’s 
systemic view of relational properties of the entities of language (cf. 
Koerner 1975, 796). 
 With reference to the next paradigm of Noam Chomsky, Dell Hymes 
and John Fought (1975, 1142), the opponents of Koerner’s statement, 
represented the opinion that there was no sufficient reason for claiming 
that transformational-generative grammar had to be viewed as a break-
through in the state of contemporary linguistic knowledge. In their estima-
tion, Koerner had rather relied on the beliefs of Chomsky’s adherents who 
proposed to analyze the first striking wave of transformational-generative 
grammar at the end of 1960s as having the traits of revolutions. Some 
adherents pointed out the unusual achievements of a single individual em-
bodied in such works as Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957), and As-
pects of the Theory of Syntax. Some claimed (cf., e.g., Mathews 1974, 
216) that linguistics in the late 1950s and 1960s “underwent a Chomskyan 
revolution, and even since we are supposed to be working within the new 
paradigm of generative grammar. If not, we are clinging to old ways” 
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(quoted after Percival 1976, 288). As Percival (1976, 288) observed, some 
other historiographers who had written about Chomskyan generative gram-
mar in Kuhn’s terms were aware of the fact that there was a sharp ex-
change of views between the adherents of a new theory and the representa-
tives of older traditions. Those who cultivated the great heritage of a post-
Bloomfieldian framework (tracking Leonard Bloomfield, 1887–1949) 
regarded both Chomsky and his “epigones” as vulgarians. The mere fact 
that this kind of conflict had occurred at all was interpreted by historiog-
raphers as an indicator that the opposite viewpoints were semantically 
incommensurable, and that this time again the older generations had failed 
to undergo the necessary experience of “conversion”. Some were also 
convinced that the transformational-generative grammar could be applied 
to all investigative domains of language study. Roman (Osipovich) Jakob-
son (1896–1982), for example, saw in the Chomskyan framework even a 
synthesis of the direct and distant past, proposing to distinguish the se-
quence: traditional grammar, structuralism and Chomskyan transforma-
tional grammar, in accordance with the distinction of Georg (Wilhelm 
Friedrich) Hegel (1770–1831), as a negation of negation, i.e., thesis—
antithesis—synthesis (cf. Hymes & Fought 1975, 905).  
 Besides, there were some other attempts in analyzing the sociological 
dimension of the Chomskyan theory, namely, in terms of the four constit-
uents of disciplinary matrices. The argumentation was formulated in the 
following way: the rules of the base and transformational components of 
the generative theory, expressed in logical forms, might be qualified as 
symbolic generalizations according to the Kuhnian understanding. Fur-
thermore, the ontological model uniting the adherents of the grammar 
appears in the notion that natural language could be regarded as a set of 
strings generated by appropriate well-defined mathematical properties. In 
addition to this, it was assumed that Chomsky and his followers had a 
clearly defined system of values, which mostly placed a premium on sim-
plicity and generality, de-emphasizing thus factual accuracy (cf. Percival 
1976, 289).  
 Finally, such a textbook as The Fundamentals of Linguistic Analysis by 
Ronald W. Langacker (born 1942), might be regarded as a good example 
of “problem-solutions” in the light of the theory of science as presented by 
Kuhn (cf. Langacker 1972). Hymes and Fought, however, were of the 
opinion that Chomsky had not only reformulated some previously existing 
notions (e.g., that of Saussure) adding successively some new elements to 
his theory in reply to the growing number of critical voices along with the 
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growth of his own linguistic knowledge. Nevertheless, the fact that Chom-
sky had developed some crucial categories of Saussure in a new way, 
giving preference to deductive reasoning instead of generalizing based on 
inductive proofs, formalizing theoretical models instead of describing 
natural languages, did not necessarily testify that Chomsky’s proposal 
should be viewed as a revolutionary change. Yet, if historiographers had 
agreed that linguistics really underwent such a kind of revolution the ad-
herents of Chomskyan approach were convicted of, they still did not have 
any evidence that transformational-generative grammar had become a 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense.  
 As Percival (1976, 289) rightly noted, generative grammar did not 
command any uniform assent among linguists from all over the world. Not 
all members of profession shared it as a conceptual framework. One could 
encounter a lot of linguists who subscribed themselves to other branches 
of linguistic knowledge, for example, structuralism in Europe or stratifica-
tional grammar, tagmemics, string analysis, etc., in America. Even the ad-
herents of generative grammar had split into numerous competing schools 
of thought. With reference to John Searle (1972/1974, 8), Percival (1976, 
289) pointed out, in this particular context, that a new generation of so-
called “Young Turks” was now offering the same kind of challenge to the 
transformational establishment as Chomsky did to the post-Bloomfieldians 
in 1957. 
 Consequently, in answer to the critical voices of Percival, Hymes and 
Fought, and others, Koerner repudiated his initial enthusiasm concerning 
his assessment of Chomskyan grammar as a paradigm and the appraisal its 
impact upon scholars as a breakthrough in the sciences of language. He 
referred, however, to his earlier disclosure: “as I have indicated in the 
cases of Schleicher and Saussure … Chomsky’s ideas cannot be regarded 
as entirely novel and without antecedents” (Koerner 1978a, 41, quoted in: 
Jaszczołt 1989, 102). This time Koerner exposed Chomsky’s direct links 
with Zellig Sabbetai Harris (1909–1992), Nelson Goodman (1906–1998), 
Roman Osipovich (Osipovič) Jakobson, and Morris Halle (originally Pinkovics 
or Pinkowitz, born 1923), and indirect links with the Praguean phonology 
and post-Saussurean structuralism. Some historiographers, as cited by 
Katarzyna Jaszczołt (1989, 101), were of the opinion that “if there was a 
Chomskyan revolution, it was not a Kuhnian one”. There was no sufficient 
reason to regard generative grammar as an obligatory paradigm for all 
linguists. However, taking a non-Kuhnian point of view, one could speak 
about a new paradigm in the case of Chomsky’s grammar exclusively 
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against the background of the grammar of Harris. Chomsky’s transfor-
mation rules changed deep structures into surface structures, whereas Har-
ris’ rules referred to the relations between surface structures. Certain 
doubts might arise, whether such a turning point within the distinction 
between the deep- and surface-structure was a revolution or only a transi-
tion from one conceptual domain to another and, correspondingly, whether 
such a transition had contributed to any increase of verisimilitude or ex-
planatory adequacy of a theory. 
 
 
The Development of Linguistic Thought as “a Succession 
of Cynosures and Discontinuity” 
 
The history of linguistic trends teaches us, as Hymes (1974, 1–38) has 
noticed, that neither of the investigative approaches has governed the 
whole discipline, even being in the center of interest, i.e., “neither has 
been exclusive holder of the stage. Each has had the center, but not the 
whole” (see Hymes 1974, 10). When one approach has dominated, another 
one has been still continued, or a new one has appeared.  
 Following Hymes’ reasoning, one may agree that the members of cer-
tain scientific enterprises are aware of some revolutionary changes having 
occurred and that some scientific communities regard themselves as para-
digmatic ones, but they have never had the opportunity to control the 
whole discipline. The grounds for such a differentiation, Hymes sees, 
especially in the diversity of cognitive interests and orientations which 
successively or alternatively have competed for exclusivity in deciding 
what the scope of linguistic studies was. Furthermore, he has noticed the 
existence of many trends and directions of study arguing for the recogni-
tion of the importance of investigative approaches and social functions of 
language. Apart from these two methodological observations, Hymes has 
added that the scope of scientific interests in language is not in the same 
way institutionalized at different schools and scientific centers. The devel-
opment of linguistics should, therefore, not be described in terms of para-
digms that replace each other, according to Hymes.  
 What the historians are aware of constitutes heterogeneous traditions of 
formation, continuation, and the growth of divergent approaches to lan-
guage that have their own records of continuity, breaks, and returns. It 
occurs, for example, that the same approach, which has been the center of 
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interest at a certain place or a certain time, disappears at another one, 
without finding any further propagator or follower.  
 In the history of linguistic thought, as Hymes (1974, 19) concludes, we 
have to deal with “a succession of cynosures and discontinuity”. Although 
he has not proposed to reject the notion of paradigm as a methodological 
device, Hymes advises the historiographers to be very careful in approach-
ing its application. The success of this notion, when accepted uncritically 
and literally, could encourage some linguists, especially from younger 
generations, to express prejudices against their own discipline, the picture 
of which would appear to them in the light of Kuhnian concepts as full of 
gaps and breaks. 
 Very critically, Percival (1976, 289) has approached the problem of the 
applicability of the Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, expressing his convic-
tion that linguistics is rather in an ambiguous position. It is either a field 
which remains “in the pre-paradigmatic stage of inter-school rivalry”, 
having failed to achieve scientific maturity, “or else a field, which, (though 
scientific), intrinsically eludes analysis in terms of paradigms” (Percival 
1976, 291, cf. Wąsik, Z. 1986, 104–105, quoted by Jaszczołt 1989, 99).  
 On maintaining his mode of reasoning, Percival comments that lin-
guists who have tried to depict generative grammar as a Kuhnian paradigm 
have not sufficiently understood the theory to realize that it does not apply 
either to the contemporary state of linguistics or to a past one. Certainly, it 
is applicable but only in a very loose sense, relegating linguistics to the 
same non-scientific status as that of social and behavioral sciences. If, 
after all, linguists still like to identify the paradigms of a mature scientific 
community, they must conclude that modern linguistics has not been a sci-
ence from the beginning. Nor it has been a “mature science” in the 
Kuhnian sense.  
 Thus, if linguistics fells outside the previews of Kuhn’s theory so does 
some other fields, which are commonly regarded as “legitimately scien-
tific” (Percival 1976, 291). Having concluded that the application of 
Kuhn’s theory to the history of linguistics has failed to succeed, Percival 
warns the practitioners of language sciences against its uncritical ac-
ceptance, explaining that it could lower rather than raise scientific stand-
ards within the domain of their study. Hence, it could be better for them 
not to regard their own activity from a Kuhnian vantage point, as they 
might feel impelled to give premature assent to any novel theory, which 
has gained a wide support, for fear of being isolated as adherents of a 
discarded paradigm. 
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Redefining the Concept of Paradigm  
for the Aims of Historiography 
 
In spite of the fact that the Kuhn’s theory had been negatively esteemed by 
historiographers of language sciences, e.g., as a “Procrustean bed” or a 
treacherous guide across the disciplines, its main terms reformulated and 
redefined, had contributed significantly to a sociological view of the de-
velopment of linguistic ideas. In a collection of his subsequent works, 
Koerner (cf. 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, and 1978d) affirmed that the straight 
application of Kuhn’s doctrine would be impossible. Nevertheless, some 
concepts, as, e.g., that of “paradigm” might be useful, according to him, 
“if, and only if, they were redefined for the particular requirements of 
linguistic historiography” (Koerner 1978d, 190). As he maintained (1978b), 
a new type of historiography should be established, which would be based 
on strong, well-defined principles, and which would equalize the current 
state of knowledge with that of a “normal science”. However, Koerner was 
aware of the fact that linguistics could not be treated as a “normal science” 
on the same level as natural sciences. It could only use select accomplish-
ments of natural sciences to reveal some aspects of its object of investiga-
tion (cf. Jaszczołt 1989, 103). Similarly as Percival (1976), Koerner (1978) 
expressed also his objection to the way in which the term revolution had 
been applied to the analysis of linguistic changes.  
 As Koerner noticed, some linguists who had tried to apply it to certain 
changes proving the continuity and development of the sciences of lan-
guage had misused this notion. The best policy, according to Koerner 
(1978, as brought to light by Jaszczołt 1989, 103), would be to adopt 
Kuhnian theory with these of Imre Lakatos, Robert King Merton (1910– 
2003), Ernst Nagel, Karl Popper, and others, using them critically, which 
would be better than having no conceptual framework. In fact, it would be 
easier to judge any historical events as the evolutionary ones, when one 
looked at them from a certain distance being not influenced by the present 
state of scientific movements and prevailing trends.  
 Accordingly, for Koerner (1978d, 203), the year 1876 marked a revolu-
tionary change in linguistics with the achievements of Schleicher, whereas 
1957—with Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures—did not. The latter had to be 
seen rather as an outcome of a long process of theory change than a sud-
den change of a scientific paradigm. 
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Postulating a New Understanding of the Term Paradigm 
 
The survey of the standpoints of linguists, against the background of those 
of the philosophers of science, critically discussed inter alia by Alina 
Motycka (1980), shows that the debate on the applicability of Kuhn’s 
notions to the description of the state and development of linguistic 
thought has added to the linguistic historiography a new non-Kuhnian 
dimension. Among them, a stable place is occupied by the term paradigm. 
As Stefan Amsterdamski (1929–2005) has noticed (cf. 1968, 197), it has 
been widely accepted because of its close understanding to Karl Mann-
heim’s (1893–1947) term Erkenntnisperspektive (cognitive perspective) (cf. 
1929/1936 [1954]; cited edition of 1936, 244, 246, 259).  
 In a popular usage, the term paradigm refers to a prevailing concept, 
focus of interest, dominating disciplinary and interdisciplinary doctrine, 
and at length to a system of common views summed up by a prominent 
individual or a group of scientists representing prior trends of research. 
Approximately the same meaning is attached to the term micro-paradigm, 
introduced on the Polish ground by Maria Nowakowska (1980, 5, cf. foot-
note 1), in order to embrace both the sets of methods, theories, and theoret-
ical convictions accepted in a given social group. However, along with the 
use of the term paradigm new pragmatic aspects of traditional terms have 
been exposed, as, e.g., climate of opinion, tradition, frame of reference, 
intellectual innovation, etc. In this context, as Jaszczołt (1989, 92) rightly 
noticed, the term mini-revolution relating to the proposal of Barbara Tu-
chańska (1987) would also be worth mentioning. 
 
 
Methodological Postulates or the Applicative Value 
of the Term Paradigm 
 
If we agree that the term paradigm might be useful for appreciating inves-
tigative approaches which happen to be distinguished in the history of 
linguistics, we would limit its scope to the structure of objective knowledge 
lying beyond the knowing subject. That means, we would not relate it to 
convictions or beliefs characterizing certain individuals or communities of 
scholars, but rather to the sets of propositions and notions expressed in 
their texts, i.e., in their objective utterances, and other means of communi-
cation that are exhaustive, simple, and verifiable in praxis. In such a re-
duced scope, paradigms would be referred to all frames of reference or-
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ganizing the human experience and theorizing the human cognition or, in 
other words, every possible framework that systematizes human experi-
ence in a scientific way. Exactly speaking, we would embrace with the term 
paradigm any epistemological frame of reference, i.e., any set of concep-
tual and cognitive-methodological assumptions about the nature of the ob-
ject of study and about the way of how to approach it while applying in-
vestigative tools, or formulating postulates and operational definitions. 
 In a very loose sense, we would confine ourselves to the notion of 
paradigm as a synonym of an investigative approach, including methodo-
logical standpoints, cognitive perspectives, heuristic models and concepts, 
furthermore also trends or theories propagated by individual scientists or 
scientific communities united within the so-called schools of scientific 
thought. In this broad view, the paradigm would not present itself as a 
closed system. It might be regarded as composed of sub-paradigms or 
micro-paradigms, constituting the part of the systems of higher range. As 
such, it could be distinguished as standing in relation to supra-paradigms 
or macro-paradigms, and so on, depending on the hierarchical situation of 
appropriate levels of reference (e.g., ad-paradigms, co-paradigms, hyper-
paradigms, hypo-paradigms, meta-paradigms, and the like).  
 The science in particular, as a system situated within other systems, 
does not necessary need to have all places (the so-called slots) occupied 
(or filled out) by hitherto-existing actual paradigms. It could have also 
some slots open for new potential paradigms, in the traditional understand-
ing of the term in question, for other new subsystems, models, concepts, 
and investigative approaches to various sides, forms of manifestation, 





While appreciating the relational value of paradigms, practitioners of his-
toriography should consider whether the disputed frames of reference 
occupy the same or not the same place within the whole system of a given 
type of science. Eventually, they may be interested in paradigms that ex-
clude each other or overlap, that belong to a superior or ulterior level, 
forming constituents of other paradigms of higher or lower order. 
 The survey of trends shaping the history of linguistic thought has 
shown the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to 
language is not to be formulated in terms of paradigms replacing each 
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other through revolutions. Historiographers of linguistic ideas are rather in 
a position to study the formation, continuation, and successive differentia-
tion of heterogeneous traditions that possess their separate notations, inter-
ruptions and returns.  
 Taking into consideration the heteronomous nature of language and 
diverse ways of approaching it in an investigative practice, one is entitled 
to state that in linguistics, and in the broadly understood sciences of lan-
guage, there exist not only substitutable but also equivalent investigative 
paradigms. Accordingly, they have to be reviewed both in diachrony and 
in synchrony, either as the succession of differing paradigms that replace 
each other, or as the co-existence of paradigms that intersect, mutually 
complement, include or exclude each other. In dependence upon the place 
of linguistics among other sciences, as to its common, adjacent, or border-
ing object of study, methodology and application of knowledge, they form 
a network of supra-, and superordinated or intrinsic and extrinsic investi-
gative perspectives. The necessity of their hierarchical and systemic ar-











On the Metascientific Status of Epistemology 
 
To begin with, this chapter, basing on the earlier author’s works (Wąsik 
2003, 13–42 and 2014, 27–46), alludes to the understanding of epistemol-
ogy as specified by French philosophers in the dictionaries of Didier Julia 
(1991) and semiotics of Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtés 
(1979 [1982]), while relating to the distinctions of Paul Lucian Garvin 
(1919–1994) introduced in his prominent publications (cf. Garvin 1977, 
101–110; and 1978, 331–351). It assumes that epistemology is a branch of 
philosophy studying nature and grounds of knowledge with regard to lim-
its and functional validity of investigative approaches used in particular 
scientific disciplines for determining their subject matter. The domain of 
epistemology embraces not only the reflections upon investigative meth-
ods and procedures but also theoretical axioms and hypotheses of a given 
type of science. In this sense, epistemology is seen as the highest level in 
the disciplinary matrix of science, i.e., succeeding the object of study, the 
description of its subject matter, and the methodology determining its 
descriptive concepts. Thus, the aim of epistemology is a profound critique 
and verification of the methodological plane by testing its coherence and 
evaluating its adequacy in its relation to the descriptive plane.  
 An epistemological analysis of a given discipline consists in the exam-
ination of its ontological and gnoseological foundations in order to answer 
how far the commitment of scientists to their attendant views on their 
object of study corresponds to its investigative approachability. Hence, the 
study of epistemological positions occupied by a given discipline is based 
on the conviction that the choice of a given investigative approach initially 
stipulates a scientists’ outlook upon the nature of their investigated object. 
In consequence, this outlook usually coincides with the choice of concep-
tual and operational investigative tools providing a basis for the formula-
tion of investigative postulates. On a metascientific level, the choice of an 
epistemological orientation means the choice of an appropriate investigative 
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perspective determined by both the accepted tasks of investigation and the 
nature of the investigated object (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 12–13.).  
 
 
Controversies Over the Disciplinary Boundaries 
of Semiotic Studies 
 
An epistemological approach to the positions held by semiotics among the 
other scientific disciplines should concentrate on answering the questions 
as to how the knowledge of the relevant properties of its object, or its 
domain (as a set of objects) of study, is itself organized. Its purpose, as one 
may assume after Roland Posner (1988, 168) is to state what kinds of 
investigative perspectives are used for determining its specific subject matter 
(in a more extensive elaboration cf. also Posner 2003).  
 For determining the epistemological position of an investigative object, 
it is important to distinguish between reality and knowledge, i.e., between 
obiectum reale and obiectum formale, 
 
 Obiectum reale, i.e., reality in itself, embraces all inherent and rela-
tional aspects of an object to be studied existing independently of sub-
jective cognition, and obiectum formale, i.e., knowledge of the reality, 
constitutes a cognitive model of the subject matter of the study distin-
guished by a subject of science as a set of relevant features of an object 
which is detached from a given investigative domain.  
 Obiectum reale consists, in the philosophical sense, of essential and 
accidental qualities of things and states of affair as existing objectively 
beyond the knowing subject, and obiectum formale makes up all rele-
vant and contingent features of cognized things and states of affair that 
have been known by an individual subject of science, i.e., perceived, 
received, apperceived and conceived mentally, as a set of properties.  
 
Essence and accidence are assumed as definitionally necessary and unnec-
essary qualities of intelligible forms of being. Relevance and contingency, 
in turn, are seen as functionally indispensable and dispensable features, 
i.e., the properties of sensible forms of being. To be exhibited is that “es-
sence” and “relevance” are referred to the same characteristic mass of 
things and states of affair as types although they are not synonymous. 
 It might be appropriate to mention that the specification of the subject 
matter construed by scientists for characterizing the nature of their domain 
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of study, or deduced from the observable features of their objects of study, 
depends upon the choice of a given investigative perspective or a set of 
concatenated investigative perspectives. 
 The properties of the objects belonging to the domain of semiotics, 
which are studied from semiotic and non-semiotic viewpoints, may also be 
revealed by different philosophical and logical positions that provide a 
metascientific basis for partial methodologies of individual types of sci-
ences. Thus, having stated, in this framework, that the epistemology of 
semiotics is shaped by various scientific paradigms, it is assumed that the 
properties of its objects may be studied, inter alia, through the set of meta, 
hypo-, inter-, intradisciplinary, and disciplinary perspectives, useful for 
distinguishing its relevant categories and notions. 
 
 
Epistemology of Semiotics as a Set  
of Investigative Perspectives 
 
The search for investigative perspectives, which has taken part in the spec-
ification of the subject matter of semiotic disciplines throughout the histo-
ry of science, can start from the bird’s-eye-view considering the panorama 
of all ontological beliefs, doctrines, trends and directions of scientific 
conduct. They are collected and defined in philosophical dictionaries or 
books on the epistemology of sciences (cf., inter alia, Podsiad and 
Więckowski 1983; Podsiad 2000; Honderich 1998 [1995]), under the 
names that refer to their notional contents, disciplinary provenance, ways 
of presentation, authors and/or followers.  
 A provisional list of investigative perspectives, arranged alphabetical-
ly, may distinguish, in particular: absolutism, activism, agnosticism, ainte-
lectualism, anthropocentrism, anthropologism, antiinductivism, antinaturalism, 
antipsychologism, aposteriorism, apriorism, Aristotelianism, association-
ism, atheism, atomism, behaviorism, Bergsonism, Berkeleianism, biolo-
gism, causalism, cogitationism, cognitivism, collectivism, comparativism 
(or comparationism), conceptualism, concretism or reism, conditionalism, 
conformism, conscientialism, constructivism, conventionalism, creativism, 
Darwinism, deductivism (or anti-inductivism), descriptivism, determinism, 
diffusionism, dogmaticism, dualism, dynamism, emanationism, emer-
gentism, emotionalism, empiricism, empiriocriticism, empiriomonism, 
empiriosymbolism, energetism, environmentalism, essentialism, eventism, 
evolutionism, existentialism, experimentalism, explanationism, extrospec-
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tivism, finalism (teleologism), finitism, formalism, functionalism, gestaltism, 
gnosticism, Hegelianism, historicism, holism, humanism, hypotheticism, 
ideoexistentialism, idealism, idiographism, immanentism, immaterialism, 
immortalism, indeterminism, inductivism, individualism, infinitism, in-
strumentalism, integrationism, intellectualism, intentionalism, interaction-
ism, introspectivism, intuitionism, irrationalism, isolationism, logicism, 
materialism, maximalism, minimalism, mnemism, monism, naturalism, 
nativism, Neokantism, Neoplatonism, neopositivism (logical positivism), 
Neotomism, nihilism, nominalism, normativism, objectivism, occasional-
ism, ontologism, operationalism, organicism, panlogism, perceptionism, 
Peripateticism (Aristotelianism), personalism, phenomenalism, phenome-
nology, pluralism, polymorphism, polyrealism, polytheism, positivism, 
pragmaticism, pragmatism, practicism, psychologism, radicalism, rational-
ism, realism, reductionism, reism (concretism or somatism), relativism, 
skepticism, sensualism, singualarism (monism), situationism, solipsism, 
sophism, spiritualism, Stoicism, structuralism, subjectivism, substantial-
ism, supernaturalism, symbolism, teleologism (finalism), theism, terminism, 
transcendentalism, transformism, utilitarianism, verbalism, verification-
ism, verisimilism, vitalism, etc.  
 A survey of the list of investigative perspectives, elaborated by the 
representatives of metascientific subdisciplines, philosophers and logicians 
(cf., e.g., Jadacki 1985, 39), provides followers of semiotics with a suffi-
cient image that the task imposed upon them to pursue the epistemological 
foundations of their field of study, taken as a whole, is enormous. Besides, 
one should bear in mind that the list is not complete yet, for more names of 
particular perspectives appear in various articles and treatises dealing with 
specific problems of the methodology of semiotic disciplines, as, for ex-
ample, (pan)experientialism, (pan)psychism, connectionism, taxonomism, 
systemism, synchronism, stratificationism, tagmemism, generativism, not 
mentioned above. One should also not forget to add those perspectives that 
derive their names from the authors of famous systems of beliefs or domi-
nant conceptions, natably, Cartesianism, Saussureanism, Chomskyanism, 
Marxism, Neohumboldtianism, Freudianism, Weberianism, and so on.  
 What is relevant for the epistemology of semiotics refers mainly to 
those studies performed from the frog’s-eye view in a search for positions 
occupied by selected authors of leading theories (e.g., Thomas A. Sebeok 
1974, Sándor Hervey 1982, Jack Fisher Solomon 1989, or David Savan 
1983, discussed by Thomas L. Short 1994, and Raivo Vetik 1994). There-
fore, because of the narrow scope of these lectures, attention will be fo-
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cused on only those fundamental marking stones that differentiate the 
boundaries of semiotics and its subject matter.  
 
 
Cognitive Attitudes and Cognitive Standpoints 
of Scientists 
 
While making a commitment to a given epistemological position, a semio-
tician is expected to notice that the names of certain investigative perspec-
tives sometimes express evaluative connotations that are positively or 
negatively esteemed. Although this division may embrace not all of the 
enumerated perspectives and the borderlines between them are not clear-
cut, one can, nonetheless, distinguish two kinds of approaches toward the 
nature of the investigated object. One the one hand, investigative perspec-
tives are specified as cognitive attitudes, i.e., intro- or projections, which 
are based on hypothetical speculations and categorically expressed beliefs, 
and, on the other, as cognitive standpoints, i.e., ascertainment statements, 
which refer to experiential knowledge.  
 
 Cognitive attitudes rely on investigative directives of scientists who 
impute certain expected properties to their object (or to the sets of ob-
jects in their domain) of study because of its (their) resemblance to the 
subject matter of preferred conceptions or dominating theories, which 
are in fashion at a given period. Alongside cognitive attitudes, one may 
place also the dogmatic statements of scholars who regard their partic-
ular approach as the only admissible and legitimately scientific mode 
of conduct.  
 Cognitive standpoints represent the opinions and postulates of scien-
tists who verify their hypotheses and convictions by means of empiri-
cal observations and proved conclusions regarding the approachability 
and the fundamental nature of the object under their consideration.  
 
A remarkable difference between the two kinds of perspectives, cognitive 
attitudes and cognitive standpoints, appears, for example, in the derogatory 
and appreciative use of names given to justified or unjustified assumptions 
about language. It is especially visible, for example, in the case of biolo-
gism, psychologism or historicism as opposed to biological, psychological, 
and historical approaches applied in the domain of linguistics and the non-
linguistic sciences of language.  
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 Biologism, as a metaphorical perspective borrowed from biology, 
represents the cognitive attitude of linguists who regard language in terms 
of a living organism that may be born and may die, that lives and grows, 
has ancestors and descendants just like any man, animal or plant. Thus, 
from a “biologistic” point of view, languages, their structures and elements 
are classified into species, kinds and sorts, families, offspring and parents, 
or described, for example, in terms of kinship, or indeed compared to a 
genealogical tree, and so forth.  
 By contrast, taking a biological perspective, practitioners of a given 
discipline adjacent to linguistics tend to pay their attention to the interrela-
tionship between the language faculty understood as an innate form of 
human communicative behavior, and the maturation of mankind in the 
light of evolution and genetics. As a matter of fact, the biological perspec-
tive, as such, is grounded on the assumption that the capacity of man to 
make notions and to realize the cognitive function of language is the spe-
cies-specific property of human beings (for more on this see, e.g., Duranti 
1997/2000, Foley 1997, Ingold 1996/1999).  
 Another example of this kind of distinction is evident in the opposition 
between the perspectives of psychology and psychologism. In the latter 
case, the transition from a standpoint to an attitude depends, however, upon 
the aims of investigation, i.e., upon resolving the question of the essence 
of language manifested in the mind of its users, while at the same time 
dealing with the problem of its approachability in investigations. So, there 
is an oscillation of viewpoints from the psychology of language through 
psycholinguistics towards the antipsychologism of empirical linguistics, 
and vice versa.  
 Considering the extremity of positions, which exist between a histori-
cal perspective and historicism, one may notice that, from the viewpoint of 
its history, a determined language is investigated in terms of its develop-
ment, being placed within the context of the development of nations, eth-
nic groups, communities and individuals, etc. The name historicism, on 
the other hand, reflects the application of a cognitive attitude of scientists 
who are convinced that only the historical approach to language can reveal 
its true nature (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1992a, 543–545).  
 The investigative perspectives distinguished by a semiotician as rele-
vant for specifying the borderlines of his domain may be classified accord-
ing to their chronological order and typological systematization. In an 
ordering diachronic overview, one can learn that certain investigative 
perspectives have succeeded each other under the influence of the intellec-
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tual “climate of opinions”, which governed in particular epochs, or have 
coexisted within the same perspective of higher or lower rank, having their 
breaks, continuations and returns.  
 As far as the systematizing viewpoint is concerned, one may ask 
whether the investigative perspectives have occurred or indeed have not 
occurred within the frameworks of particular disciplines. A short overview 
of linguistic thought against the background of the development of other 
sciences can supply us with examples of how particular sciences of lan-
guage have formulated their disciplinary frames of reference. They have 
been influenced, on the one hand, by philosophical doctrines regarding the 
nature of the investigated object, such as rationalism, empiricism or prag-
matism, and their related forms, as logical positivism, phenomenology, 
dialectical materialism, etc. On the other hand, they have been shaped by 
interdisciplinary perspectives, as, inter alia, evolutionism, diffusionism, 
structuralism, behaviorism or generativism.  
 Among the interdisciplinary perspectives borrowed from the neighbor-
ing disciplines of linguistics, to be mentioned are, among others, those 
which have played an important role in the creation of linguistic models, 
such as, biologism, historicism, psychologism, sociologism, and anthro-
pologism. Parallel to them oscillated such peripheral investigative perspec-
tive, as, e.g., comparativism, naturalism, taxonomism, descriptivism, dis-
tributionism, formalism, functionalism, stratificationism or connectionism, 
cognitivism, and others. Furthermore, one should also mention idealiza-
tionism, abstractionism, binarism, or semiotism, called also semioticism, 
which, although rarely encountered, are nonetheless relevant regarding the 
epistemological position of linguistics. 
 Groups of investigative perspectives may be classified in tandem with 
particular types of sciences, which have promoted the acceptance of pre-
ferred patterns of “scientificity” characteristic for particular epochs, and 
imitated as the modeling ones. Compare, for example: evolutionism against 
the background of history, archeology, botany, zoology, geology; structur-
alism—physics, chemistry, anatomy, logic, statistics, geography; function-
alism—psychology, biology, anthropology, sociology; generativism—algebra, 
combinatorics, informatics, computer sciences, formal logic, cognitive 
psychology, and the like.  
 Furthermore, investigative perspectives may be classified into groups 
of perspectives connected with particular conceptions, interdisciplinary 
trends or directions of study, characteristic, as such, for particular types of 
sciences or for the whole of science. In consequence, these classifications 
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afford the opportunity to apprehend the structure of concatenations be-
tween different perspectives, which may be characterized as including or 
excluding, mutually overlapping, tolerating or replacing each other in the 
same position of the whole system of science, etc.  
 Searching, for binary oppositions, one should mention that some epis-
temological positions, occupied by linguists or representatives of semiot-
ics-related disciplines, have usually oscillated between two poles. Hereto 
belong such perspectives as: rationalism and empiricism, monism and dual-
ism, mentalism and mechanism (the view that all biological processes may 
be described in physicochemical terms), finalism and causalism governed 
the views on the nature of the investigated object. Besides, to be men-
tioned are also: realism and idealism, formalism and substantialism, solip-
sism and collectivism related to manifestation forms. Similarly, methodo-
logical choices have been determined by the oppositions between: induc-
tivism and deductivism, synchronism and diachronism, introspectivism 
and extrospecitivsm, subjectivism and objectivism, absolutism and relativ-
ism, particularism and holism, isolationism and integrationism, etc. 
 To appreciate the whole system of investigative perspectives character-
izing particular branches of sign-centered disciplines and linguistic semiot-
ics, it would be necessary to employ a typological matrix subsuming all 
actual and potential philosophical standpoints, gnoseological doctrines, 
cognitive beliefs, or directives of study, and the like. In this context, the 
axis of time is unimportant. The only thing that might count here would be 
a positive marker showing the occurrence of a given investigative perspec-
tive which has found its reflections in a given concept or a certain theory 
of sign (sign processes and/or meaning). The markers of presence or ab-
sence in a typological matrix can point to the fact that some places are 
occupied and some are not occupied by a given set or by particular inves-
tigative perspectives.  
 Numerous orientations predominant in the history of linguistic thought 
have provided examples of how linguists discover or perceive the im-
portance of only one aspect of language. They usually deem this aspect as 
either exclusively scientific or decisive for the whole domain of studies, 
while rejecting the viewpoints of their immediate opponents, and holding 
defensively their positions when new prospective opponents appear on the 
stage proclaiming that their ideas are no longer valid. In fact, such schol-
ars, holding with all their might their horizons determined by a frog's per-
spective, are often unable able to amount to such a position from which 
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they could observe the place of their approach to language as one amongst 
the possible others (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1999a).  
 It is suggested therefore to bear in mind the principle: « c’est le point 
de vue qui crée l’objet », expressed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/1922, 
23) in the context of linguistics, stressing that it is the investigative per-
spective (or a set of investigative perspectives) which creates the subject 
matter of semiotics. Hence, the practitioners of semiotics have the duty to 
consider all cognitive standpoints and cognitive attitudes that remain in 
agreement with chosen aims and methods of investigation as equal in 
rights. At the same time, they should also check their “object-related” 
suitability, being aware of the possibility of the mutual influence between 
the adherents of neighboring disciplines or followers of distant disciplines 
in accordance with the law of social conformity. This means, they have to 
know that scientists adapt to the patterns of scientific conduct prevailing in 
particular stages of the development of their discipline against the back-
ground of other disciplines. Not to be omitted is also the methodological 
determinism that results from the first investigative apparatus used by 
representatives of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, before they 
become adept scholars, during the first years of their research activities.  
 It is quite common that scholars borrow certain categories and terms or 
conceptual tools and methodological distinctions from a homogeneous 
field of study to a heterogeneous one, making certain initial assumptions 
about the possible or probable nature of their object. What is significant in 
such a transplantation of investigative perspectives should be ascertained 
by answering at least two questions referring either to systemic analyses or 
investigative tools. In the first case, one needs to ask whether objects being 
compared are isomorphic, and in the second, to inquire whether the terms 
and categories applied to different domains have the same connotations as 




A Quest for the Core of Epistemological Commitments 
 
Theoreticians who pave their own way towards this new academic subject, 
called semiotics or semiology, usually formulate questions regarding the 
properties, which are essential for objects studied in its domain, and to the 
properties that may be considered as decisive for specifying the scope of 
the whole domain in question.  
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 There is no agreement among the scholars, who are considered as enti-
tled to speak in the name of general semiotics as to whether the object-
related scope of their discipline should encompass signs or sign processes. 
In accordance with the first position, the interest sphere of semioticians 
lies in searching for static facts that convey meanings. Adherents of the 
second one claim that they should devote their attention rather to semioses 
as dynamic processes, which contribute to the generation of meanings 
through the network of relationships between the interconnected facts 
constituting the “functives” of information structures.  
 
 
(1) Interested to learn about the boundaries of semiotics, an outsider to the 
discipline or the follower of sign- and meaning-related approaches may 
pose questions to explain the difference between the positions occu-
pied by leading theoreticians and practitioners of semiotics who are in-
fluential in imposing their own views on the limits of semiotic threshold. 
 
One might encounter also two positions regarding the question of what 
should be considered as the basic notional constituent of semiotics. Some 
logical and philosophical discussions about the essence and ontological 
status of the sign reduce the problem of its function or meaning belonging 
to the interest sphere of the neighboring disciplines of semiotics, either to 
linguistics or psychology. The extremity of such a view is derived from 
Charles William Morris (1938, 1964) who maintained that semiotics does 
not rest upon the theory of meaning. In Morris’s (1938/1975, 44) opinion, 
the concept of meaning is to be either abandoned or indeed clarified in 
terms of semiotics before being transferred into domains where an under-
standing of the process of creating signs, called semiosis, is important.  
 A contrary position, in which the concept of meaning prevails and the 
category of sign is treated only as a prerequisite of semantic processes, can 
be found in various works from the sciences of language, cultural anthro-
pology and sociology. This is especially true in relation to such synonyms 
of meaning as “significance” or “value” that may be found in the domain 
of language related to human individuals and society (cf. Eco 1976/1979, 
22–29, and 177; Pietraszko 1980, especially 1982, 139).  
 
 
(2) The controversies over the nature of semiotic objects starts with a 
question whether they should be seen as ergon (‘product’, ‘fact’) or 
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energeia (‘process’, ‘action’). This perspective reflects adherence to 
two opposite philosophical attitudes towards the nature of the whole 
world, which may be labeled as factualism and processualism, ex-
pressed, for example, in atomism vs. dynamism or energetism, or 
eventism, and/or substantialism vs. activism or actualism.  
 
According to atomism, the world is to be viewed as composed of elemen-
tary units and their combinations, either material or spiritual in their na-
ture. An atomistic theory holds that these elements, which can be distin-
guished as minute, discrete, finite and indivisible entities, are the ultimate 
constituents of all reality. Supporters of dynamism would regard the mat-
ter and the spirit as endowed with immanent forces capable of occasioning 
change and transmitting energy. Those, however, who believe in absolute 
energetism would try to explain the world without appealing to the terms 
of matter and spirit and tend to follow the theories or philosophical sys-
tems that seek to explain the phenomena of nature by the action of force. 
In such a view, the nature of reality should be interpreted rather in terms of 
physics as opposed to metaphysics. 
 As a position that stands very close to dynamism and energetism one 
should mention also eventism, which claims that the basic elements of 
reality constitute events conceived as occurrences and successions of causes 
and effects, which are expressed in terms of conditional antecedence and 
consequence. A such, one should understand the world as composed of 
happenings rather than of enduring entities, when considering Alfred 
North Whitehead’s (1861–1947), explication that “[n]ature is a structure of 
evolving process, and the universe of knowing and reality is a process in 
which its parts are interwoven” (Whitehead 1925, 106, quoted after John 
Regan in: Regan et al. 1982/1987, vi.).  
 Another pair of oppositions can be deduced from the division between 
the particle mechanics and wave mechanics. It leads, in consequence, to 
the concept of wave-particle duality in modern physics, which associates 
the wavelength with a material particle and the momentum of energy with 
a wave to explain the states of electromagnetic radiations. However, sub-
stantialism refers not only to the properties of material facts, described in 
terms of phenomena accessible to cognition. It encompasses also spiritual 
facts conceived as being independent of the body in its existence and ac-
tivity. Therefore, the followers of a substantialist viewpoint may distin-
guish between real and ideal substances.  
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 A contradictory place occupy here the philosophical attitudes of theo-
reticians who claim that the reality is active by nature, and that the action 
is prior to a substance, for the substance constitutes the product of an ac-
tion. In consequence, tending towards activism, they stress the role of an 
individual agent.  
 
 
(3) In discussions regarding the nature of semiotic objects, it is unavoida-
ble to speak about the status of their components. Controversies over 
different epistemological positions are exhibited here in terms of three 
concatenated pairs of opposition, i.e., materialism vs. spiritualism as 
their ontological basis, monism vs. dualism as an organizing principle 
of their existence forms, and realism vs. idealism as the aspects of their 
cognoscibility. 
 
Philosophical beliefs that regard matter and its motions as constituting the 
universe, and all its inherent phenomena, including those of mind, as due 
to material agencies, are considered to be opposed to beliefs that all reality 
is spiritual. While appealing, however, to the opposition between material-
ism and spiritualism, the theoretician of semiotics has at his disposal not 
only such monistic doctrines in which it is said that matter is the basic 
reality of the universe, or that spirit constitutes the substance of every 
possible reality. He may also take into consideration the viewpoints that 
stress the dualism of matter and spirit. Dualistic materialism and dualistic 
spiritualism differ from one another to such an extent that, in the first 
position, spirit is shown as being derived from matter and, in the second, 
the spirit is believed to precede the matter. Both substances are regarded, 
however, as different as for their essential properties, although their coex-
istence may be considered as accidental or causal in character, or as estab-
lished by someone’s intention. Neither should one omit pluralism men-
tioned in some philosophical conceptions as opposed to monism. In the 
context of materialistic positions, pluralism is identified with dualism, 
according to which matter and spirit are conceived as two separate realities 
entirely heterogeneous by nature, whereas spiritualistic pluralism assumes 
the existence of many spiritual substances.  
 The opposition between realism and idealism is understood here in 
terms of the attitudes that scientists maintain towards their object of study 
within the framework of gnoseology. Idealism, taking as its starting point 
the analysis of cognition, ascertains that a cognizing subject is not able to 
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cognize the reality, which is external to him or her, and he or she cognizes 
only their sensations, imaginations and thoughts. According to idealism, 
the subject is able only to cognize phenomena and not the reality in itself. 
Realism, on the other hand, acknowledges the approachability of the ob-
ject external to the cognizing subject. Nevertheless, philosophers differ as 
to the experiential (naïve realism) or intellectual source (critical realism) 
of their cognition.  
 To the first group belong the followers of the belief that the real being 
possesses ontological attributes of a physical being, i.e., a being accessible 
to experience, or genetically connected with what is accessible to experi-
ence, or existing as a necessary cause of what is accessible to experience. 
For the second group, the beings objectively existing are physical objects 




(4) Those who undertake the endeavors to resolve the problem of the ap-
proachability of semiotic objects pay attention not only to the perspec-
tives connected with the source of their cognition as, for instance, em-
pirical experientialism vs. rational intellectualism. They, appeal also, 
inter alia, to the pairs of opposition between perceptual sensualism and 
mental intuitionism, or subjectivism and objectivism, while relating to 
their gnoseological properties.  
 
The followers of experientialism rely on the knowledge obtained through 
direct impression or gain their judgements by empirical practice. Moreo-
ver, those who follow the doctrine of intellectualism tend to discover the 
principle of reality in reason alone or try to derive their knowledge exclu-
sively from the process of rational thinking.  
 Among some gnoseological perspectives related with experientialism, 
one should place, on one hand, sensualism, and, on the other, intuitionism. 
For the first group of beliefs the cognition experienced by the senses is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of any cognition. For the second, the 
mind is not only in a position to directly perceive external reality, but also 
to intellectually apprehend logical dependencies creating an ideal (or abso-
lute) model of reality (in itself). Such intuitions have better chances to 
occur when the subjects are able to suspend their processes of physiologi-
cal perceptions and psychological imaginations dependent on time and 
space.  
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 Subjectivism is an attitude of scientists who treat the process of cogni-
tion as subordinated to individual choices and conditions of a cognizing 
subject, or who admit no other reality than that of the thinking subject. 
According to gnoseological subjectivism, the subject cognizes reality only 
in such a form in which it appears to him- or herself, i.e., he or she cannot 
cognize anything apart from their own imagination. The consequence of 
an ontological subjectivism is a reduction of reality to the construct of mind 
existing for the subject or in itself.  
 Objectivist approaches, on the other hand, give precedence to the 
knowledge of objects over the knowledge of self, i.e., to the knowledge of 
external objects and events having real, substantial existence quite inde-
pendent of the imaginings and emotions of the cognizing subject. Gnoseo-
logically, objectivists represent a realistic standpoint claiming the cogno-
scibility of the existence forms and the properties of objects, which are as 
such independent of the cognizing consciousness, and metaphysically, 
they express a realistic attitude acknowledging the existence of things 
external to the subject and independent of them.  
 
 
(5) After having made a commitment to a certain position on the ontologi-
cal and gnoseological properties of semiotic objects, the semiotician 
has to choose an appropriate perspective that determines the way of 
approaching them through the application of methodological tools. Ac-
cordingly, he or she may apply either the methods of empiricism or ra-
tionalism, or eventually follow the principles of pragmatism, by ob-
taining their data either extrospectively or introspectively, and draw 
conclusions, gain, interpret or test his knowledge through inductive, 
deductive or hypothetical kinds of reasoning.  
 
An empiricist in the epistemological or gnoseological sense considers 
experiment as the only source of knowledge and, in the methodological 
sense, he or she represents the conviction that the aim of science should 
consist in arriving at inductively inferred generalizations on the basis of 
individual ascertainments. In turn, an adherence to rationalism means that 
a scientist shares a doctrine regarding the priority of reason over the other 
powers or sources of cognition.  
 In the methodological sense, a rationalist ascribes the dominating role 
in cognition to reason, and not to experiment. Reason, as such, is for him 
or her not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition of cognition, 
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whereas the experiment serves the mind only to realize the data given prior 
to it. Taking the position of an absolute or extreme rationalism in its pure 
form, one may be willing to regard reason and intellectual apprehension as 
the last instance in the appreciation of the worth of human cognition. In 
accordance with this pure rationalistic attitude, one formulates the so-
called rational conception of science postulating to follow only rational 
criteria in the cognition and in the activity characterizing the scientific 
conduct.  
 Among the perspectives related to empiricism but opposed to rational-
ism, one should mention also pragmatism, a doctrine that postulates test-
ing the validity of certain laws or theories by the possibilities of drawing 
practical consequences from them. For a pragmatist, truth is not attainable 
by metaphysical speculations. As true might be considered only that kind 
of knowledge that leads to an effective activity or that becomes true be-
cause of such an activity.  
 The choice between an empiricist or rationalist position towards the 
sources of knowledge implies in consequence an extrospectivistic or intro-
spectivistic outlook on the elicitation of data. Introspectivism, for example, 
is a general name referring to philosophical considerations that base their 
findings on the internal experience of the observer. Introspectivistic meth-
ods rely on the observations of consciousness within the individual’s body 
and mind. Extrospectivism, on the other hand, is a methodological attitude 
of those empirically and objectively oriented scientists who reject observa-
tion based on internal experience, insisting rather that the object of study is 
to be approached through observations controlled outside the observer’s 
body and mind.  
 Concerning the methods of observation, it is necessary to answer the 
questions that concern the basis according to which a scientist has to draw 
conclusions. In the first instance, he or she has to answer whether to infer 
from individual facts arriving at generalizations (inductive reasoning), or 
to apply a general principle to the individual cases in which facts are veri-
fied (deductive reasoning). Secondly, he or she has to decide whether they 
should test a general hypothesis based on as many numbers of particular 
observations as it is possible, to find respective counterarguments.  
 In a narrower sense, inductivism is a position appreciating the exclu-
siveness or the importance of the inductive method in empirical sciences, 
especially in the contexts of discoveries. In a broader sense, inductivism 
combines induction with deduction, which plays the role not only of a 
formal combination, but serves also for the purposes of drawing conse-
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quences, which underlie tests. Moreover, both perspectives, as such, are 
bound to empiricism. However, in transcendental philosophy, deduction 
consists in the introduction of general principles of the science from ele-
mentary structures of the mind, i.e., “categories” discovered through phil-
osophical reflections without having recourse to experiment. In the same 
context, one should situate a heuristic mode of inductive reasoning that 
refers to an intellectual apprehension of a general content, common for the 
whole set of certain concrete objects, based on the knowledge of particular 
elements of the set.  
 Not far from the moderate rationalistic forms of reasoning, one can 
place antiinductivism, a position opposed to inductivism, called also de-
ductivism, since it stresses the role of deductive method in the empirical 
sciences. Antiinductivists reject the argument about the independence of 
the observational language from a theoretical language and the irrevocabil-
ity of empirical statements. While bringing out a creative power of theoret-
ical statements, which exceed, in fact, beyond the limits of experience, 
they consider them as not only conventions or cognitive tools but as the 
most simplified and the best explained from the possible descriptions of 
the world.  
 Another intellectual form of expressing antiinductivism in the method-
ology of sciences is that of hypothetical reasoning. Hypotheticism stresses 
the role of decision making in the acceptance of tentative assumptions 
postulating, in opposition to inductivism, that the acceptance of a conjec-
ture has to be unanimously determined by appropriate inductive proce-
dures based on probability calculus. Hypotheticism proposes for the ac-
ceptance of scientific laws the principle that they should be formulated in a 
form mostly subjected to refutations through experiments. Only laws that 
have proved themselves as reliable in the face of strenuous testing trials 
can deserve to be acknowledged by scientists. 
 
 
(6) Further questions refer to the source of origin of semiotic objects ask-
ing: whether they constitute purposeful artifacts or a goal-directed ac-
tivity, whether they have been designed by a certain creator or they 
have appeared as a result of an unforeseen revolution, and, finally, 
whether they are explainable in terms of animate-life forces or inanimate 
physical-chemical forces directing the existence modes of organisms. 
These questions may be answered through the choice of the following 
cognitive attitudes expressing the oppositions, in the first case, be-
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tween finalism and causalism, in the second, between creativism and 
emergentism, and, in the third, between vitalism and mechanism. 
 
Those who stress the importance of final causes, assuming that natural and 
historic processes are determined by their ultimate purposes, follow an 
attitude of finalism, called also teleologism. Accordingly, taking into ac-
count the categories of motives and purposes, philosophers distinguish 
four kinds of teleology: metaphysical, transcendental, immanent, and an-
thropocentric teleology. Scientists who believe in metaphysical teleology 
claim that the development of the world is subordinated to a final purpose.  
 Disciples of transcendental teleology accept the explanation that the 
world and all things possess, apart from an immanent purpose, also a pur-
pose existing beyond them. Adherents of immanent teleology, in turn, rely 
on the statement that the purpose of the world and all things is included in 
themselves. However, followers of anthropocentric teleology consider 
man as the purpose of all things and the purpose of itself. Standing at the 
opposite pole to finalism, the perspective of causalism is connected with 
etiology, the branch of philosophy dealing with factors of causation. Fol-
lowers of etiologism prefer to explain the development of events in the 
world of things as a chain of causes and effects and not as an act striving 
towards purposeful ends. 
 According to creativism the world is believed to be created out of noth-
ing only by a free act of God. In addition, the being of the world may be 
considered as based on continuous creation, which constitutes the conser-
vation of the world. In contrast to the belief that everything has been creat-
ed, the antimechanic theory of emergentism states that the world under-
goes continuous changes. During such changes new qualities develop all 
of a sudden by way of unexpected leaps and emerge on a higher level 
always in novel shapes, which happen to be better and better than the 
previous ones. However, one has to remember interpretations, according to 
which a rational and spiritual factor is seen as resultant from an emergent 
revolution. 
 Some semioticians, being influenced by the philosophers of biology 
who distinguish between animate and inanimate matter, lay emphasis on 
the origin of life as irreducible to physical and/or chemical processes. 
Following the vitalists’ tenets, they believe that, within an organism, there 
exists an innate vital principle, i.e., an impulse of life—called after Henri 
Bergson (1859–1941) élan vital ‘a life force’ (cf. Bergson 1907 [1911]) or 
“entelechy”(a vital agent or force directing growth and life)2 after Aristotle 
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(of Stageria, 384–322 B.C.)—which purposefully directs its course of 
development. Empirically inclined semioticians, however, who reject the 
autonomy of life, support their beliefs by mechanist theories saying that 
the workings of the universe can be explained only by physics and chemis-
try. According to mechanism, the laws of mechanics dealing with energy 
and force, in their relation to material bodies or the axioms of geometry 
and the principle of dynamics, are sufficient enough to explain the exist-
ence of physical, biological and psychical reality. 
 
 
(7) The range of occurrence of semiotic objects may depend upon the 
scientist’s position to naturalism, immanentism or transcendentalism. 
Within the limits of those attitudes, one has to commit oneself either to 
panexperientialism, pantheism, or panpsychism. Another dimension 
form questions as to whether practitioners of semiotics should follow 
an idealistic attitude of solipsism, and whether they should believe in 
the idea of collective solipsism or follows an objectivistic standpoint of 
collectivism. 
 
Naturalism, among the other uses of this term, is considered as the mode 
of thought (religious, moral or philosophical) glorifying nature and exclud-
ing supernatural and spiritual elements. A semiotician who assumes a 
naturalist attitude regards nature in the cosmological sense as the ultimate 
reason of its own existence and activity and rejects the existence of any 
transcendental being. 
 The philosophy of immanentism states that all elements of reality are 
mutually included in itself. They are closely interconnected, and constitute 
a single and unique reality, which is cognizable (panexperientialism), in 
which one can perceive the existence of God everywhere (pantheism),3 or 
in which everything is assumed to have a soul (panpsychism).  
 A subjectivist idealistic perspective supports the view that reality does 
not exist independently of cognition, and that it constitutes a set of con-
tents embedded within consciousness. Moreover, what really exists for the 
followers of immanentism are the objects of thought.  
 According to a solipsist view, the contents of thought are understood as 
connected with the individual human mind. There is also such belief—
labeled as collective solipsism—which combines immanentism with a 
general human mind externalized through the minds of individuals (no-
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ticeable is here the positions expressed by Thomas A. Sebeok and Sydney 
MacDonald. Lamb in: Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1988, 12 and 18–19).  
 As an extreme variety of immanent dualism, solipsism even claims that 
it is impossible to provide evidence for the real existence of the world 
external to the individual Self, including also the reality of the other 
Selves. As such, it stands in opposition to collectivism, an attitude based 
on dialectical materialism, which assumes that only social groups consti-
tute the objective reality for empirical studies. Thus, from the point of 
view of objective semiotics, which rejects solipsism and individualism, it 
might be appropriate to study the semiotic objects as realized in social 
products and behaviors. 
 Semioticians who might adopt the position of transcendentalism tend 
to believe that, apart from immanent reality, there are beings that exist 
beyond the parameters of possible human experience and to cognize them 
exceeds the limits of any knowledge. Hence, transcendental semiotic ob-
jects would be considered as being above and independent of the limita-
tions of the material universe. 
 
 
(8) The boundaries of semiotics may also be specified by the scopes of the 
domains in which semiotic objects occur or by the scope of the defini-
tions of semiotic objects, wherein the focus of interest constitutes the 
essence of God (theocentrism), Man (anthropocentrism), Life (biocen-
trism) or the Sign in itself (semiocentrism).  
 
Theocentrism is an attitude expressing the conviction that God is the 
cause, means and the ultimate purpose of everything in the world. From 
the position of semiotics everything what exists is the sign of God’s crea-
tion and the sense of humankind, its existence, and fate and is determined 
by God’s will. In turn, the followers of anthropocentrism recognize Man 
as a center and purpose of the whole reality. Important is the autonomous 
role ascribed to human consciousness in cognition. The central position of 
humankind is a prerequisite of its dignity and superiority over other crea-
tures. In a biocentric depiction of the world everything in nature has its 
value and meaning. Therefore, human beings are equated with animals. 
The whole earth is shared by living being. All organisms are interdepend-
ent and should live together and harmoniously. Every organism should be 
protected as a bearer, producer or utilizer of meaning and therefore should 
be valued as a unique creature which is equal in its own right. In a semio-
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centric view, the whole universe animated vs. inanimated, personal vs. 
impersonal is perfused with signs, and the ontological reality produces 





The assessment of the epistemological foundations of semiotics, of its 
specific disciplines, may start with the elaboration of a typological matrix 
embracing all distinctions between ontological and gnoseological positions 
occupied by theoreticians and practitioners of semiotics representing par-
ticular schools of semiotic thought. However, a serious problem connected 
with patterns of scientific conduct may arise as regards the adherence of 
leading authors of a given scientific discipline to dominant disciplinary 
paradigms. A separate attention should be then devoted to the incommen-
surability of views represented by those authors, schools of thought or 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives.  
 Nevertheless, having recognized that all investigative paradigms as a 
network of disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives are equal in 
right on a metascientific level, the scientist may start with: the choice of 
his/her views upon the nature of investigated objects, the status of their 
components, as well as the organizing principles of their existence modes. 
Furthermore, he/she has the duty to determine the properties of objects 
with regard to: their genesis and range of occurrence as well as the scope 
of the domains in which the scientists usually study them, the approacha-
bility of their cognizable aspects, the source of their cognoscibility and the 
methodological and conceptual tools serving to expose their functional 
relevance. 
 In consequence, the apprehension of the object-related scope of a se-
miotic domain may result from the acceptance of viewpoints regarding: 
(1) whether the semiotic objects exist only in the cognizable world (in the 
physical and psychical reality, outside the body and inside the mind, in the 
physical reality both extraorganismic and intraorganismic by nature) or 
also beyond the (physical and psychical, extraorganismic or intraorganis-
mic) reality of the cognizing subject, and (2) whether the semiotic objects 
occur in the realm of God only, God and man, in the realm of man only, or 
in the realm of all living systems, belonging to the properties of an indi-
vidual subject or a group of individuals constituting a phatic communion 













ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE  










Heteronomies of Language 




Introductory Statements  
 
The focus of attention in this chapter, based on the distinctions elaborated 
by the author (Wąsik, Z. 2006), will be concentrated on the characteristic 
features of language taken into account, on the one hand, as the subject 
matter of the principal object of scientific study and, on the other, as the 
aspects of the subject matter of the adjacent objects being examined from 
either disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspectives. Its special objective is 
to expose the idea of scientists’ epistemological awareness in the division 
of academic disciplines.  
 In the history of linguistic thought, linguists have studied various as-
pects of the verbal means of human signification and communication 
while emphasizing the importance of only one aspect and presenting their 
own approach as scientific or relevant for the whole investigative domain. 
They have fought against their opponents defending their initial positions 
without stating that all questions related to the properties of language are 
equal in right on a metalinguistic level. Hence, crossing the boundaries 
between isolationist and integrationist approaches, it might be important to 
specify which of the manifestation forms and the existence modes of lan-
guage could be autonomized as the subject matter of linguistics, and which 
of the forms of its manifestation should be treated as belonging to heteron-
omous conditionings of objects studied by its neighboring disciplines.  
 For detaching of domains of disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies, 
it will be essential to enumerate all modes in which language as a set of 
extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of its speakers and learn-
ers, i.e., as observable and inferable meaning-bearers, exists in: (1) exter-
nalized products of speech, (2) internalized products of thought, (3) con-
crete processes of articulation and audition, (4) mental faculties of creation 
and interpretation, (5), relationships between verbal means, their meaning, 
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and use, (6) mental associations between verbal means of signification, (7) 
observable links between interpersonal collectivities of communicating 
individuals, (8) assumable links between intersubjective collectivities of 
communicating individuals, (9) physiological and intellectual endowments 
of man as a talking animal, and (10) genetic codes transmitted in the evo-
lution of human species.  
 To separate the investigative domain of linguistics from the domain 
studied by non-linguistic disciplines, it is enough to observe the distinction 
between language “as an object” and language “as a relational property” of 
other objects of study. In consequence, practitioners of linguistic disci-
plines should be aware of the fact when they observe the extrasystemic 
properties of languages conditioned by external environments, and when 
they detach the systemic-structural properties of a particular language 
from its environment. By this reference to the disciplinary awareness of 
scientists, it is emphasized that language as an object of study is indivisi-
ble. However, the same cannot be said about the scope of the disciplines 
which depend on the choice of viewpoints.  
 Taking a structural-systemic perspective, the author proposes to distin-
guish three conceptual levels on which the object of linguistic studies is 
investigated: (1) language in general—language in particular, (2) language 
ex definitione—language in abstracto—language in concreto, and, fur-
thermore, (3) language as a theoretical construct—language as an induc-
tive generalization—language as an autonomous sociolect—language as a 
heteronomous idiolect. As he points out, interlingual differences are so 
great that, from all languages of the world, it is impossible to create a new 
system of verbal means which may serve for the purposes of mutual un-
derstanding. In the same way, one cannot believe in the creation of any 
natural language, considered as a natiolect or ethnolect, from the aggrega-
tion of its idiolects. To summarize the discussion about heteronomous 
existence modes of language and its autonomization in their use and cog-
nition, the author concludes that not only the linguists are able to autono-
mize their object of study. Any heteronomy of language can be made au-
tonomous from any (inter)disciplinary point of view. 
 
 
Investigative Approaches to Language 
 
The history of linguistic thought provides examples (for details and refer-
ences see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 56–57) that linguists have studied various as-
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pects of verbal means of human communication while exposing the im-
portance of only one aspect, and considering only their own way of seeing 
things as relevant for the whole investigative domain or as exclusively 
scientific. Consequently, multifarious cognitive interests and directions of 
study have been developed arguing about the true nature of the linguistic 
object. Being split into various schools, practitioners of linguistic sciences 
strived to find solutions for determining which properties of language and 
its functions appear to be most important, and to decide which of the ap-
proaches to its existence modes and manifestation forms are to be consid-
ered as legitimately scientific. Moreover, particular interest domains of 
language sciences are unequally institutionalized in particular academic 
centers of research and education. 
 Studies on the nature of language started with philosophical specula-
tions about the principles of universal grammar common for the whole of 
mankind. This was the heritage of Enlightenment. When linguistics freed 
itself from the complex of a servant of philology, its representatives devot-
ed more attention to spiritual and ethnic-cultural manifestations of lan-
guage.  
 The results of comparative historical studies, conducted in the 19th 
century, led the founding fathers to the ascertainment that particular lan-
guages were related natively. The objective of such genetic-evolutional 
studies was seen in a systematization of the principles of language chang-
es, or in an explanation of the directions of their development.  
 Afterwards, a discovery of the diversity of languages due to the 
achievements of structural-comparative studies contributed to a recogni-
tion that ethnic or national languages evolved from vernaculars on various 
levels of social stratification. In the typology, in turn, a conviction that 
languages as objects of study should be treated with respect to their inter-
nal and external properties shifted to an assertion that they could simulta-
neously belong to various structural types. Instead of speaking about typo-
logical constructs of language systems, linguists started to propose typo-
logical matrices of systemic properties of languages, their elements and 
structures.  
 Furthermore, the interest in differences and similarities between lin-
guistic systems turned into inquiries about functional convergences and 
divergences which could be found in the structure of languages of the 
world. This objective was achieved, in the first instance, by elaborations of 
partial typologies of linguistic categories, entities, units and constructions, 
as in the case of the typology of future forms, of passives, of modality, of 
Chapter Four 82 
 
reflexives, of questions, etc. Gradually, typological comparative studies 
were replaced by contrastive studies, which started to be conducted along 
with the search for language universals and partial typologies of language 
phenomena, not for the interest domain of linguistics proper, but to serve 
for other disciplines bordering with linguistics. 
 In general linguistics, the object of study had been not uniformly un-
derstood; it was referred either to inductive generalizations drawn from all 
disciplines dealing with languages of the world, or only to hypothetical-
deductive assumptions abstracting the model of language sensu stricte 
from all investigated languages. In the beginning of the 19th century, gen-
eral studies in language, identified with the philosophy of language, the 
subject matter of which was seen in the faculty language of mankind, had 
been abandoned in favor of comparative linguistics.  
 However, towards the end of the 19th century general linguistics in-
cluded also a structural typology of differences in the structure of all lan-
guages of the world, and, as such, it occupied its place in a tripartite division 
of disciplines along with the disciplines studying particular languages, and 
comparing them from a historical-genealogical point of view. Departing 
from a synchronic point of view, as elaborated in the domain of general 
theoretical and particular descriptive linguistics, researchers started to 
cross the borders of linguistics proper, entering the zones of newly-created 
neighboring disciplines.  
 In interdisciplinary searches, scientists collected various linguistic 
data, aiming to support those scientific disciplines, the main object of 
which belonged to functional environments of languages. As an alternative 
for strictly linguistic studies, the subject matter of which was language in 
itself, practitioners of language sciences had switched their interest sphere 
to studies conducted from a perspective of neighboring disciplines. The 
reason for such a differentiation of investigative domains was that linguists 
had departed sometimes from incommensurable views expressed in the 
form of either projections or ascertainments. Their epistemological com-
mitments to the views on the nature of language and its approachability 
had oscillated between extreme perspectives, based on assumed attitudes 
or experiential standpoints, such as, inter alia, inductivism or deductivism, 
individualism or collectivism, positivism or idealism, monolingualism or 
multilingualism, synchronism or diachronism, evolutionism or diffusionism, 
factualism or processualism, formalism or substantialism, taxonomism or 
explanationism, idiographism or nomologism, normativism or descriptivism, 
instrumentalism or generativism, isolationism or integrationism, etc. At 
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times they had been influenced by the prevailing theories espoused in the 
philosophy of language, or being fashionable in the philosophy of science. 
As a rule, they had treated language as an autonomous object of study 
principally in abstraction from its external conditionings.  
 Linguists and semioticians (discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2003, 83–94) who 
exhibit the social character of language from a perspective of systemic 
structuralism usually regard as autonomous either (1) the set of mental 
signs composed of concepts and sound patterns that are shared by all 
members of a particular speech community, as postulated in the lectures of 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/1922), or (2) the set of concrete types of 
verbal means of signification that are used for communicating about the 
extra-linguistic reality, in accordance with the linguistic theory of lan-
guage Leon Zawadowski (1966), following the functionalist principles of 
Karl Ludwig Bühler (1879–1963) summarized in his work of 1934.  
 In approaches of isolationists, natural languages are reduced to “stag-
es” and stages are identified with “systems”. Integrationists, in turn, ex-
pose investigative problems relatable to actual speakers, as they cooperate 
communicatively and interactively within the frame of discourse practices 
with other members of social groupings, such as interindividual, public 
and mass aggregations of local or global, national or international commu-
nities connected by blood kinship or ethnic descent, common profession or 
confession, and shared means of signification or cognition.  
 Against the background of isolationist or integrationist positions in the 
division of disciplinary work, one should speak in favor of an assumption 
that natural language is heteronomous by nature, but it may be autono-
mized as a separate object of study. As such, any language can be studied 
by itself, or in relation to its functional environments.  
 The question of how to detach the boundaries of linguistic and non-
linguistic disciplines is connected with the answer of how to analyze the 
correspondence between the commitments of practitioners of science to 
the views on their object of study and its investigative approachability. 
Hence, from a holistic point of view, it will be necessary to depict the 
functional nature of language taking into account all properties of com-
municating individuals with their biological and cultural endowments as 
representatives of living species, with their sensorial and intellectual facul-
ties as persons, and with their semiotic and axiological capabilities as 
members of social collectivities. 
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The Existence Modes of Language 
 
On account of concrete and mental, static and dynamic, substantial and 
relational manifestations of language as a property of human beings, the 
object of linguistic study, in agreement with the principles of hard-science 
linguistics after Victor H. Yngve (1986), may be specified in terms of at 
least one of six separate existence modes (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 35): 
 
(1) Language manifests itself in collectively accepted patterns of vocal 
sound waves which are articulated by speakers and segmented by lis-
teners as verbal means of individual signification and interindividual 
communication;  
(2) Language sustains itself in the consciousness of speakers/listeners as 
mental equivalents of vocal sound waves being processed and inter-
preted as verbal means of individual signification and interindividual 
communication;  
(3) Language recurs in concrete speaking and listening activities of indi-
viduals who possess physiological endowments for the production and 
reception of vocal sound waves as the significative means of interindi-
vidual communication;  
(4) Language endures in mental sign-processing and sign-interpreting activi-
ties of individuals who possess intellectual abilities to create and rec-
ognize vocal sound waves, and their sensorially perceivable surrogates, 
as significative means being distinguishable from each other, grammat-
ically correct, semantically logical and pragmatically appropriate to re-
spective contexts and situations;  
(5) Language is deducible from socially abstracted networks of relational 
values of significative means which are externalized by individual 
communicators in their concrete speaking and listening activities;  
(6) Language is assumable from networks of associations between mental 
equivalents of significative means and their relational values which are 
internalized by individual communicators in their sign-processing and 
sign-interpreting activities.  
 
It has to be noticed that all the enumerated six existence modes of lan-
guage—in the products of verbal speaking and thinking, in the processes 
of sending and receiving, encoding and decoding of verbal products as 
meaning-bearers, in the relational values of verbal products being realized 
in speech and memorized through associations in thought—constitute 
Heteronomies of Language and the Division of Linguistic Labor 85 
 
extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of communicating individ-
uals. In opposition to speech processes, thoughts or networks of associa-
tions, which depend upon physiological and mental capabilities or compe-
tencies of individual communicators, only the sets of externalized patterns 
of verbal products, as well as their relational properties, become independ-
ent from the will of particular members of certain collectivities when they 
function as a means of social communication. But in the real world, lan-
guage as a property of collectivity does not constitute a set of empirical 
data. It may be only assumed as a theoretical construct consisting of those 
interindividual means and contents of communication that are typified 
from observable changes in individuals when they are engaged in com-
municating activities. What can be concretely singled out are no more than 
referential behaviors of communicators the interpretational practices of 
whom have to be mentally inferred from the shared knowledge of commu-
nication participants.  
 Thus, in the physical dimension, communicating individuals are linked 
with other each other through sound waves and energy flow carried out in 
their sending and receiving activities, and in the logical dimension, inter-
subjective links come into being through the mutual understanding of 
people when communicating individuals negotiate and confirm a meaning 
of verbal means through interpretative practices and referential behavior 
on the basis of internally concluded commonalities of experience, or 
knowledge about the same domain of reference.  
 Considering the role of language in the formation of communicative 
communities, one can distinguish after Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik (2007, 
55–56), on the basis of observable and concluded similarities in their ref-
erential behavior and their interpretational activities, two additional exist-
ence modes of language, where: 
 
(7) Language unites communicating individuals into concretely observable 
interpersonal groupings that occur between communication partici-
pants when they produce, emit, perceive, and receive verbal meaning-
bearers in the form of sound waves and their surrogate codes through 
respective physical channels; 
(8) Language can be deduced from intersubjective groupings that arise be-
tween individual communication participants when they understand or 
interpret the received verbal meaning-bearers in the same way while 
referring them to mutually shared extralingual reality known to each 
other separately. 
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Apart from interpersonal links related to the use of language that come 
into being through the exchange of energy flow being sent and received, 
and the intersubjective domain of reference being inferred by communica-
tion participants, there are also interorganismic links, which should be 
considered, namely the linguistic faculties inherited genetically. Therefore, 
alluding to ascertainments of the researchers of human mind, such as, inter 
alia, the biologist Richard Dawkins (1976/1989, 1982, and 2006), the 
philosopher Daniel Clement Dennett (1995 and 1996), and the psycholo-
gist Susan J. Blackmore (1998 and 1999), with special consideration of 
Kalevi Kull (2000a), a semiotician of biology from the Tartu School, one 
is entitled to assume that language exists also in the generational memory 
of organisms in the form of mental memes or biological-semiotic texts. 
 Worth mentioning is the hypothesis of Edward Sapir (1984–1939) and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941) that the perception of extralingual 
reality is formed by the structure of a determined language (cf. Whorf 
1956). To be exposed is also the claim regarding the innate faculty of 
language about the genotype-phenotype interplay in the genetic code of 
organisms put forward by Marc D. Hauser, Noam Avram Chomsky and 
W. Tecumseh Fitch (2002), and the presence of primitive semantic pat-
terns in the lingua mentalis, advocated by Anna Wierzbicka (cf. 1972 or 
1980). These conceptions allow us to formulate a statement about the two 
additional existence modes of language. 
 
(9) Language is possible due to an innate speech faculty localized in genet-
ically specialized neuronal centers of human brains to communicate by 
using vocal systems of verbal means with a threefold duality of pattern 
structure and sequential segmentation while implementing complex 
physiological techniques of articulation and audition.  
(10) Language has emerged as a result of evolutionary changes of animal 
organisms adapting to their natural and artificial surroundings through 
the extension of their communicational abilities preexisting in their ge-
netic memory as a set of primitive and more developed verbal means. 
 
 
Defining the Formal Object of Linguistics 
 
Linguists may determine somehow the autonomy of their object of cogni-
tion by abstracting language as obiectum formale from language as obiec-
tum reale embedded in different heteronomous dependencies, i.e., by spec-
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ifying their subject matter and its various aspects, by stipulating its domain 
of occurrence, or by enumerating their tasks and methods on the investiga-
tive level, etc. Since such a phenomenon as an overall human language, 
representing or including every natural language, does not exist at all, and 
only various linguistic systems, situated on various levels, are accessible to 
cognition, the distinction between language as obiectum formale vs. lan-
guage as obiectum reale entails also the opposition between “language as a 
definitional model” in general and “language as an ecologically deter-
mined specimen” in particular.  
 In order to answer the question of what the formal object of linguistic 
studies is, one has to know the boundaries between the systemic facts of 
language and non-systemic facts of language. There are also other disci-
plines which are interested in the concrete manifestation forms of particu-
lar languages in their social environments but from non-linguistic view-
points (cf. Grucza 1983, 282).  
 
Model 4-1. Semantic relationships between the terms related to the division  
of linguistics, the properties of language, and the linguistic and non-linguistic 




PROPERTIES OF LANGUAGE 
relational inherent 
ecological lexical grammatical 
non-linguistic linguistic 
SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 
 
 
Because separating the facts to be described as linguistic objects from the 
facts that belong to the domain of other sciences depends on the criteria 
employed in the delimitation of “extra”-linguistic facts from “intra”-
linguistic facts, one has to decide which of the properties of language 
become autonomous as tools of interpersonal communication, and which 
possess a heteronomous character, being dependent on biological and  
psychological conditionings of individual users. That means, one should 
determine the boundaries between the subject matter of the so-called “ex-
ternal” linguistics and the subject matter of “internal” linguistics, follow-
ing Ferdinand de Saussure’s suggestion (adapted from Wąsik, Z. 2003, 
36–38). However, the claim that “external” linguistics is interested in the 
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extralinguistic facts of language, and that intralinguistic facts of language 
are studied by “internal” linguistics has to be contested. In accordance 
with the opinion of Leon Zawadowski, there are also extralinguistic facts 
belonging to the domain of linguistics that result from the relation of text 
elements to extratextual reality (cf. Zawadowski 1966, 75 and Saussure 
1922, 40–43 and 261). Hence, it is better to distinguish between relational 
and inherent properties of language, bearing in mind that there are two 
kinds of relational properties, namely “lexically relational prope rties”, 
being ipso facto language-specific, and “ecologically relational prop-
erties”, considered as non-language-specific.  
 In an attempt to define the subject matter of “internal” linguistics, one 
needs to detach those grammatically inherent and lexically inherent as well 
as lexically relational properties which form the system of language from 
the ecologically relational properties which are to be subsumed under the 
non-systemic properties of language. The latter, encompassing the subject 
matter of the so-called “external” linguistics, are studied within the do-
main of the so-called non-linguistic sciences of language (cf. Model 4-1).  
 Therefore, linguists have to separate the system of language from its 
ecology (cf. Haugen 1972, 324–39), including its grammatically and lexi-
cally inherent as well as lexically relational properties—subsumed under 
the so-called ecological-relational properties of language (cf. Zawadowski 
1966, 75). From the viewpoint of ecological conditionings in which the 
languages of the world function as separate, major, and small or minor, 
systems of signification and communication, the specification of non-
systemic properties of languages seems to be useful for typological pur-
poses. Ecological properties correspondingly incorporate such variables 
as, for example, name, history, users, territory, standardization and codifi-
cation, domains of use, symbiosis with other languages in contact, forms 
of struggle for independence, language loyalty and ethnic solidarity, legal 
status and attitudes toward language. 
 
 
Linguistics and the Non-Linguistic Sciences of Language 
 
Owing to the multiaspectuality of language, it is important to delimit those 
properties that constitute the subject matter of linguistics from those which 
serve as criteria for defining the scope of the subject matter belonging to 
the other non-linguistic sciences of language, or to their neighboring disci-
plines (as illustrated in Model 4-2). 
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 To separate the domains of linguistics and the neighboring sciences of 
language, it is enough to observe the distinction between language as “an 
object” of study and language as “a relational property” of objects studied 
by other disciplines. For example, as far as the object of anthropology is 
concerned, a scientist may be curious about what the definitional attributes 
of the category of the human being are. For a psychologist, the perfor-
mance of language abilities can be treated as a clue as to how the mind 
(psyche), being the principal object of his study, operates. Furthermore, in 
the sociology of language, the social group (society) is a formal object of 
study and the language spoken by this group serves as a criterion deter-
mining its scope. Thus, one can say that language can be studied from the 
viewpoint of non-linguistic sciences of language in the ecology of man, 
i.e., in the communicational settings of individuals and collectivities.  
 
Model 4-2. The sciences of language and the division of linguistic subdisciplines 
 
Sciences of Language 
 











Linguistics proper studies language as a principal object, but sometimes in 
relation to its ecological settings, and sometimes in abstraction from the 
ecology in which it functions. In the first case, heteronomies of lan-
guage—studied by neighboring disciplines, such as, for instance, anthro-
pology, psychology, and sociology—are assigned as the properties of the 
formal object of linguistic studies belonging to anthropolinguistics, psy-
cholinguistics, and sociolinguistics. In these “ecolinguistic” disciplines, 
language constitutes the main object of study, and man, mind, or society 
are used as criteria embracing the scope of objects studied in the domains 
of so-called heteronomous linguistics. In the second case, the so-called 
autonomous linguistics claims to study linguistic facts solely on an intra-
systemic ground. Linguists try to make generalizations about systemic 
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properties of language as a whole, or describe and compare systems of 
particular languages of the world, while abstracting them from the ecology 
of their individual speakers, social groups, or ethnic, national, or interna-
tional communities. The boundaries of autonomous linguistics are to be 
delimited from those of heteronomous linguistics and the ecological sci-
ences of language by distinctions made between language as obiectum 
reale and language as obiectum formale. But the division of autonomous 
linguistics into the domains of general linguistics and particular linguistics 
is a consequence of the distinction between a theoretical approach to the 
systemic properties of language as a definitional model and a material one 
to languages as ecologically determined specimens.  
 
Model 4-3. The investigative domains of linguistics and the non-linguistic sciences 
of language from theoretical, descriptive, comparative and applied points of view 
 
A matrix of ecological 
properties of language  
in general 
Definitional and abstract  
properties of language and its 
structures in general 
Theoretical 
Ecological properties of  
a language in particular 
Systemic and structural proper-









of languages  
and language  
structures 
History  
of languages  
and language  
structures 
Comparative 
Language planning and 
glottopolitics 
Language policy and mastering 





Regarding the subject matter of autonomous linguistics, one has to take 
into account that the language as a definitional model is not to be equated 
with properties characterizing all languages of the world, or a selected 
language in particular. It is also not the “language in itself” which is speci-
fied in terms of observational statements as the subject matter of compara-
tive linguistics. Correspondingly, systemic properties of ecologically de-
termined languages are studied in typological linguistics in a search for 
primariness and secondariness, universalness and exclusiveness, isomor-
phisms and allomorphisms, and in historical linguistics—for origin and 
evolution, separation and unification, continuity, or disappearance of struc-
tures which realize respective communicative functions.  
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 On the basis of a division between disciplines that deal with language, 
it is not enough to consider the description of its actual state as a system in 
itself and to present its ecological situation. Useful here might also be 
comparative studies, historical and typological, conducted in a parallel 
manner both in the domain of linguistics as well as of the non-linguistic 
sciences of language. Such studies (as distinguished in Model 4-3) are 
important in both investigative domains for the elaboration of the so-called 
tertium comparationis, which would embrace, on the one hand, a matrix of 
ecological properties and, on the other, a definitional model of language as 
a semiotic system. 
 Apart from “pure” studies based on taxonomic or explanatory state-
ments which evaluate the state of language as it is, or explain why so and 
so is as it is, one conducts in the domain of linguistics also “applied” stud-
ies, based on directive statements that determine what should be done in 
order to reach certain states of language to be avoided or achieved, as for 
example foreign language teaching, lexicography, speech aphasia, speech 
pathology, speech therapy, rhetoric and language standardization, and the 
like (for details see Grucza 1983, especially 274–340, and 341–475; cf. 
also 390 and 436–438).  
 The practical applicability of the knowledge of language is not only 
relevant for linguistic disciplines mastering the use of verbal means and its 
optimal acquisition for the purposes of interpersonal communication; there 
are also issues belonging to the domain of the neighboring disciplines of 
linguistics, which are connected with language politics in the planning of 
vehicular languages for interethnic and international communication. 
 Thus, practitioners of language sciences have to be aware of when they 
describe the properties of language conditioned by its environment, and 
when they deal with the systemic properties of a language from a structur-
al and functional point of view. Taking a selected viewpoint, they have to 
observe the boundaries of disciplines in accordance with respective inves-
tigative domains, i.e., they have to know when they are on the ground of 
the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, or the non-linguistic sciences of 
language, being interested in facts which belong to the investigative field 
of other sciences, and when they are on the ground of heteronomous lin-
guistics, or finally—autonomous linguistics, investigating purely linguistic 
facts. They have to observe: firstly, whether they have entered the domain 
of anthropology, psychology, or sociology, secondly, whether their do-
main coincides with that of the anthropology of language, the psychology 
of language, or the sociology of language, thirdly, whether their subject 
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matter is formulated in terms of so-called hyphenated disciplines, such as, 
for example, anthropolinguistics, psycholinguistics, or sociolinguistics, and 
fourthly, whether their reflections apply to systemic properties of language 
autonomized within linguistics proper independently of other disciplines. 
By this reference to disciplinary awareness, it is emphasized that “lan-
guage as an object of study is indivisible”. However, the same cannot be 
said about the investigative perspectives and disciplines, which depend on 
the choice of viewpoints, theories and definitions. To be mentioned is a 
common practice of linguists who exceed the boundaries of their own 
discipline. While invading the fields explored by practitioners of other 
disciplines, they occasionally speak in the names of psychologists, sociol-
ogists or ethnologists, politicians or historians, sometimes even without 
having sufficient training in those respective domains. 
 Irrespective of the divisions between autonomous linguistics and het-
eronomous linguistics, one must state that language in its entirety can be 
approached from various perspectives. Remembering the famous tenet 
« c’est le point de vue qui crée l’objet » (Saussure 1922, 23), one has to 
bear in mind that the subject matter of linguistics is created by investiga-
tive perspectives both of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary provenance. 
It is worthwhile mentioning also the perspectives derived from philosophi-
cal positions, and furthermore, doctrines and frames of reference that are 
developed on metascientific premises (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 45).  
 As a matter of fact, it is not only linguists who are able to autonomize 
their object from a purely linguistic viewpoint; psychologists, sociologists, 
logicians, or philosophers, for example may construe their own model of 
language even though they do so from a perspective of its external condi-
tionings. Methodologically important for the linguists in question is when 
their model is formulated according to a linguistic theory of a language 
system delimited from its ecology, and when the gnoseological subject mat-
ter of particular autonomous linguistics means also a relative autonomy of 
a given natural language from its individual users in an ontological sense. 
 
 
Methodological Aspects of Linguistics 
 
In considering the division of investigative domains, not to be forgotten is 
also a super-ordinate level of metascientific studies, namely, metalinguis-
tics, whose duty is to formulate statements about linguistics as an investi-
gative object. In confronting metascience in general with metalinguistics 
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in particular, there is no need, however, to distinguish separate sets of the 
sciences of science and the sciences of linguistics, as for example philoso-
phy of science and philosophy of linguistics, psychology of science and 
psychology of linguistics, sociology of science and sociology of linguis-
tics, logic of science and logic of linguistics, methodology of science and 
methodology of linguistics, history of science and history of linguistics. 
Their place is on the level of the sciences of science in general. Consider-
ing, for example, logic and methodology as common for all sciences, one 
is not entitled to treat the distribution of their statements and laws as char-
acteristic for particular scientific disciplines. It is rather more appropriate 
to speak about methodological aspects of the sciences of language (for 
details and references see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 44), than about the methodolo-
gy of linguistics. In fact, every particular discipline, dealing with different 
internal and external properties of language, belongs to a separate type of 
science with respect to its methodology. It is only within the domain of 
general methodology where the practitioners of language sciences are able 
to distinguish partial methodologies which embrace the linguistically relevant 
neighboring disciplines of linguistics and the disciplines of linguistics 
proper as well as their sub-disciplines, as applying methods characteristic 
of particular types of science in general. The duty of such partial method-
ologies is to consider the co-occurrence of various gnoseological concep-
tions and various investigative approaches to objects articulated in the 
domains investigated by smaller or larger partial disciplines of language 
studies (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 45).  
 Worth mentioning here are those disciplines which apply common 
methods derived from shared or borrowed investigative perspectives of 
disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and metadisciplinary provenance, for ex-
ample, geography of language, ethnography of speaking, statistics, history, 
naturalism, functionalism, cognitivism, and the like. Not to be omitted 
among the neighboring sciences is also a number of those auxiliary disci-
plines which study the substance of linguistic codes, such as phonetics, 
utilizing the achievements of natural sciences and graphetics, tied up with 
cultural sciences and art, and the like. The picture of disciplines useful to 
the sciences of language will be incomplete if one does not add those dis-
ciplines whose objects border with language within the domain of the 
higher range, such as library sciences, literary studies, or archeology. 
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Conceptual Levels in the Understanding of Language  
 
For the reason that theories depend on certain authorized viewpoints, one 
has to acknowledge the statement that language assumed as a theoretical 
construct, does not exist really. Nor can it be abstracted from any concrete 
hitherto existing language. Distinguishing an uncountable “language as a 
theoretical construct” from a countable “‘language’ as a real object”, sci-
entists have to be aware that “language as a definitional model” is not to 
be equated with the properties common to all languages of the world or 
with the properties characteristic of one language in particular.  
 
Model 4-4. The notion of language and the problem  
of its empirical approachability 
 







theoretical construct  
on a hypothetical-deductive basis 
Language  
in abstracto 
generalization of inductively observed language 











(1) shared means of verbal signification and 
communication, autonomized collectively  
by virtue of social sanctions 




Hence, the opposition between “language in general” and “a language in 
particular” does not reflect a distinction known nota bene since the nine-
teenth century from the lectures of the Austrian linguist Friedrich Müller 
(1834–1898) as “die Sprache an und für sich”, i.e., in abstracto vs. “die 
Sprache als Individuum”, i.e., in concreto (cf. Müller 1876, 1 and 50). It 
appears to be insufficient for us, when we confront “language as a defini-
tional model” and “a language as an ecologically determined specimen” in 
the context of the disciplinary and interdisciplinary delimitation of the 
system of language from the ecology of language (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 58).  
 Therefore, at least three conceptual levels of language have to be dis-
tinguished, as illustrated in Model 4-4: (1) in general and in particular, (2) 
ex definitione, in abstracto and in concreto, and (3) as a theoretical con-
struct, as an inductive generalization, as an autonomous sociolect, or as a 
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heteronomous idiolect. As one may notice, language in general can be 
understood either as language ex definitione, i.e., a theoretical construct on 
a hypothetical-deductive basis, or as language in abstracto, i.e., a generali-
zation of inductively observed language properties in time and space. 
Furthermore, language in particular seen as synonymous with language in 
concreto, may be specified either as a shared means of verbal signification 
and communication, autonomized collectively by virtue of social sanctions, 





In the same way as it is impossible to abstract an overall human language 
from hitherto existing languages of the world that might stand for current 
and for future languages as well, one cannot believe in the creation of a 
particular language on ethnic or national levels from the totality of its 
idiolects. It is particularly unrealizable when the language as a system of 
shared means of communication, which provides the rules for socially 
accepted norms, does not possess autonomy from its user as a knowing 
subject. 
 In concluding statements, one should state that to cross the boundaries 
between isolationist and integrationist approaches, it is important to speci-
fy the existence modes of language that are autonomized as the subject 
matter of linguistic studies against the background of its heteronomous 
dependencies in the domain of human sciences. Since a basic heteronomy 
of language are individuals who speak and understand it, linguistic texts 
constitute their “dispositional” properties (cf. Quine 1960/1965, ix) as far 
as they may be referred each time to extratextual reality during the process 
of interpretation. These properties can be inductively abstracted from all 
individual realizations of texts repeated by communication participants in 
the same way in all typical communicational settings. As observable parts 
texts become linguistic “extensions” of monolingual selves (cf. Lamb 






Speech as a Linguistic Faculty 






Within the framework of distinctions introduced in this chapter, the prop-
erties of language in general are discussed in relation to man as a social 
and individual, as well as a dynamic (processual) and static (factual) phe-
nomenon. The core of such distinctions, widely popularized and confront-
ed with each other, comprises the following three terms, known from the 
lectures of Ferdinand de Saussure: langage (‘speech’), langue ‘(‘a lan-
guage in particular’)’ and parole (‘both speaking and thinking’), and the 
two terms introduced to the epistemology of linguistics by Noam Avram 
Chomsky, namely competence (‘knowledge of a language’) and perfor-
mance (‘realization of a language’). What is common for both authors is 
the claim about the intraorganismic existence mode of language as a com-
plete system and its intra- and extraorganismic manifestations in particular 
acts of mental thinking and concrete activities of speaking and listening.  
 While alluding to the famous tenet of Wilhelm von Humboldt that 
language “is not a ready-made product but an uninterrupted process” (cf. 
Introduction, p. 6), the view is exposed that language is both a social activ-
ity and a social fact. What is more, against the usage reducing the linguis-
tic object to the oppositions between system and text, the concurrence 
between dynamic and static aspects of language and its realization in texts 
is presented here on the basis of the four phases of speech formulated by 
Karl Bühler, such as “speaking as an action” and “language as work” 
against the background of “speaking as an (accomplished) act” and “lan-
guage as a (created) structure”. In this confrontation of “speaking” vs. 
“language”, “action” and “act”, as textual aspects of speech, are placed in 
opposition to “work” and “structure”, constituting ipso facto the systemic 
aspects of speech. 
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 Saussure’s conceptual construct is known through three terms: le lan-
gage, specified as a physiological-mental faculty of humanity, la langue―as 
an abstract and social system of signs, and la parole—as an individual act 
of creation and comprehension of verbal signs in speaking and thinking 
processes. A determined language, as a system of associated types of men-
tal signs consisting of two parts, the concepts of word meanings and sound 
patterns of word forms that mutually imply each other, functions for the 
purposes of communication only in synchrony, that is to say, on the axis of 
simultaneity. Its particular elements, however, are manifest in diachrony, 
i.e., on the axis of succession, having separately different sources of origin 
and different historical records in time and space. The mere term langage, 
known from the interpretation of Saussure’s lectures, has been abandoned 
in English translations depicted through (uncountable) language or speech 
as a synonym of the faculty or power of speaking, i.e., the ability to ex-
press one’s thoughts and emotions by speech sounds. Nonetheless, it has 
been retained primarily in respect to the concept of speaking understood as 
the “speech activity” of an individual.  
 Chomsky, in turn, is recognized a promoter of a nativist conception of 
language as a set of inborn lexical ideas and grammatical rules localized in 
the human brain, thanks to which communicating individuals possess the 
so-called linguistic competence, understood as an ad hoc knowledge, pre-
ceding their sensual experience, to create and recognize what is effective 
in its communicational usage. Chomsky’s supposition about the creative 
capacity of human minds which allows speakers/listeners of a given lan-
guage to generate and understand unlimited numbers of communicative 
entities, units and constructions realized through performative activities on 
the level of sentences, clauses, phrases, words, morphemes, and phonemes 
out of a finite number of basic constituents stands in close connection with 
a nativity assumption about the linguistic endowment of human brains. 
Following Chomsky, a competent speaker/listener should be judged ac-
cording to his or her execution of linguistic abilities in the formation of 
contextually appropriate, communicatively acceptable, grammatically well-
formed, and phonetically faultless utterances.  
 In subsequent proposals of sociological and educational adaptations, 
the Chomskyan notion of communicative-linguistic performance has been 
subsequently altered into the realization of communicative competence of 
speakers, where their verbal and nonverbal performances are understood 
as an execution of their linguistic and semiotic abilities in generating an 
infinite number of textual realizations of language which serve the purpos-
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es of interpersonal communication about the reality both the commonly 
known and never encountered before. It is thus assumed that communi-
cating individuals may be judged from the educational point of view as 
maladjusted or well-adjusted with respect to of their linguistic, semiotic, 
social, and cultural competences.  
 
 
Language and Speech 
 
The debate about the opposition between “language” and “speech”, and 
furthermore between “system” and “text”, usually starts with Saussure’s 
categories langage—langue—parole. From the three proposed terms, only 
the opposition between “language” and “text” is widely held in the linguis-
tic tradition. The third element, namely langage, has been abandoned 
because of its ambiguity in linguistic writings. Nonetheless, its sense still 
exists in the usage of the English term speech. “Speech” is exploited 
sometimes along with “language” as a synonym of the faculty or power of 
speaking, i.e., the ability to express one’s thoughts and emotions by speech 
sounds, but it has been retained primarily in respect to the understanding 
of the “act of speaking”. 
 According to Ferdinand de Saussure, langue and parole constitute two 
aspects of langage. The Saussurean distinction, however, as Adam Heinz 
(1914–1984) has noticed (1978, 240), is unsatisfactorily precise. It is not 
clear enough how langue and parole should be seen in relation to such 
categories as “process” and “product” (energeia and ergon), as well as to 
“system” and “text”.  
 In Karl Bühler’s (1934, 48–68) specification, then again, “speech” is 
divided into the four phases of realization, namely Sprechhandlung (‘speak-
ing as an activity’), Sprechakt (‘speaking as a realized act’), Sprachwerk 
(‘language as work’), and Sprachgebilde (‘language as a created struc-
ture’). In these sequential phases of speech, Bühler confronts de facto the 
two oppositional pairs, such as process vs. product and text vs. system. In 
the first instance, he places Handlung (‘activity’) and Werk (‘work’) as 
two different kinds of processes against the background of Akt (‘act’) and 
Gebilde (‘structure’) as two kinds of ready-made product. In the second, 
while distinguishing between Sprechen (‘speaking’) vs. Sprache (‘lan-
guage’), Bühler sees Handlung (‘activity’) and Akt (‘act’) as textual as-
pects of speech standing in opposition to Werk (‘work’) and Gebilde 
(‘structure’) which are acknowledged as systemic aspects of speech.  
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 The Saussurean term langage has not lost its validity for the representa-
tives of the non-linguistic sciences of language, or the neighboring sciences 
of linguistics. Joseph Vendryes (1875–1960) argued earlier, independently 
of Ferdinand de Saussure, in favor of the distinction between the studies of 
“speech” and the studies of “language”. In his handbook, written in 1914, 
i.e., two years before Cours de linguistique générale (1916), which ap-
peared in print under the characteristic title Le langage as late as in 1921, 
Vendryes expressed his conviction that the search for the origins of speech 
was not a linguistic problem. The majority of linguists who wrote about 
the origins of speech were, in his opinion, wrong when they tried to re-
solve this problem from a linguistic point of view as if it were identical 
with the origins of languages. As he affirmed, conforming with the term 
introduced by Arsène Darmsteter (1846–1888) in 1887 (cf. Darmsteter 
1887/1921), “Between speech and language, there is such a difference that 
speech constitutes an ensemble of physiological and psychological abili-
ties, which a human being has in command in order to speak, while lan-
guages constitute practical applications of these abilities” (Vendryes 1921, 
275, trans. is ours: ZW).  
 The observance of the difference between language and speech has 
appeared to be relevant for neuropsychologists. Mariusz Maruszewski, a 
Polish psychologist (1932–1973), for example, proposes to define lan-
guage as a socially actualized system of symbols having a specific mean-
ing, which are utilized in human communication in accordance with the 
principles of how to construe linguistic utterances being independent of an 
individual (1970, 17 [1975]).  
 In other words, language, in Maruszewski’s view, is considered as an 
objective system that comprises the resources of socially created means for 
denoting elements of reality (understood in its broadest sense) perceived 
by a speaker and means for expressing the relationships between these 
elements. By stressing the objectivity of this system, Maruszewski means 
only that it is a social norm. As such, language system has to be equated 
with a set of rules serving mutual understanding, which are used by a 
given social group, and which has to be acquired by each of its members, 
so that he/she is able to participate in this mutual understanding.  
 By speech, Maruszewski proposes to understand an ensemble of activi-
ties that consist in the processes of mutual understanding achieved through 
the use of a language. As he has asserted, an individual acquires the ability 
of performing such activities as a consequence of being in contact with 
other speaking individuals. Thus, speech is a kind of individual activity, 
Chapter Five 100 
 
which consists in the realization of the rules of language for the purposes 
of mutual understanding. From this point of view, one should distinguish 
between the two groups of activities constituting the speech: the activities 
of sending the speech products and the activities of receiving the speech 
products (cf. Maruszewski 1970, 17 [1975]).  
 To have a clear picture of the difference between speech and language, 
it is worthwhile mentioning the position of the authors of Dictionnaire de 
linguistique, Jean Dubois et al. (1973). Under the lexical entry langage, 
one can read there that speech is a specific faculty of mankind to com-
municate by using systems of vocal signs while implementing complex 
physiological techniques. This faculty implies the existence of a symbolic 
function and genetically specialized neuronal centers, and vocal signs used 




System and Text 
 
The langue-and-parole distinction coming from the lectures of Ferdinand 
de Saussure has been popularized in the area of functional structuralism in 
the epistemology of linguistics—under the influence of the static interpre-
tation of language as a tool halted at a certain stage of development—as an 
opposition between “system” and “text”. Since language as a system is 
primarily conditioned by the texts produced by its speakers, its substantial 
realization has to be interpreted in terms of a token-and-type distinction. 
Within a pair: “a set of tokens (of specimens)” vs. “a set of types (classes 
of specimens) of tokens”, the first member of this distinction is to be pre-
sented in terms of the remaining others.  
 The “text” is usually rendered as a product of speech, i.e., a concrete 
realization of language as a system of signs having both an abstract and a 
social character. In this sense, it can be included into the realm of parole, 
as proposed by Saussure, when one takes into consideration this alone 
what originates in the individual act of text-processing connected with an 
individual act of text-understanding in the mind of individual language 
speakers and listeners.  
 In functional linguistics, the text is therefore treated as a primary form 
of the manifestation of language which serves as a tool of mutual under-
standing by means of speech. On the one hand, it is a material bearer of 
meanings conventionally ascribed to it, and on the other, a means of com-
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munication. As such, the text is to be considered as a basic constituent of 
all elements of language, although it can manifest itself in any substantial 
shape. 
 The “system” of language, however, is conceived in terms of its textual 
realization making up a set of typical elements and relations between these 
elements which repeat always in the same way throughout all communica-
tional events. As such, they become a basis for the realization of speech 
behavior of individuals and social groups in a conventional and commonly 
accepted form.  
 The sets of types of text elements, which serve for transmitting infor-
mation about extralinguistic reality (and in individual acts of speaking and 
understanding—about extra-textual reality), are inductively deciphered 
from all language phenomena repeated in the same way and in the same 
situational environment. To be precise, one may say that the system of 
language is composed of these abstracted categories of text elements, their 
properties, entities, units, and constructions, which appear on the levels of 
phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax, and stylistics. Their hierarchy 
is as follows: distinctive feature, phoneme, morpheme, stem, word, phrase, 
clause, sentence, utterance, and discourse.  
 In the process of acquiring a particular language, an individual speaker 
has the possibility to appreciate all actual qualities of constructions and to 
preview their potential combinations in realization. Nevertheless, he/she is 
unable to acquire it in totality. As a whole, a given system of language, 
normalized and standardized by a certain speech community, exists only in 
the sets of text types, mastered by all of its actual and potential speakers 
and processed in all contexts of its social forms of manifestation connected 
with its application, acquisition and attrition.  
 Moreover, because the system of each natural language is abstract by 
nature, it can be deduced from concrete texts only by inferences. Addi-
tionally, a particular language has a social character, because, as a whole, 
it recurs mainly in the processes and products of communication among 
people. One should thus agree that “language in general”, assumed hypo-
thetically as a theoretical construct by researchers who strive to discover 
all its regularities by observation of its various forms of manifestation in 
particular types of communicational events, is de facto empirically unap-
proachable. It is true that the realization of language achieves a concrete 
observational shape solely in the texts of its individual speakers.  
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Collectivity and Individuality 
 
Linguistic facts of speech present themselves in two human-centered con-
ditionings that govern their states of being, namely in the individual and 
social modes of existence. What manifests itself in particular acts of 
speaking and understanding constitutes the properties of individual partic-
ipants in human communication. As social facts, in another dimension, 
one has to recognize these collectively accepted tools of interindividual 
communication which crystallize themselves in the acts of speech as sets 
of shared verbal means. In its social existence form, a particular language 
appears as an organized set of the types of text elements that are acquired 
and realized for the needs of speakers/hearers and requirements of speech 
communities in accordance with commonly accepted rules of usage and 
norms of correctness.  
 In abstracting language in general from individual products and acts of 
speaking, called parole in Saussurean terms, one not only detaches the social 
facts from the individual ones, but also, at the same time, one distinguishes 
the properties of linguistic texts which are “abstractively” relevant from 
those which are functionally irrelevant. In other words, it is possible to 
distinguish these properties of the linguistic facts which are essential from 
some others which are less or more accidental in its substantial realization. 
One can say that a language in particular is not a function of a speaking 
person, but rather a ready-made product which an individual initially ac-
quires in a passive way. As opposed to language, parole constitutes an 
individual act of will and human intelligence, related both to thinking and 
speaking operations being simultaneously performed. In the first instance, 
parole exhibits combinations by means of which the speaker subordinates 
certain communicative functions to elements of a certain code taking into 
consideration their word-for-word meaning, communicational impact, or 
stimulus-response effect. In the second, it involves psychophysical mecha-
nisms that allow a particular person to express these combinations through 
products, also called “genres of speech” which are perceivable by human 
senses in specific communicational events. 
 
 
Process and Product 
 
Another kind of “aspectual” approach to functional properties and forms 
of the manifestation of language in speech has been expressed in the dis-
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cussions between representatives of two opposite orientations arguing 
about the fact whether language is a process or a product (for interpreta-
tions and references see Helbig 1973, 119–148, especially pp. 124 and 
127–135). Recognized, in this respect, has been the claim of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt from the Introduction to the first volume of his work Über die 
Kawi- Sprache auf der Insel Jawa of 1836, to be found also in his sepa-
rately published and more known work Über die Verschiedenheit des 
menschlichen Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung 
des Menschengeschlechts also of the same year 1836.  
 
Die S p r a c h e  in ihrem wirklichen Wesen aufgefasst ist etwas beständing 
und in jedem Augenblicke V o r ü b e r g e h e n d e s  … Sie selbst ist kein 
Werk (Ergon), sondern eine Thätigkeit (Energeia). Ihre wahre Definition 
kann daher nur eine genetische seyn. Sie ist nehmlich die sich ewig 
wiederholende A r b e i t  d e s  G e i s t e s , den a r t i c u l i e r t e n  L a u t  
zum Ausdruck des G e d a n k e n  fähig zu machen. Unmittelbar und streng 
genommen, ist dies die Definiton des jedesmaligen S p r e c h e n s ; aber im 
wahren und wesentlichen Sinne kann man auch nur gleichsam die Totalitat 
dieses Sprechens als die Sprache ansehen (Humboldt 1836, LVII, Form der 
Sprache § 8).4 
 
One can accordingly say after further contemporary interpretations that 
language is energeia and not ergon; in other words, it is a generative activ-
ity of expression and an affective force which repeats always in the same 
way and always in a new way. A characteristic feature of language, con-
sidered under the dynamic aspect, is that its speakers, by producing verbal 
signs from a finite number of means which they have at their disposal, 
execute an infinite number of communicational events. Hence, (Johann) 
Leo Weisgerber (1899–1985) has proposed, in his work Vom Weltbild der 
deutschen Sprache (1953), to interpret the assertion “language is energeia” 
rather as “language is a spiritual force” (Germ. die geistige Kraft or die 
geistige Macht) which transforms things and affairs into phenomena in 
such a way that they become the property of human thought. In this dy-
namic view, language is ascribed to have its own life in a given society 
when it oscillates between reality and human minds as “the intermediate 
spiritual world” (Germ. die geistige Zwischenwelt).  
 As ergon one has to regard, following the Humboldtian view, these 
outputs of language which become a ready-made product, liberated from 
the process of speaking. Leo Weisgerber, in turn, has interpreted ergon as 
the result of “the ‘wording’ of the world” (Germ. das “Worten” der Welt; 
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cf. Weisgerber 1955), i.e., as a crystallization of “a world view” (Germ. 
die Weltansicht) in the consciousness of individuals, communities and 
nations, and, consequently, in the spoken and written texts of a language. 
 
 
Competence and Performance 
 
Language as a social aspect of human speech is relatively independent of 
the will of its individual speakers and listeners. Nobody is able to create 
his/her language as a personal property and to transform it into a means of 
signification and communication when it is not accepted by a social con-
tract established by members of a given speech community. An individual 
has to learn it, in order to cognize it and to obey its rules. A child, for 
example, acquires it for itself gradually. Language exists even in the form 
of a capability, as in the case of a person who has lost the ability of speak-
ing. One can say, by way of illustration, that someone possesses a lan-
guage when he/she understands only its texts while conceiving them as 
verbal, spoken or written signs. The problem with the supposed proprietor-
ship of a language is connected with the social character of verbal means. 
Individual uses of language are sanctioned by social norms, sometimes im-
posed by authorities. They are governed by the principles of common 
acceptability which the particular members of speech communities have 
the duty to conform to. Another form of possessing the speech is specified 
in Saussurean terms as “the linguistic faculty proper” (« la faculté linguis-
tique par excellence »). It refers to two kinds of abilities: in one sense, it 
means the ability to acquire the language of an ecologically determined 
community during the “critical period” of maturation in the development 
of an individual, and in another, it may also connote the ability to create 
one’s own inter-individual communicative means which is developed on 
the bordering zone between separate varieties of one and the same lan-
guage, or several languages spoken by regional communities, ethnic mi-
norities, or national majorities in a given communicational setting. This 
kind of proprietorship related to a particular language, mastered by society 
or individuals, is usually understood as the “linguistic competence”.  
 The term competence has entered the domain of linguistic theory ow-
ing to the proposal of Noam Avram Chomsky (1965, 3–15). In accordance 
with the intention of the author, this term was referred initially to the 
knowledge of grammar applied in actual speaking (see Chomsky 1965, 3):  
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Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a 
completely homogenous speech community, who knows its language 
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors 
(random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in 
actual performance. 
 
Slightly later, with the inclusion of a phonemic and semantic capability of 
speakers, the notion of linguistic competence has covered the totality of 
linguistic knowledge, the abilities and habits of an ideal language speaker 
and listener who functions in a homogeneous speech community not pol-
luted by any influences from the outside. At the same time, sociologically 
inclined linguists (after Dell Hymes 1962, 1966, 1971, 1972) have noticed 
the need for introducing a pragmatic component into a more general no-
tion of “communicative competence” while emphasizing that considera-
tions of language use are often indispensable for the comprehension of 
much of the linguistic form. Instead of assessing what can be said in a lan-
guage, practitioners of language sciences have rather to account for “what 
can be said when, where, by whom, to whom, in what manner, and under 
what particular circumstances” (Saville-Troike 1982, 8). Consequently, the 
area of communicative competence is proposed to involve knowing not 
only the linguistic code, but also to deal with the social and cultural 
knowledge, speakers are presumed to have, to enable them to use and inter-
pret linguist forms. Ultimately, the conceptual scope of communicative 
competence encompasses not only the notion of social competence but 
also the notion of cultural competence, or the total set of knowledge and 
skills which speakers employ in a situation, as one may conclude from the 
following statement of Muriel Saville-Troike (1982, 22–23): 
 
Communicative competence extends to both knowledge and expectation of 
who may or may not speak in certain settings, when to speak and when to 
remain silent, whom one may speak to, how one may talk to persons of 
different statuses and roles, what appropriate nonverbal behaviors are in 
various contexts, what the routines for turn-taking are in conversations, how 
to ask for and give information, how to request, how to offer or de-cline 
assistance or cooperation, how to give commands, how to enforce 
discipline, and the like—in short, everything involving the use of language 
and other communicative dimensions in particular social settings … 
 
A competent speaker/listener is seen as being able to create and recognize 
linguistic utterances as mutually distinguishable under the phonological 
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aspect, as correct with regard to its grammar, logical from a semantic point 
of view, and as suitably adjusted to an appropriate situational context. An 
empirical testimony of such a broadly understood linguistic competence is 
to be found in the communicative-linguistic performance of an individual. 
Verbal performance refers to the execution of linguistic abilities in gener-
ating an infinite number of textual utterances, which serve the purposes of 
interpersonal communication, both the commonly known and new ones 
not heard before. The general competencies of individuals, having a lin-
guistic, communicative, social, and cultural character, are usually judged in 
relation to ideal interlocutors in an ideal speech community, including 
good manners or maladjustment that result from inappropriate educational 
treatment. Sometimes, the statement of “incompetence” may give rise to 
social sanctions or even discriminations due to misjudgments. 
 Defined on the ground of language sciences, the notion of linguistic 
competence as well as a broadly understood notion of communicative 
competence has found its reflection in the methodology of foreign lan-
guage teaching. Accordingly, the perspective of “communicativism” is fre-
quently suggested as an epistemological attitude of practitioners of foreign 
language teaching who become convinced that, apart from structural facts 
of the language system, the learners should be trained in the pragmalinguis-
tic, social and cultural environment of communication.  
 The normative model of intercultural communicative competence in 
the area of globalization for the tasks of the world citizenship, has been 
widely popularized by Michael Byram (1997, 32–47), the promoter of a 
belief that to draw appropriate conclusions from learning alien cultures, 
the learners of a foreign language should first realize and understand their 
own culture. According to this model, teachers of foreign languages, while 
using appropriate didactic materials for transmitting cultural knowledge 
and improving linguistic skills, are expected to shape the intercultural 
communicative competence of their pupils through instilling into their  
minds five kinds of the respective “savoirs”, such as (1) savoir, i.e., 
knowledge of native and foreign cultures along with accepted norms of 
conduct in public and private institutions in relation to differences inside 
the society and language variations, (2) savoir être, i.e., positive attitudes 
marked by curiosity, openness to modify ways of thinking and perceiving 
the others, and readiness to transform the way of perceiving the foreign 
culture and to show keen interest to otherness, (3) savoir comprendre, i.e., 
linguistic skills of interpreting and comprehending, which enable an indi-
vidual to assess, for example a document or an event, and to uncover opac-
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ities or allusions in their connotative meaning, (4) savoir apprendre, i.e., 
educational skills of acquiring new knowledge about a foreign culture or 
unknown cultural practices, and to manage this knowledge with appropri-
ate attitudes in communicative interactions, (5) savoir s’engager, i.e., 
operational skills of comparing and contrasting native and foreign cultures 
on the basis of well-defined principles. (discussed by Wąsik, E. 2014). 
 Moreover, in the domain of applied linguistics, Michael Canale and 
Merill Swain (1979, 1980, 1988), and separately also Michael Canale 
(1983), advocating the idea of a communicative approach to the foreign 
language teaching, have proposed to integrate the communicative compe-
tence within the framework of the four constituents: (1) grammatical com-
petence, referring to the knowledge of vocabulary and grammatical rules, 
(2) sociolinguistic competence—suitability to the situation, (3) discursive 
competence—cohesion and coherence, and (4) strategic competence—
appropriate use of communicational tactics. 
 Communicative competence is composed minimally of grammatical 
competence, sociolinguistic competence, and communicational strategies, 
or what is also called as strategic competence. There is no strong theoreti-
cal or empirical motivation for the view that grammatical competence is 
more or less crucial to successful communication than the sociolinguistic 
competence or strategic knowledge. The primary goal of a communicative 
approach must be to facilitate the integration of these types of knowledge 
for the learner, an outcome that is not likely to result from overemphasis 
on one form of acquisitional competence over the others throughout the 
program of foreign language teaching (Canale & Swain 1980, 27). 
 Theoretical specifications pertaining to the notion of linguistic and 
communicative competence have been utilized by practitioners of foreign 
language teaching in the preparation of language tests. According to Lyle 
F. Bachmann and Adrian S. Palmer, the testing of verbal skills can be  
accepted as a surrogate form of linguistic performance in specific situa-
tions or contexts. Bachmann (1990/1991, 81–90), for example, has as-
sumed that the communicative competence consist of language knowledge, 
i.e., in other words, a capability or an ability to introduce this knowledge 
in a speech performance. In his opinion, the communicational language 
abilities include: linguistic competence, strategic competence and psycho-
physiological mechanisms of individuals.  
 In their subsequent work, however, Bachmann together with Palmer 
(1996/2000, 62–82) have departed from the assumption that each commu-
nicative performance of verbal abilities is based on complex and multidi-
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mensional interactions between the properties of individual language 
speakers and listeners. To these properties belong: (1) personality charac-
teristics, which encompass age, sex, nationality, residence status, native 
language, level, and type of general education, or prior experience with a 
given text, (2) topical knowledge about the real-world and culture as well 
as (3) affective and emotional correlates of topical knowledge. As far as 
the knowledge of a language is concerned, understood as linguistic compe-
tence, one may distinguish after the authors two of its levels. The first  
level, called organizational knowledge, includes the erudition of how to 
construe texts as a sequence of utterances and sentences, which includes 
both: (1) grammatical knowledge about word formation, sentence compo-
sition, and even their realization in spoken and written texts, (2) textual 
knowledge including the rhetorical rules of cohesion and conversational 
rhetoric.  
 The second level includes pragmatic knowledge, i.e., the knowledge 
about the relationships of utterances to the goals of language users and to 
the contexts of language use, which embraces (1) the functional knowledge 
of language users about how to formulate utterances, so that they fulfill 
respective functions, as, e.g., ideational, manipulative, heuristic, or imagi-
native, as well as (2) the sociolinguistic knowledge pertaining to the ac-
quaintance with social contexts of how to construe utterances under the 
differentiation of language varieties, registers, idiomatic expressions, cul-
tural references and figures of speech. Thus, it is obvious for the special-
ists of language teaching that the acquisition of purely linguistic abilities 
which can be tested is not enough, as far as they must cooperate with vari-
ous situational contexts of language use. 
 Alluding to the questions pertaining to the communicative competence 
as a kind of knowledge achieved by learners through their participation in 
social and cultural life of human individuals, the authors (Coste et al. 
2001) of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: 
Learning, Teaching, Assessment, discussed to a great extent by Hanna 
Komorowska-Janowska (2006, 65–66) in the context of second language 
pedagogy, and summarized with reference to linguistic properties of com-
municating individuals by Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik (2007, 173), have 
mostly taken into consideration the extensive proposal of Byram (1997). 
This document prepared by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg takes into 
consideration the development of the following general competences: 
declarative knowledge (savoir), skills and know how (savoir-faire), exis-
tential competence (savoir-être), and ability to learn (savoir-apprendre).  
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 The first domain of sociolinguistic competence includes, among the 
other things: the knowledge about the culture of communicative communi-
ties who speak in a particular language, especially about the everyday life 
of people (eating, drinking, holidays, working hours, or recreation), envi-
ronmental conditionings (standards of living, housing), interpersonal rela-
tions (social class, family patterns, gender- and generation-determined roles), 
values, beliefs and attitudes (in the domain of history, politics, art or reli-
gion), body language, social customs and ritual behavior, as well as the 
attentiveness to differences between bearers of different cultures, covering 
the knowledge, awareness and understanding of relations (similarities and 
noticeable differences) between communicating individuals and groups.  
 The second domain institutes mainly practical skills (i.e., social, exis-
tential, professional, and recreational), as well as communicational skills in 
interpersonal and intercultural relationships (the ability to establish mutual 
relationships between the cultures of a native and foreign language, to show 
sensitivity, to identify with and to apply various strategies in the in the 
contacts between representatives of different cultures, to fulfill a mediating 
role between domestic and foreign cultures, to counteract against misun-
derstandings, or conflicts that result from the lack of respect, and to over-
come the disagreements based on stereotypes or prejudices).  
 To the third domain, one may include the existential competence of 
communication participants which embraces their behavioral attitudes of 
showing interest and openness towards new experiences and views, new 
persons, societies and cultures. Special positions occupy here also the 
willingness to accept beliefs, opinions, and cultural values of others, or the 
readiness and ability to assume conventional attitudes toward intercultural 
differences in customs, beliefs, motivations, cognitive styles and person-
ality factors, etc.  
 The fourth domain, referring to the ability of learning, constitutes a con-
dition for achieving all four kinds of communicative competences in inter-
personal contacts between representatives of different linguistic and cultural 
communities. Their foundations are formed by epistemological and voca-
tional awareness, cognitive and heuristic abilities, such as, for example, 
the ability to learn new terms along with new experiences, to learn new 
things, to utilize modern informational technologies in conformity with 







Form and Substance 




Delimiting the Domain of Interest 
 
The subject matter of this chapter (based on the version of Wąsik, Z. 1999b, 
including the references of Wąsik, Z. 1997 and 1998, which has been 
partly summarized in 2003 and extended in 2008)5 comprises—with spe-
cial regard to figurative devices—the educational modes of explaining the 
notion of form in correlation with the notion of substance, as encountered 
in the academic handbooks by the students and practitioners of language 
sciences. Therefore, the topic of the following inquiry has been limited to 
linguistic semiotics which the users of academic handbooks, dictionaries 
and encyclopedic entries usually meet during their university studies.  
 
 
Understanding the Notion of Form,  
Its Scope and Contextual Usage 
 
Against the background of the development of philosophical thought, it 
should be noted that the applications of the term form in linguistic writings 
together with its lexicographic usage do not stand in one-to-one corre-
spondence. In the modern usage, form is placed in opposition to content, 
i.e., to sense or meaning, whereas the notion of form is usually equalized 
with the grammatical (i.e., phonological, morphological and syntactic) 
entities and structures distinguished from the lexical (and stylistic) ones on 
the basis of their category-related features. Another view of form is con-
nected with the opposition between phonological and semantic planes in 
language. Accordingly, the elements of form are discussed within the 
framework of functionalist structuralism as text elements that correspond 
to the elements of extratextual content. For this reason, form is frequently 
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either contrasted with or placed in relation to function or meaning. What is 
more, the adherents of formalist structuralism otherwise propose to speak 
in favor of such a definition of the term form which appears to be synony-
mous with a relational value of substance. Thus, the linguistic form is 
meant to operate, as a specific carving pattern, on the amorphous non-
linguistic matter giving, in the output, a network of relationships, into 
which the elements of linguistic character mutually (among themselves) 
enter (cf. Dubois et al. 1973, forme). 
 
 
Substantial Form as an Existential Determinant of Matter 
 
In the context of the notion of form in its relation to substance, one has to 
place the issue of the so-called zero-signs, or the question of the order of 
words, which are considered to be meaningful. This topic might be better 
understandable when one confronts the statement of Ferdinand de Saus-
sure, a forerunner of abstract structuralism: “So it is not even necessary to 
have any material sign in order to give expression to an idea the language 
may be content simply to contrast something with nothing” (Saussure 
1972 [1983, 86]), with an illustrative declaration of Louis Hjelmslev, a 
founder of formalist glossematics: 
 
In the general calculus there is no question of whether the individual 
structural types are manifested, but only whether they are manifestable 
and, nota bene, manifestable in any substance whatsoever. Substance is 
thus not a necessary presupposition for linguistic form (italics BS), but 
linguistic form (italics BS) is a necessary presupposition for substance. 
Manifestation, in other words, is a selection in which the linguistic form is 
the constant and the substance the variable (Hjelmslev {1953, 94}, quoted 
by Bertha Siertsema 1955/1965, 127). 
 
One can thus notice that the linguistic substance has been principally de-
fined in a negative manner. Everything which may be defined as a “sub-
stance” has been considered as not a “form”, i.e., as not belonging to the 
system of interdependencies that constitute the structure of each of the 
given objects. In consequence, paying more attention to form than to sub-
stance has lead some formally inclined linguists (cf. Heinz 1978, passim) 
to believe that the form is independent of the substance.  
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Alluding to the Antique Heritage of the Notion of Form, 
Substance and Matter 
 
The notion of substantial form as a principle constituting the real existence 
of matter is descended from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), nota bene the pupil 
of Plato (427–347 B.C.). However, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) has rein-
terpreted it in a mentalist direction, assuming the existence of a priori forms, 
due to which thought, by virtue of its internal structure, orders subjective 
experience and creates the science. But he has applied the term form only 
with reference to sensorial perceptions in the context of matter (cf. Podsiad 
& Więckowski 1983, forma). From that time on, following Kant’s reinter-
pretation, form has been placed in relation to (and as independent of) mat-
ter. And the matter as corporeality, being the notion of Platonic heritage, 
has been opposed to its Aristotelian understanding as the raison d’être and 
the ground of changes.  
 In consequence, the interaction between Platonist and Aristotelian ways 
of reasoning has contributed to neglecting the unorganized matter and 
paying more attention to the importance of the form. In this combination 
of approaches, where the “form” is defined as a counterpart of a “func-
tion” or a “meaning”, and where the “substantial form” is treated as an 
organizing principle of being and the “matter”, in fact, a constitutive quali-
ty of language. 
 
 
Language as a Carving Pattern  
Operating in Speaking and Thinking Processes 
 
Being influenced by a structuralist way of seeing the nature, in one of the 
chapters devoted to the understanding of linguistic value, Saussure has 
stated that: “In order to realise that the language itself can be nothing other 
than a system of pure values, one needs only consider the two elements 
which are involved in the way it functions, ideas and sounds” ([1983, 110]), 
as far as: “The characteristic role of a language in relation to thought is not 
to supply the material phonetic means by which ideas may be expressed. It 
is to act as intermediary between thought and sound, in such a way that the 
combination of both necessarily produces a mutually complementary de-
limitation of units” (Saussure [1983, 110]; cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 33). 
Form and Substance in the Educational Discourse 113 
 
 This above quoted statement and its further extension in Saussure’s 
lectures have explicitly shown how language as a carving pattern operates 
in speaking and thinking processes ([1983, 110–111]):  
 
Thought, chaotic by nature, is made precise by this process of segmentation. 
But what happens is neither a transformation of thoughts into matter, nor a 
transformation of sounds into ideas. What takes place, is a somewhat 
mysterious process by which ‘thought-sound’ evolves divisions, and a 
language takes shape with its linguistic units in between those two 
amorphous masses. One might think of it as being like air in contact with 
water: changes in atmospheric pressure break up the surface of the water 
into series of divisions, i.e. waves. The correlation between thought and 
sound, and the union of the two, is like that.  
 
As it results from the Saussure’s reasoning, (1) language orders thoughts 
on the one plane and speech sounds on the other, providing them with 
forms, and also (2) language forms itself by mediating between the sub-
stances of internal ideas and external sounds (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 34).  
 
 
Language as a Domain of Articulation: The Sheet-of-Paper Metaphor 
 
Speaking about the unification of thought with sound material, Saussure 
has exposed the concept of language as a system of pure values. However, 
having in mind its role in the creation of basic sign structures, he has de-
fined language as a domain of articulation where the idea establishes itself 
in the sound and where the sound becomes a sign for the idea, as follows: 
“Linguistic structure might be described as the domain of articulation … 
Every linguistic sign is a part or member, an articulus, where an idea is 
fixed in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an idea” (Saussure 
[1983, 111]). This view is reflected in Saussure’s comparison of linguistic 
structures to a sheet of paper where the thought constitutes its recto, and 
the sound—its verso, as it is shown in his own statements:  
 
A language might also be compared to a sheet of paper. Thought is one 
side of the sheet and sound the reverse side. Just it is impossible to take a 
pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at the same time cutting 
the other, so it is impossible in a language to isolate sound from thought, or 
thought from sound. To separate the two for theoretical purposes takes us 
into either pure psychology or pure phonetics, not linguistics.  
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 Linguistics then, operates along this margin, where sound and thought 
meet. The contact between them gives rise to a form, not a substance 
(Saussure [1983, 111]). 
 
One can, therefore, state that it is impossible to cut up the first side without 
cutting up the second one. Similarly, in a language, one is not able to sepa-
rate either sound from thought, or thought from sound; one can grasp the 
essence of the linguistic sign only through the abstraction of either pure 
psychological or pure phonological facts. 
 
 
Metaphorical Depiction of Language as a Game of Chess 
 
The popular dictum of Saussure (1916/1949, 169]) « La langue est une 
forme et non une substance » (quoted by Siertsema 1965, 6), i.e., “lan-
guage is a form and not a substance” (Saussure [1983, 120]), should be 
interpreted that language is not only a set of physical expressions but also 
a set of values of elements that mutually imply each other. In view of the 
fact that the elements of language are interchangeable, because they can be 
expressed in different substances, the form of language alone is under-
stood as a system of pure values.  
 Thus, one can, say in accordance with the Saussurean approach that the 
form constitutes a set of relations between pure values and that it superim-
poses itself as a system upon the substance (e.g., in speech or writing). 
Hence, form in opposition to substance is to be seen as language-specific 
and substance as a property which is characteristic of the so-called parole.  
 Figuratively, Saussure has presented a relation between form and sub-
stance on the basis of a parallel between the language and the game of 
chess. As experts know, chess is a game played on a chessboard by two 
people who maneuver 16 pieces each according to rules governing move-
ment of the six kinds of pieces (pawn, rook, knight, bishop, queen, king), 
in order to bring the opponent's king into checkmate. In educational dis-
course, linguists use the notion of rules applied in the chess game to par-
ticular pieces located and relocated on a chessboard to compare them with 
the rules of language utilized by its speakers in a certain contextually de-
termined communicational situation. In the same way as chess players 
tacitly define their moves in the game, which allows them to play in an 
effective way with an infinite number of potential outcomes, the users of 
verbal signs from a particular language realize their communicational 
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goals by making use of the system of rules and words that enable them to 
perform their speech acts in actual instances of speech communication. 
 In a chess game, for example, the material shape of each piece, what 
they are made of (of wood or of ivory, etc.), is not relevant when those 
pieces are exchangeable, when they are got lost, even by the pieces of 
chalk or stone. However, a mutual relation between them, and the role 
separately ascribed to chess-pieces in a given moment when they are 
placed on the chessboard is relevant.  
 
… to say, for instance, that the parts of speech do reflect linguistic 
structure, simply because they are logically viable categories—is to forget 
that linguistic facts do not exist independently of sound-sequences divided 
into meaningful segments … The point can be brought out once again by 
comparison with chess (cf. p. 125ff). Consider a knight in chess. Is the 
piece by itself an element of the game? Certainly not. For as a material 
object, separated from its square on the board and the other conditions of 
play, it is of no significance for the player. It becomes a real, concrete 
element only it takes on or becomes identified with its value in the game. 
Suppose that during a game this piece gets destroyed or lost. Can it be 
replaced? Of course it can. Not only by some other knight but even by an 
object of quite a different shape, which can be counted as a knight 
provided it is assigned the same value as the missing piece. Thus it can be 
seen that in semiological systems, such as languages where the elements 
keep one another in a state of equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, 
the notions of identity and value merge. 
 That is why in the final analysis the notion of value covers units, 
concrete entities and realities. There is no fundamental difference between 
these notions, but they allow the same problem to be formulated in a 
variety of different ways. Whether we are trying to determine units, 
realities, concrete entities, or value, it will always come down to the same 
central question, which runs throughout the whole of static linguistics 
(Saussure [1983, 108–109]). 
 
 
Substance and Form of Language in the Metaphor of a Sand Pie 
 
Hjelmslev, in turn, although alluding to Saussure, has presented a slightly 
different opposition between form and substance which coexist within the 
same two planes of language, namely the plane of expression and the plane 
of content. If truth be told, Hjelmslev (cf. 1943 [1953/1961/1963, 13 and 52–
58]) has confirmed Saussure’s claim as to the duality of the sign, but he 
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has proposed to regard its two sides signifié and signifiant as two separate 
“functives”, i.e., expression form and content form which are intercon-
nected by a sign function. By this proposal, Hjelmslev has rejected the 
widespread opinion (nota bene of Polish logicians) that the sign is some-
thing which stands for something else. In his view, the sign is not an ex-
pression that points to a content outside the sign itself, but a two-sided 
entity which acts in two directions: “outwards”, i.e., to the substance of 
expression and “inwards”, i.e., to the substance of content. 
 As Hjelmslev has assumed, without linguistic signs the so-called sub-
stance of expression may create a disordered row, or an unorganized mass 
of sounds to which none of language users can ascribe any content. Fur-
thermore, the substance of content may appear as an unordered set, or a 
shapeless mass, of thought about things and states of affairs which have no 
boundaries and which are not classified at all. 
 By the form, one should understand in the Hjelmslevian sense an ab-
stract scheme or a principle organizing structural relations between func-
tives connected with each other by a sign function in both planes: the plane 
of expression and the plane of content. In Hjelmslev’s interpretation ([1953, 
44]), the form operates as a curving pattern on both planes of the linguistic 
sign which are connected with each other, making them mutually subordi-
nate as both the substance of content and the substance of expression.  
 What constitutes a formless continuum in both planes, what has been 
ordered differently by the form of each of the languages in particular, 
Hjelmslev has proposed to call the “matter”. As he has explained, the so-
called “purport” of substance, following its English translation, constitutes 
the “factor that is common … and that remains common to all languages” 
(Hjelmslev [1953, 46], quoted by Siertsema 1965, 148). In Hjelmslev’s 
opinion, the same matter can exist in different languages receiving only a 
different shape, i.e., a different form. And what this shape determines, are 
exclusively the functions of language, the sign function and the functions, 
which are derived from them. Matter itself remains, in each case, sub-
stance for one or another form. As it results from Hjelmslev’s formula-
tions, the “matter” (of content, or of expression) can become a “substance” 
only then, when it appears in the role of a functive connected by a sign-
function with the “form” (of content or expression). The substance is, in 
Hjelmslevian terms, this part of the matter of content, or expression, which 
constitutes a concrete product ordered and organized by the form that has 
been shaped for the purposes of communication by means of verbal signs.  
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 To illustrate the difference between matter (purport), substance and 
form of a language, Hjelmslev has utilized the metaphors of a piece of 
sand, a mold form and a formed sand pie. By the substance of sand, he has 
understood the sand which is found within a mold form. The form, he has 
seen in the shape given to the sand pie (in question) by a mold. The start-
ing difference between sand as matter and sand as substance depends from 
the fact, whether a determined set has an ordered character, provided by a 
given form. A handful of sand as the matter can become a substance for 
different sand pies formed by a number of different molds. 
 
[T]he unformed purport extractable from … linguistic chains is formed 
differently in each language. Each language lays down its own boundaries 
within the amorphous “thought-mass” and stress different factors in it in 
different arrangements, puts the centers of gravity in different places and 
gives them different emphases. It is like one and the same handful of sand 
that is formed in quite different patterns, or like the cloud in the heavens 
that changes shape in Hamlet’s view from minute to minute. Just as the 
same sound can be put into different molds, and the same cloud take on 
ever-new shapes, so also the same purport is formed or structured differently 
in different languages. What determines its form is solely the functions of 
the language, the sign function and the functions deducible therefrom. 
Purport remains, each time, substance for a new form, and has no possible 
existence except through being substance for one form or another 
(Hjelmslev [1963, 52]). 
 
How should one see the terms distinguished by Hjelmslev in the context of 
the plane of expression and the plane of content in a language? In accord-
ance with the interpretation of the author of this conception himself, matter 
in the plane of expression should constitute all kinds of sounds emitted by 
people in different languages. The speech sounds, forming constituents of 
signs of a particular language, in which people communicate, are to be 
determined as a substance of the expression plane. However, phonemes, 
by means of which those particular signs are distinguished from other sign 
in the system of language, should be treated as belonging to the form of 
the expression plane. A good analysis of Hjelmslevian view of the plane 
of expression is provided by Siertsema (1965, 146): 
 
As an example of the elements marked off in this way by different 
languages in the expression plane Hjelmslev gives “the continuum made 
by the median profile of the roof of the moth, from the pharynx to the 
lips”. (What is meant is, of course, the sounds produced in the various 
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places of this “continuum”, not the continuum itself). In familiar languages 
this zone is usually divided into three areas, a back k-area, a middle t-area, 
and a front p-area, Eskimo and Lettish, however, have two k-areas, whose 
lines of division do not coincide in the two languages. Eskimo places the 
boundary between a uvula and a velar area, Lettisch between a velar and a 
vela-palatal area. This, too, might be schematically represented. 
 
Scheme 6-1. The zones of p, t, k area in the segmentation of the expression plane 
(adapted from Siertsema 1965, 146) 
 
Engl. p t K 
Lett. p t k1 k2 
Esk. p t k1 k2 
 
As far as the plane of content is concerned, Hjelmslev has illustrated the 
difference between matter, substance, and form, on the basis of samples 
taken from semantics and morphology. As the most representative, he has 
selected some instances of segmenting and naming the color spectrum in 
different languages of the world. From the viewpoint of an external ob-
server, the spectrum of colors might be regarded as an objective matter. 
The segments of spectrum, however, delimited by the names of appropri-
ate colors constitute the substance of the plane of. However the scope of 
names, forming determined semantic fields, by which particular languages 
of the world differ one from another, are treated as facts belonging to the 
form of the plane of content. In the plane of content, the substance of 
words denoting particular colors is a continuum of the length of light 
wave; and the form introduced for the purpose of deeming the lexical 
oppositions denotes different colors, which characterize an ecologically 
determined language. Particular languages transform this continuum into 
perceivable and distinct features, being equal as to their number, or differ-
ent in one or another language, once at the same point of the continuum, 
once at different points. Again one may utilize the analysis of the color 
spectrum exemplified by Berta Siertsema (1965, 145): 
 
… Welsh, for instance, has in its content plane the element ‘glas’, which 
covers the English content-element ‘blue’. But it also includes the bluish 
green which the English call no longer blue but green, plus the bluish grey 
which in English is called ‘gray’; it ‘ covers’ part of the English content-
elements ‘grey’ and ‘green’. For the other shades of grey, the brownish 
ones, the Welsh have another word” “llwyd”, which also includes, 
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however, what English is called “brown”. Hjelmslev ([1953, 49]) represents 
it as in Scheme (2): 
 
Scheme 6-2. The content plane illustrating the segmentation of colors  














In another kind of exemplification (cf. Dubois et al. 1973), one may also 
point to the English word brown that refers similarly as the French brun 
and marron to a certain class of color shade (substance). However, the 
curving out, which operates on this substance, is not identical with the one 
that operates on French equivalents, in the way that it has established the 
existence of two French variables in opposition to singular terms in Eng-
lish. 
 Pursuing Hjelmslev’s reasoning with respect to the segmentation of 
matter, one should add that particular languages differ in the plane of con-
tent not only by means of entitative signs fulfilling a lexical function but 
also by means of categorial signs fulfilling a grammatical function. Gener-
ally speaking, one can state that particular languages of the world differ 
typologically from one another under the formal aspect, although the mat-
ter can be always the same. This contributes to the fact that there exists a 
possibility of making interlingual translations and that every language can 
be passed on from generation to generation in the process of learning via 
cultural transmission.  
 As one may see, the Hjelmslevian view of sign, inspired by Saussure’s 
parole, resembles the Platonic logos, but it reflects also the Aristotelian 
way of delimiting the substance from the matter through the form. Being a 
Platonist, Hjelmslev believed that language functions formally unite the 
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internal mental facts with the external physical facts which men have at 
their disposal. One may say that both matters, the amorphous mass of 
thought and the amorphous phonic continuum, are organized by the form 
of expression, and the form of content into the substance of each plane, i.e., 
into the substance of expression and the substance of content (cf. Wąsik, 
Z. 1998, 34–35).  
 Although Hjelmslev has treated the substance as a part of the matter 
(the purport) organized by the form, he has spoken in favor of Saussure’s 
statement that language is a form and not a substance. In opposition to the 
Prague-School functionalists who have investigated the substance of lan-
guage as relevant for semantic function, the pupils of Hjelmslev and the 
adherents of the Copenhagen School are called formalists (cf. Umberto 
Eco, in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 943–946, 
and Teresa H. Hołówka in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. 
Sebeok 1986, 937). 
 Extreme formalism of the Copenhagen School, exposing only the net-
works of semiotic relations between expression forms and content forms 
realized in different substances of communicative means, is represented in 
the works of Sydney MacDonald Lamb (cf. 1984, 78). Lamb interprets the 
sign as a relation between content and expression or, using Saussure’s 
terms, between a signifié and a signifiant. But Lamb does not follow Saus-
sure’s depiction of the sign as an object of two sides implying each other, 




The Form as Mediating Information in Creative Relationships 
 
With reference to the language as a system of values mediating between 
conceptual and acoustic images, which forms itself in the segmentation of 
thoughts and sounds by means of signs, it would be good to add (after 
Wąsik, Z. 1997, 1999, and 2003) the opinion of Simone Weil (1965, 96). 
The mere fact, according to Weil, that logos has been translated into ver-
bum, indicates that something has been lost, because the logos means, in 
the first instance, a relation, and for Plato and Pythagoras (of Samos, c. 
570–c. 495 B.C.), it has been a synonym of the number. As far as “harmo-
ny” means also “mediation”, she would have translated the sentence: “In 
the beginning was the Word” as: “In the beginning was the Mediation”. 
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 Applied in the context explaining the beginnings of biological and 
psychological life, the statement of Weil has been recognized as a cyber-
netic manifesto by the professor of medical sciences, Jan Trąbka (1983, 
213ff). In Trąbka’s view (see Polish quotation in Wąsik, Z. 1997, 134; and 
1999, 94, subsequently translated into English 2003, 87; trans. is ours: 
ZW): 
 
The essence of information consists in the mediation. Through the 
mediation of information the cells unite themselves in one organ, and the 
individuals of one species join themselves into one group, in order to form 
a singular more perfect organism, equipped with new properties, not 
encountered before, within a singular cell or within a singular individual.  
 
If biological semioticians had spoken—acknowledging the kinship of 
“logos” with “number”—in favor of the Greek logos translated as relation 
and not as verbum denoting a “thing”, they would probably accept the 
opinion of Trąbka (1983, 214, trans. is ours: ZW) that:  
 
The life begun at that time when two prototypical cells (already detached 
from their environment and being with it in a dynamic state of equilibrium) 
initiated a mutual informational contact with each other, when there 
appeared a mediation between the source-sender and addressee-receiver.  
 
By this acknowledgement of the original understanding of the logos as a 
relationship, respective followers of this assumption would accept as rea-
sonable an approach to language as a pure form from the perspective of 
connectionist cognitivism. In such a view, it is worthwhile to discuss the 
changeability of linguistic form both in the substantial realization of text 






Changeability and Variability of Languages 






In accordance with the rules and principles of linguistic historiography, the 
subject matter of this chapter consists of a short survey of some relevant 
views on the changeable nature of language resulting from its relation to 
the passing-time-bound nature of the environment, in which it is spoken 
and generationally transmitted through education as a means of human 
communication. These views taking into consideration such semiotic proper-
ties of language as conventionality, learnability, and forgetability, aim to 
popularize some main points of the author’s achievements that come from 
his earlier works published in subsequent years (Wąsik, Z. 1996, 1997, 
1999 and 2003). 
 
 
Synchrony vs. Diachrony Distinction 
in the Study of Language 
 
The approach to language as a form, realized substantially in individual 
acts and products of communicational processes, is connected with the 
definition of language as a system of pure values, which are determined by 
nothing other than the arrangement of text elements in a given moment of 
time (for discussion and important references see Wąsik, Z. 2003). This 
means, according to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916 [1959, 80], or 1972 
[1983, 80]) suggestion that language as a functional unity should be con-
sidered on “the axis of simultaneity” and not on “the axis of succession”. 
As such, it exists, only as an organized system in the consciousness of its 
individual speakers/hearers, as members of given communicative commu-
nities, and by virtue of this also in the individual acts of speaking and 
understanding in a synchronic cross section. The individual users of a 
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language are not interested in the history of its constituents realized in 
actual utterances, which they utilize as a tool of communication with the 
aim to evoke the behavior and reactions of their interlocutors, or to express 
their own feelings and emotional states. From a diachronic perspective, the 
properties of language are studied mainly by historians and to a lesser 
degree by those who speak it (cf. Saussure [1959, 79–100], or [1983, 79–
98]), since the evolution of language phenomena is a slow process which 
is rarely perceivable by its users. Each of the levels of language, each 
structure, or each of its constitutive elements, can have their own separate 
history. Research into their nature is therefore never ultimately complete. 
It is rather partial when one takes into account the fact that the particular, 
simultaneously functioning, elements of the system of a particular lan-
guage, which exist also in the consciousness of its different users, can be 
situated on different levels of its development.  
 Explaining the difference between the synchronic and diachronic de-
scription of language, Saussure also takes advantage of the analogy of the 
chess game. With reference to this metaphor, one can say that a chess 
player, at a given moment in time when he/she sees the situation of the 
various chess pieces on the board, is not interested in the fact of what has 
happened earlier. Yet, he or she takes into consideration simultaneous 
functional dependencies between them, in order to predict the consequenc-
es of their own move, which may cause changes in a given situation.  
 Synchronic linguistics, which has formed its foundations on the basis 
of Saussure’s principles, proposes to study only a static aspect of language 
how it functions at the present time in a taxonomical way. That means, it 
aims to appreciate the relations between elements of a particular language 
system, reduced to a certain stage of its development in a state of a rela-
tively functional stability, and to characterize thus the systems of different 
languages with typological respect of their structural properties. Diachron-
ic linguistics, contrariwise, stresses the temporal succession of changes 
within language systems. It deals with the changes in an explanatory way 
based on historical-comparative methods. Having noticed some particular 
changes within a given system, historians estimate the causes of transfor-
mations of whole systems of language, their subsystems and constitutive 
levels, into new qualitatively different systems, or into new forms of cog-
nate systems constituting the continuation of previous systems and their 
preceding forms. Hence, in historical linguistics, systemic properties of 
particular languages are specified in terms of observational statements and 
compared as empirical data in search of the genesis and development, 
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separation and unification, continuity, or disappearance, of such structures, 
which serve the realization of their respective functions. 
 
 
Evolutional and Conventional Nature 
of Language Phenomena  
 
Language as an extraorganismic system of verbal means of signification 
and communication is generationally transmitted through education and 
participation in culture. Only the speech faculty, which constitutes an 
intraorganismic property of humans, can be genetically inherited. There-
fore, every representative of the species homo sapiens, called also homo 
animal symbolicum, can acquire every language, create his or her own 
linguistic system, or also forget a particular language which they have 
learned. Learnability implies here also translatability of every language 
learned by users as a second, third or fourth, etc., language. Cultural 
transmission through education in a given generational context and crea-
tivity are connected with the defining characteristics of language, such as 
conventionality. The consequence of conventionality is the formation not 
only of new languages, but also of mixed languages, or their new func-
tional and stylistic varieties, new expressions and utterances, which have 
not been heard before in a given language, etc. The conventional nature of 
language also contributes to interlinguistic contacts of bilingual, or multi-
lingual, speakers, to diglossic situations where different languages, or their 
different varieties, coexist functionally on the basis of equality, or alterna-
tive occurrence.  
 A prominent place among the representatives of the first view is occu-
pied by Sydney MacDonald Lamb (1991) who defines the subject matter 
of linguistics as a continuous mental phenomenon, i.e., as a cognitive 
system to be abstracted from all the individual and composite linguistic 
systems of the world. For Lamb (1991, 65), however, language in the 
collective sense is an illusory object. Only individuals, described as “lan-
guage knowers”, “language doers” and “language users”, are believed to 
communicate on the basis of verbal signs shared on different levels of 
social, ethnic, national, or international, organization.  
 To make Lamb’s monolingualist conception of language more trans-
parent, one has to recall the understanding of general linguistics as the 
study of language in a holistic perspective as suggested by Hugo Ernst 
Mario Schuchardt (1842–1927). In his review of Ferdinand de Saussure's 
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Cours de linguistique générale (1916), this pioneer of pidgin and creole 
studies has stated, inter alia:  
 
Die ‘allgemeine’ Sprachwissenschaft setzt besondere Sprachwissenschaf-
ten voraus, die aber gibt es nicht … die Sprache bildet eine Einheit, ein 
Kontinuum. … In der Sprache lassen sich keine festen Scheidewände 
erkennen, ihre verschiedenen Gestaltungen verhalten sich zueinander wie 
Mundarten [‚General‘ linguistics presupposes particular kinds of linguistics, 
which do not exist however … Language forms a unity, a continuum. … In 
the language there are no permanent subdividing walls which can be 
recognized; its various forms relate to each other in the same way as 
dialects do] (Schuchardt 1917, 7 [1921/1928, 318]; trans. is ours: ZW). 
 
An opposite view, although similar with reference to “a systemic” point of 
departure, has been proposed by Eberhard Zwirner (1899–1984) with his 
multilingualist position towards the formal object of linguistic studies. For 
Zwirner (1963, 1967), the true essence of empirical studies is comprised 
only of the “system of languages” to be found in all existing languages of 
the world. Zwirner’s contention is that linguists are only able to describe 
variations of languages and to detect invariance in the structures of a lan-
guage. By drawing conclusions from abstract features of all languages of 
the world, it is impossible for them to create a new system of verbal signs, 
which could be utilized as an overall means of communication, and which 
might stand not only for actual, but also for future languages.  
 As regards the relationship between a language and its individual 
speaker/listener, it is of crucial importance to contrast the theory of Inte-
grational Linguistics developed by Hans-Heinrich Lieb (1936– ) with 
Lamb’s conception of Language and Illusion. These two views about 
language overlap, as a matter of fact, with reference to the notion of the 
idiolect understood as an individual communicative means, or as an indi-
vidual linguistic system.  
 There is also a link uniting Zwirner’s methodological assumptions and 
Lieb’s conviction that “a theory of language is a theory about languages”, 
where the domain of linguistic studies is to be specified as a compositional 
set covering all natural languages (Lieb 1983, 15). In asserting that his 
theory refers to “all actual languages whether past, present or future”, Lieb 
(1983, 19) puts his outline of the concept of “natural language” in relation 
to both a given historical language from its inception to its (possible) ex-
tinction, and also to periods of historical languages. In such a context, Lieb 
rejects the assumption of post-Saussurean linguistics that natural lan-
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guages are to be reduced to “stages” and stages to be identified with “sys-
tems”. Instead, he suggests that language variability should be encom-
passed in terms of synchrony and diachrony within the boundaries of an 
integrated domain of linguistic studies. Consequently, it seems indispen-
sable to Lieb that a theory of language should be relatable to actual speak-
ers as they exist in space and time within a given society, i.e., linguists 
should be aware of the way in which “a language” is related to its use 
(Lieb 1983, 22). However, this set of individual means must be consid-
ered, in Lieb’s view, as belonging to a particular language. Thus, as he 
states (Lieb 1983, 23): 
 
A means of communication that is an element of a language is to be 
homogeneous relative to the varieties of the language: only in its entirety 
can it belong to any given variety. It may well belong to several varieties 
simultaneously, to a regional dialect, sociolect, style of speech, etc.  
 
Practitioners of linguistics, giving credence to the source material collect-
ed from actual speakers, should pay attention to the fact that an individual 
language user may also develop his or her own sub-variety of communica-
tive means, “during the entire time of his or her existence” (Lieb 1983, 
23). They should also become aware of the possibility that this personal 
language in question can simultaneously, or interchangeably, adhere not 
only to one or more varieties of one and the same language, but also to the 
varieties of two or more (both neighboring or distant) languages. This 
necessitates their taking into account both mixed and non-standardized 
varieties of languages as well as the inconsistency of individual speakers. 
 It is noticeable that both Lieb and Lamb propose to study idiolects as 
individual realizations of language in general, or languages in particular, 
without restricting them to stages and periods of time. However, they 
differ in their understanding of the notion of “language as a whole”. Lieb 
assumes the existence of “a language in particular” as countable unity of 
varieties distinguished by characteristic properties whereas Lamb believes 
that there is only one “language in general”, which constitutes itself an 
uncountable entity common to all human beings in the world.  
 Both authors, Lieb and Lamb, acknowledge the communicative means 
of a speaker as directly accessible to linguistic observations, but they stress 
different aspects. Lieb does not see any difference between individual 
means of communication and idiolects in the traditional sense, specifying 
them as sets of abstract texts consisting of form and meaning. For Lamb, 
in turn, “the texts themselves are not the objects of investigation but clues 
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to the nature of an underlying system which is not directly observable” 
(Lamb 1991, 60).  
 To avoid confusion with the commonly understood term “idiolect sys-
tem”, Lamb has preferred to call the cognitive system located in the mind 
of an individual speaker a “linguistic idiosystem”. Moreover, the texts pro-
cessed by the individual speaker in question, are to be treated as an idiolect 
“extension” of an individual human being (Lamb 1991, 62). 
 Lamb’s solipsist assumption about the mental existence mode of the 
linguistic system (i.e., located in the mind of speaking individuals) might 
be confronted with the manifesto on the psychological nature of language, 
summarized by Andrzej Gawroński (1885–1927) during the interwar peri-
od, as follows: 
 
(1) Language is a phonic and articulated form of the psychic interior of an 
individual, and, as a medium expressing human mind, it may be com-
pared to the fine arts;  
(2) The psychic interior consists both of intellectual elements related to the 
senses of words, to their notional representations, and of emotional el-
ements evoked by extralinguistic facts and/or language forms;  
(3) All changes in a language correspond to changes in the mind, but not 
all changes in the mind have to be reflected in a language;  
(4) Language, as a lifeless form of a living psychical interior, adapted by 
an individual to his/her needs, is always in arrears in its development 
in relation to the development of human intelligence when it is rela-
tively constant as a means of communication;  
(5) Communication, as a social factor, is subjected to the automatization of 
human habits, whereas language, as a personal matter, is dependent, 
with respect to the possibilities of changes, upon the will of an individ-
ual striving for the deautomatization of habits;  
(6) Social language does not exist at all; in the same way as there is neither 
a collective spirit nor collective intelligence, and such notions are a 
kind of fiction based on the content of communication (see Gawroński 
1927; quoted and trans. by Wąsik, Z. 1999a, 175). 
 
To come closer to the subject matter of our discussion, it is worthwhile to 
recall some traditional approaches to the notion of idiolect, as summarized 
by Els Oksaar (1987, 293–97). It was Bernard Bloch (1907–1965) who has 
introduced the term idiolect to the domain of structural linguistics, refer-
ring to “the totality of all possible expressions of a single speaker at a 
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given single time, who uses a determined language to become integrated 
with another speaker” (Bloch 1948, 7). Both the proprietorship of a lan-
guage and the mode of expression in a language included in this definition 
imply that idiolect characterizes also single speakers. They can, according 
to Bloch, possess different dialects within different life spans and, indeed, 
both one and two, or more, idiolects at the same time.  
 In a narrower sense, Charles Francis Hockett (1916–2000) has defined 
the idiolect as “the total set of speech habits of a single person at a given 
time” (1958/1959, 321), or as an individual realization of the language 
system. To be added here is also the view of André Martinet (1908–1999):  
 
[I]f a linguistic description has to be consistent, it must be that of an 
idiolect, i.e., the language as spoken by a single individual. But does this 
not contradict our assumption that language is above all an instrument of 
communication? … we cannot be satisfied with limiting our observation to 
one single individual, since that individual will not handle his language 
tomorrow in exactly the same way as he does or did the day before. The 
idiolect, as a frame of linguistic description, needs to be precisely dated 
(Martinet 1962, 105–106).  
 
What's more, the term idiolect is understood here also as connoting the 
totality of language-distinguishing peculiarities of a social, professional, 
regional, or psychophysical, nature of an individual, as one can gather 
from the following explanatory remarks.  
 The term idiolect has been introduced to describe individual usages. 
Two main aspects of the idiolect concern the linguist, namely the use of 
register and style. Style is a variation with reference to the interpersonal 
tension between speaker and listener, ranging from the most formal, e.g., 
in reading a list of minimal pairs, to the most spontaneous, as in familiar 
discourse. Register covers variations conditioned by the social context, 
e.g., the register of the lawyer in the courtroom, which contrasts with reg-
isters appropriate to the club, or domestic environment. All idiolects thus 
select from a potential range of style and register in a given communica-
tive community, and it is this selection between categories of variety 
which―in addition to idiosyncratic habits of pronunciation—marks the 
speech of an individual speaker in a dialect-speaking community (cf. 
Meetham & Hudson 1969, 242–43). 
 Since this personal language is attached not only to one or more varie-
ties of the same language but also to a group of languages, one has to 
consider the incidence of mixed and non-standardized versions of vernacu-
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lars and the occurrence rate of their inconsistent speakers, following the 
opinion of Norbert Reiter (1928–2009). Therefore, personal language 
should be confronted with the traditional notion of “idiolect” as an indi-
vidual set and that of “sociolect” as an inter-individual set of communica-
tive means, which are directly accessible to linguistic observations.  
 To dispense with the term idiolect, Reiter (1986) proposes the expres-
sion der individuelle Zeichenbestand (‘the individual sign reservoir’). This 
kind of an individual language is to be specified as „die Gesamtheit aller 
sprachlichen Zeichen, die ein Individuum zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt 
weiß (‘the totality of all linguistic signs which an individual knows at a 
given point in time’, Reiter 1986, 142; trans. is ours: ZW).  
 As Reiter maintains, speech communication occurs only then when 
there is a correspondence between the sign reservoirs of two individuals. 
The individual sign reservoirs, in turn, which correspond to each other in 
the knowledge of two individuals, are labeled by Reiter as das interindivi-
duelle Zeicheninventar (‘the interindividual sign inventory’). And progress 
in interindividual communication on the social level might be achieved, in 
Reiter‘s view, through the aggregation of sign knowers into an organized 
whole, where the number of interlocutors (inter-actors) happens to be 
transformed from a dyad into a “pleiad” (cf. 1986” 149).  
 
 
Multilingualism and Variability of Languages 
as a Historical Fact 
 
From the viewpoint of their systemic properties, in accordance with the 
claim of Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson (1989, 450–457), 
languages, created for the needs of individuals and requirements of com-
munities as a tool for mutual understanding, should be treated as equal in 
right. However, with regard to their external environments, called by soci-
ologists of language ecological properties, languages appear to be unequal, 
and the degree of their inequality can differ. They can have a status of an 
international means of communication, or they can be classified according 
to the number of speakers and domains of importance when they are used 
not at all times and not at all places as languages with universal lexis. 
Therefore, multilingualism, major and small languages of the world, and 
language majorities and minorities have to be considered as issues which 
should be discussed in the light of the neighboring disciplines of lin-
guistics.  
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 The variability of languages in time and space, which is perceived as a 
barrier of communication in the functional environment of the major lan-
guages of the world, occupies a stable place in the application of 
knowledge derived from linguistics and non-linguistic sciences of lan-
guage. This knowledge is particularly relevant for disciplines that are 
interested in the optimization of language-in-use in the process of its ac-
quisition, or in the planning of vehicular languages for the purposes of 
interethnic and international communication, as well as language politics 
and language policy making. 
 As an investigative problem, the existence of multiple languages in the 
world is the concern of foreign language teachers, lexicographers, and 
specialists for the codification of languages not possessing their own al-
phabet, interpreters of foreign literature, communication engineers, mis-
sionaries, librarians cataloging alphabetically and systematically books 
and periodicals published in particular languages, neurophysiologists ex-
amining the brain of bilinguals or multilinguals, and others. They all have 
to know how far human language, as an overall phenomenon, is dependent 
on its heteronomies. In particular, they should question how particular 
varieties of interindividual verbal signs, which unify certain groups while 
separating them from others, autonomize themselves ontologically in their 
structures and functions as independent semiotic systems, becoming rela-
tively resistant to the influence of their individual users.  
 Trying to explain the sources of multilingualism in the world, practi-
tioners of language sciences may be also interested to answer questions 
regarding the origin of the language faculty as an “anthropolectal” catego-
ry, as well as examining the direction of development, separation or dif-
ferentiation, uniformization or unification of language varieties. These and 
other questions regarding monogenesis or polygenesis of various linguistic 
systems depend not only upon the possibilities of comparative historical 
linguistics but also upon cooperation between linguistics, the non-
linguistic sciences of language and their adjacent disciplines. 
 Within the domain of language sciences, there are also investigative 
problems, which are connected with the existence of inequalities among 
communicative communities. Such problems raised in the context of mul-
tilingualism, however, which result from the conventional nature of lan-
guage, do not belong to the subject matter of linguistics, since it is not 
only linguists who can resolve them.  
 For those who pursue the very nature of multilingualism, it is im-
portant to ask on what level of interpersonal communication the shared 
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systems of verbal signs are to be described as separate languages. The 
merry fact that the boundaries between neighboring languages and dialects 
are indistinct, especially when not only the systemic but also the ecologi-
cal criteria are pondered, gives rise to the problem of a general definition 
of language. Nevertheless, one cannot agree with the statement according 
to which every linguistic system created by humans for the purposes of 
communication can be called a language, because it possesses certain 
properties common to all known and described languages of the world. In 
such a case, multilingualism would be seen (in the estimation of Wąsik, Z. 
2003, 52) as appearing even on the level of idiolects, and going further, on 
the level of sociolects, dialects, ethnolects or natiolects, and polylects.  
 Systemic properties of particular languages are determined mainly on 
the basis of their lexical-grammatical distinctiveness both on the evolu-
tional genetic and the structural-functional levels. A language might be con-
sidered as structurally developed when its subsystems―phonological, 
morphological, syntactic, and lexical—form together a complex unity 
differing in particular from the subsystems of genetically related lan-
guages. This differentiation, observed in the partial subsystems, is charac-
teristic of varieties of the same language, or for the mixed languages.  
 One can notice (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 52) that some varieties of the same 
language differ from others only with regard either to the realization of 
pronunciation or to the application of certain grammatical rules, or certain-
ly to the usage of lexical, or stylistic, registers. There are cases, known 
from the domain of interlingual contacts where, within the system of a 
language constituting a substructure of the so-called substrate language, 
only the sound system remains, and grammar and vocabulary are adopted 
from another superposed language. It happens also that the borrowing 
language retains its original phonetic and morphological-syntactic struc-
ture, dispensing only with its own vocabulary.  
 Researchers who deal with dialectology are aware of the fact that due 
to contacts and parallel developments the majority of particular languages 
appear as separate communicational systems being more, or less, mixed in 
the domain of phonetics and lexis. One should also add that the criterion of 
structural distinctness is not a sufficient and ultimate condition for deter-
mining a certain set of communicative means, shared by a particular eth-
nic, or national, community, as a separate language. Systems, which are 
genetically cognate and structurally related, can become separate lan-
guages when they have developed themselves to such an extent that they 
possess a separate ecology. Among them one may find such similar lan-
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guages which are utilized by different speech communities in a separate 
territory, or which have been codified in another way and possess various 
realizations of spoken texts in writing in all domains of social life. 
 In the context of the opposition between system and ecology (of a lan-
guage), one should bear in mind also that the ecological properties, i.e., 
demographic, geographical and political can have an impact on the sys-
temic differentiation of languages and their varieties (for references see 
Wąsik, Z. 2003, 52). Different varieties of a particular language, as a sys-
tem, depend not only on the differentiation of users but also on the situa-
tions, and communicational requirements of speech communities as well 
as on the domains of communication.  
 The entirety, for example, of territorial, social and functional variants 
of a language, which is used as a historically formed means of communi-
cation by a nation, is called a natiolect, or in the terminology of everyday 
life—a national language. However, the term ethnolect is referred rather to 
an ethnic group, called also a nationality group, or a national minority, 
which in a given territory, using its own language, has not achieved yet 
these historically motivated political laws to which another national group 
is entitled (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1997, 20).  
 The bearers of a minority language who live within a larger national 
group inhabiting a certain territory, being bound by a common past and 
culture, and possessing also shared political views and economic interests, 
are treated as an ethnic group. The term ethnic pertains to a people sharing 
a common and distinctive culture, religion, language, etc., especially a group 
that is a minority within a larger society. From the perspective of historical 
studies, speech communities forming nationality groups are divided into 
native ethnic groups, i.e., descending from local ancestors and influx 
groups coming from other ethnic territories, i.e., originating from migra-
tions of peoples.  
 Minority languages are the languages of ethnic minorities who do not 
possess their own statehood within the territory of a given state, and who 
manifest their feeling of ethnic separateness and will to persist by means 
of cultivating their own language (and often cultural traditions, or religious 
beliefs). In cases, where a language is, in the first instance, an integrating 
factor, and serves as a means of group identity separating it from the rest 
of population within a certain society, one can speak about linguistic mi-
norities (for reference see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 53). For some practitioners of 
linguistics, minorities constitute folk groups utilizing a native language 
other than the language of the state, or the language of official communi-
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cation utilized by the majority in the whole country (for references and 
discussion see Wąsik, E. 1999, 21).  
 With reference to a variety spoken in a smaller, or larger, region, one 
applies also the term dialect, denoting a vernacular. Sometimes, these two 
terms—dialect and vernacular—are understood as synonyms. Sometimes, 
the term vernacular is used as a hyponym of the term dialect, i.e., denot-
ing a subcategory of a more general class, and dialect, alternately, as a 
hyperonym, i.e., denoting a general class under which a set of vernaculars 
is subsumed. In turn, by using the name vernacular, one means such a 
variety of a spoken language, which is bound to a speech community of a 
given environ. Vernaculars distinguishing themselves against the back-
ground of other varieties by certain systemic rules constitute an intermedi-
ate level as the core, on which national languages develop. To stress the 
existence of commonalties between the features of certain groups of local 
vernaculars, i.e., not only for the purposes of naming any variety of a na-
tional language, one uses the term dialect as a superordinate term.  
 Dialect is a variety of a determined language which distinguishes itself 
from other varieties by features of phonology, grammar, and vocabulary, 
and by its use by a group of speakers set apart from others geographically 
or socially. Linguists define as a dialect sometimes a provincial, rural, or 
socially distinct, variety of a language that differs from the standard lan-
guage, especially when considered as a nonstandard, or special, variety of 
a language―the literary dialect. In historical linguistics, the name dialect 
refers also to a determined language considered as one of a group that 
have a common ancestor (in Greek diálektos means ‘discourse, language, 
dialect’; as a noun it is derivative of dialégesthai ‘to converse’ cf. dia- + 
légein ‘to speak’). A vernacular is considered here as a native, or indige-
nous, language, as opposed to a non-naturally learned one, used by ordi-
nary people in everyday communication (respecting the etymology of 
Latin vernacul /us/, i.e., ‘household’, ‘domestic’ or ‘native’, akin to verna, 
meaning ‘a slave born in the master's household’ (cf. Random House 
1992/1995/1997. Webster’s College Dictionary). 
 The terms natiolect and dialect do not exclude each other in such a 
case when they are referred to linguistic systems, which do not distinguish 
themselves in their inherent properties, but which separate themselves 
from each other with respect to their ecological conditionings. Such a 
situation occurs, for example, when nationality, culture, religion, writing, 
or political systems distinguish their users, etc.  
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 Along with dialects and vernaculars, which constitute the property of 
selected social groups that distinguish themselves from other groups 
though the same variety of a common language, to be mentioned also are 
sociolects (for details see Wąsik, Z. 1997, 21), being the result of tenden-
cies for diminishing any kind of differences in the social domains of com-
munication. The term sociolect covers all subordinated varieties of lan-
guage, used by certain groups of interest, levels and social classes, which 
differ in principle from the other varieties as regards the lexical system. In 
the context of such particular sociolectal variants, one should name also, 
among others, jargon and slang (called in French argot). Among stylistic 
varieties, or functional styles, to be enumerated also are informal registers.  
 Scholars who deal with the sociology of language usually designate as 
a register such a variety, which is typically used in a specific kind of 
communicational setting. The name jargon connotes, in a positive sense, 
the vocabulary of specialists, i.e., a professional terminology avoiding, in a 
purposeful way, universal understanding, and in a negative sense, the 
spoken variety of language with a lower degree of codification. By jargon, 
one understands especially the vocabulary, peculiar to a particular trade, 
profession, or group: medical jargon, or unintelligible talk or writing; 
gibberish; babble, and sometimes a kind of language use that is character-
ized by an uncommon, or pretentious, vocabulary, and convoluted syntax 
and is often vague in connotative meaning. To jargonize exactly means ‘to 
utter with a gargling sound’, ‘to gargle’, ‘rattle the throat’ (cf. Random 
House 1992/1995/1997. Webster’s College Dictionary). 
 The lowest place in the hierarchy of sociolects is occupied by varieties, 
which do not belong to the standard language. Being artificially created by 
certain social groups, they are meant to deceive the environment with 
distorted meanings of words and expressions. Along with them, practition-
ers of language sciences use also such terms as slang or jargon, or names, 
which refer misleadingly to the varieties of a higher order, namely as a 
synonym of dialects, e.g., the dialect of thieves, of pupils, of criminals. 
Slang is a very informal usage of vocabulary and idiom that is characteris-
tically more metaphorical, playful, elliptical, vivid, and ephemeral than 
ordinary language. As slang one considers, in the colloquial terminology, a 
kind of speech, or writing, characterized by the use of vulgar or socially 
taboo, vocabulary, and idiomatic expressions.  
 The term jargon when referred to a particular usage of professionals, 
etc., or the special vocabulary of thieves, vagabonds, and the like, is also 
considered as a synonym of argot or cant. Argot connotes a specialized 
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vocabulary peculiar to a particular group of people, devised for private 
communication and identification: thieves, or the special vocabulary and 
idiom of a particular profession, or social group. In the same context, cant 
is taken also as a private language variety of the underworld, or the words 
and phrases characterizing a particular class, or profession. 
 Practically, one cannot reject the situation in which a determined lan-
guage, recognized by linguists as a separate system of signification, has, at 
a given moment in time, only one speaker who uses it in intrapersonal 
communication being both sender and receiver. There are also cases when 
it may be used only in small group communication by local collectivities 
dispersed in different parts of the country, or by those who live in diaspora 
on different continents, while functioning in symbiosis with other speech 
communities within the domain of public and mass communication. 
 Since multilingualism is an accomplished historical fact not to be al-
tered by legal acts, or scientific declarations, linguists are not willing to 
accept such an extreme claim (cf. Schuchardt 1928, 318), according to 
which the language as a whole manifests itself in the form of a continuum 
in the collective sense. The language as a oneness—constituting the totali-
ty of all linguistic systems of the world common for all people on the 
human planet (cf. Lamb 1991, 65)—should be therefore relegated to scien-
tific hypotheses. If not, they would then be obliged to treat particular ver-
bal systems encountered in the world of humans as textual extensions of 
the same language. Accordingly, its varieties, which have the same defini-
tional properties as linguistic systems, would be distributed on different lev-
els of interpersonal communication between all people of the world, such 
as linguistic idiosystems, linguistic sociosystems, linguistic diasystems, 
and, furthermore, linguistic ethnosystems, linguistic natiosystems, or even 
linguistic polysystems. 
 Linguistic discussions on the development of languages and their vari-
eties were initiated in 19th century within the framework of compara-
tivism. That determined languages were related genetically in the form of 
language families had brought the founding fathers of comparative gram-
mar (Friedrich Karl Wilhelm Schlegel, 1772–1829, Franz Bopp, 1791–
1867, Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm, 1785–1863) to the idea that parental 
languages could be reconstructed. The objectives of such genetic-
evolutional studies, conducted, inter alia by August Schleicher (1821–
1868) and Johannes Schmidt (1843–1901), were expressed predominantly 
in the systematization of the principles of language change, or in the ex-
planation of the directions of their development. Afterwards, the discover-
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ies of linguistic geography, started by Georg Wenker (1852–1911), and con-
tinued by Jules Gilliéron (1854–1926); contributed to the recognition of the 
mixed character of languages in the report of Hugo Schuchardt (1917).  
 As a result of revised findings of the late Neogrammarians (Karl Brug-
mann, 1849–1919, and Paul Kretschmer, 1866–1956), an entirely new view 
was approved that the so-called reconstruction was rather to be seen as a 
theoretical construction of languages which never occurred in reality, as 
noticed by Hanns Oertel (1868–1952) in a book on general linguistics with 
a historical orientation (cf. Oertel 1901, 128). Accordingly, at least four 
assumptions about potential directions in the evolution of languages char-
acterized the epistemological formation of comparative linguistics, where 
homogeneous passive language users turned to active heterogeneous lan-
guage doers:  
 
—  from a homogeneous means of verbal signification and communica-
tion, which initially served a uniform intercourse community, to cor-
rupted vernaculars, which started to fulfill communicational require-
ments of differentiating dyadic, or small-group, linguistic collectivities 
and linguistic communities;  
—  from an accomplished arena of hitherto heterogeneous linguistic varie-
ties to a mixed form of the first degenerating and then homogenized 
means of verbal signification and communication;  
—  from naturally pure varieties of local vernaculars to artificially culti-
vated linguistic systems, which subsequently became unified on indi-
vidual, group-specific, regional, ethnic, national and international lev-
els on the basis of social sanctions being imposed on communicating 
individuals through conventions; 
—  from ephemeral and domestic ways of individual speaking and region-
al idioms to shared means of verbal communication on each level of 
the social stratification of interacting linguistic collectivities and lin-
guistic communities. 
 
In typological linguistics, the conviction that particular languages should 
be treated with respect to their internal and external properties shifted in 
the direction of the statement that they could simultaneously belong to 
various structural types. Instead of concerning themselves with typological 
constructs of language systems, linguists (for details see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 
57) proposed to elaborate typological matrices of systemic properties of 
languages, their elements and structures. Besides, the interest in differ-
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ences and similarities between linguistic systems evolved into investiga-
tions of functional convergence and divergences, which could be found in 
the structure of the languages of the world. This objective was achieved, in 
the first instance, through the elaboration of partial studies on the typology 
of linguistic categories, entities, units and constructions, as in the case of 
the typology of future forms, of passives, of modality, of reflexives, of 
questions, etc. In the meantime, typological comparative studies were 
replaced by contrastive studies, which along with the search for language 
universals (conducted by Joseph Harold Greenberg (1916–2001), cf. his 
1963/1966 position) and partial typologies of language phenomena were 
conducted for the purposes not only of linguistics proper but also other 





To sum up the debate on the object of linguistic studies, it is advisable to 
consider the following ascertainments (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1996, 35–56): 
 
(1) The boundaries between multilingualism and monolingualism can be 
overcome, if one extends the scope of language variability from a lan-
guage in particular into language in general, assuming that “a variety 
of a language is to be a subset of the language” (Lieb 1983, 22);  
(2) Particular varieties of an overall set of communicative means, which 
are organized at different levels of social stratification, can be regarded 
as separate linguistic systems as far as they possess the same defini-
tional properties;  
(3) Individuals knowing several linguistic varieties must have at their 
disposal a core of shared means, which enables them to communicate 
at regional, ethnic, national as well as international levels;  
(4) The formation of a linguistic idiosystem in language contact situations 
depends not only upon the activity of a single bilingual, or multilin-
gual, subject, but is also a continuous and gradual development of 
communicational abilities in an individual achieved through the ex-
change of verbal signs with other individuals;  
(5) In the same way as it is impossible to create an overall language from 
all languages of the world, one cannot believe in the formation of a 
particular language from the totality of its idiolects when there is no 






The Wording of the World 




Semiotic Substantiation of the Theme 
 
The subject matter of this chapter (based on Wąsik 2010c having been 
popularized in 2014) constitutes a methodological survey of conditionings 
in which the word as a meaning carrier of humans becomes a trace of their 
creative and interpretive activity in interpersonal communication. Refer-
ring to the terms exposed in the title, the notion of “wording” is derived 
from the pragmatics human communication doing things with words, and 
the notion of the “trace” is specified against the functional classification of 
semiotic objects. What is characteristic of traces is that, originating in the 
source, or being produced by source agents, they do not need to be present 
when they are received and/or interpreted by their target agents. 
 As regards the wording as a trace of human activity, one has to consid-
er, on the one hand, the metamorphoses of human universe resulting from 
the linguistic and communicative performances of social groupings, and 
on the other, the changes taking place in the environments of human indi-
viduals on a uniquely personal level. Investigating the changes in the life-
world of man, one can notice the following two trace-leaving processes 
that come into being: (1) “the wording of the world” due to the naming 
and terminological ordering of objects and states of affairs, and, (2) the 
objectification of language where its speakers know “how to do things 
with words”.  
 Considering the subjective changes in the performance of communi-
cating selves, one may utilize the theory of “memes” according to which 
the word might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited 
features from one language into another, or as an exponent of human pref-
erences in the creation of new meaning carriers that minimize their com-
municational effort. Linguistic performances of people provide evidence 
for their immersion in the general knowledge and cultural heritage of hu-
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manity, being especially visible in literary works and/or in interlingual 
translations. Likewise, the preceptor-oriented studies may reveal the traces 
left by particular authors as a source of inspiration in the case when they 
are anonymous or intentionally omitted. 
 
 
Specifying the Notional Scopes of Word and Trace 
 
Before specifying the subject matter of this study, it is indispensable to 
explain the notional contents of the two terms word and trace, specifically 
exposed in the title of its presentation. The notion of the word will be 
deduced from the connotation of a name denoting the object of philological 
studies, and the notion of the trace will be highlighted against the classifica-
tion of semiotic objects. Both the word, as an investigative object, and the 
trace, as an investigative perspective, are referred at this point to the re-
sults of the linguistic-communicational activity of humans, as an investiga-
tive domain. 
 The point of departure, namely the “word”, is connected here with the 
Greek lógos, the second part of the names philology and philologist. The 
former one, philology, denotes a specific field of scientific activity and a 
specific subject of institutional teaching, and the latter, philologist, a par-
ticular specialist performing a certain role in science and education. De-
scended from the Latin philologus, subsequent to the Greek philologos, 
“philologist” means ‘the lover of the word’, where the form philo-, from 
the Greek phílos, connotes the sense ‘loving’, ‘treating with love’, or just 
‘taking care of’. Likewise, ‘the love for the word’, as the object of philo-
logical studies, is a devotion to the study of texts primarily spoken and 
secondarily written. Relevant is that lógos might be rendered as “word”, 
“speech” and/or “discourse”, regarding its derivation from the Greek verb 
légein denoting ‘to choose’, ‘to collect’, ‘to speak’, and, what is more, 
even as “proportion”, or “relation”, understood in the ancient philosophy 
as the notional principle which governs the order of universe. To be added 
is also that lógos was rendered in Christian theology as Word denoting the 
second person of the Holy Trinity, i.e., the Word of God, the light and the 
source of life, embodied in Jesus Christ (cf. Random House 
1992/1995/1997. Webster’s College Dictionary). 
 The understanding of the “trace” in the following approach to the 
properties of the word might be explained from the viewpoint of things 
which fulfill a substitutive function with respect to other things for the 
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sake of their makers or utilizers. In the first instance, the trace can be eval-
uated in terms of semiotic objects distinguished as a mark (Gk semeion, i.e., 
an indicating sign), a name (Gk ónoma, i.e., a verbal designation of things, 
persons, places, states, phenomena, etc.), and a symbol (Gk symbolon, i.e., 
a token of an object broken into two parts, which means only when it is 
reunited with another token into a single entity; a token of identity verified 
by comparing its other half; cf. Gk. symballein ‘to bring/put/throw togeth-
er’, e.g., ‘a contract’). In the second, the position of traces is to be consid-
ered, within the framework of associated stimuli or implicational phenom-
ena, as indices (or indexes), symptoms, signals, appeals, symbols, icons 
(pictorial or mimetic symbols), as well as non-motivated verbal signs 
forming the modes and means of human understanding (see Wąsik, Z. 
2003,96–98; 2014, 114). In the third, the quality of the verbal sign as a 
trace might be also exhibited against the background of various representa-
tions of reality, as, for example, reflection (mirroring), photography, pic-
ture (painting), model, scheme, map, including replicas,6 and the like. 
 The traces as tokens or types of natural and cultural objects are consid-
ered as possessing, within the boundaries of communicational reality of 
humans, both the features of non-motivated and motivated, non-intentional 
and intentional, non-artificial and artificial, non-teleological and teleologi-
cal phenomena and states of affair being created involuntary or voluntary, 
without or with an aim-in-view, etc. What appears to be an essential prop-
erty of traces is their “translocation in time and space”, that is, when they 
are received and/or interpreted by their target or destination agents (as 
recipients, addressees, and the like), the source agents of their origin (as 
authors or spokesmen, as senders or emitters) do not need to be present at 
a particular moment or place. Thus, traces constitute material objects rep-
resenting something that exists immaterially when they are perceived. By 
saying that the traces make present what is absent here/there and now/then, 
it is meant that their implied objects, or domains of reference, belong to the 
inferential extrasemiotic reality. 
 With reference to its main theme, the focal point of this chapter is to 
answer how the humans contribute to metamorphoses of the world through 
the word as a means of signification and communication. It departs from 
an assumption that the word as a property of its creators is changeable by 
nature when considered in terms of a meaning-creating activity in opposi-
tion to a meaning-carrying fact. Therefore, the subject matter of this trace-
related study constitutes a typology of verbal meaning carriers to be ob-
served in products resulting from the species-specific behavior of people 
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who create and interpret the universe of meanings as communicating indi-
viduals and participants in interpersonal communication. To be more pre-
cise, its principal interest sphere pertains to conditions under which the 
words might be treated as vestiges of humans’ communicational customs, 
assuming that the basic function of language is to form interpersonal and 
intersubjective communities of speakers and receivers who send and re-
ceive, produce and understand messages in a similar way. These condi-
tions of word-processing acts, as, for example, inherent and relational 
properties of language in use, constitute, in one dimension, the levels of 
particular linguistic systems and, in another dimension, the domains of 




of Trace-Leaving Processes 
 
Studying the word as a trace of humanity, a practitioner of semiotic studies 
might be interested, in general, to learn how human universe changes its 
nature7 as a result of linguistic activity of social groupings on ethnic or 
national, regional or professional, global or local levels, and, in particular, 
to make a survey of changes that take place in the environments of human 
individuals when they communicate on a uniquely personal level. 
 In the semiotics of human communication, there are two trace-leaving 
processes that come into being, firstly, “the wording of the world”8 as a 
consequence of nomination and terminological9 subsumption of objects 
(things and states of affairs) and, secondly, through the objectification of 
language assuming that its users realize “how to do things with words”.10 
Anybody who distinguishes between a folk and scientific nature of experi-
ence can notice that the names given to objects on the basis of their con-
ventional usage and arbitrary choice are not identical with the names 
grounded on the acceptance of classificatory or typological principles. It is 
especially visible when one confronts, for example, the names of kinship 
or colors11in everyday life with the names of species in botany or zoology. 
Similarly, anybody who belongs to a community of knowers or believers 
may easily understand the difference between a referential value of utter-
ances or expressions that predicate about ordinary facts or nominate the 
domains of human life in time and space (for example, places, times, 
events, towns, rivers, cities, etc.) and a binding force of utterances or ex-
pressions that perform the new types of social facts (for example, official 
Chapter Eight 142 
 
documents, marriage contracts, oaths, curses, bets, legal verdicts, and the 
like). Correspondingly, the traces of personal activity based on the expres-
sive and impressive functions of verbal means in interpersonal communi-
cation are to be confronted with the cultural and social traces of typical 
human activities (as, for example, commemorative inscriptions on rocks or 
trees, stones or tables in churches, cemeteries, graves or even houses in 
which renowned personalities used to live or make a stopover). 
 Taking into account, furthermore, the theory of memes,12 the word 
might be interpreted as an indicator of borrowed or inherited features of 
language. Under the term meme, philosophers of mind understand any 
nonverbal and verbal product or behavior of humans that can be trans-
ferred from individuals to individuals, from groups to groups, from gen-
erations to generations by imitation or learning, both in a conscious and 
unconscious way. Among memes, one can enumerate not only observable 
practices, habits, or fashions, either in technology or cultural customs, like 
poems, songs or dances, and the like, but also intersubjective beliefs, atti-
tudes, convictions, emotions, and the knowledge that stay behind them in 
mental spaces of communicating individuals, as, for example, ideas and 
concepts, propositional contents and theories that unite people referring to 
the same intersubjective experience when they communicate. In speech, 
memes are seen as disseminating themselves in broadcast messages 
through a social-semiotic sphere of chains and aggregations of communica-
tors in the same manner as infectious diseases. 
 Speech can be interpreted as providing evidence for preferences and 
motivations in the formation processes of vocabulary and grammar. The 
same statement refers to lexical borrowings, cultural transfers of products 
along with their names, variability and changeability of languages,13 the 
phenomena of linguistic substrates,14 superstrates15, or adstrates,16 as well 
as linguistic interferences17 occurring as mental transfers of native structures 
in language contact situations. The terms substrate and superstrate stand 
for the contact relationships between the language of invaders and the lan-
guage of indigenous population. A substrate situation occurs when the 
language of invaders places itself upon the language of indigenous popula-
tion in view of that it has a greater prestige even though some features still 
remain in the core or periphery of the language as traces of the previous 
indigenous structures.  
 The superstrate situation takes place when the language of local popu-
lations absorbs only some marginal features of a superimposed language 
because of the minor prestige of invaders. Superstratal traces may be 
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found in the speaking habits of indigenous peoples first and foremost in 
the pronunciation or vocabulary. As parallel to substrate and superstrate, 
linguists have also coined the term adstrate to describe mutual influences 
between languages spoken on the territories inhabited by neighboring 
populations. Thus, one could find the traces of grammatical and lexical 
properties in the structure of adjacent languages or their dialects. 
 While cultural transfers are outcomes of collective intercourses and 
borrowings, interferences have a solipsistic character, as far as they occur 
in mental spaces of individuals. Linguistic interferences in the mind of 
foreign-language learners are based on the reduction of image schemata, 
composed of concepts and sound patterns, to their equivalents from a 
native language previously acquired in a natural way. In short, interference 
can be described as an influence of the patterns of a native language upon 
the patterns which are processed mentally and physiologically in a foreign 
language. Linguistic interferences may be considered in terms of positive 
or negative transfers.18 The latter is the source of errors in the acquisition 
of a foreign language, affecting, for example, patterns of pronunciation, 
word formation, inflectional morphology, and phrase or sentence struc-
tures. One should stress, however, that a verbal interference takes place not 
in the system of a language but in the text-processing activities of com-
municating individuals who transfer mental patterns of meaning carriers 
and their interpretations as meaning bearers from the knowledge of one 
language to the realization of another, from the discursive patterns of one 
language to the discursive practices of another one. As a matter of fact, 
there are several links between members of different groups where the 
word mediates in such transactions as face-to-face communication, written 
correspondence, commercial trades, commodity exchanges, sexual cou-
pling and transportation traffic. 
 Exposing, therefore, the social nature of communicative communities 
where conversation, talk, colloquy and parley dominate, one has to distin-
guish between speech communities,19 intercourse communities, called in 
German Verkehrsgemeinschaften20 or kommunikative Gemeinschaften,21 
and discursive communities. Linguistically inclined studies expose speech 
relations among communicators as attributed by system-specific properties 
of a particular language. However, the rise and existence of Verkehrsgemein-
schaften are determined by extra-systemic properties of different languages, 
their standards, dialects and varieties, the speakers of which are engaged in 
various conjugal intercourses, as industrial, technological, religious, cul-
tural, political, and/or matrimonial ones. As to the discursive (discourse-
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based) communities,22 their nature depends on the realization of communi-
cational tasks in various domains of social life realized among representa-
tives speaking the same language at a national level or different languages 
at an international level. Their existence is determined by certain types of 
texts or text-formation activities of communication participants embedded 
into their roles played in society and culture. Thus, as to the usage of words, 
communicating individuals in speech communities are united, and in discur-
sive communities they are divided according to their group membership. 
 The word as a trace may exhibit the tendencies of minimizing the 
communicational effort of speakers23 that result in the reduction of sounds 
or omission of frequently realized lexical items, due to the principle of 
redundancy. In the case of individual speakers, the spoken (or written) 
word may sometimes be recognized or serve also as an exponent of their 
social, professional, regional or ethnic identity. More detailed issues,  
which deserve to be exposed here, are inborn aptitudes and capabilities of 
human individuals to acquire a determined language, to be bilingual or 
multilingual. 
 Not to be forgotten are also the cases of language attrition (when the 
number of speakers diminishes), negative or positive transfer of lexical 
elements in the expression plane and the content plane (when the contact 
situations occur between language speakers and listeners who belong to 
different cultures). Linguistic performance of individuals may be studied 
as evidence of their competence and immersion in the generally available 
knowledge and cultural heritage. Moreover, the word is not only a trace of 
human abilities in creating artistic poetry or prose, it might be also consid-
ered as a clue to the understanding of how the general mind works in 
which the minds of particular individuals are embedded. 
 
 
Investigative Implications and Assumptions 
 
To propose the domains of linguistic inquiries, one should add that the 
word is to be seen not only as an expression of intimate spirituality of 
human individuals but also as a trace of intercourse communities to which 
they belong. The esthetics and style of the word as reflecting the cultural 
tradition of humankind are also relevant for consideration. Their traces are 
especially visible in literary works, in translations from a determined lan-
guage into other languages, in the choice of expressive and/or impressive 
means. Sometimes the preceptor-oriented studies may reveal the traces left 
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by other authors as a result of inspiration source or even plagiarism. To 
describe the nature of intertextuality, in postmodernist approaches to liter-
ary texts of secondary degree, where their author is declared “to be dead” 
in terms of “the archeology of knowledge”24, or in which the source of 
their origin or inspiration is not documented or intentionally omitted, like 
forgeries, fakes, falsifications, imitations, and the like, the term palimpsest 
has been used.25 According to an antique or mediaeval usage palimpsest 
refers to a parchment (i.e., the skin of sheep, goats, or other animals pre-
pared as the leather for writing on), or another kind of material from which 
the original writing has been partially or completely erased or scraped to 
make room for another kind of writing.26 Known from the 17th century in 
English the nominal form palimpsest along with its adjectival form pal-
impsestic is usually specified as a novel text written by hand on materials 
from which one can see traces of another earlier handwritten text.27 Spe-
cial attention deserves, furthermore, the statistical analysis of linguistic 
means identifying the semiotic traces the authors of texts when they are 
anonymous or not identified. 
 
 
Selected Examples of Verbal Traces 
in Human Communication 
 
Speaking about the suggestions and consequences of such a broadly de-
fined scope of the investigative domain, it might be important to provide 
also a few widely known examples (being also available in online ency-
clopedias or dictionaries) excerpted from cultural spheres of human life-
world, which pertain to a particular individual, social or ethnic group and 
to the language of humankind in general. 
 
(1) Traces of morphological and semantic motivation are to be found in 
marked or unmarked practices of naming and/or categorizing extralingual 
objects of reference, as, inter alia: (a) in conventional word-formations: 
Germ. Kugelschreiber, Engl. ball pen or ballpoint, also ballpoint pen, 
French le stylo à bille, stylo-bille or pointe-bille, cf. Polish długopis a 
‘long writing’ means, (b) in customary commemorations, etc.: Sixtus 
(the sixth son in the family), Gagarinka (the girl’s name glorifying the 
first flight to Cosmos by Jurij Gagarin), or (c) in emotional signals of 
adherence to the representatives or followers of a certain political lea-
ning: Franz, Franziska, Francesca, Joseph, Josephine (the most popu-
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lar name in the Austrian provinces during the rule of Kaiser Franz Jo-
seph), Adolph (Adolf), Adolphine (Adolfina), Hitlerike (after the first 
and last name of the German chancellor during the Nazi time), Vladle-
na, Ninel (blended or sound-inverted forms of Vladimir Lenin), or 
even (d) in inferred indices of a flattering submission to imposed rules: 
Stalinka, Stalingrad (former Caricin, and later Wolgograd) Stalin-
Straße, Karl-Marx-Allee, Karl-Marx-Stadt, (‘Karl Marx Town’, former 
and later Chemnitz), and the like. 
 
(2) Furthermore, in contact situations between the bearers of the same 
language and/or of different languages, one could trace: (a) the genera-
tional transmission of similar sounds, as mama, papa, dada, nana, or 
cognate words, as deva in Sanskrit, deus in Latin and Zeus in Greek, 
etc., (b) the remnants of substrate and superstrate relationships, cf. e.g. 
Eng. cheese, school, and Germ. Käse, Schule against the background 
of Lat. caseus, schola, etc.; likewise, the Nynorsk kyrkje, Eng. Church, 
and Germ. Kirche, against the background of Greek kyri (a) kón 
(dôma) ‘the Lord’s (house)’ kyriaké ‘dem Herrn gehörig’, (c) the ac-
ceptance of synonyms and suppletive forms as a result of borrowings, 
e.g., by English speakers from Scandinavians, and later from French 
Normans, engaged in various conjugal intercourses: to and till, sick and 
ill, cf. also sickness and illness vs. malady; forms of “to be”: am, are, 
be, is, was, were, been, being (as historical vestiges of “aran”, “beon” 
and “wesan”), (d) the expansion of behavioral memes realized in speci-
fic blends, interjections or particles, as, e.g., “O.K.” (oll or orl korrect 
representing all correct), “KO” (a knockout in boxing), “Hi!” (hey! or 
how-are-you!), “Gee!” (used in a slang to express an anger but surprise 
or pity in the sense of English Jesus!), “Exactly!” (‘that’s right/true’, 
Germ. genau!, Polish dokładnie!, Italian exactamento!), (e) interfer-
ences as equivalents from the native language previously acquired in a 
natural way, e.g., in idiomatic expressions, as, e.g., *How many years 
do you have? instead of “How old are you?”; similarly: *Wieviel Jahre 
hast du? instead of „Wie alt bist du?“, *What hour it is? instead of 
“What time is it?”, *Welche Stunde ist es? instead of „Wieviel Uhr ist 
es?“ or „Wie spät ist es?“ ‘How late it is’ (comp. respectively in 
French « Quelle âge as-tu? » ‘Which age do you have?’« Quelle heure 
est-il? » or Polish structures „Ile masz lat?” ‘How many years do you 
have?’, „Która jest godzina?” ‘Which (of the order) is the hour?’). 
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(3) Interesting instances of inter-generational transmission that belong 
both to the domain of naming motivations, mentioned under (1), and 
the domain of intercultural borrowings, specified under (2), might be 
found also in the linguistic customs concerning the division of time or 
quantity, as the testimony of earlier distinctions which are etymologi-
cally forgotten, for example, (a) Sunday is the first day and Saturday is 
the last of the week, cf. in Portuguese, historically: Domingo (“primero 
dia” ‘first day’) – Segunda-feira (“segundo dia” ‘second day’) – Terça-
feira (“terço dia” ‘third day’) – Quarta-feira (“quarto dia” ‘fourth 
day’) – Quinta-feira (“quinto dia” ‘fifth day’) – Sexta-feira (“sexto 
dia” ‘sixth day’) – Sábado (“último dia” ‘last day’), and the usage after 
the ISO (International Organization for Standardization) normalization: 
Segunda-feira (“1° dia” ‘1st day’) – Terça-feira (“2° dia” ‘2nd day’) – 
Quarta-feira (“3° dia” ‘3rd day’) – Quinta-feira (“4° dia” ‘4th day’) – 
Sexta-feira (“5° dia” ‘5h day’) – Sábado (“6° dia” ‘6th day’) – Domin-
go (“último dia” ‘last day’, and practically, one can encounter in the 
sense of ‘Sunday’, e.g., in Colombia, Séptimo día ‘seventh day’), (b) 
Wednesday is the middle day of the week, compare, for example, Ger-
man: Sonntag – Montag – Dienstag – Mittwoch (‘mid-week’) – Don-
nerstag – Freitag – Samstag; Polish: niedziela – poniedziałek – wtorek 
– środa (‘mid-week’, cf. “dzień w środku tygodnia” ‘the day in the 
middle of the week’) – czwartek – piątek – sobota; Finish: sunnuntai – 
maanantai – tiistai – keskiviikko (‘mid-week’) – torstai – perjantai – 
lauantai, (c) Monday is the first and Sunday is the last day of the week, 
compare, for example, Polish: poniedziałek (= “dzień po niedzieli”, 
i.e., the day ‘after Sunday’) – wtorek (from “wtóry” as a synonym of 
“drugi”, i.e., ‘2nd day’) – środa – czwartek (‘4th day’) – piątek (‘5th 
day’) – sobota – niedziela (Polish “nie działać” means ‘do not work’, 
i.e., ‘not a working day’); Latvian: pirmdiena (‘1st day’) – otrdiena 
(‘2nd day’) – trešdiena (‘3rd day’) – ceturtdiena (‘4th day’) – 
piektdiena (‘5h day’) – sestdiena (‘6th day’) – svētdiena (‘holly day’), 
(d) Saturday is a bathing day in Scandinavian languages (Old Norse 
laugardagr, laug ‘bad’; Old Danish løverdag), compare, for example, 
Faroese: mánadagur – týsdagur – mikudagur – hósdagur – fríggjadagur 
– leygardagur – sunnudagur; Danish: Mandag – Tirsdag – Onsdag – 
Torsdag – Fredag – Lørdag – Søndag; Finish: – maanantai – tiistai – 
keskiviikko – torstai, – perjantai – lauantai – sunnuntai, (e) September, 
October, November, December are the vestiges of the Roman calendar, 
which was initially lunar, when the year had ten months with March as 
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the first and December as the tenth month, compare in English (from 
Latin): [January, February – added in the later Roman Republican ca-
lendar], March – April – May – June – July – August – September 
(‘7th month’) – October (‘8th month’) – November (‘9th month’) – 
December (‘10th month’), etc. 
 
(4) The realization of the principle of least effort in verbal behavior has 
left its traces: (a) in the historical changes of frequent words and their 
structures, compare, for example, Lat. lingua teodisca, Germ. Deutsch 
and Norwegian Tysk; Eng. English and Faroese enskt, Germ. Norwe-
gisch, Norwegian Norsk; Germ. Schwedisch and Swedish svensk, etc., 
(b) in the fast-speech reduction of redundant communicational features, 
cf., e.g., I don’t (I do not), He’ll (he will, he shall), he’d (he would, 
he should, he could); I wanna talk to you (I want to talk to you), I’m 
gonna be (I am going to be), It’s gonna be all right (It is going to be all 
right). 
 
To sum up, one has to remark that only the language- and-context-specific 
explorations might reveal the metamorphic nature of humans investigated 
in the domain of their control and reference. The subject matter of such 
studies should constitute then the trace-leaving types of interpersonal 
transmission of meaning carriers and their intersubjective interpreta-
tions derived from the texts and text-processing activities of communi-
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On the Idea of Semiotic Universals 
 
The following chapter is based on the author’s paper “The Search for Uni-
versals of Language in a Semiotic Perspective”, delivered for the first time 
at the Societas Linguistica Europaea 29th Annual Meeting: Universals versus 
Preferences (In Synchrony and Diachrony) in Klagenfurt on September 4–
8, 1996. Popularized in his subsequent monographs in English (Wąsik, Z. 
1998 and 2003), its main ideas have been outlined for the presentation (cf. 
Wąsik, Z. 2005) “In Search of Semiotic Universals of Language Among 
Design Features of Human Communication Systems” in the Global Semi-
otics Section, directed by Eero Tarasti, at the International Summer School 
for Semiotic and Structural Studies Under the Auspices of the IASS/AIS at 
Imatra, Finland, on June 11–19, 2005. Some of the results of these explo-
rations have been also published lately (Wąsik, Z. 2007; 2014, 65–78). 
 The so-called “universals of language” have been explored by practi-
tioners of linguistics and its neighboring disciplines at least in three do-
mains: (1) as properties which are to be found in all languages of the world 
(mainly by Joseph Harold Greenberg, 1915–2001, and Uriel Weinreich, 
1926–1967), (2) as communicative competencies of speakers and/or lis-
teners, which may be deduced from their communicative performance 
when they create and recognize linguistic utterances as phonologically 
diacritic, grammatically correct, semantically accurate and pragmatically 
appropriate (by Noam Avram Chomsky, born 1928, Dell Hathaway 
Hymes, 1927–2009, and their followers), or (3) as defining characteristics of 
speech derivable from the contrast between verbal and non-verbal means 
of communication used in the universe of humans and animals (by Charles 
Francis Hockett, 1916–2000, Stuart A. Altmann, born 1930, and Charles 
Egerton Osgood, 1916–1991). 
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In Search of the Defining Characteristics of Language 
 
The subject matter of this chapter consists of a search for the defining 
characteristics of language conducted by Hockett (1958/1959, 1959, 1960a, 
1960b, 1963/1966) against the background of classificatory proposals done 
by Altmann (1962, 1967), as well as Hockett and Altmann (1968) along 
with further extensions delivered by Osgood (1980, 9–50), which have 
been earlier confronted and elaborated by the author himself (cf. Wąsik, Z. 
1987, 67–71; 1997a, 47–56; 1998, 64–69; and 2003, 78–82) with refer-
ence to the state of the art exposed in contemporary academic handbooks 
and encyclopedias.  
 However, the sets of properties in Hockett’s framework, as to their 
number and arrangement, have been developed gradually. As one can read 
from Table 9-1, the seven key properties of language proposed by him in 
1958 (Hockett 1958/1959), have been extended to thirteen in 1960 (Hock-
ett 1960a), then the sixteen properties, and afterward supplemented with 
three additional characteristics in 1963 (Hockett 1963/1966).  
 
Table 9-1. Charles F. Hockett’s key properties of language  
1958 1960 1963 
(1) duality,  
(2) productivity,  
(3) arbitrariness,  
(4) interchangeability, 
(5) specialization,  





cast transmission and 
directional reception, 




tion, (7ꞌ) semanticity, 
(8ꞌ) arbitrariness,  
9ꞌ) discreteness,  
(10ꞌ) displacement, 
(11ꞌ) openness,  
(12ꞌ) tradition,  
(13ꞌ) duality of pat-
terning 
(1ꞌ) vocal-auditory channel, 
(2ꞌ) broadcast transmission 
and directional reception,  
(3ꞌ) rapid fading, (4ꞌ) inter-
changeability, (5ꞌ) to-
tal/complete feedback,  
(6ꞌ) specialization, (7ꞌ) seman-
ticity, (8ꞌ) arbitrariness,  
(9ꞌ) discreteness, (10ꞌ) dis-
placement, (11ꞌ) productivi-
ty/openness, (12ꞌ) cultural 
transmission/tradition,  
(13ꞌ) duality of patterning,  
(14ꞌꞌ) prevarication (inten-
tional avoidance of truth or 
deception), (15ꞌꞌ) reflexive-
ness, (16ꞌꞌ) learnability 
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While proposing a fixed set of properties amounting to sixteen, Hockett 
has detached the group of ten properties as “a defining set for language”. 
In his opinion, any system that has openness, i.e., 11ꞌ, displacement—10ꞌ, 
duality—13ꞌ, arbitrariness—8ꞌ, discreteness—9ꞌ, interchangeability—4ꞌ, 
complete feedback—5ꞌ, specialization—6ꞌ, rapid fading—3ꞌ, and broad-
cast transmission with directional reception—2ꞌ, deserves to be called a 
language; so far “any language manifested by our own species will be 
called a human language” (Hockett 1966, 15). 
 The remaining six characteristics, among sixteen, such as vocal-auditory 
channel—1ꞌ, semanticity—7ꞌ, cultural transmission/tradition—12ꞌꞌ, pre-
varication—14ꞌꞌ, reflexiveness—15ꞌꞌ, learnability—16ꞌꞌ, have appeared to 
Hockett as non-defining properties. In his view, every language must pos-
sess such a property as semanticity, assuming that the contrast between 
arbitrariness (included into the defining set) and iconicity (to be eventual-
ly included among the non-defining properties) would make no sense at 
all. All the same, he has assumed as possible that “every language has 
prevarication … and reflexiveness …; at least every human language 
does” (Hockett 1966, 15).  
 Charles F. Hockett’s “key properties of language” had been elaborated 
in turn by Stuart A. Altmann, who used to work in the field of behavioral 
ecology and sociobiology of primates, although within the so-called “de-
sign-feature approach to animal communication”. In Altmann’s contribu-
tions, first individually (Altmann 1962 and 1967) and then cooperatively 
(Hockett & Altmann 1968), the emphasis was shifted from the properties 
of language—as far as he was not sure about their universality—to the so-
called “design features” of communicative behavior of humans against the 
background of “all organic behavior of any sort, or even of the behavior of 
all matter, living or inert” (Hockett & Altmann 1968, 61). As a matter of 
fact, Altmann (1967, cf. Hockett & Altmann 1968, 63–71) was probably 
the first researcher who had subsumed the sixteen “design features” (rec-
orded as DF) of Hockett (1963) under certain types of groupings, called 
frameworks (A, B, C, D, E), as follows: 
 
 FRAMEWORK A—features determined by the channel or channels— 
(DF1) Vocal-Auditory Channel, (DF2) Broadcast Transmission and 
Directional Reception, (DF3) Rapid Fading; 
 FRAMEWORK B—features derived from the social setting—(DF4) In-
terchangeability, (DF5) Complete Feedback, (DF8) Arbitrariness, 
(DF14) Prevarication, (DF15) Reflexiveness; 
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 FRAMEWORK C—features expressing the behavioral antecedents and 
consequences of communicative acts—(DF6) Specialization, (DF7) 
Semanticity, (DF10) Displacement, (DF11) Openness; 
 FRAMEWORK D—features reflecting continuity and change in the na-
ture of communication systems—(DF12) Tradition, (DF16) Learnability. 
 
However, Altmann’s and Hockett’s proposal of design-features of lan-
guage subsumed under five frameworks pertaining to animal communica-
tion cannot be approved in totality from the viewpoint of structural lin-
guistics, having in mind that such design features undoubtedly determine 
the intrasystemic properties of language, such as (1) Arbitrariness, Seman-
ticity, and Openness, in addition to Discreteness and Duality of Patterning; 
whereas (2) Prevarication, Reflexiveness, Specialization, Displacement are 
to be seen as another group of extrasystemic properties of language. Like-
wise, against the background of the correctly classified relational proper-
ties of language, which pertain the physical-acoustic nature of communica-
tion, as (3) Vocal-Auditory Channel, Broadcast Transmission and Direc-
tional Reception, as well as Rapid Fading (of the Voice Sound), one 
should subsume under the same framework pertaining to a communicating 
individual and communicative community such features as (4) Interchangea-
bility, Complete Feedback, Tradition and Learnability. 
 Having been inspired by the exchange of opinions at a conference of 
1961 devoted to language universals, which were published in 1963, 
Charles E. Osgood (1980, 47, see especially his footnote there) undertook 
another elaboration of Hockett’s ideas. As a result, he submitted a slightly 
similar set of the so-called “defining characteristics of language”, having 
been enriched more quantitatively than qualitatively.  
 As to the primary set of six defining characteristics of language, Os-
good (1980, 10–14) proposed that they should be general enough to serve 
as criteria for evaluating the nature of communication in the realm of all 
species. Thus, anything that is to be called a language must have, in Os-
good’s view, signals that [1] nonrandomly recur in some communication 
channel, [2] are producible by the same organisms that receive them and 
manifest themselves in such nonrandom dependencies as [3] pragmaticity, 
[4] semanticity, [5] syntacticity, and [6] combinatorial productivity.  
 With these six hypothetically assumed characteristics in mind, Osgood 
sees the need to accept the existence of a language among some animals; 
the absolute NO-answer he declares with regard to clams, partly YES to 
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birds and dogs and a certain YES to the ways of communication among 
bees and apes. 
 Ten additional characteristics Osgood (1980, 20–26) submits to accept 
as decisive to get through the threshold of being a language when they are 
to be determined as a species-specific property of man. The first five of 
them Osgood suggests to denote—without any comments on the use of 
terms—as “structural” and the remaining five as “functional”. If there is  
something which is a language and deserves “to be called a human lan-
guage”, it must be distinguished, according to Osgood (1980, 20–23), by 
such “structural characteristics”, not only involving [7] the use of the vo-
cal-auditory channel, and resulting in [8] a nondirectional transmission but 
directional reception as well as [9] the evanescence in time of the forms in 
the channel, but also requiring [10] the integration over time of the infor-
mation derived from the physical forms and the necessity of [11] providing 
prompt feedback to the sender of his or her own messages. Noticeable is in 
Osgood’s highlighting that the enumerated structural characteristics are 
relatable to combined functions of the physical nature of sound and the 
biological nature of human organism.  
 In turn, the necessary qualities of human language have to be deter-
mined, in Osgood’s (1980, 23–26) depiction, by the following “functional 
characteristics”: [12] the semantic relations between forms and meanings 
must, in general, be arbitrary rather than iconic, and [13] the forms in the 
channel that distinguish meanings must be discretely rather than continu-
ously variable. It also appears indispensable for Osgood that these forms 
in the communication channel are [14] analyzable hierarchically into levels 
of units-within-units, with [15] large numbers of units at each higher level 
being exhaustively analyzable into relatively small numbers of components 
at each lower level. The final place occupies the Osgood’s functional 
conditioning, according to which the [16] extension of a language within 
the species, both generationally and geographically, must be via experi-
ence (learning) rather than via inheritance (maturation). 
 As Osgood (1980, 26–32) argues, apart from these sixteen defining 
characteristics of language, considered hitherto as universals, one should 
additionally take into account a number of other qualities consisting of two 
types of five non-defining characteristics, without which, as he claims, 
language would be still regarded as a human language though a rather 
strange one.  
 The first type of these five additional characteristics (cf. Osgood 1980, 
27–29) reflects certain intellectual and cultural traits that are common to 
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human species rather than linguistic regularities that pertain to messages of 
any determined language, such as [17/1] propositionalizing, stating that mes-
sages “are testable as to their truth and falsity”, [18/2] prevarication—
“messages can be intentionally false, deceptive, or meaningless”, [19/3] 
reflexiveness—“messages can be used to talk about other messages and/or 
their components”, and finally [20/4] learnability, stating that messages of 
any language “can be acquired by any normal human being”, plus [21/5] 
translatability—“any natural human language can be translated into any 
other human language”.  
 The second type in the Osgood’s record (1980, 29–32) consists of these 
five non-defining characteristics of language, which form rather statistical 
than absolute universals across all languages of the world and the levels of 
their entities, units and constructions, as far as they are based on psycho-
linguistic performance principles and their interactions, such as [22/1] 
the rules of selection and combination of alternative forms; [23/2] the 
principle of progressive differentiation of meaning-signaling forms; [24/3] 
the least effort principle, stating that “the higher the frequency-of-usage 
level (1) the shorter the length of forms, (2) the smaller the number of 
forms, and (3) the larger the number of different meanings (senses) of the 
forms used”; [25/4] affective polarity—“affectively positive forms are 
distinguished from affectively negative forms (1) by marking (either overt 
or covert) of the negative members of pairs and (2) by priority of the posi-
tive members of pairs in both the development (in the language and in the 
individual) and from sequencing in messages”; [26/5] the Pollyanna Prin-
ciple—“affectively positive forms and constructions are more diversified, 
more frequently used, and more easily processed cognitively than affec-
tively negative forms and constructions”. 
 To discuss the constituents of the Osgood’s typology of language uni-
versals, specified as a search for the so-called “defining characteristics of 
language” which evaluate the nature of communication in the realm of all 
species, against the background of Hockett’s “key properties of language” 
and, furthermore, also Altmann’s contributions as “design features of lan-
guage”, one has to take into consideration only the absolute universals, 
i.e., sixteen of the supposed defining characteristics and five of the sup-
posed non-defining characteristics of language, without taking any posi-
tion to the question whether they are exhaustive or completely substanti-
ated.  
 A deeper analysis has shown that the characteristics distinguished by 
Osgood overlap in their principal part with the characteristics of Hockett, 
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without taking into account their order, with an exception however that a 
slightly different treatment have such properties of language as specializa-
tion and duality in Hockett’s distinctions, and pragmaticity and syntacticity 
in Osgood’s counterproposals. A remarkable modification of Hockett’s ap-
proach to broadcast transmission and directional reception makes up Os-
good’s characteristics referring to recurrence of forms in communication 
channel and integration over time of forms derived from physical forms, as 
one can state against the background of the following summary of Os-
good’s search for the “defining characteristics” of language from the view-
point of communication in the realm of all species, cf. [8], [1], 10]: To 
new proposals, one should include hierarchical and componential organi-
zation and also translatability of languages. The property of translatability 
seems to be obvious because it can be derived from the learnability of 
language. To sum up, it is worth comparing the sets of defining and non-
defining characteristics as enumerated in Review 9-1 and Review 9-2. 
 
 
Review 9-1. Osgood’s Defining Characteristics of Language  
Considered as Semiotic Universals  
[1] nonrandom recurrence in communication channel; [2] producible by the same 
organisms that receive them, in such non-random dependencies as [3] pragmatici-
ty, [4] semanticity, [5] syntacticity, and [6] combinatorial productivity; 7] vocal-
auditory channel; [8] nondirectional transmission but directional reception; as well 
as [9] evanescence in time of the forms in the channel; [10] integration over time 
of the information derived from the physical forms and the necessity of [11] 
providing prompt feedback to the sender of his or her own messages; [12] semantic 
relations between forms and meanings must be arbitrary rather than iconic; [13] 
forms that distinguish meanings must be discretely rather than continuously varia-
ble; [14] analyzable hierarchically into levels of units-within-units, with [15] units 
at each higher level analyzable into components at each lower level; and finally, 




Review 9-2. Osgood’s Non-Defining Characteristics of Language 
17/1] propositionalizing; [18/2] prevarication; [19/3] reflexiveness; and [20/4] 
learnability, plus [21/5] translatability; [22/1] rules of selection and combination of 
alternative forms; [23/2] the principle of progressive differentiation of meaning-
signaling forms; [24/3] the least effort principle; [25/4] affective polarity; [26/5] 
the Pollyanna Principle. 
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Semiotic Properties of Language 
in the Light of Structural Linguistics 
 
On the basis of knowledge accumulated in contemporary academic hand-
books, one can state that the defining properties of language have been 
neither in Hockett’s nor in Osgood’s works sufficiently and/or convincing-
ly substantiated and exhaustively ordered. The cause of such a state is to 
be seen in unclear criteria for formulating what a definition is from a logi-
cal point of view. Nothing is to be found about the next kind to which the 
language as a defined object might be compared.  
 What linguists have as an alternative at their disposal is an elaborated 
set of heterogeneous characteristics exposing only specific differences. For 
example, from an intrasystemic point of view, only such properties might 
be relevant as arbitrariness, discreteness, duality, hierarchicality, compo-
nentiality, syntacticity, semanticity, openness (or productivity in other 
terms). As standing very close to the domain of language sciences, one can 
deem the property of pragmaticity. However, pragmaticity being oriented 
towards indirect or direct usage of the verbal form(s) of communication 
should be relegated to the extrasystemic properties of language.  
 Furthermore, among the intrasystemic properties of language, structur-
alist the linguists may notice the lack of a double class character of verbal 
signs expressed through the division of morphemes into grammatical and 
lexical, which is nota bene not the same as the double articulation of ver-
bal signs into meaningful and diacritic segmental entities, i.e., morphemes 
and phonemes. Without doubt philosophers of language would also add 
such properties as, for example, transparency and gestalticity of verbal 
means used in communication. 
 As far as the most of Hockett’s and Osgood’s properties of language 
along with some additionally proposed in our discussion above have a 
fixed position in the epistemology of linguistics, it will be worthwhile to 
explain them again in terms of semiotic linguistics, as presented in Table 
9-2, elaborated by the author of this monograph in his earlier works 
(Wąsik, Z. 1987, 1997a, 1998, 2003). To identify which of the discussed 
semiotic universals are relevant for investigative domains of the neighbor-
ing disciplines of language sciences and linguistics proper, it is recommend-
ed to observe the boundaries between the properties that pertain to the:  
 
(I) form and structure of language as a system of verbal means of signifi-
cation and communication;  
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(II) substance of codes and the channels of communication; 
(III) the cognitive faculties and communicational abilities of human beings 
determining the ways of language acquisition and language attrition 
across cultures and generations;  
(IV) relationships between the verbal means as signifiers and their signi-
fied referents in the extralingual reality, as well as between the verbal 
means and their speakers and listeners in accordance with pragmatics 
of communication (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 69).  
 
Table 9-2. Extrasystemic versus intrasystemic properties of language 
Ecological- and lexical-relational  
properties of language 
Grammatical- and lexical-
inherent properties of language 
II. Substance of codes and the channels of 
communication: [LP 1] vocal-auditory, 
[LP 2] centrifugal transmission and direc-
tional reception, [LP 3] evanescence in 
time, [LP 4] linear integration over time.  
III. Cognitive faculties and communica-
tional abilities of human beings across 
cultures and generations: [LP 5] inter-
changeability of sender-receiver roles, 
[LP 6] complete feedback, [LP 7] cultural 
transmission, [LP 8] creativity, learnabil-
ity and forgetability, [LP 9] translatability, 
[LP 10] changeability in time and variabil-
ity in space. IV. Relationships between the 
verbal means as signifiers and their signi-
fied referents, as well as between verbal 
means and their speakers and listeners: 
[LP 11] specialization, [LP 12] contextual-
ity, [LP 13] translocation, [LP 14] 
metadesignation (metalinguistic reflexivi-
ty), [LP 15] prevarication, [LP 16] prag-
maticity, [LP 17] intentionality, [LP 18] 
transparency, [LP 19] gestalticity, [LP 20] 
lexical autonomization 
I. Form and structure of language 
as a system of verbal means of 
signification and communication: 
[LP 21/1] semantic referentiality, 
[LP 22/2] conventional arbitrari-
ness, [LP 23/3] discrete distinctive-
ness, [LP 24/4] double articulate-
ness, [LP 25/5] morphological 
duality, [LP 26/6] bipartite signifi-
cance, [LP 27/7] functional and 
compositional hierarchicality, 
[LP 28/8] binary isomorphism, 
[LP 29/9] syntagmatic integrativity 




The above distinguished four groups of properties (I–IV) might be sub-
sumed under two separate classes of “extrasystemic properties of lan-
guage” (groups II–IV) that belong to the investigative domain of the 
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neighboring disciplines of language-related sciences, as, for example, psy-
chology of language, (cultural) anthropology of language, philosophy of 
language or logic, and their auxiliary disciplines, as, for example, articula-
tory or acoustic phonetics within the domain of natural sciences (anatomy 
and physics) and “intrasystemic properties of language” (group I) that 
belong to the subject matter of autonomous linguistics proper. 
 
 
Extrasystemic Properties of Language 
 
From the viewpoint of substantial properties of codes and the channels of 
communication, one can separately distinguish four types of characteristic 
features (abbreviated henceforth as Language Properties = LP): [LP 1] vo-
cal-auditory, stating that phylogenetically conditioned verbal signs have a 
phonic character; they are emitted through the vocal tract and received by 
ear; [LP 2] centrifugal transmission and directional reception—sound 
waves expand in all directions (centrifugally), but they are received from 
that direction in which the receiver finds himself while listening; [LP 3] 
evanescence in time— due to physical laws, phonic substances of speech 
sounds are transitory and volatile; [LP 4] linear integration over time—
receivers apprehend sound waves as a sequence of segments arranged in a 
line.  
 Considering sensorial and intellectual properties of language with 
reference to the receptive and productive activities and the cognitive and 
creative capabilities of language users and language doers, one is able to 
separate two subgroups of species-specific properties of humans. The first 
subgroup refers to their biological characteristics, as [LP 5] interchangea-
bility of sender-receiver roles, stating that the communicating individuals, 
who can be both a sender and a receiver of his or her own signs and the 
signs of other individuals, can produce, perceive and reproduce their own 
or foreign signs as many times as they want; [LP 6] complete (total) feed-
back—the sender, while speaking, can not only simultaneously perceive 
reactions of others, but he or she can also react to the form and content of 
what they emit him- or herself; which also gives them the possibility of 
controlling and/or correcting their errors.  
 The second subgroup of sensorial and intellectual properties of lan-
guage relates to cultural distinctiveness of humankind, as: [LP 7] cultur-
al transmission, stating that languages are not genetically inherited, but 
generationally transmitted through education and participation in culture; 
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[LP 8] creativity, learnability and forgetability—as far as speech faculties 
can be inherited, every representative of the species homo sapiens, under-
stood also as homo animal symbolicum, can not only acquire every lan-
guage but also create his or her own linguistic system, or forget a deter-
mined language which they have learned; [LP 9] translatability—the fea-
ture of learnability implies also the feature of translatability of every lan-
guage learned by users as a second, third or fourth, and so forth, language; 
[LP 10] conventionally determined changeability in time and variability in 
space—bearers of a determined language, as members of communicative 
communities can contribute, on the basis of a social agreement or contacts 
between different languages or their different varieties, to the formation of 
not only new but also mixed languages or their new functional and stylistic 
varieties as well as new expressions and utterances never heard before in a 
determined language, etc.  
 Referential-utilitarian properties of significative means, realized in 
communicational events, constitute another group of properties character-
izing the language, which depend upon the will, knowledge and intention 
of its users. Among them, one can distinguish, in the first instance, [LP 11] 
specialization, stating that language not only fulfills expressive and evoca-
tive functions but also has developed for fulfilling various kinds of signifi-
cative and communicative functions; [LP 12] contextuality—the meanings 
of verbal means of communication specify themselves in dependence of 
contexts and/or “con-situations”; [LP 13] translocation—using memorized 
and uttered verbal signs of a particular language humans may speak about 
things and states of affair being remote in time and space; [LP 14] 
metadesignation (metalinguistic reflexivity)—since verbal signs are things 
by nature that serve the purposes of speaking about other things, humans 
may speak in a language also about the language as an object of extralin-
gual reality; [LP 15] prevarication—the extralingual reality of verbal signs 
can be both true and false, observed and inferred, abstract and concrete, as 
well as imagined and real; it can be perceived as ambiguous or meaning-
less; [LP 16] pragmaticity—linguistic utterances can be interpreted direct-
ly according to its literal word-for-word value, i.e., locutionary meaning, 
or indirectly while exerting an impact upon receivers as a result of their 
illocutionary force; [LP 17] intentionality—the sender can deliberately 
manipulate with a communicative sense of an utterance while changing its 
literal referential value in indirect speech acts; [LP 18] transparency—
conventionalized verbal signs lacking ambiguity or illocutionary force are 
usually transparent by nature as far as receivers understand them immedi-
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ately as denoting the objects of reference; [LP 19] gestalticity—verbal signs 
used for artistic and pragmatic purposes happen to be “gestaltic”, i.e., 
possessing a shape or configuration of properties that cannot be derived by 
the summation of its component parts, so that the receiver does not grasp 
their locutionary meaning directly, but he or she interprets them in de-
pendence of their illocutionary force or inferred intertextuality; [LP 20] 
autonomization (lexicalization)—in everyday use verbal signs strive to 
become independent from derivational meanings of their constituents so 
that their user does not identify or remember their morphological motiva-
tion, etymology or phrase-structure rules. 
 
 
Intrasystemic Properties of Language 
 
When the semiotic properties of language are not searched for in the do-
main of its speakers and listeners and/or their functional environments, but 
within the realm of verbal means which humans utilize for the purposes of 
signification and communication, i.e., when the object of definition is the 
language in itself, and not the human being in relation to language, then a 
separate group among semiotic universals can be distinguished, as far as 
the intrasystemic properties of language are concerned.  
 Accordingly, the language among the other semiotic systems distin-
guishes itself through such properties which can be labeled as lexical-
grammatical properties of verbal means of signification and communi-
cation: [LP 21/1] semantic referentiality, stating that the semantic function 
of verbal signs results from their substitutive character, i.e., from their 
reference to the extralingual reality based on implication. Verbal signs are 
not parts of extralingual reality. The relation between signs and their ob-
jects of reference always repeats in a similar way, although always in new 
surroundings, in the processes of interpersonal communication and inter-
subjective signification as well as in the cognitive processes of mental 
associations and inferences; [LP 22/2] conventional arbitrariness—the 
relationship between verbal signs and their objects of reference in the 
extralingual reality is not natural by origin; it depends upon the social 
usage and customs conditioned by free and non-motivated choices; 
[LP 23/3] discrete distinctiveness—verbal means of signification and 
communication are not continuous and global by nature; they are articulat-
ed and perceived as text elements being mutually distinguishable and 
replaceable in the same contextual environment; [LP 24/4] double articu-
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lateness—verbal means can be divided on the morphological and phono-
logical level into smallest meaningful text elements (morphemes) and 
smallest diacritic text elements (phonemes); [LP 25/5] morphological 
duality—verbal means can be divided on the morphological and semantic 
levels into two classes of signs: categorial and entitative, i.e., grammatical 
and lexical morphemes; [LP 26/6] bipartite significance—verbal means as 
textual constituents of predication frames can be divided, on the syntactic 
level, into sentences and word phrases that realize, on the logical and se-
mantic level, both the function of propositions and the function of con-
cepts; [LP 27/7] functional and compositional hierarchicality—regarded 
as subordinating text elements of lower order function within entities, 
units or constructions of higher order on the basis of hierarchical subordi-
nation: phonemes within morphemes, morphemes within semantemes 
(stems), semantemes within words, words within phrases (word groups), 
phrases within sentences, sentences within utterances, utterances within 
discourses, discourses within texts, and texts are defined as the last in-
stance in terms of verbal signs opposed to non-verbal signs. On a superordi-
nating level—text elements of higher order consist at least of one entity, 
unit or construction of lower order, i.e., a text consists at least of one dis-
course, and a discourse consists at least of one utterance, an utterance 
consists at least of one sentence, a sentence consists at least of one phrase, 
a phrase consists at least of one word, a word consists at least of one se-
manteme (stem), a semanteme consists at least of one morpheme, a mor-
pheme consists of at least of one phoneme. In the last instance, the pho-
neme is a further indivisible entity constituting a bundle of simultaneously 
realized diacritic features of human speech sounds; [LP 28/8] binary iso-
morphism of text structures—basic (segmental) text structures, for exam-
ple, syllable, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, are, as to their binary 
forms, identical on each level of the hierarchy of language elements, hav-
ing both a constitutive component and an accessory component. For ex-
ample, for a syllable, a constitutive component is the vowel or semivowel, 
for a stem—the lexical morpheme, for a word—the stem, for a phrase—
the determined word, for a clause—the verbal phrase, for a sentence—the 
main clause. Accessory, on the contrary, for a syllable is the consonant, for a 
stem—the derivational affix, for a word—the inflectional ending, for a 
phrase—the determining word, for a clause—the nominal phrase, for a 
sentence—the subordinated clause; [LP 29/9] syntagmatic integrativity 
and paradigmatic commutability—verbal signs can create entities, units 
and constructions appearing in form of segments and/or suprasegmental 
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features. Examined in their functioning on the level of utterances and 
locutions, both the simple signs and the composed signs are regarded as 
complex signs of higher order as to their global meaning, where the sum of 
their components is not equal to the sum of their partial meanings. All 
meaningful forms as simple signs or composed signs are considered as 
members of the same syntactic paradigm when they can alternatively re-
place each other within the same context of locutions and/or utterances; 
[LP 30/10] combinatorial-productive openness—the system of language 
functions as an open system, so that its users have the opportunity to pro-
duce an infinite number of signs from a finite number of simple elements 
and conventionally established phraseological constructions. 
 The specification of ten (1–10) among thirty (LP 1–30) intrasystemic 
properties of verbal means of interpersonal communication and intersub-
jective signification, as these characteristic features of language that be-
long to the investigative domains of autonomous linguistics in opposition 
to the extrasystemic properties that may constitute the interest sphere of 
heteronomous linguistics or the non-linguistic sciences of language, can 
lead to the specification of its semiotic definition, under the condition that 
the language will be confronted with other systems of understanding on 
the basis of searching for the genus proximum of the linguistic sign among 





Against the background of the preceding discussion, it is proposed that the 
classificatory approach to the semiotic universals of language has to bear 
in mind the genus proximum and differentia specifica of language in the 
context of its intrasystemic and extrasystemic properties constituting the 
subject matter of linguistics and the non-linguistic sciences of language. 
In such a view, the semiotic properties of language are to be deduced from 
the comparison between the verbal and non-verbal means of communica-
tion in the light of linguistic semiotics itself and not necessarily from the 
perspective of man’s place among other living species. In the end, a recent 
line of reasoning has to be taken into account arguing that linguistic diver-
sity is a crucial datum for investigation, as put forward by Nicholas Evans, 
and Stephen Curtis Levinson in their intensely contested article "The Myth 
of Language Universals: Language Diversity and Its Importance for Cog-






Searching for the Epistemological Roots 




Controversies over Language as a System of Signs 
 
The research question (cf. Wąsik 2003, 84) posed in the following chapter 
are connected with the epistemological position of language as a systems 
of signs, whether it should be seen as: (1) a material or spiritual state of 
being (materialism vs. spiritualism), (2) an ideal, abstract or concrete fact, 
or a set of relational properties (reism vs. realistic idealism vs. connection-
ism), (3) something which manifests itself both in the physical and psychi-
cal reality, outside the body and inside the mind, only in physical reality 
but extraorganismic or intraorganismic by nature, or only in the psychical 
reality, or beyond the physical and psychical reality of the knowing subject 
(dualism of body and mind vs. materialistic monism vs. idealistic monism 
vs. transcendentalism), (4) accessible to the cognizant and knowing sub-
ject through sensual experiences or intellectual apprehension (empirical 
experientialism vs. intellectual rationalism), (5) observed outside body and 
mind or within the individual’s body and mind, or inside the organism 
(extrospectivism vs. introspectivism), (6) experienced and created by in-
ternal feelings, imaginations or sensations of an individual self, or noticed 
and controlled by his or her senses outside the organism (subjectivism vs. 
objectivism), (7) perceived through individual tokens as variants of a gen-
eral type, or conceived through types as invariants encompassing common 
features of tokens (inductivism vs. deductivism), (8) constituting the prop-
erty of an individual self or the possession of a collective community (in-
dividualism, solipsism vs. collectivism), (9) created by the free act of a 
supernatural power, by a rational factor, or emerged unexpectedly by the 
way of an accident (creativism vs. emergentism, teleologism vs. causal-
ism), (10) occurring in the realm of God and man or only in the realm of 
man, etc. (theism, theocentrism vs. anthropocentrism). 
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Ontological and Gnoseological Status of Signs 
 
The most controversial issues presented here pertain to the ontological status 
and cognitive approachability of the category of the sign. As it has been 
noticed, the views of theoreticians and practitioners of semiotic disciplines 
(discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2014, 79–96) are not unanimous as to whether the 
sign constitutes a concrete or mental entity, and whether its material shape, 
possessing a spiritual replica in the mind of its users, can be approached as 
an ideal or real object. As to the manifestation forms of signs, being speci-
fied as sensible or intelligible, extraorganismic or intraorganismic forms of 
being, the questions arises whether they might be examined subjectively or 
objectively.  
 Semioticians still argue whether the sign is to be defined as a separate 
phenomenon or as a complex of related phenomena. One can encounter 
certain views according to which the sign is specified either as a monola-
teral entity or a plurilateral unit comprised of interrelated constituents, or 
as relations between those constituents. An overview of semiotic thought 
can illustrate that the conceptions of the sign are expressed either in terms 
of (I) a unilateral sign, in which the sign-vehicle and its referent are treated 
as separate entities, or (II) a bilateral sign, whose two parts, the signifier 
and the signified, constitute a twofold psychical unity. Some linguists 
adhere to the concept of (III) a semantic triangle, in which the sign-vehicle, 
its meaning, as a thought or notion, and its referent form separate parts. 
Moreover, philosophers prefer to speak about (III') a trilateral sign, where 
the sign-vehicle, its meaning as an interpretant (generating one or more 
signs), and its object of reference constitute a threefold unity. Separately 
distinguished are also the concepts of (II') the sign as a dyadic relation and 
(III'') the sign as a triadic relation.  
 To explain the background of divergences in the formulation of sign-
conceptions, it is proposed to explore the status of its constituents. An 
adept observer may notice—in all conceptions of signs and their objects of 
reference, investigated in terms of two constituents existing concretely and 
mentally, that is, to say in other words, residing in the intraorganismic and 
extraorganismic reality of communicating individuals—the occurrence of 
four common elements: an externalized stimulus serving as a concrete 
sign, an internalized stimulus acting as mental reflection of the sign, an 
externalized response serving as concrete referent of the sign, and an in-
ternalized response acting as a mental reflection of the referent of the sign. 
Thus, instead of a semantic triangle, which is favored among the theorists 
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of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, the adept of semiotic studies 
should rather speak of a semantic quadrangle. 
 Those and other controversies have undoubtedly found their roots in 
the three philosophical ways of thinking about the concrete and mental 
nature of language in relation to reality, namely Platonism, Aristotelianism 
(modified through Cartesianism), and Stoicism (for the discussion of terms 




The Dual Character of the Linguistic Sign 
 
Platonic lógos and Saussurean parole 
 
It was Plato, a Greek philosopher, who initiated the dualistic idealism 
assuming that speech and thought are inseparable, and that both capabili-
ties form a unity, called lógos. On the basis of the belief that speech is a 
faithful replica of thought, the followers of Plato put forward a postulate to 
study verbal activities for gaining the knowledge of how the mind of hu-
mans works (for reference to Plato after Chajim Heymann Steinthal, 
1823–1899, 1863/1890, 51–112, and after Ernst Hoffmann, 1880–1952, 
1925, 34; see Pazukhin 1983, 15–17). 
 
 
The Sign as a Oneness of Two Separable Psychic Sides  
 
Undoubtedly, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), a Swiss linguist, might 
have been inspired by the Platonic idea of lógos (Greek λόγος) when he 
has introduced, in his lectures, a category of parole (cf. 1916/1922, passim 
and 101) underlying both speaking and thinking simultaneously. However, 
as not exactly fitting within the context of Platonism—even though ap-
pealing to the idea of duality—one has to consider Saussure’s conception 
of the sign as a twofold mental unity composed of signifié and signifiant, 
usually rendered as ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’, or equated with ‘significa-
tion’ and ‘signal’ in an incorrect translation of Roy Harris (cf. Saussure 
1972 [1983, 67]), in which both parts of the sign are considered as a one-
ness of two inseparable sides, being in equal degree psychic. 
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Model 10-1. Saussurean concept and image acoustique as ‘concept’ and ‘sound 
pattern’ in Roy Harris’ translation (Saussure [1983, 11–12]) 
 
concept 
sound pattern  
 
An absolute psychologist definition of the sign which unites, in Saussure’s 
view, not a thing and a name but a concept and an acoustic image (ren-
dered as “sound image” or “sound pattern”), probably originates in the late 
rationalist phase of Aristotelian heritage (cf. also the opinion of Eugenio 
Coseriu 1967, 81–112), developed under the influence of Cartesian 
thought by the authors of the Port-Royal grammar. Although published 
anonymously, the authorship of this grammar, the so-called Grammaire 
générale et raisonnée (A general and reasoned grammar)28 of 1660, has 
been ascribed to Claude Lancelot (1615–1695) Antoine Arnauld (1612–
1694). As Jacques Bourquin (1991, 346) points out “The grammar belongs 
to the rationalist current of thought … deeply influenced by René Des-
cartes (1596–1650)”, a French philosopher and mathematician (for details 
see also Crystal 1987, 84). In such an understanding the linguistic sign 
according to Saussure is viewed as a two-sided mental oneness, which 
unite not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound-pattern. 
 
 
The Unity of Speech and Thought in Parole 
as the Realization of Language  
 
Saussure’s lectures exhibit, however, inconsistency in rationalistic presen-
tations of the sign as a unity of two mental sides: concept ‘concept’ (inter-
preted also as ‘image’ or ‘notion’) and image acoustique ‘acoustic image’. 
One of his chapters devoted to the problem of the linguistic value (cf. 
Saussure 1916/1922, 155–169) shows explicitly his adherence to the Pla-
tonist unity of (external) expressions and (internal) thoughts.  
 Saussure’s (1922, 157) conception of the duality of language may be 
interpreted as a Platonic heritage when recalling his metaphorical illustra-
tion which states that the unity of speech and thought in the realization of 
language may be compared to a sheet of paper where it is impossible to cut 
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up the first side without cutting up the second one; similarly, in a lan-
guage, one is not able to separate either sound from thought or thought 
from sound; The domain of linguistic study is thus placed by Saussure on 
the borderland where the elements of two orders are combined into a unity 
of linguistic form (cf. Chapter Six, pp. 113–114). 
 
 
The Hjelmslevian Duality of the Sign: 
Expression and Content as Two Functives 
United by a Sign Function in Speech and Thought  
 
The Hjelmslevian view of the sign, motivated by Saussure’s conception of 
parole, resembles the Platonic notion of lógos, but it reflects also the Aris-
totelian way of delimiting the substance from the matter through the form. 
Louis Hjelmslev (cf. 1943 [1953/1961/1963, 13 and 52–58]) confirmed 
Saussure’s claim as to the duality of the sign, but he proposed to regard its 
two sides in terms of functives: expression form and content form, con-
nected by a sign function. Hjelmslev rejected the widespread opinion of 
logicians that the sign is to be described as something that stands for 
something else. In Hjelmslev’s view, the sign is not an expression that 
points to a content outside the sign itself but a two-sided entity that acts in 
two directions: to the outside, i.e., to the substance of expression, and to 
the inside, i.e., to the substance of content (cf. Chapter Six, pp. 115–120).  
 As a Platonist, Hjelmslev believed that the so-called sign function 
unites both internal mental facts with external physical facts which hu-
mans have at their disposal. Appealing to his terminology, one may say 
that the amorphous mass of thought (the matter of content) as well as the 
amorphous phonic continuum (the matter of expression) are organized by 
the form of each plane into the substance of expression and the substance 
of content. Although Hjelmslev treated the substance as a part of the mat-
ter (the purport) organized by the form, he favored in fact Saussure’s 
statement that language is a form and not a substance (cf. also the respec-
tive statement of Saussure in Chapter Six, p. 114): 
 Consequently, in opposition to the functionalists of the Prague School 
investigating the substance of language as relevant for semantic function, 
the pupils of Hjelmslev and the adherents of the Copenhagen School were 
called formalists (cf., inter alia, Umberto Eco in Encyclopedic Dictionary 
of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok, 1986, 943–946, and Teresa E. Hołówka in Ency-
clopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 937). 
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 A separate reflection of Platonist ideas might also be found in the dis-
tinction between Bedeutung, i.e., inferable meaning and Kundgabe, i.e., 
observable manifestation, introduced into the philosophy of language by 
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859–1938). According to Husserl, the 
act of speaking forms an intentional act of meaning where the connotative 
meaning is deducible from the verbal signs as spoken. Hence, the meaning 
and manifestation are, for Husserl, mutually exclusive as phenomena when 
tied as products of speech to indication (cf. Richard Leo Lanigan in Ency-
clopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 697). 
 
 
Language in a Triadic Sequence or a Unified Triangle 
 
The Mediating Role of Human Intellect 
 
It was Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, who introduced to the original dyad, 
consisting of the sound and thought of man, a third element, namely the 
things in reality he learns and communicates about. In comparison to Pla-
to, Aristotle made progress by distinguishing the thought about reality 
from the expression of this thought in words (called lexis), as two hetero-
geneous phenomena.  
 The Aristotelian sequence was reinterpreted by William of Ockham 
(alias Occam, an English scholastic philosopher, 1285–1347)29 in his Summa 
Logicae, written between 1323 and 1326, giving the rise to a nominalist 
triangle. However, the translated terms of Aristotle: res—intellectus—vox 
[‘thing—intellect—voice’] were replaced by Ockham through: res—
conceptus—terminus [‘thing—concept—term’] (cf. Ockham 1974). For 
Aristotle, concepts mediated between things and words, and in Ockham’s 
depiction concepts were tied to things by a natural bond, and the relation 
between words and things was based, on a convention (cf. Pazukhin 1983, 
61–63). And Ockham believed that thinking activities can be carried out 
not only by manipulating words in an acoustic or in a voiceless mental 
form, but also that mental acts can be performed without words (verbal 
thinking vs. pure thinking). 
 Against the background of medieval conceptualism, the idea of Aristo-
tle had been modified by his rationalist continuators from the Port-Royal 
School. According to a rationalist hypothesis, the thinker was operating 
with concepts directly and making use of words only when his/her ac-
counts of reasoning were to be communicated to others. 
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 As far as the relation between reality, thought and language is con-
cerned, the Aristotelian threefold sequence reappeared in the assumption 
of the spiritual intermediate world (Germ. die geistige Zwischenwelt), put 
forward by the followers of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836 [1988]). In the 
20th century, the Aristotelian triad also found its expression in the works 
of Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), 
widely known under the label of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis regarding the 
conception of linguistic determinism in human cognition, but with the stress 
on the sequence: “language, thought and reality”.  
 The Aristotelian idea of the mediating role of the human mind, through 
innovations of Scholastic thinking, underwent further modifications. It was 
still continued by the interpreters of the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839–1914), and Charles William Morris (1901–1979) pertaining to the 
relationships between human actions and various signs created by man (cf. 
Petrilli 2013, 1–34). 
 Peirce elaborated (around 1897) the concept of a trilateral sign, or a 
triad, as an ideal unity of three constituents. This concept, however, cannot 
be uniformly interpreted. From one formulation, distributed in his various 
writings, one might conclude that Peirce has understood (1) the sign as a 
threefold representamen of the sign-vehicle that is capable to stand for its 
object and to signify its interpretant which produces another sign referring 
to the same object. From another, one might view (2) the sign as a triadic 
relational structure that participates in generating different interpretations 
of meaning by producing other signs determined by the same object.  
 With reference to the latter understanding of the subject matter of se-
miotics, it is worth emphasizing Peirce’s idea of continuous semiosis the 
limits of which are demarcated by the ultimate interpretant of the sign. It 
points the way towards a dynamic view of sign action that generates an 
interpretant itself. However, since every sign can generate an interpretant, 
which is another sign in turn, and every interpretant can be a sign, the 
distinction between both terms is analytically relative, as has been exposed 
by Joseph Ransdell (1931–2010, see in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semi-
otics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 675–681). What's more, as far as any given sign is 
itself an interpretant of a prior sign of the same object, it seems obvious 
that the distance between the sign and its object is greater when more 
intermediating signs are generated in the process of interpretations. 
 In the same context, as important for the theory of sign production, it is 
appropriate to mention another philosopher, namely Gottlob Frege (1848–
1925) who has been interested in resolving the problem of how to approx-
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imate the meaning of a given sign through the explanation of its senses. 
Frege is usually mentioned as the originator of a triadic scheme (devel-
oped around 1892), in which three elements: Zeichen, Sinn, Bedeutung 
(interpreted as: “sign, sense, indication”) are engaged in grasping the 
meaning of a given sign, as an ideal object, through other signs of the 
same language (cf. Frege 1892, 100, as discussed by Eco 1979, 60–61). 
 
 
The Semantic Triangle and its Interpretational Variants 
 
As closer standing to Aristotle than to Ockham, one should consider the 
so-called semantic triangle known widely under the names of Ogden and 
Richards (1923), in which all three of its constituents form separate enti-
ties, and only one of them is a sign.  
 







Comparing various interpretations of a semantic triangle, one encounters 
more or less appropriate epistemological substitutes of its three original 
terms. The names for these [1–3] constituents of a semantic triangle can be 
traced in the proposals of various authors:  
 
— Charles Kay Ogden (1889–1957), and Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893–
1979): [1] symbol—[2] thought (or reference)—[3] referent. The rela-
tionships between three constituents has been described as CORRECT: [1] 
symbolizes (a casual relation) [2], ADEQUATE: [2] refers to (other casu-
al relations) [3], and TRUE: [1] stands for (an imputed relation) [3] (cf. 
Ogden & Richards 1923/1949, 11); 
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Model 10-3. Charles A. Ogden’s and Ivor A. Richards’ semantic triangle  
 
 




—  (Nils) Gustaf Stern (1882–1948): [1] word—[2] meaning—[3] refer-
ent (cf. Stern 1931/1963, 37); 
 







— Stephen (alias István) Ullmann (1914–1976): [1] name—[2] sense—
[3] thing (cf. Ullmann 1952, 22);  
 







There are, however, also adherents of the concept of a semantic triangle 
who have tried to make use of a bilateral sign conception, as, for example:  
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— John Lyons (born 1932): [1] form—<WORD>—[2] meaning (con-
cept)—[3] referent (cf. Lyons 1968, 404);  
 








— Pierre Guiraud (1912–1983): [1] symbol, both a signifying form and its 
acoustic image—[2] reference, i.e., a signified concept—[3] referent, 
i.e., a named thing (after Guiraud 1955/1972 [1976, 21]), translation of 
the terms is ours: ZW). 
 
Model 10-7. Pierre Guiraud’s placement of Saussurean bilateral sign within the 
scheme of a semantic triangle  
 
REFERENCE, 















The most remarkable divergence occurs in the interpretations of the term 
symbol used by Ogden and Richards. For that reason, a beginner in the 
field of linguistic semiotics has to choose from amongst different pro-
posals. He/she must decide whether “symbol” is a word, a name, a form of 
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a word, or whether it may be considered as oneness in two manifestations, 
i.e., both a signifying form and its acoustic image.  
 
Model 10-8. John Lyons’ and Pierre Guiraud’s constituents of a semantic triangle 















John Lyons has introduced the term word as a unity of form and meaning, 
whereas Pierre Guiraud has treated “the physical form” and “its mental 
reflection” as two sides of a symbol. While Lyons has referred the form to 
a mental counterpart of the word, i.e., to mental meaning, Guiraud has 
regarded it as a concrete part of the bilateral sign in Saussurean outlining. 
To identify divergences in the formulations of a semantic triangle, one has 
to check the ontology of its constituents in comparison to those distin-
guished in particular conceptions of a unilateral sign.  
 When comparing the sign conception of Pierre Guiraud (cf. 
1971 [1974]; 1971 [1975]) where separate entities are to be distinguished in 
the following definition: « un signe est un stimulus—c'est-à-dire une subs-
tance sensible—dont l'image mentale est associée dans notre esprit à celle 
d'un autre stimulus qu'il a pour fonction d'évoquer en vue d'une communi-
cation. ». (Guiraud 1971, 29), one can understand why it has been impos-
sible to place the four constituents into the angles of a triangle, such as (1) 
the sign itself, (2) the mental image of the sign, (3) the mental image of the 
referent, and (4) the referent itself, in the following definition:  
 
The sign is a stimulus (1), i.e., a sensorial substance, the mental image (2) 
of which is associated in our mind with the image (3) of another stimulus 
(4), and the function of which is to evoke the latter for communication. 
(Guiraud 1971 [1974], 29; the introduction of numbers and interpretation 
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Detachment of the Sign from Its Referent  
 
The Implicational Nature of the Sign 
 
Along with Plato and Aristotle, one should mention the Stoics who made a 
major contribution to the theory of sign and meaning in Antiquity. The 
main source of our knowledge about their teachings, including those of 
Chrysippos (c. 280–296 B.C.), are critical treatises (Against the Logicians; 
Against the Mathematicians or Against the Grammarians) of Sextus Em-
piricus (fl. c. 180–200 A.D.), one of the representatives of the Skeptics (cf. 
Sextus Empiricus 1933–1949, available in the English translation of Rob-
ert Gregg Bury, a British priest and scholar, 1869–1951).  
 The importance of the Stoics for the foundations of semiotics has been 
recognized in at least four areas (for details see. Sebeok 1976, 27, Rollin 
1976, 41–44; David Savan in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. 
Sebeok 1986, 976–982 and 954–957; Hołówka in Encyclopedic Diction-
ary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 939; and Pazukhin 1983, 25–29). 
 
(1) The Stoics treated signs as corporeal phenomena that reveal something 
what is real but non-evident through conditional implications;  
(2) The Stoics have distinguished between logical inferences as ideal and 
incorporeal by nature and psychological judgments expressed in corpo-
real sentences;  
(3) The Stoics viewed all signs as existing materially either in a sensible or 
intelligible form of a both cosmic and human soul in the activities of 
speaking and thinking. Only the meanings of the signs inferred through 
logical reasoning were considered as possessing an ideal form of exist-
ence;  
(4) The Stoics noticed that signs occur not only in the realm of humankind 
but also among animals, although only humans can combine the past 
and the future with the present and speak about signs that are desig-
nates (referents) of other signs.  
 
St. Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis, A.D. 354–430, one of 
the Latin fathers in the early Christian Church; bishop of Hippo in North 
Africa), a medieval philosopher, although a Platonist with respect to meta-
physical matters in theology, is included among the continuators of Stoic 
thinking on the basis of his views regarding the semiotic nature of lan-
guage. It is he who has placed signs among things the function of which is 
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to signify other things, and who has put forward the idea of “meta-
designation”, i.e., the ability to speak in signs about other signs, as the 
main characteristics of human beings. To the most quoted definitions of 
sign belongs his statement (cf. Augustinus 1962): 
 
Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid 
ex se faciens in cogitationem venire [A sign is that thing which, besides the 
impression it makes on the senses, causes something else beyond itself to 
come under one’s knowledge] (Augustinus 397 [1958], De doctrina 
Christiana, Liber secundus, I. 1., trans. is ours: ZW).  
 
One has, however, to notice that St. Augustine’s attitude to the nature of 
meaning is, in fact, Aristotelian. It is probable that his doctrine about ver-
bum interior (‘the inner word’), seen not as a replica of the spoken word of 
any language known by speakers, but identified with mental images, might 
well have its source in the Aristotelian belief about the meanings as 
thoughts of things being developed in the human mind. Aristotle is sup-
posed to say that while words of national languages differ from one anoth-
er, their mental counterparts must have universal character for all men.  
 In the same context, according to Rostilav Pazukhin (1983, 63), Anicius 
Manlius Severinus Boethius (Boëthius, A.D. 475?–525?), Roman philoso-
pher and statesman, interpreted mental images as specific natural signs of 
things (cf. Boethius 1877/1880). The compromise between the Augustini-
an tenet of the heteromorphism of speaking and thinking—including the 
assumption that thoughts could be formed by means of mental signs before 
they are expressed in words—and the Boethian interpretation of Aristotle 
have found its reflection in the sign theory of Ockham.  
 As a result of Ockham’s nominalist views (mentioned above in the 
context of Aristotle) the logical theory of propositions has been developed 
claiming that there are two varieties of sentences having dissimilar struc-
ture and composition: mental sentences (propositiones mentales) and spo-
ken sentences (propositiones vocales). However, in the investigative prac-
tice, modern logicians who adopt a positivistic attitude toward language 
understand the propositional content as referring to an ideal or abstract 
counterpart of a sentence, the bearer of truth or falsity. 
 Along these lines, it might be appropriate to emphasize that the con-
temporary usage of the term proposition reflects the Stoics’ mode of rea-
soning, when stressing the conditional character of logical inferences. To 
sum up, one should add that the teachings of Stoics have influenced not 
only the Scholastic thought in the Middle Ages, but have also survived 
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within the modern propositional logic developed from a positivistic and 
objectivistic point of view.  
 One may also agree with the conclusion that Stoicism as a semiotic 
approach to language is present in the work of contemporary logicians and 
linguists who follow a perspective of positivism, and who comply to the 
distinction between signification and indication, as well as between natural 
and conventional signs. It is especially true with respect to Rudolf Carnap 
(1891–1970), and the Vienna Circle, Ludwig (Josef Johann) Wittgenstein 
(1889–1951), and the Lwów–Warsaw School, as well as Kazimierz Aj-
dukiewicz (1890–1963), and their followers and pupils (cf. Pazukhin 1983, 
61; Louis Gerard Kelly in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. 
Sebeok 1986, 715–21; Dąmbska 1973, 7–14; Simone 1973, 19; and 31; 
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 
1986, 479; Hołówka in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 
1986, 936 and 939).  
 
 
Linguistic Functionalism as a Heritage of Stoic Tradition 
 
Stoicism is also embodied in the sign conception of Karl Ludwig Bühler, 
standing very close to the Prague School in respect to linguistic functional-
ism while footing at the same time on the psychological foundations as far 
as the theory of apperception is concerned. For Bühler (cf. 1934/1965, 28–
36, and 1934/1982 [1990, 34–36]), the principal property of a concrete sign 
is seen in its representational function (die Darstellungsfunktion).  
 In Bühler’s interpretation, the sign is defined as a perceptual thing 
standing for something else and used for the purposes of communication. 
With reference to “the principle of abstractive relevance” (das Prinzip der 
abstraktiven Relevanz), Bühler has stated that not all concretely realized 
features of the sign are important for the fulfillment of its communicative 
function (die Mitteilungsfunktion). However, some of them, which consti-
tute its functionally relevant features, may appear as redundant in the event 
that they become reduced without disturbing the process of communica-
tion, and supplemented by receivers through their apperception (i.e., 
through the traces of their memorized experiences). Karl Bühler has con-
tributed to the instrumentalist functionalism in linguistics, the result of 
which is the distinction between phonetics and phonology. The instrumen-
talist view of language, exposing the functionality of elements that play a 
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serviceable role in relation to their users or makers, has been borrowed, 
however, from intellectual trends prevailing in art and architecture. 
 The instrumentalist functionalism arose in the “climate of opinion”, 
popular in Austria, Switzerland and then in Germany after World War I, 
which promoted the perspectives of purpose-and-need-oriented rationalism 
in architecture, utility products, and environmental urbanist constructiv-
ism. Within an instrumentalist approach to function, the main attention of 
researchers was paid to abstractively relevant features inherent in the 
structure of elements playing a serviceable role with regard to human 
needs and social requirements (cf. Wąsik, E. 2011). Through the mediation 
of constructivism in applied arts and instrumentalist functionalism, which 
turned into a kind of functionalist structuralism aiming at the demarcation 
of what is typical and general from what is accidental and individual, re-
searchers started to be interested in determining what is functionally rele-
vant and irrelevant in the structure of their objects of study. 
 As a mode of thinking and tendency among intellectuals and architects, 
functionalism was opposed to expressionism. The propagators of function-
alism postulated to consider the needs of average people while producing 
the utility goods which conform rationally to the requirements of everyday 
life and are not falsified by abundant ornament and useless form. The 
rationalist principle demanded that architecture and applied arts reflect 
pure relationships between humans and their environment while taking 
account of their biological, social and culture-creative nature. The followers 
of rationality principle in art and architecture exposed the adequacy of 
function in relation to purpose, and argued that the beauty is the mirror of 
what grows as a result of appropriate uses for specified purposes. 
 In Bühler’s instrumental model of language (das Organon Modell der 
Sprache, cf. Model 10-9), the sign was identified with a sensible phenom-
enon standing for something else (aliquid stat pro aliquo) and functioning 
as a tool by means of which one person communicates to another person 
about the real things and states of affairs lying beyond the sign itself. For 
Bühler, the fundamental property of the sign was seen in its symbolic 
function, i.e., its semantic capacity to represent other objects.  
 Bühler defined the communicative function of language along with the 
symbolic function of its signs in terms of a threefold performance of lan-
guage while considering the role of the linguistic sign in its relation to the 
sender as a symptom, in its relation to the receiver—an appeal signal, and 
to the extralingual reality—a symbol (Cf. „Dreifach ist die Leistung der 
menschlichen Sprache, Kundgabe, Auslösung, Darstellung”. Bühler 1965, 28). 
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 The circle in Model 10-9 illustrates the phenomenon of the sound, that 
is, the actual word spoken. The triangle demonstrates the linguistic sign 
and shares common space with the circle in some areas, while extending 
beyond it in other areas. This overlapping exposes the two key features of 
the relationship between the sign and its physical realization. Where the 
circle overlaps the triangle, the phenomenon sound contains more acoustic 
information than the sign does. The triangle also envelops space beyond 
the circle. This means that some part of the message may be missing due 
to either misspellings or omissions on the side of the sender, or because 
the channel is subjected to interferences. In this case, receivers are still 
able to fill in the gaps to create a meaningful message when they can men-
tally supply what got lost. This phenomenon is what Bühler has called an 
‘apperceptive enlargement’ (eine apperzeptive Ergänzung).  
 
Model 10-9. Karl Bühler’s instrumental model of language (adapted from Bühler 
1965, 28 in conjunction with the respective terms translated into English; cf. 





The sign conception of Karl Bühler was developed in the works of Leon 
Zawadowski, Professor of general linguistics at the University of Wrocław 
in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Leon Zawadowski in: Meier 1961, 225; and 
Zawadowski 1970, 28–49). In details, Leon Zawadowski presents the so-
called “linguistic theory of language”, based on inductive methodology of 
function-oriented textual linguistics, in his academic handbooks of 1966, 
Lingwistyczna teoria języka (A linguistic theory of language), and 1975, 
Inductive Semantics and Syntax: Foundations of Empirical Linguistics. 
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The core of his theory constituted the definition of language as a semantic 
system with grammar and universal lexicon in a functional and ecological 
sense, i.e., the system that can be used everywhere by everyone for every 
task as a set (of classes) of text elements serving to communicate about the 
(set of classes of referents in the) extratextual reality. 
 Departing from the disciplinary-specific perspective of autonomous 
linguistics, Zawadowski, treated the sign as a token of a type of text-
elements that represents a token belonging to another type of elements, 
called referents or extratextuals. He also opted for considering complexes 
of characteristic (functional) features of texts and extratextuals as a signi-
fier and meaning, as a signified. 
 
Model 10-10. Delimitation and abstraction of differential and non-differential 
features in the sequence of simple sign T and its referent R as meaning (adapted 
for didactic purposes from Zawadowski 1975, 84) 
 
 
Zawadowski (1975) distinguished between the sets of individual and nor-
mal-usage features, on the one hand, and the mass of characteristic proper-
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ties of the simple sign as a text-element and its referent, standing in a se-
mantic relation of representation (T and R), on the other. By this, he sub-
sumed meaning-bearers and referential meanings to the same category of 
observable objects. For example, his description of the T-element con-
tained such features as, in particular: (1) the boundary of the total mass of 
sounds, (2) independent characteristic set, i.e., independent part of phonic 
social norm, (3) minimum differential set (phonemic, phonological, ‘rele-
vant’, ‘functional’, or ‘distinctive’).  
 Accordingly, following Zawadowski one can find in the description 
of the referent, understood as an R-element of extratextual reality, re-
spectively: (1) the boundary of the total mass of referent, (2) independent 
characteristic set, i.e., fundamental meaning (the norm of referent), and 
(3) minimum differential set (minimum differential meaning). Regarding 
the individual and social features of signs and their referents, Zawadowski 
labeled them as accidental features and reserve non-differential features, 










Presenting the Objective of Inquiry 
 
The aim of this chapter is, in general, to put forward an idea of epistemo-
logical equivalence, which should be achieved in translational praxis, and 
its focus concentrates, in particular, around the question of how the trans-
lations of sign-related terms selected from the students’ and editors’ lec-
tures Cours de linguistique générale (CLG) of Ferdinand de Saussure 
reflect the epistemological, i.e., ontological and gnoseological, awareness 
of their translators (see Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 415).  
 The focus of the interpretative inquiry is Saussure’s model of the sign 
as a twofold entity consisting of mental parts, a signifier and a signified, 
which mutually imply each other. For that reason, some original samples 
of quotations from the text of CLG are confronted with an earlier German 
translation and two distinct translations into English in order to check how 
the possible meaning disparateness of analyzed terms may exert an impact 
upon the addressees of lectures in general linguistics and semiotics.  
 In concluding remarks, the proposal for an ecumenical translation is 
submitted, where the knowledge of scholarly traditions and the epistemo-
logical connotations of discipline-specific terms establish the central aim 
of a translator’s schooling. Hence, a critical approach to the translational 
praxis, with special reference to its interpretative consequences, which 
have a place in academic teaching, appears to be indispensable (for details 
see Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 415–428; and 2014, 97–109). 
 
 
On the Idea of Epistemological Equivalence in Translation 
 
To explain the investigative perspective of his inquiry, the author departs 
from the assumption that epistemology deals with the philosophical foun-
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dations of human knowledge being accumulated in the body of theories 
and methods which result from the research activities of scientists. Ac-
cordingly, the purpose of an epistemological analysis of the scientific 
discipline in question is seen in the examination of the extent to which the 
scientists are aware of the correspondence between the respective views on 
their object of study and its investigative approachability (cf. Wąsik, Z. 
2003, 13; 2009a, 415; for more on this see Chapter Two).  
 As to evaluative aspects of translational praxis constituting this inves-
tigative domain, the category of epistemological equivalence is considered 
at the word level following the classificatory proposals of Mona Baker 
(1992, 11–12) and detailed distinctions summarized in the compilation of 
Dorothy Kenny (1998). However, in conformity with the statement of 
Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet (1958/1968 [1995]), the notion of 
equivalence is associated not only with a semantic search for correspond-
ing expressions which are listed in bilingual dictionaries. Hence, it is 
worthwhile to quote the opinion of the authors who state that “the need for 
creating equivalences” should arise from the situations to which the trans-
lated texts refer, because the entries in the dictionaries can not always be 
recognized as exhaustive (cf. Vinay & Darbelnet [1995, 255–256]). Even 
if the semantic equivalent of an expression in the source language text is 
available in a dictionary, it is not sufficient for creating an accurate trans-
lation. So, the equivalence-oriented translation could be viewed as a kind 
of procedure that “replicates the same situation as in the original, whilst 
using completely different wording” (Vinay & Darbelnet [1995, 342]).  
 In view of the terminological distinctions of Vinay and Darbelnet in-
troduced in 1958, practitioners of linguistic semiotics are advised to be 
aware of the fact that, for arriving at translational equivalence, the stylistic 
impact of the source language text has to be maintained in the target lan-
guage text. This estimated impact might eventually be redefined, follow-
ing Eugene Albert Nida’s proposals (1964, 159), as a dynamic corre-
spondence based upon “the principle of equivalent effect” between the 
terms functioning in appropriate texts of source languages and target lan-
guages, which have been regarded as two different codes in Roman Osi-
povich Jakobson’s framework (1959/1971, 233), for whom “translation 
involves two equivalent messages in two different codes”.  
  In the light of pragmatics, it is worth mentioning that the terms being 
translated should have, according to Juliane House (1977, 203), the same 
argumentative or expository force. To be added is also the conviction of 
Eugene Albert Nida and Charles Russell Taber (1982/2003, 200) who state 
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that the equivalent effect occurs in a situation when a translator seeks to 
translate the referential meaning of an original term in such a way that the 
target-language wording will exert the same communicative impact on the 
target-text addressees as the original source language wording did upon 
the source-text addressees.  
 Entering the domain of the following study from a methodological 
perspective, one has to take for granted that the epistemological commit-
ments of translators regarding the existence mode and cognoscibility of 
objects, to which the translated terms in question refer, might undoubtedly 
be stipulated by their choice of investigative attitudes acquired through 
education or borrowed from the climate of intellectual opinion prevailing 
at a specific time in a respective discipline of science. 
 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s Bilateral Sign 
as a Type of Semiotic Object  
 
The object of analysis in the domain of translational study on the basis of 
Saussure’s lectures represents here an absolute-rationalist model of the 
sign as an indivisible entity of two sides evoking each other in the mind of 
a communicating individual during his or her understanding and inter-
preting activities. A comprehensive survey of terminological distinctions, 
derived from logical, philosophical and linguistic semiotics would be 
relevant for presenting the position of this bilateral-sign conception among 
all models of the sign which have originated in the sciences of language 
and culture (cf. Wąsik, Z. 2009b, 126–127).  
 Worth mentioning, in this context, is the question (extensively dis-
cussed in Chapter Ten, pp. 165–166) of their existence modes, where signs 
are specified in terms of a one-sided item or a many-sided composite en-
compassing interrelated constituents, or a network of relations between 
those constituents. Additional kinds of questions refer to the manifestation 
forms of signs, that is, whether they appear as concrete or abstract objects 
in material or spiritual (physical or psychical) forms of being, whether 
they are observed inside or outside of the mind as real or ideal, sensible or 
intelligible, namely as extraorganismic or intraorganismic phenomena. 
Accordingly, from a gnoseological perspective, signs are approached ei-
ther extra- or introspectively, through individual tokens or general types, 
occurring in the realm of humans only, in the realm of all living systems, 
or in the universe of creatures, extraterrestrial and divine in nature. 
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Controversies in the Translations of the Two Sides 
of the Linguistic Sign 
 
Having confronted a number of quotations coming from the French origi-
nal of CLG with their two distinct translations into English against the 
background of the preceding German translation, the author of this study 
tries to evaluate various connotations of analyzed terms while pondering 
how they may exert an impact upon the recipients of educational discourse 
in semiotics. The following three groups of examples should illustrate the 
search for translational equivalence in rendering the French terms of 
[I] the mental representation of the linguistic sign in « concepts » and 
« images acoustiques », [II] the definition of the bilateral sign: « Le signe 
linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image 
acoustique », and [III] the replacement of « concept et image acoustique » 
respectively by « signifié et signifiant ». 
 
 
Translating the Two Mental Sides of the Linguistic Sign 
 
The two sides of the sign called originally concept and image acoustique 
had no uniform interpretations in languages other than French when Saus-
sure’s lectures, published by his pupils after his death, came to the fore-
ground of semiotic structuralism in Europe among linguists and later soci-
olinguists and anthropologists of culture. This is visible in the comparison 
of excerpted fragments from the original translated into German and Eng-
lish in two different versions (the second one is marked by a bold font). Cf. 
 
[I]  
Le point de départ du circuit est dans le cerveau de l’une, par example A, 
où les faits de conscience, que nous appellerons concepts, se trouvent 
associés aux représentations des signes linguistiques ou images acoustiques 
servant à leur expressions. Supposons qu’un concept donné déclanche dans 
le cerveau une image acoustique correspondante : c’est un phénomène 
entièrement psychique, suivi à son tour d’un procès physiologique : le 
cerveau transmet aux organes de la phonation une impulsion corrélative à 
l’image : puis les ondes sonores se propageut de la bouche de A à l’oreille 
de B : procès purement physique. (Saussure 1916/1922, 28–29) 
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Model 11-1. Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept and image acoustique 






Der Ausgang des Kreislaufs liegt im Gehirn des Einen, z. B. A, wo 
Bewußtseinsvorgänge, die wir Vorstellungen schlechthin nennen wollen, 
mit den Vorstellungen der sprachlichen Zeichen oder akustischen Bilder 
assoziiert sind, welche zu deren Ausdruck dienen. Stellen wir uns vor, daß 
eine gegebene Vorstellung im Gehirn ein Lautbild auslöst: das ist ein 
durchaus psychischer Vorgang, dem seinerseits ein physiologischer Prozeß 
folgt: das Gehirn übermittelt den Sprechorganen einen Impuls, der dem 
Lautbild entspricht; dann breiten sich die Schallwellen aus dem Munde des 




Model 11-1.1. Hermann Lommel’s translation of concept and image acoustique 






Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A’s brain, where mental facts 
(concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic sounds 
(sound-images) that are used for their expression. A given concept unlocks 
a corresponding sound-image in the brain; this purely psychological 
phenomenon is followed in turn by a physiological process: the brain 
transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the organs used in 
producing sounds. Then the sound waves travel from the mouth of A to the 
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Model 11-1.2. Wade Baskin’s translation of concept and image acoustique 






The starting point of the circuit is in the brain of one individual, for 
instance A, where facts of consciousness which we shall call concepts 
are associated with representations of linguistic signs or sound 
patterns by means of which they may be expressed. Let us suppose 
that a given concept triggers in the brain a corresponding sound 
pattern. This is an entirely psychological phenomenon, followed in 
turn by a physiological process: the brain transmits to the organs of 
phonation an impulse corresponding to the pattern. Then sound 
waves are sent from A’s mouth to B's ear, a purely physical process. 
(Saussure 1972 [1983, 11–12])  
 
 
Model 11-1.3. Roy Harris’ translation of concept and image acoustique 






In the German edition of 1931, Hermann Lommel has translated the French 
term concept (‘concept’) as Vorstellung, i.e., ‘(mental) image’ or ‘(mental) 
idea’, and image acoustique ‘acoustic image’ as Lautbild, i.e., ‘sound-
image’. As a consequence, the difference between the epistemological 
positions of German and French terms may be more understandable if one 
confronts with each other the definitions of Vorstellung, and the German 
Begriff (which is exactly an equivalent of the French term concept).  
 With reference to a lexicographic sense, one has to explain that the 
German entry word Vorstellung refers, in effect, not to a denotative mean-
ing of the mental image or idea as a product, but rather to a mental imagi-
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nation; whereas the imagination itself is to be understood as a psychical 
process involving, in the consciousness, an evocation of the images of 
objects and situations which, at a given moment, do not effect the sensorial 
organs of a human individual, but are based on past perceptions and/or 
fantasies (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 113; 2009a, 421).  
 As far as the German Begriff is concerned, it might be perhaps translat-
ed not only as a “concept” but also as a “notion” into English. One has to 
be aware, at this instant, of the synonymous or vague connotations of both 
terms notion vs. concept occurring in the English philosophical literature, 
as it has been noticed by Alfred Tarski who expressed serious doubts in 
his endnote no. 4 to the article “The semantic conception of truth and the 
foundations of semantics” (Tarski 1944, 341–375): “sometimes they refer 
simply to a term, sometimes to what is meant by a term, and in other cases 
to what is denoted by a term. Sometimes it is irrelevant which of these 
interpretations is meant; and in certain cases perhaps none of them applies 
adequately”.  
 It is obvious, therefore, why the term notion, etymologically pertaining 
to “knowledge” and/or “cognition” (cf. the derivatives of Latin noscere ‘to 
come to know’ or notificare ‘to make known’ having its roots in the Greek 
gignóskein) has never been applied in the translation of Saussurean terms. 
As a matter of fact, only the English “conceive” as a verb of action might 
be compared with a respective derivational base of the German begreifen, 
in the sense ‘to grasp’, ‘to capture’ or ‘to comprehend’ what someone says.  
 The English term concept (descendent from the Latin conceptum 
‘something conceived’, originally neuter of conceptus, a past participle 
of concipere; cf. Old French conceivre having its roots in the Latin 
concipere ‘to take fully’, ‘take in’ composed of con- + -cipere, a combina-
torial form of capere ‘to take’) refers to the connotative meaning of a 
name, mental equivalent of the set of features characteristic for objects, to 
which the name is referred, i.e., their designates in particular (cf. Wąsik, Z. 
1987, 113 and Random House 1992/1995/1997, Webster’s College Dic-
tionary, discussed by Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 421). 
 Differences in the understanding of original terms following Saus-
sure’s depiction of the rational nature of a two-sided sign have without 
doubt their source in the lack of distinctions between imaginationist psy-
chology, which pertains to the mental activity of visualizing the shape of 
cognized and perceived phenomena and events as individual tokens, and 
conceptualist psychology, which exposes the mental recollection of char-
acteristic (or similar) features of phenomena and events formed and con-
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cluded as general types. Being engaged in the translation of the two sides 
of the bilateral sign, one has to take for granted that both the signified and 
the signifier might be rendered in terms of imaginative reflections evoked 
by sensorial-perceptive features of things and names in the consciousness 
of sign users. 
 In the same way also, within the framework of conceptualist psycholo-
gy, making a reference to knowledge about the characteristic sets of tokens 
and types of signs as well as their designates, one is entitled to assume that 
both the signified and the signifying sides have mental equivalents of these 
sets in the consciousness of their users, namely, the conceived minimal 
mass of differential features of a referent should have as a counterpart the 
conceived minimal mass of differential features of a sign-vehicle. Howev-
er, such a distinction does not exist, in the logical, philosophical or psy-
chological terminology, as the conceptual features of the sign, in other 
words, a conceived, i.e. mental reflection of characteristic features of a 
sign corresponding to the concept of a referent (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 113; 
discussed also by Wąsik, Z. 2009a, 421). 
 A careful researcher being trained in epistemological distinctions of 
psychology may become aware of the fact that the German translator has 
located both terms of Saussure within the domain of imaginationist psy-
chology, pertaining as such to mental associations which form a configura-
tion of simultaneous properties that cannot be derived by the summation of 
its componential parts. 
 As to the English translation of the French concept and image acous-
tique their word-for-word translations in terms of “concept” and “acoustic 
image” had functioned in the intellectual climate of opinion of linguists 
and semioticians until the time when the two respective terms were first 
rendered as concept and sound-image by Wade Baskin, and then replaced 
by Roy Harris, in his translation of CLG, through the terms concept and 
sound pattern. To explain his reasons for rendering image acoustique not 
as “acoustic image” but as sound-image the former editor, Baskin, made 
the following observation in a footnote: 
 
The term sound-image may seem to be too restricted inasmuch as beside 
the representation of the sounds of a word is also that of its articulation, the 
muscular image of the phonational act. But for F. de Saussure language is 
essentially a depository, a thing received from without (see p. 13). The 
sound-image is par excellence the natural representation of the word as a 
fact of potential language, outside any actual use of it in speaking. The 
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motor side is thus implied or, in any event, occupies only a subordinate 
role with respect to the sound-image. [Ed.] (Saussure [1959, 66]) 
 
Harris’ proposal to introduce the term sound pattern appears to be suitable 
for subsuming both sides of the bilateral sign under the same epistemolog-
ical position. It is remarkable that both concept and sound pattern belong 
to the domain of conceptualist psychology, as far as they refer to the types 
of similarities between particular tokens of the sign constituents. With 
reference to the position of earlier English terms in Baskin’s translation, 
one has to state that his sound-image and the original French term image 
acoustique remain in the same domain of imaginationist psychology;  
whereas both the English term “concept” and the French concept are to be 
subsumed under the heading of conceptualist psychology.  
 
 
Model 11-1.4. Possible German rendering of Saussurean concept and image 






As far as the German translations are concerned, Begriff and Lautmuster 
would possibly be more appropriate as translational equivalents against the 
background of the English “concept” and “sound pattern”, which coincide 
with each other as belonging to the domain of conceptualist psychology. In 
this sense, the terms “sound pattern” and Lautmuster would be placed in 
opposition to “sound-image” and Lautbild in English and German.  
 
 
Searching for Translational Equivalence in the Definition 
of a Bilateral Sign  
 
A similar problem, as with the translation of its constituents, occurs also 
with the definition of the linguistic sign as a two-sided psychic entity (a 
so-to speak psychic entity with “two facets”) translated from the original: 
« Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et 
une image acoustique ». There is, however, a noticeable exception in the 
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English proposal of Roy Harris, rendering the statement: ‘The linguistic 
sign unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and an acoustic image”, 
having been known from the climate of opinion as a literal, word-for-
word translation by: “A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and 
a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern”.  
 More divergences are seen in the translation of the second consequen-
tial statement: « Ces deux éléments sont intimement unis et s’appellent 
l’un l’autre » [‘these two elements are intimately united and appeal (to 
themselves), each to the other’]. Against the background of the German 
translation: „Diese beiden Bestandteile sind eng miteinander verbunden 
und entsprechen einander“, the sentence in question might be rendered in 
the following words: ‘Both of these constituents are closely linked to each 
other and correspond each to the other’.  
 Probably closer to Lommel’s translation stands the interpretation made 
by Harris with reference to the idea of a linking relationship assumed to 
exist between the two sides of the linguistic sign. Compare, in this respect, 
the first part of Baskin’s translation: “The two elements are intimately 
united, and each recalls the other” with Harris’: “These two elements are 
intimately linked and each triggers the other”. 
 The same, however, cannot be said about the second part of the sen-
tence as regards the equivalence at a word level, when one confronts the 
French phrase « s’appellent l’un l’autre » with the German „entsprechen 
einander“ and the English (in Baskin’s translation) “each recalls the other” 
or (in Harris’ translation) “each triggers the other”.  
 In French, the latter phrase, « s’appellent l’un l’autre », means exactly 
‘evoke each other’, which is not at all reflected in the German „entspre-
chen einander“ (which should be literally rendered as ‘correspond to each 
other’). As regards the sentence: “These two elements are intimately 
linked”, to be added is, at the margin of this particular study devoted to the 
analysis semiotic terms only, that the English word “intimately” can be 
seen rather as a literal substitute of the French « intimement », than an 
equivalent at a word level, as it is the case with the German „eng“ where 
both refer to the connotative meaning of ‘close’, or, to be exact, ‘tight’. Cf. 
 
[II]  
Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une 
image acoustique. … 
Le signe linguistique est donc une entité psychique à deux faces …  
Ces deux éléments sont intimement unis et s’appellent l’un l’autre.  
(Saussure 1922, 98–99)  
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Das sprachliche Zeichen vereinigt in sich nicht einen Namen und eine 
Sache, sondern eine Vorstellung und ein Lautbild. (Saussure 1931, 77)  
Das sprachliche Zeichen ist also etwas im Geist tatsächlich Vorhandenes, 
das zwei Seiten hat. … 
Diese beiden Bestandteile sind eng miteinander verbunden und entsprechen 
einander. (Saussure [1931, 78]) 
 
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound-image. … 
The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity. … 
The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other.  
 (Saussure [1959, 65–66])  
 
A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between 
a concept and a sound pattern. … 
The linguistic sign is, then, a two-sided psychological entity. … 
These two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other. 
(Saussure [1983, 66])  
 
 
Detecting Incongruous Renditions of Two Mental Sides 
of the Linguistic Sign 
 
Having evaluated the selected quotations, an inquisitive semiotician—who 
refers to the distinction of Victor Huse Yngve (1996, 209–210) between 
the physical domain of observable concatenations of facts or processes and 
the logical domain of inferable associations linking related factual or pro-
cessual phenomena—may find out that Baskin’s terms in English, signified 
and signifier, could be considered rather as standing quite close to the 
translational equivalents of Lommel’s terms in German. However, having 
compared Bezeichnetes and Bezeichnung (Bezeichnendes) from the trans-
lated text with Bezeichnetes and Bezeichnendes from the graphical depic-
tion of the two-sided sign as presented in Model 11-2.2., he or she could 
expect also a word-for-word rendering of French signifié and signifiant by 
‘signified’ and ‘signifying’ in English. They might also come to the con-
clusion that signifiant in French and Bezeichnendes in German represent a 
gerund form derived from the verb and functioning as a noun. As a matter 
of fact, signifier and signifying are two distinct word forms. The grammat-
ical category, to which the word signifier belongs, is an ad-verbal noun 
composed of the word stem signifi- (from the word basis signify) and an 
inflectional affix -er. Accordingly, in confrontation with the French original 
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and Lommel’s translation into German, Baskin’s passage might have been 
formulated as follows: “I propose to retain the word sign to designate the 
whole and to replace concept and sound-image (acoustic image) respec-
tively by signified and signifier (signifying) …”. 
 Nevertheless, against the background of semiotic tradition, one has to 
regard Harris’ replacement of Saussurean terms signifié and signifiant by 
signification and signal as epistemologically incommensurable. A poten-
tial reader, or participant of educational discourse, is to be made aware that 
the word signification connotes, without a doubt, an act of indicating an 
object in the domain of reference, that is, the process of referring to signif-
icance, content, importance, or sense, of a given sign; whereas signal im-
plies a token of the concrete sign type which evokes feelings, reactions of 
sign-utilizers, or indicates either an observed or concluded representation 
of its object of reference in the extrasemiotic reality. Hence, the difference 
between signification and signal lies in their belonging to two divergent 
existence modes of the signifying and the signified parts of the sign; exact-
ly saying, to the logical domain of rational associations and the physical 
domain of empirical observations. But the same cannot be said about the 
imputed meaning of ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’ (eventually ‘signifying’) as 
translational equivalents of signifié and signifiant. Compare quotations: 
 
[III] 
Nous proposons de conserver de mot signe pour désigner le total, et de 
remplacer concept et image acoustique respectivement par signifié et 
signifiant ; ces derniers termes ont l’avantage de marquer l’opposition qui les 
sépare soit entre eux, soit du total dont il font partie. (Saussure 1922, 99)  
 
 






Ich schlage also vor, daß man das Wort Z e i c h e n  beibehält für das 
Ganze, und Vorstellung bzw. Lautbild durch Bezeichnetes und Bezeichnung 
(Bezeichnendes) ersetzt; die beiden letzteren Ausdrücke haben den  
Vorzug, den Gegensatz hervorzuheben, der sie voneinander trennt und von 
dem Ganzen, dessen Teile sie sind. (Saussure [1931, 78–79]) 
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I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to 
replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and 
signifier [signifiant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating 
the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of 
which they are parts. (Saussure [1959, 67]) 
 
 






We propose to keep the term sign to designate the whole, but to 
replace concept and sound pattern respectively by signification and 
signal. The latter terms have the advantage of indicating the 
distinction which separates each from the other and both from the 
whole of which they are part. (Saussure [1983, 67])  
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Postulating an Epistemological Ecumenism 
in Translation Studies 
 
As concluding remarks, the necessity of an ecumenical translation is to be 
postulated, in which familiarity with the scholarly traditions and 
knowledge of the epistemological connotations of discipline-specific terms 
within the boundaries of competing schools of scientific thought might 
constitute the core of the translator’s attention.  
 
 
Model 11-2.5. Possible rendering of Saussurean signifié and signifiant  







Model 11-2.6. Possible rendering of Saussurean signifié and signifiant  
by “signification” and “significate” as two mental sides of a bilateral sign after 






Accordingly, critical approaches to the translational praxis with special 
reference to the problem of epistemological positions of educational semi-
otics against the background of scientific heritage appear to be useful. 
Bearing this postulate in mind it might be advisable to replace Baskin’s 
term “signifier” by “signifying” as a grammatical equivalent of signifiant 
and Bezeichnendes and Harris’ term “signal” by “significate” as a mental 










THE SEMIOTIC SELF IN DISCURSIVE 










Modeling the Conceptual Types 




Epistemological Positions of Sign-and-Its-Referent 
Relationships and the Theories of Meaning  
 
This chapter (basing on Wąsik 2014, 111–126) assesses how to present the 
status of semiotic objects equalized with the sign as an entity, or the unity 
of the sign and its reference, and the nature of semiotic meaning. As has 
been summarized in search of historical roots, popular conceptions of the 
sign and/or meaning, that prevail in semiotic tradition are formulated ei-
ther in terms of a unilateral sign, in which the objects playing the signify-
ing and signified roles are detached as separate entities, or a bilateral sign, 
the constitutive sides of which, the signifier and the signified, comprise a 
twofold unit. Some semioticians adhere to the conception of a semantic 
triangle with three constituents forming separate entities, and some prefer 
the conception of a trilateral sign constituting a threefold unit as a oneness. 
 Bearing in mind that the existing varieties of sign conceptions exhibit 
not only differences in the usage of terminology but also in the formation 
of their visual representations, it is indispensable to find a parameter that 
contains features and constituents specific for particular approaches to 
their forms of being and manifestation. Having noticed that all constituents 
of hitherto existing sign conceptions are to be found within the structure of 
a semantic quadrangle, the author proposes to consider the usefulness of a 
typological matrix which respectively encompasses suitable explanatory 
and illustrative primitives. 
 In the search for descriptive parameters, the focus of this chapter is on 
validating the applicative value of a positivist’s sign conception in which 
the sign-vehicle as a meaning-bearer is detached from its referent as a 
meaning. In this instance, according to a functionalist principle of abstrac-
tive relevance, the unilateral sign conception is discussed as distinguishing 
between the sets of individual- and normal-usage features and the mass of 
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characteristic properties of the sign and its referent(s). And, in another 
instance, the emphasis is put on providing evidence about the usefulness of 
combined empiricist and rationalist perspectives for illustrating a multipo-
lar character of semiotic objects with regard to their inferable essence and 
observable relevance. 
 An important epistemological distinction that has an impact upon the 
categorization of sign conceptions depends on answering the question 
whether the sign is to be viewed as a token or a type (an exemplar or a 
class, an item, or a kind). It is explicitly the distinction between tokens and 
types which pertains to the manifestation forms not only of signs, but also 
of designates they represent in extrasemiotic reality, i.e., to the objects 
which are called referents.  
 Having reviewed a plentiful assortment of all hitherto known sign con-
ceptions brought to a common denominator within the framework of a 
semantic quadrangle, the following analysis demonstrates how its two main 
constituents, namely the broadly defined sign and its referent, as a token and 
type―with their collective and individual properties exclusively and inclu-
sively and in their concrete and mental manifestation forms―may be mod-
eled as oscillating between logical positivism, rational empiricism, empirical 
rationalism, and absolute rationalism. 
 Primary attention in semiotics is given not only to the manifestation 
forms of signs, but also to their referential meaning. However, the term 
meaning does not stand in one-to-one correspondence to various formula-
tions of the notional scope of the sign as a basic category of semiotics. 
Hence, a representative of a particular semiotic discipline has to decide, 
which among various specifications of meaning deserves to be treated as a 
semiotic concept, and which should be labeled as a non-semiotic concept. 
 
 
Asking for the Genus Proximum of the Linguistic Sign 
 
To distinguish between a sign and a non-sign, one has to ask for its genus 
proximum. In this context, a well-known formula aliquid stat pro aliquo, 
‘something stands for something else’, applied by Karl Bühler while defin-
ing the verbal sign as “the phenomenon susceptible of sense perception, 
normally an acoustic phenomenon” [„das sinnlich wahrnehmbare, 
gewöhnlich akustische Phänomen“] (see Bühler 1934/1982 [1990], 25, 
40], 31, 47, cf. Wąsik, Z. 2003, 96, 2014, 112), does not appear to be ad-
vantageous for the aims of linguistics, because it requires elaborating an 
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extensive set of the differentia specifica. In order not to oscillate between 
various conceptions, one has to find a determining feature common for all 
notional scopes of the term sign. And such a proposal may be deduced 
from the classification of semiotic phenomena, specified as something that 
is recognized as it appears or as it is experienced by senses, or sensorial 
stimuli, understood as something that excites the body and activates the 
mind. In the first instance, definitional properties of the sign, as exposed in 
Model 12-1.1, may be determined by four positively marked levels of 
phenomena: (i) non-implicative vs. implicative, (ii) non-artificial vs. artifi-
cial, (iii) non-semantic vs. semantic, or (iv) non-arbitrary vs. arbitrary.  
 



















An alternative explanation can be also made in terms of stimuli preferred 
by mind- and body-centered practitioners of semiotics. As illustrated in 
Model 12-1.2 (adapted from Wąsik, Z. 2009b, 126; 2010d, 561), one may in 
the second instance utilize distinctions between: (i) non-associated vs. asso-
ciated, (ii) non-intentional vs. intentional, (iii) non-inferred vs. inferred, 
(iv) non-conventional stimuli vs. conventional. To be more precise, in the 
classificatory approach to associated stimuli, the term conventional is 
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often reduced, especially in linguistic writings, to the connotative meaning 
of the term arbitrary, i.e., free and non-motivated. 
 








Taking into consideration that language is usually defined as a system of 
signs, one has to be aware that the sign as a semiotic object should occupy 
a lowest place in the hierarchy of experiencable phenomena or sensible 
stimuli (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 107; 2003; 97; 2005, 89; 2009b, 126; and 2010d, 
561). As Model 12-2 illustrates, semiotic objects can appear in the role of: 
 
— index as an implicative phenomenon or an associated stimulus,  
— symptom as an implicative non-artificial phenomenon or an associated 
non-intentional stimulus,  
— signal as an implicative artificial phenomenon or an associated inten-
tional stimulus,  
— appeal as an implicative artificial non-semantic phenomenon or an 
associated intentional non-inferred phenomenon,  
— symbol as an implicative artificial semantic phenomenon or an associ-
ated intentional inferred stimulus,  
— icon as an implicative artificial semantic non-arbitrary phenomenon or 
an associated intentional inferred non-conventional stimulus, and  
— sign as an implicative artificial semantic arbitrary phenomenon or an 
associated intentional inferred conventional stimulus. 
 
Thus, the linguistic sign may be viewed in the hierarchy of semiotic objects, 
such as a (1) non-implicative vs. implicative phenomenon or non-associated 
vs. associated stimulus, i.e., non-index vs. index, (2) non-artificial (natural) 
vs. artificial phenomenon or non-intentional vs. intentional stimulus, i.e., 
(indexical) symptom vs. signal, (3) non-inferred vs. inferred phenomenon 
or non-semantic vs. semantic stimulus, i.e., (signaling) appeal vs. symbol, 
(4) non-arbitrary vs. arbitrary stimulus or non-conventional vs. conventional 
phenomenon, i.e., (iconic) symbol vs. (signifying) symbol. 
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On the Ontological Typology of Sign Conceptions 
 
Varieties of sign conceptions discussed in the previous chapter exhibit not 
only differences in the terminology, but also in the formation of their visu-
al representations. With consideration of the need for their comparison, 
one has to elaborate a matrix that contains all features and constituents 
being specific for particular approaches to their ontological status (cf. 
Wąsik, Z. 1998, 48; 2003, 100; 2005, 90; 2009b, 128; and 2010d, 562).  
 
Model 12-3. A matrix for the typology of sign conceptions with respect to their 
ontological status 
 
the sign  =   as an entity, a unity, a relation 
or a relational network 
the relation =  
E =  extraorganismic (concrete, sensible) 
I  =  intraorganismic (mental, intelligible) 
S =  stimulus (sign-vehicle, signifier, expression) 





Through the application of a unified scheme, as in Model 12-3, one can 
expose seven types of sign conceptions according to their ontological 
status (discussed from a historical perspective in Wąsik, Z. 1995, 209–
217). An overview of semiotic thought (cf. Chart 12-1, adapted from 
Wąsik, Z. 1998, 49–50; 2003, 100; 2005, 90; 2009b, 127; and in particular 
2010d, 563) has shown that the manifestation forms of the sign are ex-
pressed in the conception of: (I) a unilateral sign in which the sign-vehicle 
and the referent are treated as separate entities, (II) a bilateral sign where 
its signifier and its signified constitute a twofold mental unity, (III) a se-
mantic triangle in which the sign-vehicle, the meaning as a thought or no-
tion, and the referent form separate parts, and (III') a trilateral sign where the 
sign-vehicle, the meaning as an interpretant generating (an)other sign(s), 
and the object of reference constitute a threefold unity.  
 As separate varieties occur also (II') the sign as a dyadic relation and 
(III') the sign as a triadic relation. So far, the quadrilateral sign as an entity 
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or the sign as a tetradic relation (or a fourfold relation), i.e., a network of 
relationships between the four “sign-arguments”, has not been postulated 
at all. Anyway, such types as (IV') and (IV") are admissible (when the 
bilateral or trilateral sign, or the sign as a dyadic relation, or the sign as a 
triadic relation might be considered as theoretically justified). Some concep-
tions are distributed in semiotic writings, e.g., I (Karl Bühler, 1934), I (Aure-
lius Augustinus Hipponensis, c. 397–426), I (Wiesław Łukaszewski, 1974), 
I (Louis Trolle Hjelmslev, 1943), II (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1916), II' (Syd-
ney MacDonald Lamb, 1991), III (William of Ockham, c. 1323/1951), 
III(Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, 1923), III John 
Lyons, 1968), III, and IV (Pierre Guiraud, 1971). Some others are poten-
tial or occur as parts of other conceptions, as, e.g., I( within II, and I 
within III, I within III(. However, the conceptions of (III’) the trilateral 
sign (Gottlob Frege, 1892, Charles Sanders Peirce, c. 1897, cf. Peirce 
1931–1938), and (III') the sign as a triadic relation (Charles Sanders 
Peirce, c. 1897) do not fit within the proposed framework, but may be 
explained in terms of accepted primitives.  
 Bringing the explanatory and illustrative primitives to a common de-
nominator, as illustrated in Model 12-3, and Models 12-4a and 12-4b (af-
ter Wąsik, Z. 1996, 290; 1998, 51; 2003, 102; 2005, 91; and 2010d, 566), 
one may notice that all distinguished varieties of sign conceptions embrace 
the four elements of (IV) a semantic quadrangle, such as: 
  
(1) an externalized repraesentans  
 (i.e., the externalized signifying object as a concrete sign),  
 
(2) an internalized reflection of the repraesentans  
 (i.e., the internalized signifying object as a mental sign), 
 
(3) an externalized repraesentatum  
 (i.e., the externalized signified object as a concrete referent), and 
 
(4) an internalized reflection of the repraesentatum 
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III'. The trilateral sign 
III". The sign as a triadic relation 
ES           ER 
IS           IR 






IS IR IS 
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ER ES ES 
IS            IR 
IV'. The quadrilateral sign   IV''. The sign as a tetradic relation 
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Model 12-4a. The sign and its referent as constituents of a semantic quadrangle 
 
= individual properties of S as the 
sign or the sign as a token 
=  individual properties of R as the 
referent or the referent as a token 
 
  IS              IR 
  ES             ER 
 
With respect to mutual relationships between the constituents of this se-
mantic quadrangle in question, which have been illustrated in Chart 12-2a 
and furthermore Chart 12-2b, one may notice the four kinds of ontological 
implications in the observed and inferred reality, namely:  
 
(A) a sensible extraorganismic sign implies its sensible extraorganismic 
referent 
 (i.e., ES⇒ER, rendered as concrete sign and concrete referent),’ 
 
(B) an intelligible intraorganismic sign implies its sensible extraorganismic 
referent 
 (i.e., IS⇒ER, rendered as mental sign and concrete referent), 
 
(C) a sensible extraorganismic sign implies its intelligible intraorganismic 
referent,  
 (i.e., ES⇒IR, rendered as concrete sign and mental referent), 
 
(D) an intelligible intraorganismic sign implies its intelligible intraorgan-
ismic referent 
 (i.e., IS⇒IR, rendered as mental sign and mental referent). 
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Chart 12-2a. The sign and its referent in multipolar relationships 
 
(A) Concrete sign stands for concrete referent = ES implies ER 
 
(C) Mental sign is referred to concrete referent = IS implies ER 
 
(B) Concrete sign triggers mental referent = ES implies IR 
 
(D) Mental sign is linked to mental referent = IS implies IR 
 
IS             IR 
IS              IR 
 
ES            ER 
  IS              IR 
ES               ER 
  IS              IR 
 
ES             ER 
ES             ER 
 
 
In the context of the sign functioning as a meaning-bearer belonging to the 
domain of semiotic objects, the notion of meaning appears to be heteroge-
neous; for that reason, it should be thus discussed separately. 
 
 
The Sign and its Referent Within the Framework  
of a Semantic Quadrangle  
 
Another kind of distinction that can have an impact upon a number of 
multipolar relationships between constituents of sign conceptions depends 
on the answer to the question whether the sign is to be regarded as a token 
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or a type (in the sense: a specimen or a class, an item or a kind). This distinc-
tion, however, between tokens and types concerns not only the manifesta-
tion forms of signs but also the objects of reality they stand for, refer to or 
signify, i.e., which they represent, evoke, or indicate, namely those objects 
which are named referents.  
 In a much-generalized way, it is assumed that the main task attributed 
to signs consists in representation. In order to state what the representation 
of a given sign is, one has to determine the status of the repraesentans to 
which it corresponds, i.e., whether it is localized on the levels of indica-
tion, signalization, symbolization, or signification. Specifying, for exam-
ple, the concept of a verbal sign (a word, a name, a locution or a text ele-
ment, and the like) for the needs of language sciences, one should rather 
opt for its narrow understanding on the level of signification, i.e., as an 
arbitrary semantic intentional associated stimulus.  
 It is a matter of epistemological preferences as to what names are as-
cribed to the constituents or the entities of the domain of signification. 
They may be specified either as signifier and signified, or as sign and 
referent, repraesentans and repraesentatum, significans and significatum. 
They may be also treated separately as sign and designate, sign and sig-
nificate. or name and designate (nominatum, signum and significatum, 
signum and referent, designator and designatum, and the like).  
 
Model 12-4b. The sign and its referent as a token and a type  
in a unified scheme of the semantic quadrangle 
 
 = individual properties of S as the 
sign or the sign as a token 
= collective properties of S as the 
sign or the sign as a type 
= individual properties of R as the 
referent or the referent as a token 
= collective properties of R as the 
sign or the referent as a type 
IS     IR 
ES    ER 
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To avoid any adherence to psychological or logical conceptions, it might 
be appropriate to use the term referent for a repraesentatum of the sign as 
relatively unmarked. In the logical-philosophical usage, the term designate 
entails the counterpart of a name considered under the aspect of truth, and 
the term significate connotes rather the meaning of an abstract correlate 
embodying the raison d’être of the sign.  
 Taking for granted that “signs” and their “referents”—either real or 
fictitious, sensible (corporeal) or intelligible, observed or concluded— 
make up objects in the theoretical sense, which manifest themselves as 
tokens and/or types, one may explain them within the framework of a 
unilateral sign conception following the definition of Karl Bühler (1934, 
223–234) as constituents of a semantic quadrangle (cf. the respective 
terms in Model 12-4, adapted from Wąsik, Z. 1996, 290).  
 
Model 12-5. The relationship between the sign and its referent  











However, the relationship between “signs” as tokens and types, as singular 
tokens, or as abstract types and their “referents” as tokens and types, as 
singular tokens, or as abstract types, are more complicated when they 
appear in 3 x 3 kinds of combinations (as shown in Model 12-5). 
 The potential relations: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i (which are illustrated in 
Model 12-5) may be multiplied by the four kinds of possible unilateral 
sign conceptions: A, B, C, D (cf. Chart 12-2a and 12-2b) and interpreted 
within the framework of a semantic quadrangle.  
 Thus, one can expose in reality 36 kinds of combinations between 
signs and their referents, as extraorganismic objective or intraorganismic 
subjective tokens and/or types, inclusively or exclusively, as one may 
deduce from Chart 12-2b presenting an epistemological overview of signs 
and their referents according to their multipolar relationships (cf. Wąsik, 
Z. 1996, 291–292). 
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Chart 12-2b. The sign and its referent in multipolar relationships 
 
(A) Concrete sign stands for concrete referent = “ES ⇒ER” 
 
(a)      IS         IR (b)      IS        IR (c)      IS         IR 
(d)      IS         IR (e)      IS         IR (f)      IS         IR 
(g)      IS         IR (h)      IS         IR (i)      IS         IR 
 
 




 ER  ER 
 ER  ER  ER 
 ER 
(a)      IS (b)      IS (c)      IS 
 ER 
(d)      IS (e)      IS (f)      IS 
(g)      IS (h)      IS (i)      IS 
 
 
(C) Mental sign is referred to concrete referent = “IS ⇒ER” 
 
 ES 
 ES  ES  ES 
(a)                   IR (b)                  IR (c)                   IR 
(d)                  IR (e)                  IR (f)                   IR 
(g)                  IR (h)                  IR (i)                   IR 
 ES  ES 
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(D) Mental sign is linked to mental referent = “IS ⇒IR” 
 
ER ES ER ES ER ES 
 ER ES ER ES ER ES 









As one may figure out from Charts 12-2a and 12-2b in comparison with 
Chart 12-1 (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1998, 52–53; and 2003, 103), depending upon 
the choice of an epistemological position, the relationships between the 
constituents of the unilateral sign, selected as a matrix, namely, the sign 
and its referent may oscillate between: (A) logical positivism, referential 
antipsychologism = concretism, (B) rational empiricism, psychological 
logicism = moderate psychologism, (C) empirical rationalism, logical 
psychologism = moderate psychologism, and (D) absolute rationalism, 
extreme psychologism = mentalism.  
 
 
Semiotic and Non-Semiotic Conceptions of Meaning 
 
In view of the fact that the sum of sign conceptions does not correspond to 
the number of the definitions of meaning (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 121; and 
2003, 104–105), semioticians often resign from using the term meaning 
while replacing it by other synonymous expressions, such as, for example, 
sense, importance, reference, value, or significance. They know, as a mat-
ter of fact, that how to specify the essence of meaning depends on the 
choice of answers given to the following instances of questions:  
 
(1) whether the meaning exists as a process or a product, a token or a type, 
and whether it is approachable as a real or ideal, concrete or abstract, 
observed or concluded, intrinsic or intentional, objective or subjective 
phenomenon;  
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(2) whether the meaning resides in the signifier-side or the signified-side 
of the sign, or whether it constitutes a part or a whole, and furthermore, 
inherent or relational properties of the sign or its referent;  
(3) whether the meaning is to be detected from extrospective or introspec-
tive observations of the effects the sign causes upon feelings, reactions 
or behavior of the sign users;  
(4) whether the meaning should be concluded from the interrelationships 
among signs and/or between signs and their referents, signs and their 
users, signs and their contexts of use, and/or among the users of the 
signs (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 121; and 2003, 104–105). 
 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to state the meaning of what 
kind of semiotic objects one is interested in, and for what particular aims. 
One should determine the context and domain in which the meaning mani-
fests itself, i.e., in the realm of humans only, in the realm of all living 
systems, or in the universe of all possible sign processes, including extra-
terrestrial and divine. Being, for example, interested in the meaning of 
verbal signs, one should be aware of the fact that to select this definition 
from a variety of proposals, it is necessary to commit oneself to a certain 
epistemological position regarding the ontology and gnoseology of the 
subject matter in question, which should be determined as having meaning 
“in itself” or “for someone”, or in “relation to something”, etc. 
 
 
Classifying the Conceptions of Meaning 
Consistent with Epistemological Positions of Scientists 
 
Semioticians of language have at their disposal an extensive list of concep-
tions related to meaning (for references to primary and secondary sources 
see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 105–106). This list may be summarized through the 
following ascertainments and enumerations.  
 
 For those who adhere to the positions of nominalist philosophy, e.g., 
Adam Schaff (1961, and 1970, 120–122), the property of meaningful per-
tains to (cf. Jacek Juliusz Jadacki in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, 
ed. Sebeok 1986, 1140):  
 
(i) the mere name of an abstract idea or of a mental concept, or of a complex 
of common properties assigned to individual referents.  
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 Followers of Plato working within the framework of idealistic realism 
believe that the meaning exists (cf. Holger van den Boom and Jadacki in 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1137, and 1139): 
 
(ii) as an abstract idea independently of corporeal referents.  
 
 Conceptualists (adhering to the compromise between realism and nom-
inalism and regarding universals as concepts), in turn, identify meaning 
with (cf. Jadacki in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 
1986, 1139): 
 
(iii) a set of common properties subjectively attributed to individual 
referents of the sign.  
 
 Similarly, some associationists, basing on the philosophy of John Locke 
(1969/1975), are convinced that meaning is (cf. Pelc 1982, 233): 
 
(iv) an idea or an image of the referent which is formed in the thought of 
the users of a sign.  
 
 Adherents of classical logic favor, at a related point, the distinctions 
between connotations vs. denotations, intensions vs. extensions of the sign, 
derived from the logic of John Stuart Mill (1843), when opposing con-
formism to referentialism (cf., e.g., Pelc 1982, 240, Jadacki in Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 1139; and Ogden & Richards 
1923/1949, 10), according to which the meaning might be attributed to: 
 
(v) a set of common properties of the type of referents, or  
(vi) a set of referents belonging to the same type, qualified as a meaningful 
domain of reference.  
 
 Respectively, for the followers of either concretist or mentalist connec-
tionism (cf. Weisgerber 1929, 34, 178–179, and Zinovyev 1973, 15–16) 
meaningful is:  
 
(vii) a relation between the sign and its referent, between the signifier and 
the signified of a twofold mental sign, or the mere fact that such a relation 
exists where the sign represents (designates) certain objects, and the 
semiotician knows which ones.  
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 Additionally, in the context of sign-processing and sign-interpreting 
activities of cognizing and communicating subjects, as one may deduce 
from the philosophical thought of Gottlob Frege (1892, 100), and Charles 
Sanders Peirce (c. 1897; cf. 1931–1938), discussed by Umberto Eco 
(1976/1979, 60–61) and commented by Joseph Ransdell in Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 675–681, meaning is identified 
with: 
 
(viii) the translatability of a sign into other signs,  
 
 Likewise, not to be omitted is the view of phenomenologists, follow-
ing, inter alia, the works of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1900/1913 
[1970], 1901/1913 [1970], and 1913 [1931/1962]), or Roman Ingarden 
(1931 [1973]), discussed extensively by Jerzy Pelc (1982, 289–294) that 
meaning is: 
 
(ix) a reference to all emotional and cognitional processes of sign users 
directed toward intersubjective and intentional objects.  
 
 Practitioners of communication studies endorse, after Wilfrid Stalker 
Sellars (1974), the concept of meaning, reviewed, among others, by Anto-
nio Marras (1992, 713–716):  
 
(x) as a “functional classification”, which aims at a functional specification 
of the system of rules, consisting of all permissible moves made at various 
levels and dimensions of conceptual activities of communicating individuals 
that govern the role of a verbal sign in the language and behavior of a 
given linguistic community.  
 
 Moreover, representatives working in the pragmatics of speech com-
munication promote also the understandings of meaning: 
 
(xi) as a mode of how to use the sign, following the proposal of Ludwig 
Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1921 [1922], 1953 [1953]), or else (cf. Ranjit 
Chatterjee in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 
1164), or 
(xii) as a disposition how to react to the sign or to its designate with  
reference to logical behaviorism represented by Charles William Morris 
(1964, and 1938/1975; cf. also Pelc 1982, 235–240).  
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 Representatives of connectionist contextualism, in the same way as 
Adam Schaff (1960, 321, 374; or 1961, 614), expose the relational view of 
meaning:  
 
(xiii) as a structure or a reflection of the relations among signs in a given 
system, between signs and objective reality, sign users and signs, sign 
users and objective reality, and among sign users themselves.  
 
 Promising also for the followers of “multimodal logic” is a relativist 
conception of meaning, put forward by Richard Montague (1970/1974) 
along with the continuators of “truth-conditional semantics”, developed by 
Donald Herbert Davidson (1967/1984), and discussed, inter alia, by Daniel 
Vanderveken (1991, 374) while taking the reference to his earlier position 
(Vanderveken 1990–1991), where meaning is seen:  
 
(xiv) as a set (or a class) of all possible worlds in which the given utterance 





In the investigative domain of semiotics, one can encounter a variety of 
heterogeneous meaning-bearers, produced and interpreted by communi-
cating subjects. Therefore, it is no wonder, that semiotics has the status of 
an interdisciplinary investigative perspective, utilizing the achievements of 
traditionally recognized disciplines, which place the notions of sign and 
meaning and, more broadly, means and processes of communication among 
their descriptive categories. What is more, verbal expressions as semiotic 
objects which bear certain meanings are to be considered from the perspec-
tive of their users, producers or receivers as correlates of certain functions, 






The Semiotic Self in the Realm  




Extending the Boundaries of Research 
on the Semiotic Self 
 
This chapter aims at broadening the investigative domain devoted to the 
semiotic self—as a (non)animal organism, which subsumes the signals 
from its environment and emits them to its environment as significant—
through the notion of the signifying and communicating self, who sends 
and receives the sensorially perceivable meaning-bearers, and who pro-
cesses and interprets these mentally apprehensible meaning-bearers for the 
sake of collective understanding. This aim is fulfilled by putting together 
the conceptions of the subjective universe including all living systems, 
which are current in cultural anthropology and philosophy of biology. 
Accordingly, the communicative life-world, which results from the rela-
tionships between the outer selves of individuals, acting as producers and 
receivers of signs as meaning-bearers, is seen as a counterpart of the sub-
jective universe of the inner selves formed by sensual knowledge, originat-
ing from their personal life experiences, and consensual knowledge, com-
ing from the socially created contents of communication.  
 In keeping with the idea of enriching the notion of the semiotic self, as 
outlined by Thomas A. Sebeok (1979/1991, 1991, 1992/2001, 1998/2001) and 
Norbert Wiley (1994), through the inclusion of the concepts of the life-
world of an individual human being, defined as die Lebenswelt by Edmund 
Husserl ([1900/1913 [1970], 1901/1913] [1970], 1913 [1931/1962], 1952 
[1989], 1970 [{1935–1936} 1956/2012], and 1916–1937/2008), or as die 
Eigenwelt des Menschen by Hans Petersen (1937), this chapter tends to-
wards incorporating a signifying and communicating subject into the se-
miotic spheres of nature and culture. Among direct sources of influence on 
the theoretical model of subject-centered semiotics bridging the realm of 
culture and nature, it discusses Umberto Eco’s (1976/1979, 22–28) ap-
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proach to culture as a collection of semiotic systems that fulfill communi-
cative functions and Stanisław Pietraszko’s (1980; 1982) view of culture 
as an axiosemiotic sphere, against the background of biological concepts 
introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) including Umwelt and 
Funktionskreise (the latter being rendered in some contemporary transla-
tions as “functional circles” or “functional cycle”; cf. Cassirer 1944/1962, 
24; Wąsik, Z. 1997c, 347; and Wąsik 2003, 114, footnote 21).  
 To be added is that the research material compiled for the tasks of the 
author’s first studies on the subject-centered semiotic paradigm of linguis-
tics (Wąsik, Z. 1987) had to be extended especially with publications edit-
ed recently in the domain of non-linguistic sciences of sign and meaning. 
In the meantime, a new neuroscientific turn emerged unifying the frame-
works of scholars in the domain of biology, psychology and anthropology, 
philosophy and even arts around the philosophy of mind and conscious-
ness (cf. Andrade 1999; Brier 1999, 2000; Emmeche 1999; Stjernfelt 
1999).  
 Abandoning a dualistic distinction between body and mind, biological-
ly inclined scientists started to speak in favor of a monistic notion of the 
“embodied mind” (cf. the works of Emmeche 1992, Emmeche & Hoff-
meyer 1991, Hoffmeyer & Emmeche 1991, and Hoffmeyer 1993 [1996]). 
Noticeable was the topic of the conference at Bennington College in Ver-
mont in early November 1999, which focused on the embodied mind and 
the Baldwin effect. Philosophers of biology, semioticians, brain/mind 
specialists, and communication theoreticians convened there to evaluate 
the relevance of the suggestion of James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934), an 
American psychologist, concerning the idea of adaptive evolution (cf. 
Baldwin 1896), according to which “the ability of individuals to learn can 
guide the evolutionary process” (Kull 2000b, 46). A detailed account was 
provided by David Depew (2000, 7, quoted by Wąsik, Z. 2003, 108, foot-
note 4):  
 
The general idea of the Baldwin effect is that learned behaviors can affect 
both the direction and the speed of evolutionary change. If an organism 
chances during its lifetime to acquire habits or exhibit behaviors which 
permit more effective interaction with its environment, … it will probably 
leave more offspring. If, moreover, by means of directed habituation, 
imitation, and other forms of learning it can pass that innovation along to 
offspring, relatives, and other organisms with which it is socially interactive, 
then descendants of such individuals or groups will on the whole do better 
reproductively in a given environment than individuals and groups not 
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possessing the forms of habituation and learning in question. If protracted 
over transgenerational time, … this process will shift the phenotypic trait 
distribution in the population toward a preferred, but from the perspective 
of inherited factors, only permissible plasticity of behavior in the face of 
environmental change.  
 
It also seems relevant to expose the biological concept of “embodied se-
mantics” derived from interactions between organisms and their environ-
ments, i.e., subjective knowledge gained through sensory actions in cogni-
tion “embodied in the lived histories of organisms, their communicative, 
cultural and linguistic practices” (Foley 1997, 177). Enactionism as a per-
spective related to the subjective enactment of the world in sensory cogni-
tion or “the meaning as enaction”, has been developed by William A. Foley 
(1997) in anthropological linguistics, within the framework of biological 
and cognitive studies on man.30 It is based on the theory of embodied cog-
nition and knowledge, having been popularized by Humberto Romesin 
Maturana (1970/1980) with Francisco Javier Varela (García) (1973/1980, 
1987), Chilean biologists, and continued later in the works of Francisco 
Javier Varela, Evan Thomson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991).  
 Besides, exploring the bridges between biological and cultural sciences 
within the framework of semiotics, researchers (cf., inter alia, Biltz 
1981, Ingold 1996/1999, and Kull 2000b) have opted for paying more 
attention to comparative studies of habits and behavior of humans and 
animals. Still other subjects have evoked the interest of several practition-
ers of semiotic disciplines (e.g., Ingold 1992, 1989; Teherani-Krönner 
1996; Kull 1998b; Nöth 1996, 1998; and Coletta 1999) within the span of 
the last two decades: social behavior in animals, animal and human ecolo-
gy, cross-cultural studies, agricultural ecology, environmental policy, etc. 
 Respecting the fact that over fifty years ago Alfred Louis Kroeber and 
Clyde Kluckhohn (1952), in their book on Culture: A Critical Review of 
Concepts and Definitions, compiled a list of 164 different definitions of 
culture, equalized either with the process of civilization or with the culti-
vation of uniquely human faculties of taste, reason, values, and intellect, 
this chapter will expose only these anthropocentric conceptions which 
regard culture as an integrated system of human activity or institutions that 
satisfy human needs and fulfill social requirements, or a system of patterns 
and norms of behavior, which is respected by individuals or groups partic-
ipating in social interactions.  
 Not to be forgotten are here also the proposals advocating another 
existence form of sign and meaning which can be concluded from the view 
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of culture as a final effect of learning. As such, the semiotics of culture is 
assumed to consist in the knowledge of people, i.e., in a directly unobserv-
able ideational order. Being called the culture proper, this ideational order 
is to be distinguished from a phenomenal order of perceivable events 
along with their concluded regulations. In other words, the latter are sub-
sumed under a behavioral manifestation of culture. However, the system- 
and structure-oriented semioticians of culture, who have adhered to the 
heritage of instrumentalist linguistics, prefer to devote their primary atten-
tion to the rules generating the sphere of the so-called cultural texts and 
their (significative) functions.31  
 In search of the subject-centered semiotics, the respective theories of 
sign and meaning that originate from an anthroposemiotic view of culture 
(cf. Eco 1979, 22–29, and 177 as well as Pietraszko 1980; and 1982, 139) 
have been confronted with a biosemiotic approach to nature of Jakob von 
Uexküll (1940 [1982]) and the son of Jakob, Thure von Uexküll (1970, 
1979a, 1979b, 1982a 1982b, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1993), bridged 
by a framework in which the observable sign is regarded as a type of ob-
ject of nature or culture, and where the inferable meaning tends to be seen 
as a relational property attached to this object by a subject. In such concep-
tions, the emphasis is put on the interpretative activity of a human subject, 
who subsumes the objects as significant, firstly, when they fulfill certain 
functions with respect to his or her aims, goals or purposes and, secondly, 
because they possess certain values for satisfying his or her needs, desires 
and/or expectations (cf. Wąsik, Z. 1987, 124–131; and 2003, 110).  
 
 
Anthropological and Cultural Foundations 
of Subject-Centered Semiotics  
 
Semiotic-Communicational View of Culture 
 
While introducing the readers to his theory of semiotics, Umberto Eco 
(1979) takes for granted that culture as a whole should be investigated as a 
communicational phenomenon based on systems of signification. Accord-
ingly, he explains how the subject-oriented meanings develop in human 
culture in terms of the creation of tools and the exchange of commodities. 
 For Eco, there was no culture initially, even when an Australopithecus 
transformed a stone into a tool for the purpose of splitting the skull of a 
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baboon. As he maintains (Eco 1979, 22), culture was born just when a 
human being (I) determined the function of the stone, (II) started to call it 
“a stone that serves for something”, and (III) recognized it as that kind of 
stone that corresponds to the Function F and that has the Name Y (cf. 
Model 13-1, adapted from Eco 1979, 23). 
 Having encountered the particular stone S-Token 1, and having used it 
as a means for performing a certain Function F, the Australopithecus 
comes some days later upon a second stone S-Token 2, which he recogniz-
es as a representation of the same type. The ability of subsuming S-Token 
2 along with S-Token 1 into an abstract model S-Type standing for the 
same Function F is a semiotic activity of ascribing meanings to encoun-
tered functional forms, i.e., sign-vehicles.  
 
 
Model 13-1. The stone as a useful tool which has a certain function and a certain 
name in the semiotics of culture 
 
S-Token 1 S-Token 2 
 Function F 
Name Y S-Type 
 
In Eco’s depiction, a new semiotic dimension will be then added to this 
process of cultural meaning-creation when the possibility exists of giving a 
name to that general type of object, i.e., the stone as a tool. The Name Y 
denotes the stone-type as its signified meaning and connotes the Function 
F in particular that is performed by stone-tokens as signifiers. 
 Whoever uses the object called S-Token 1 for the first time must con-
sider how to transfer a new acquired meaning, the new type of infor-
mation, namely that it stands for F, from this time to the next day. Thus, a 
name given to it seems to be an appropriately elaborated mnemonic de-
vice, which mediates between cultural objects and their possible functions. 
 Thanks to the exchangeability of sender-and-receiver roles, the cultural 
object may also become the content of potential intrapersonal communica-
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tion. The transmission of knowledge from an individual of today to the 
same individual of tomorrow and to other individuals of the same human 
kind contributes to the fact that, within a society, every function of an 
object becomes transformed into the sign of its virtual use. 
 In a similar way, Eco has applied semiotic concepts to the analysis of 
economic relationships that govern the exchange of commodities. What 
Eco has assumed is that the same cultural objects which are discussed as 
functional types in Model 13-1 may be considered as commodities C-
Token 1 and C-Token 2 in accordance with their Exchange Value EV (a 
process shown respectively in Model 13-2, adapted from Eco 1979, 25). 
 In accordance with Eco’s reasoning, the economic relationship be-
tween the objects exchanged in the culture as commodities (belonging at 
the same time to different types) becomes significant in reality when the 
value of these commodities is expressed within the same exchange param-
eters elaborated in a particular culture.  
 Based on the distinction used by Karl (Heinrich) Marx (1818–1883) in 
Das Kapital (Marx 1867, 1885, 1894)32, the exchange value parameter EV 
may refer back, in Eco’s view (1979, 25–26), to Human Labor HL as be-
ing indispensable for the production of both C-Token 1 and C-Token 2. 
All commodities can be correlated through the more sophisticated cultural 
device of Money C-Type, i.e., another type of commodity, which func-
tions as a universal sign of EV expressed in quantities. 
 The objects, stones and commodities, illustrated schematically in Mod-
els 13-1 and 13-2, have been analyzed only with respect to their singular 
function. However, within the representation of culture in its totality, one 
should take into account every possible function of a given object, its 
possible semantic content, and its particular meaning, thus registering 
every kind of functional synonymy and/or homonymy. 
 According to Eco (1979, 26–28), every cultural aspect should be con-
sidered as a separate semantic entity. The systems of cultural signification 
should be analyzed in terms of semantic fields established for the struc-
tures of sign-vehicles in their multidimensional semantic analysis. 
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Model 13-2. The signifying relationship between human labor, money  
as a commodity-type and the exchange value of commodities 
 
Human Labor HL 
Exchange Value EV 
C-Token 1 C-Token 2 
Money C-Type 
 
Accordingly, Eco illustrates the multidimensionality of semantic analyses 
of cultural objects with the example of “automobile”. “Automobile” is to 
be analyzed not only as a semantic entity which is connected with the 
sign-vehicle, e.g., /automobile/ in English. “Automobile” becomes a full 
semantic unit having many aspects when it is placed on the axis of opposi-
tions and relations with other units. It can be opposed to “carriage” or 
“bicycle” or “feet” when one distinguishes between different kinds of 
transportation, e.g., “by car” vs. “on foot”, etc.  
 “Automobile”, as such, can be analyzed from different perspectives or 
considered on differed levels, for example, on physical, mechanical, eco-
nomic, social or linguistic-semantic levels, etc. Thus, in Eco’s view, semi-
otics is interested in such levels on which the car is treated as a sign-
vehicle of a certain value, e.g., exchange, utility, and symbolic value when 
they designate the social status and/or prestige of its owner, when they co-
determine the comfort, speed of ride, etc.  
 Similarly, as in the verbal communication where the sign-vehicle of 
the type /automobile/ can become the meaning of another sign-vehicle of 
the type /car/, the exchange value of one cultural good can become the 
meaning of some other goods that are to be also found in the code of cul-
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On the Origins of Axiosemiotics as a Study of Signs Dealing 
with Values of Objects in the Domain of Human Culture 
 
In addition to the depiction of culture as a class of rules generating the 
sphere of so-called cultural texts with their significative and communica-
tive functions, one should also highlight an occurrence of two orders in the 
system of culture, namely a semiotic order and an axiotic order, which 
were postulated under the label of axiosemiotics by Stanisław Pietraszko 
(1928–2010), the founder of cultural studies in Poland. 
 In the light of Pietraszko’s (1982, 139) distinction, culture is seen as a 
system of axiosemiotic regularities occurring between subjective values 
and meanings which condition and determine the modes of human life, 
and which become realized (materialized) in the sphere of products and 
the behaviors of people. Pietraszko regards the axiosemiotic activity of 
humans as an ascription of new values and meanings to objects hitherto 
known as cultural or natural. The ascription of new values to objects by 
subjects of culture contributes to the creation of new things in an episte-
mological sense and transferring them to another class of reality. In the 
case of the acquisition of new meanings, a new value-related situation 
takes place in their relation to cultural subjects. The “axiosemiotic nomi-
nation” of things, resulting in the transfer of products and behaviors of 
people to the realm of cultural objects, is not always taking into considera-
tion their utilitarian role. An object can possess, apart from its functionali-
ty, an axiological significance given to it through the ascription of a cer-
tain value. Accordingly, an “axiotic” act (Pietraszko’s term) may be ac-
companied by a semiotic act when a cultural object enters into a new rela-
tion with the subject of culture (see Pietraszko 1980, 60, and 66–69, dis-
cussed and quoted by Wąsik, Z. 1987, 130–131). 
 
 
A Need-Oriented Conception of Meaning  
in the Umwelt of Organisms 
 
Viewing semiotic approaches to culture from function-oriented and value-
oriented perspectives, one can see, in consequence, the necessity of find-
ing a superior frame of reference. It appears that the ascription of meaning 
to objects having certain functions or values is not only a modus operandi 
that might be regarded as exclusively characteristic of human subjects. 
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 The semiotics of culture might be also highlighted, using terminologi-
cal distinctions of the semiotics of nature, in accordance with the repre-
sentatives of the so-called Umwelt-research program who adhered to the 
Uexküllian concept of meaning. Jakob von Uexküll investigated how living 
organisms perceived their environment and how this perception deter-
mined their behavior (cf. Deely 2004). He called his investigative method 
Umwelt-Forschung. In 1926, Uexküll founded the Institut für Umweltfor-
schung at the University in Hamburg. The term Umwelt, in the sense of the 
subjective world of an organism, was coined in Uexküll’s book of 1909, 
Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, and the term Funktionskreis (translated 
either as “functional circle” or “functional cycle”) was added in the 2nd 
edition of it in 1921 (cf. Model 13-3, after Uexküll, J. 1909/1921).  
 
Model 13-3. Jakob von Uexküll’s functional circle in the Umwelt of an organism 
as a clue to the biological understanding of meaning (adapted from Torsten Rüting 
2004, 53, following the translation of Urmas Sutrop 2001) 
 
 
As Kull has pointed out: “… in his article of 1907 he still uses the term 
‘Milieu’, as different from ‘Außenwelt’” (1999b, 390). Worth mentioning 
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here is the term die Eigenwelt des Menschen proposed by Hans Petersen 
(1937). Interesting is also the comparison of Umwelt(en) to “soap bub-
ble(s)” (Uexküll, T. 1982, 3) in the context of Umweltröhre(n) ‘environ-
mental pipe(s)’ introduced by Jakob von Uexküll in his Theoretische Biolo-
gie (see 1920/1928, 70, and 108; cf. also 1920 [1926]). The first one refers 
to the circular environment of a living organism at a given moment as a func-
tional circle (Funktionskreis), and the latter is meant to illustrate the se-
quence of all environmental circles (cycles) that a subject has to pass 
throughout its whole life being understood as a determined journey. 
 The investigative method of pursuing and reconstructing this journey 
through invisible worlds is illustrated in the works of Jakob von Uexküll 
and Georg Kriszat (1934 [1957/1992]) and Jakob von Uexküll (1936). A 
separate source of discussion is the notion of “semiotic niche”, introduced 
following that of “ecological niche” of Julian Sorell Huxley (1942/1974, 
524) in the environmental contexts of biosemiotics and ecosemiotics (cf. 
Hoffmeyer 1993 [1996, 59, and 96]; Kull 1998b, 350; and Brier 2000, 70). 
Worth mentioning here is also an unusual concept of “ecological niche for 
rationality” employed by William Warren Bartley III (1934–1990) in his 
critique of Western rationalist philosophy (cf. Bartley 1962/1984, 113).  
 According to an investigative attitude of the so-called biosemiotism—
in conformity with the term specified by Thomas A. Sebeok (1974, 1976) 
and extended by Martin Krampen (1981, 1992), popularized by Sebeok 
1979/1989), as well as Myrdene Anderson et al. (1984) and Marcel Danesi 
(2000)—all living systems take part in the process of creating and utilizing 
meanings: (1) even the simplest forms of life, the unicellular systems, have 
the ability to respond to external impulses through species-specific reac-
tions characteristic of each individual being; (2) as opposed to products 
and commodities, all living organisms, because of the capability of mean-
ing-creation and meaning-utilization, are to be treated as autonomous 
systems (cf. Uexküll, T. 1982, 7); (3) plants and animals share the capacity 
to sort stimuli translating them as signs of organismic needs; (4) self-
regulating processes, called homeostasis, play an important role in their 
individual development, which ends in death; and (5) living systems tend 
to maintain their internal stability through interactions with the environ-
ment, owing to the coordinated response of their parts to any situation or 
stimulus that might disturb their normal condition or function. In this way, 
within the framework of biosemiotics, according to Thure von Uexküll 
(1984, 188): “A sign is something that signifies to the activity of a living 
system something that has significance for the maintenance of the struc-
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ture, the homeostasis of this system (its system needs)”. This view is also 
supported by the following explanatory statement of T. von Uexküll 
(1984, 188):  
 
In order to realize my purpose of translating Peirce’s formula into a 
concept of biological relationship, I shall have to consider two factors: (1) 
When a living system is the “somebody”, the subject, for whom signs and 
their significates have a meaning, it is materially an open system … It 
retains its structure, its homeostasis, in open exchange with its environment. 
(2) Living systems are active system. They maintain their homeostasis by 
their own activity. 
 
The structure of semiotic processes looks different in the realm of plants, 
described by phytosemiotics, from the way it looks in the realm of ani-
mals, which belongs to the descriptive domain of zoosemiotics. In compar-
ison to animals, plants do not have a nervous system for processing signi-
fiers, and they have no specialized effectors for acting on something that is 
signified. So, the structure of phytosemiotic processes should be described, 
as T. von Uexküll (1984, 188–189) points out, in terms of cybernetic rela-
tions. In accordance with these relations, a change in the homeostasis of 
the system, caused by its environment, or its own metabolism, which devi-
ates from the reference value, means for the system a need for activity to 
restore the substances necessary to maintain its homeostasis. In the realm 
of zoosemiotics, living systems have specialized receptors for receiving 
signs, a nervous system that processes them, and specialized effectors 
which exert an influence upon something that is signified. Hence, within 
the functional circle of animals “[a] perceptual sign (e.g., a smell of food)” 
can be defined as “something that signifies to the living system the need 
for an activity—its behavior—that has significance for its hunger-needs 
(e.g., obtaining a food object)” (quoted from Uexküll, T. 1984, 189). 
 According to Thure von Uexküll (1984), the organisms of animals 
possess such a level of complexity that simple phytosemiotic sign process-
es are included in the zoosemiotic ones. This means that when a food 
object appears within the subjective universes of animals, it only creates 
the conditions for phytosemiotic processes within their bodies. The grasp-
ing and eating of a food object create, in the gastrointestinal tract, the 
conditions for the activation of the phytosemiotic processes that signify to 
the intestinal cells that they must absorb the needed substances. The object 
“food” contains carbohydrates, fats, and proteins—the signified “some-
thing” for these phytosemiotic signs.  
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 Discussing the biosemiotic conception of meaning in its relation to the 
anthroposemiotic theory of culture, it is essential to restrict the interest of 
this chapter to the Umwelttheorie of Jakob von Uexküll (1940 [1982]), in 
the light of which certain objects can be said to possess an “ego-quality”. 
In this biological theory, the understanding of what the subject-oriented 
meaning is, with reference to the role of a meaning-receiver and/or mean-
ing-utilizer, receives primary attention. 
 In the realm of biosemiotics, the sign is described as something that 
has a meaning for someone because of something. Certain objects from the 
environment can become and function as meaning-carriers when they 
possess the qualities which are significant for the fulfillment of subject-
related needs, as, e.g., “drinking-quality”, “eating-quality”, “sitting-quality”, 
“obstacle-quality”, “climbing-quality”, etc. (cf. Uexküll, J. [1982, 28–29]).  
 In view of several examples provided by J. von Uexküll, it is worth 
starting with the use of the stone in the following situation:  
 
Let us suppose that an angry dog barks at me on a country road. In order to 
drive it off, I pick up a stone and frighten it off with an adept throw. 
Nobody who observes this process and afterwards picks up the stone 
would doubt that it was the same object ‘stone’, which first lay on the road 
and then was thrown at the dog ([1982, 27]). 
 
Analyzing the position of the stone in relation to the man and the dog, he 
notices that its physical and chemical properties have remained the same 
but the object in itself has been transformed into another kind of object, 
because it has changed its extrinsic meaning. As long as it was part of the 
country road, the stone served as support for the walker’s feet.  
 In his second example, J. von Uexküll ([1982, 28–29]) notices that 
what possesses certain meanings for people happens to be neutral objects 
in the subjective universe of dogs. Utilized under certain circumstances, 
for the dog, as a house-occupant, many things in the kitchen have only a 
sitting-quality, a climbing-quality, or perhaps only an obstacle-quality—
especially chairs and cupboards, which may contain books or washing. All 
the small household effects, such as spoons, forks, matches, and the like, 
do not exist in the world of a dog because they are not meaning-carriers. 
However, a great number of things will exist for the dog as far as they 
have an eating-quality or a drinking-quality (cf. Uexküll, J. [1982, 29]). 
 The third example, analyzed by Jakob von Uexküll ([1982, 29–31) to 
explain his subject-oriented understanding of meaning, is the blooming 
meadow. Even for different subjects who are in it, the meadow is not the 
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same; one can consider the role of the stem in a blooming meadow-flower, 
which functions as the meaning-carrier in four kinds of subjective univers-
es, i.e., in the Umwelt of:  
 
(1) a girl picking flowers, who gathers herself a bunch of colorful flowers 
that she uses to adorn her bodice;  
(2) an ant, which uses the regular design of the stem surface as the ideal 
path in order to reach its food-area in the flower petals;  
(3) a cicada-larva, which bores into the sap-path of the stem and uses it to 
extract the sap in order to construct the liquid walls of its airy house;  
(4) a cow, which grasps the stems and the flowers in order to push them 
into its wide mouth and utilizes them as fodder. 
 
In Jakob von Uexküll’s explanation ([1982, 31]), each Umwelt forms a 
closed unit, for example,  
 
(1) The color of the blossom serves as an optical perceptual cue in the 
girl’s Umwelt;  
(2) The ridged surface of the stem functions as a feeling perceptual cue in 
the Umwelt of the ant;  
(3) The extraction point presumably makes itself known to the cicada as a 
smell perceptual cue;  
(4) The effector cues are mostly imprinted upon other properties of the 




— The thinnest point of the stem is torn apart by the girl as she picks the 
flower; 
— The unevenness of the stern’s surface serves the ant both as a touch 
perceptual cue for its feelers and as an effector cue-carrier for its feet;  
— The suitable extraction-point that is made known by its smell is pierced 
by the cicada, and the sap that flows out serves as building material for 
its house of air;  
— The taste perceptual cue of the stem causes the grazing cow to take 
more and more stems into its chewing mouth. Every act of perception 
and operation imprints its additional meaning on the meaningless ob-
ject and thereby makes it into a subject-related meaning-carrier in the 
subjective universe.  
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That is, following Uexküll’s reasoning: 
 
[T]he picking of the flower transforms it into an ornamental object in the 
girl’s world. Walking along the stem changes the stem into a path in the 
ant’s world, and when the cicada-larva pierces the stem, it is transformed 
into a source for building material. By grazing, the cow transforms the 
flower stem into wholesome fodder” (quoted from Uexküll, J. [1982, 31]). 
 
In the analyzed Umwelten, the flower stem, acting as a meaning-carrier, 
has been in each instance confronted with a new meaning-receiver that 
could also be described as a meaning-utilizer. The four meaning-utilizers, 
the girl, the ant, the cicada larva, and the cow, have used the flower stem: 
as a decoration, as a path, as a supplier of material for the building of a 
house, and as food, respectively. To the selected subjects, for which the 
stem is the carrier of meaning, one should add the whole plant. The stem is 
part of the plant. Thus, the whole plant should be treated as its subject. 
However, the whole plant cannot be considered as a meaning-utilizer 
when forced to receive the meaning of other subjects, which is not in its 
own interest. The extrinsic meaning of the flower stem within the plant is 
its place in the homeostasis of the organism as a system, but the plant as a 
subject finds itself in relation to other utilizers of its stem in a position of 
“tolerance of meaning” (Germ. Bedeutungsverduldung). The tolerance of 
meaning for other subjects can be inconvenient for the plant in different 
measures, e.g., when it is picked, torn to pieces, perforated or chewed by 
another subject. As Jakob von Uexküll ([1982, 59–60, especially 71]; see 
also Uexküll, J. [1982, 83–87, Glossary]) has pointed out, one may en-
counter many situations of that kind in nature, when subjects and their 
parts become meaningful objects for other subjects, when they find them-
selves within “functional circles” (Funktionskreise) of: medium, food, 
enemy, and sex. 
 Appreciating a solipsistic paradigm, which bridges the semiotics of cul-
ture with the semiotics of nature against the background of language-
centered sign and meaning studies, it will be argued, in the next chapter, 
that the so-called “humanistic turn to the subject” has paved the way to the 
semiotic self, who ascribes significance to objects being useful or valuable 






Significance as a Subjective Construct 




Delimiting the Investigative Domain of Human Semiotics 
 
As the research findings on semiotic universals of language in communi-
cation have shown, the following pair of oppositions might be isolated 
among the most relevant species-specific properties of humans in relation 
to animals: interchangeability vs. immutability of sender-receiver roles, 
experientiality vs. innateness in generational acquisition and transmission; 
conventionality in origin vs. naturalness of signaling means, variability or 
constancy and changeability or stability of language; displacement facility 
vs. boundedness in time and space; intentionality vs. instinctiveness; seg-
mentability vs. globality or and discreteness of patterning continuity. 
 In this chapter, departing from the survey of individual and social ex-
istence modes of human self as opposed to the non-human self, a nature- 
and culture-centered conception of subjective significance is coupled with 
the conception of intersubjective understanding. It is assumed that, in the 
investigative field of subject-centered human semiotics, the focal point of 
a scientist’s interest should encompass the typology of sign- and meaning-
related properties of signifying and communicating individuals, as the real 
selves and as participants in social communication, which are relevant for 
the fulfillment of their purposes, or the satisfaction of their needs.  
 Considered against anthropological and biological conceptions of 
meaning, the problems of function, or value, of significant objects and the 
needs, or purposes, of living subjects are considered as constituting a link 
between the semiotics of culture and nature. In consequence, the subject 
matter of human semiotics is specified here in terms of those relevant 
properties of cultural objects which are distinguished in sign- and mean-
ing-processing and sign- and meaning-interpreting activities of communi-
cating individuals as functional tools or valuable goods. 
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 To come to the point, it has to be noted that there are some semiotic 
properties of signifying and communicating selves realized in signs as 
observable meaning-bearers which belong to the physical domain of em-
pirical investigations. However, there also some other semiotic proprieties 
of signifying and communicating selves, which are inaccessible to obser-
vation, standing in relation to the referential meaning understood in terms 
of conceptual and propositional contents of communication, which should 
be treated as belonging to the logical domain of associated mental objects. 
As far as they cannot be directly tested, they may be only inferred through 
the intersubjective knowledge of communication participants. 
 In reference to empirical approachability of semiotic properties of the 
selves, this chapter ends with the theories of personal-subjective constructs 
and social construction of reality, devoting special attention to radical 
constructivism. Constructivist theories are discussed, firstly, to elucidate 
the concept of the broadly understood semiotic self as a social being 
whose contacts with external environments are mediated by the verbal and 
nonverbal means of signification and communication, and, secondly, to 
expose the fact that it is the language which “objectivates” the shared 
experiences of signifying and communicating selves making them availa-
ble to all members belonging to a determined linguistic community, who 
become in such a way both the source and the tool of interpersonal com-
munication and intersubjectively comprehensive knowledge.  
 
 
Meaning as Nomination and Subsumption 
of Significant Objects  
 
In exposing the anthropological and biological conceptions of subjective 
significance uniting the semiotics of culture and nature, elaborated by the 
author of this chapter (cf. inter alia Wąsik, Z. 2003, 107–125, especially 
119–120; and 2009, 131–132; as well as Wąsik, E. & Wąsik, Z. 2012, 
329–331), special attention is paid to communicational practices and pat-
terns of meaning-creation and meaning-utilization in social interactions. 
Consequently, the subject matter of human-centered semiotics is specified 
here in the conceptions sign and meaning that are rooted in the concepts of 
utility and interest, or validity and obligation, pertaining to function and 
purpose-oriented, or value- and need-oriented, views of culture.  
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Between Purpose-Oriented Functions and Need-Oriented 
Values in the Personal and Subjective Realization of Culture 
 
To examine the semiotic activity of human selves who are engaged, as con-
crete persons in the processes of sending and receiving of meaning-bearers, 
or as mental subjects in the processes of meaning-creation and meaning-
interpretation, the author of this research enterprise has distinguished in coin-
cidence with the proposals made primarily by Umberto Eco (1976/1979) 
and Stanisław Pietraszko (1980) against the background of Jakob von 
Uexküll’s (1940 [1982]) scaffold, two semiotic manifestation forms of 
natural and/or cultural objects, on the one hand, in the investigative do-
main of praxeology,33 and on the other, in the investigative domain axiol-
ogy.34 Departing from the conception of subjective meaning, he has de-
fined culture, in a concise approach, as a set of as types of praxeosemiotic 
and/or axiosemiotic regularities occurring between the signs of functions 
or the signs of values, which become realized in the nonverbal and verbal 
products of the activity and attitudes of human beings and co-determine 
and condition the existential modes of their everyday life. With reference 
to the outline of the subject-oriented investigations of praxeological semi-
otics and axiological semiotics conducted on the bordering zones between 
cultural sciences and linguistics, he has postulated to search for their roots 
in the essentialist and organicist functionalism originating in the episte-
mology of culture, sociology and biology. Accordingly, taking both posi-
tions separately, researchers can investigate from a functionalist perspec-
tive all objects found in the domain of culture according to their servicea-
ble role they fulfill in the satisfaction of communicational needs of the 
subjects of culture, and as regards the value-oriented approaches, one can 
tend, in the first place, to the classification of all subjective needs of peo-
ple, aiming at discovering, how they are satisfied through selected semiot-
ic objects, or one can also check which respective needs can be satisfied 
by concrete kinds of semiotic objects. 
 Exposed in such a human-centered theory of culture is the role of a 
signifying subject who is engaged in the activity of nomination and sub-
sumption of cultural, or natural, objects with regard to their praxeological, 
i.e., function-related, or axiological, i.e., value-related, significance for the 
fulfillment of his/her purposes or the satisfaction of his/her needs. Hence, 
the praxeosemiotic nominations and subsumptions are regarded as involv-
ing the ascription of functions to the objects hitherto being not useful for 
certain purposes. In turn, the axiosemiotic nominations and subsumptions 
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are interpreted as resulting in the transfer of products and behavior of 
people to the realm of cultural objects, which are not necessarily connect-
ed with their usefulness. 
 In consequence, the particular nominations and subsumptions of natu-
ral and/or cultural objects from the viewpoint of praxeosemiotics35 are 
seen as connected with the ascription of functions to the objects hitherto 
being not useful for certain purposes. On the opposite side, the nomina-
tions and subsumptions from the viewpoint of axiosemiotics36 are placed 
as resulting in the transfer of products and behavior of people to the realm 
of cultural objects, which begin from that time on to be utilized as valuable 
devices for satisfying someone’s needs. 
 
 
Model 14-1. Praxeological, or axiological, nominations and subsumptions 

























Thus, in a praxeosemiotic and/or axiosemiotic conception of culture, as 
visualized in Model 14-1, the emphasis is placed on the activity of a Signi-
fying Subject who subsumes the cognized objects of nature and culture 
(Object-Token 1 and Object-Token 2) as significant, firstly, when they 
fulfill a certain Function with respect to his or her Purpose and, secondly, 
because they possess a certain utilitarian Value for satisfying his or her 
Need (meant as a signaled systemic lack), desire or expectation.  
 An object of cognition, found in the surroundings of social life-world, 
can possess, apart from its praxeological Significance also an axiological 
Significance. For the aims of their specific interpretation, the particular 
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terms from Model 14-1 (modified after the proposals made by Wąsik, Z. 
2003, 120; 2005, 94; and 2009, 132) have been defined here as follows:  
 
— Object is a perceivable thing, or event, in a praxeosemiotic, or an axio-
semiotic, sphere of culture;  
— Signifying Subject is a meaning-utilizer (meaning-creator, meaning-
receiver), to be understood as a living system with an ego-quality, who 
subsumes and/or utilizes objects of culture (Object-Token 1 and Object-
Token 2) under the Object-Type of either a Praxeosignificate or Axiosig-
nificate;  
— Praxeosignificate is a functional object of culture, regarded as a signif-
icant Tool, i.e., the sign of a Function;  
— Axiosignificate is a valuable object of culture, regarded as a significant 
good, i.e., the sign of a Value;  
— Tool is an object of culture which serves a certain function enabling the 
fulfillment of a subjective Purpose of a meaning-utilizer;  
— Good is an object of culture which possesses a certain Value enabling 
the satisfaction of a subjective Need of a meaning-utilizer;  
— Significance is the extrinsic meaning of an object of culture for the 
Signifying Subject of culture with respect to its relevance for being 
subsumed under the sign of a Function, i.e., a Praxeosignificate, or the 
sign of a Value, i.e., an Axiosignificate);  
— Function is a role which is played by a Tool while serving a goal-
oriented Purpose intended by a Signifying Subject of culture;  
— Value is a relational property of an object of culture that satisfies a 
subjective Need of a Signifying Subject of culture;  
— Purpose is an aim to be fulfilled, or a goal to be reached, an end to be 
gained, or an objective to be attained, which means for the activity of a 
Signifying Subject of culture an impulse to utilize a Tool for perform-
ing a serviceable Function;  
— Need is a systemic lack of an organism to be satisfied which means for 
the activity of a Signifying Subject an impulse to restore a disturbed 
equilibrium in his or her biological urges, psychological wants, desires, 
or social expectations;  
— Fulfillment/Satisfaction is the utilization of a Tool or a Good, which is 
significant for a certain Purpose, or a Need, of the Signifying Subject 
of culture with respect to its Function or Value;  
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— Nomination/Subsumption is a semiotic detection and/or recognition of 
the Object-Token 1 with Object-Token 2 as identical with the general 
properties of the Object-Type. 
 
As it comes out from the interpretation of individual constituents included in 
Model 14-1, an object of culture can possess, apart from its “functionali-
ty”, or “utility”, also a praxeological significance, or an axiological signif-
icance for the signifying subject of culture. In the same (or similar) com-
municational context, a “praxeotic”, or an “axiotic”, act may be accompa-
nied by a semiotic act when a cognizing subject enters into a new relation 
with a cognized object. It is concluded that the ascription of significance to 
objects, known before as natural or cultural, with regard to their functions 
or values, contributes, from the logical point of view, to the creation of 
entirely new types of semiotic objects, called respectively, either as 
“Praxeosignificates” or as “Axiosignificates”, while transferring them 
from one kind to another kind of reality.  
 A careful reader may notice that there is no contradiction between a 
function-and-purpose-oriented approach and a value-and-need-oriented 
approach to language and culture. Both praxeological and axiological 
formulations of sign and meaning (as subjective significance), as one may 
deduce from the constituents of the action-oriented model of human cul-
ture, reveal only an aspectual difference between the same cultural objects 
which are significant for the subjects of culture either from the viewpoint 
of their function or value. 
 Having in view the analytical applicability of the praxeology- and /or 
axiology-oriented model of cultural semiospheres, practitioners of semiot-
ic studies may investigate all semiotic systems of culture either from the 
viewpoint of instrumental function they execute in fulfilling communica-
tional purposes of the subjects of culture or from the viewpoint of utilitari-
an value they exhibit for satisfying their respective needs. 
 
 
Physical and Logical Domains of Human Semiotics 
 
As it has been stated, the subject matter of human semiotics encompasses 
the sign- and meaning-related properties of communicating individuals 
considered on the one level as the real selves and on the other as partici-
pants in social communication that come into being in the realization of 
their communicational purposes or the satisfaction of their needs. From 
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such a viewpoint, the actual sign-vehicles of semiotic objects evidently 
belong to the physical domain of observable relational properties of com-
municating selves as concrete persons, according to the distinctions made 
by Victor H. Yngve (1996, 209–210).  
 However, when the concrete objects. found in the physical domain, is 
subsumed by signifying subjects under potential tools or goods as signs of 
functions, or values, they are immediately placed within the boundaries of 
the logical domain of mentally associated facts. In view of that, the con-
cept of the physical domain must be counterpoised to that of the logical 
domain. It seems obvious that, in the investigative field of human-centered 
semiotics, scientists are not in a position to study the semiotic properties of 
communicating selves as inferred subjects, which are unobservable. The 
logical domain as a counterpart of the physical domain appears to be in-
dispensable, as far as the content of intentional communication cannot be 
directly tested. It may be only inferred through the intersubjective 
knowledge of communication participants as a set of dispositional proper-
ties that can be activated in observable products and behavior of people.  
 
 
Model 14-2. Subsumptions of observable objects under the signs of inferable 









Object-Token 1 Object-Token 2 
Tool/Good 
 






So, the subject matter of a scientist’s interest in human semiotics encom-
passes those inferable properties of cultural objects that are relevant for the 
realization of communicational purposes or the satisfaction of needs of 
cultural subjects. As shown in Model 14-2, Object-Token 1 and Object-
Token 2, which belong to the physical domain of concrete facts, are sub-
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sumed under the scope of Object-Type into the logical domain of rational 
associations with regard to their praxeological, or axiological, significance 
as either a tool or a good when they fulfill the purpose, or satisfy the need, 
of a signifying subject. 
 
Personal-Subjective Constructs and Social Constructions 
of Reality 
 
Cognitive models may be, in the span of human life, replaced by others 
based on inferential, slightly altered, or entirely innovative, constructs 
when the experiential domain of a cognizing subject expands as a result of 
his and/or her subsequent searching explorations. Replacement of models 
depends of human expressions of meaning, which are changeable. Taking 
into account the conception of meaning as a subjective and intersubjective 
subsumption of significant objects occurring in human communication, 
one should expose the praxeological semiotics and the axiological semiot-
ics within the framework of constructivism. 
 
 
Considering the Subject-Related Conception of Meaning 
from a Constructivist Perspective 
 
Constructivism, taking the notion of construct as its point of departure within 
the framework of epistemology, is a cognitive attitude of a knowing sub-
ject, which manifests in a certain semiotic system understood in terms of 
behaviors and products of communicating individuals who transmit and 
interpret pre-constructed meanings. In the present from, highly developed 
under the influence of cognitive sciences, constructivism is founded upon 
a generalized assumption that people create their own view of the world 
they live in on the basis of reflections of their individual experiences. 
That’s why contemporary constructivists expose the role of the individual 
self as a cognizer and maker of meanings. In this particular context of 
solipsistic constructivism, each individual is regarded as generating his or 
her own mental model which allows them to understand (or to make sense 
of) the world by selecting and transforming information, formulating hy-
potheses, and coming to decisions that rely on their personal cognitive 
structures. Cognitive structures provide the basis for meaning-creation and 
meaning-deciphering through mental schemata, or models, organizing the 
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experience of human individuals, which allow going beyond the infor-
mation provided to them by sent and received meaning-bearers. 
 From the position of epistemological constructivism, the meaning-
bearers constituting semiotic means of communication are detached from 
the meaning belonging to extrasemiotic reality. Reality, in turn, is defined 
either as observable data or as inferable constructs. Being independent 
from the cognizing subject, data usually appear as immediate objects of 
perception accessible in direct, or indirect, experience, i.e., through senses 
or their instrumental extensions. Contrariwise, constructs are considered as 
sets of cognized, or assumed, properties of the objects as they appear in 
the mind of the knowing subjects; as such they result from mental activi-
ties of individuals who form new concepts or generate new ideas, based on 
inductive, or deductive, reasoning. 
 
 
Personal Constructs in the Perception of Reality 
 
The term personal construct has been coined by George Alexander Kelly 
in his book The Psychology of Personal Constructs (PCP) of 1955, who 
has suggested that “man looks at his world through transparent patterns or 
templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of 
which the world is composed” (Kelly 1955, 8–9). The main point of PCP 
deals with the person’s perception of the world, which depends on his 
mental frame of reference. Thus, a construct is a subjective depiction of 
some event in the person’s environment, a way of looking at something 
which is then tested against the reality of the environment. 37 
 Among the most crucial consequences taking place in the application 
of constructs to the interpretation of the world in human communication to 
be mentioned are: 
 
— Patterns: People anticipate future facts and/or events according to their 
own interpretations of recurrent reality. 
— Individuality: People have different experiences and therefore construe 
facts and/or events in different ways (i.e., persons differ from each oth-
er in their constructs). 
— Range: Constructs are limited to a particular range of appropriateness, 
called the focus of convenience (i.e., they are not relevant to all situa-
tions). 
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— Comparability: To the extent that people have had experiences similar 
to others, their personal constructs tend to be similar to the construc-
tion systems of those other people. 
— Commonality: People are able to communicate with others because 
they can construe typical constructions. 
 
Understood as a mental scheme for the interpretation of reality, the notion 
of personal construct suggests that each individual person is engaged in 
the cognitive activities while taxonomically classifying experienced ob-
jects with respect to their extrinsic meaning.  
 Bearing in mind the personal-constructivist’s assumption that the pro-
cess of cognition is based solely on the individual interpretation of cog-
nized phenomena, and that the ascription of meanings to the experienced 
objects is manifested in the mind of an individual human being, one 
should, more precisely taken, speak here about the formation of personal-
subjective constructs. It is true that any person’s semantic interpretation of 
any event is subjective in nature even when it is based on typical frames of 
reference elaborated through interpersonal communication, which can 
supposedly lead to the creation of intersubjectively similar constructs in 
the minds of individual persons interacting within the same culture. 
 
 
Subjectivity of Solipsistic Signification and Intersubjectivity 
of Collective Communication  
 
Personal-subjective constructs form the basis not only for a similar percep-
tion of the world but also for unified behaviors against the objects evaluat-
ed with respect to their utility. Personal constructs, expressing subjectively 
defined referential meanings, constitute the most important factors which 
determine all forms of social behavior, including the verbal form of com-
munication. 
 For researchers of communication, it is obvious that, as a result of 
frequent interactions, particular members of a determined linguistic com-
munity may develop analogous schematic constructs, which find reflec-
tions in the commonalities of expression contents in their mental spaces. 
They are aware of the fact that people usually integrate with each both on 
the basis of perceptible meaning-bearers and in conformity with assumable 
knowledge of meaning-bearers. 
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 Elaborated in the domain of sociology, the idea of social constructiv-
ism is rooted in the philosophical theories which deal with the relation-
ships between the inner world and outer world of man. Social constructiv-
ists develop their theory of cognition while explaining the way in which 
human individuals accumulate their knowledge about the outer world and 
formulate the investigative questions which are focused around the theory 
of perception. The foundation of sociological constructivism constitutes an 
assumption that social reality is shaped by information gained by particu-
lar human beings as organisms in the interaction with their environment.  
 As pointed out by Peter Ludwig Berger and Thomas Luckmann, the 
authors of The Social Construction of Reality, originally published in 
1966, man as a social being is mediated by symbols in his contacts with 
external environments. In the estimation of Berger and Luckmann, 
knowledge, related in a certain way to reality, is incessantly connected 
with certain contexts and social situations, insofar as it is always created 
by society and transmitted among its actual members. However, apart 
from social factors, this knowledge is determined by historical, psycholog-
ical as well as biological factors. In society, which constitutes a sphere of 
objective facts consisting of externalized products of human activity, the 
cognized phenomena and states of affair become internalized and thus 
personified through subjective meanings; Hence, it is the language which 
“objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all with-
in linguistic community, thus becoming both the basis and the instrument 
of the collective stock of knowledge” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 68) 
 Following the conviction of social constructivists, the society is the 
creator of knowledge, although an individual human being, as an organ-
ism, experiences, de facto, the reality while receiving various kinds of 
information from the environment. The stock of everyday knowledge is 
created due to social interactions; this knowledge is—as one can say after 
Berger and Luckmann—negotiated and approved among particular mem-
bers of society (cf. 1966, 19–46).  
 A certain kind of a social construct is the reality of everyday life, or the 
world of life, which comes into being as a result of communicational ac-
tivities. The reality of everyday life, or the world of life, is considered as 
one of many realities, albeit a basic one. But it is not identical with the 
really-existing objective world. As a result of interactions, it becomes an 
intersubjective world, that is, the world which is shared by an individual 
with other individuals. As Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, 
23) state:  
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The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an inter-subjective 
world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply 
differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I 
am alone in the world of everyday life without continually interacting and 
communicating with others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in 
everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with 
others.  
 
An individual can have access to the subjectivity of other individuals only 
through his/her own subjectivity. According to Berger and Luckmann: 
“Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself 
in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and 
to other men as element of a common world. Such objectivations serve as 
more or less enduring indices of the subjective process of their producers, 
allowing their availability to extend beyond the face to-face situation in 
which they can be directly apprehended” (1966, 34). 
 In the communication by voice, the sound waves are objectivated as 
elements of common world: “A special but crucially important case of 
objectivation is signification, that is, the human production of signs. A sign 
may be distinguished from other objectivations by its explicit intention to 
serve as an index of subjective meanings. To be sure, all objectivations are 
susceptible of utilization as signs, even though they were not originally 
produced with this intention” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 35). 
 Thus, one can say that human expressivity manifests itself in products 
accessible both to their creators and to other people: These real objects, 
which are observable, and which become symptoms of actions or their 
meaning-bearers, Berger and Luckmann consider as elements of the com-
mon world. Noteworthy, among such elements are, e.g., bodily symptoms, 
gestures, postures, certain movements of hands legs, etc., which are acces-
sible to communicating individuals in immediate contacts.  
 
 
Sociology of Knowledge on Subjective Constructs 
and Intersubjective Comprehension  
 
One of the examples of social constructivism constitutes the so-called 
sociology of knowledge in the domain of science and education, having 
been conceptually applied inter alia by James Moffett (1983, 1987), Mar-
garet D. Roblyer, Jack Edwards, Mary Anne Havriluk (1997), claiming 
that:  
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(1) The personal-subjective constructs of communicating individuals are 
distributed in the form of reported speech and may contribute to com-
mon understanding processes only as types of intersubjectively shared 
experiences;  
(2) Mutual comprehension belief is based on the assumption that when one 
communicator employs a mental construction reflecting his/her own 
experience, which is similar to that employed by another, then they 
both may understand each other effectively;  
(3) Supposing that his or her construction processes appear as mentally 
similar to those of the other communicator, then he or she may play a 
role involving that particular individual in the social process as com-
munication participant. 
 
Departing from the cognitivist constructivism as an investigative perspec-
tive, the views of sociologists of knowledge and theorist of education are 
founded on the premise that people construct their own view of the world 
they live in by reflecting on their individual experiences. Each cognizing 
subject is seen as generating his or her own “rules” and “mental models” 
in search of the ways of making sense of the world.  
 Thus, constructivists place the main emphasis on the individual self as 
a “maker of meanings”, who selects and transforms information, formu-
lates hypotheses, and who comes to decisions relying on his or her person-
al cognitive structures. Cognitive structures, i.e., mental schemes, or mod-
els, provide a subjective meaning and organize the experiences of individ-
uals allowing them to go beyond the information given to them previously. 
To sum up, learning, discovering and communicating are therefore consid-
ered in different varieties of constructivists’ theories as searches for mean-
ing that consist of adjusting subjective mental models to accommodate 
new personal experiences, in which individuals construct new ideas, or 
concepts, based upon previously acquired knowledge. Consequently, em-
bedded in social contexts, individuals are viewed as lifelong learners, 
discoverers and/or communicators. 
 While cognitive constructivists emphasize the “individual as a personal 
scientist”, i.e., an individual subject of science who creates and under-
stands the meaning of phenomena organized in his or her mental world, 
social constructivists postulate how best to consider the manner in which 
personal-subjective meanings and understandings grow out of social en-
counters, as far as sociality is defined in terms of meaning-negotiating 
activities within the framework of social interactions. An example of so-
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cial constructivism is the sociology of knowledge and education dealing 
with how subjective constructs of communicating individuals may be 
distributed effectively in form of reported and shared experiences. 
 The mere notion of subjective construct, understood as a frame of 
reference, or a scheme for the interpretation of reality, suggests that every 
individual person, as a cognizing subject, subsumes concrete objects to 
certain classes of objects with regard to their extrinsic meaning, i.e., as 
having the properties of subjective significance. It is supposed that inter-
personal communication can lead to creating intersubjectively similar 
constructs in the minds of people interacting within the same culture.  
 In a schematized opinion, the personal-subjective constructivist’s stance 
is reduced to the assumption that the process of cognition is based on the 
interpretation of cognized phenomena and the ascription of meanings to 
them in steadily changing contexts and situations of social, physical and 
psychical world manifested in the mind of an individual human being. Any 
interpretation of any event is relative; as a consequence; there are no abso-
lute, correct, or preferential frames. In this way, subjective constructs form 
the basis not only for a similar personal perception of the world but also 
for unified behaviors against the objects evaluated with respect to their 
utility. Moreover, subjective constructs, expressing individually defined 
referential meanings, constitute the most important factors which deter-
mine all forms of social behavior, including the verbal form of communi-
cation.  
 When similar schematic constructs come into being in the minds of 
members of a determined linguistic community, as a result of recurring 
interactions, it is understandable that they find reflections in the common-
alities of the expressions of meaning-bearers. People integrate with each 
other individually on the basis of observable verbal means of expression 
and in accordance with inferable comprehension of meaning-bearers.  
 
 
Knowledge of Meaning in the Light of Radical Constructivism 
 
For radical constructivists, Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995, 1988, and 2001), 
Alexander Riegler (2001), Markus Peschl and Astrid von Stein (cf. Riegler, 
et al. 1999), working in the fields of science and education, it is useless to 
think about knowledge as representing external reality independently of a 
knowing subject. In their view, knowledge depends upon the activity of 
cognizing individuals who strive towards a subjective organization of their 
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experiential domains and not to the discovery of an objective world that 
exists beyond their capacities of cognition.  
 Perceived as a mind-depended entity, the cognizing subject appears as 
an epistemological solipsist being unable to transcend the domain of his or 
her individual experience. The scientific and/or unscientific theories, he or 
she encounters, or construes, on their way to apprehending knowledge as 
sets of propositional contents, appear only as conceptual models that help 
them only to manage their experiential domain.  
 From a human-centered perspective, constructs are considered as sets 
of both cognized and assumed properties of the objects as they appear in 
the mind of the knowing subjects. Constructs are conceived, or generated, 
on the basis of mental inductive abstractions and deductive compositions. 
The heritage of constructivists’ positions to the personal-subjective proper-
ty of meaning as significance, which result from a collective character of 
culture realized in human signification and communication systems, may 
be summarized in the following statements: 
 
(1) Meaning is a personal-subjective construct that depends upon an indi-
vidual who makes it; 
(2) Meaning does not reside in non-verbal or verbal means which individ-
uals produce and transmit for communicating about their emotional 
and conceptual contents, and, for that reason,  
(3) Meaning cannot be passed on as an entity in the same manner as mean-
ing-bearers; hence, 
(4) Language and culture as semiotic systems have to be regarded as com-
posed of meaning-bearers which trigger communicating activities with-
in the cognitive domains of particular communicating individuals; and  
(5) Communicating in a given semiotic system is based on the continuous 
mental processing and interpreting of meaning-bearers, which are be-
ing produced and received; whereas mutually shared meanings happen 
only to be assumed. 
 
In the span of years, the personal-subjective constructs, as cognitive sche-
mata, may be replaced by other modelling devices based on inferences, 
altering abstractions, or innovative creativity, when the experiences of a 
cognizing subject increase as a result of his or her subsequent explorative 
activity. The replacement of such personal-subjective constructs depends 
on interpersonal and intersubjective relationships in the human life-world, 
in which they function as communicating and experiencing individuals. 




To sum up, one can notice that there is a link between a subjective uni-
verse of meaning developed in the biosemiotic Umwelt theory and the 
personal-subjective construct theory elaborated by representatives of mod-
ern cognitivism and radical constructivism. What has to be extended, in 
the approach to the solipsistic view of the inner self, is the theory of the 
social construction of reality. Human individuals develop through the 
perception of the things and states of affairs being reflected in their mental 
spheres as images of iconic nature. Another kind of solipsistic knowledge 
is related to the concept formation on the basis of collective communica-
tion. Important is here to bear in mind “the distinction between an imagi-
nationist psychology, which pertains to the mental activity of visualizing 
the shape of cognized and perceived phenomena and events as individual 
tokens, and a conceptualist psychology, which exposes the mental recol-
lections of characteristic (or similar) features of phenomena and events 
formed and concluded as general types (i.e., containing the minimal mass 
of differential features)” (see Chapter Eleven, pp. 189–190). As far as the 
only empirically accessible object of cognition is the communicating indi-
vidual, the whole life-world of communicating groups is to be viewed in 
the light of collective solipsism.  
 From a constructivist perspective, against the background of the dis-
tinction between the praxeological and axiological subsumption of semiot-
ic objects in the realm of human culture, any ego- and group-specific 
meaning may be viewed as a constructive self-determination, or self-
awareness, of individuals in their belonging to different communicative 
collectivities. Thus, one can conclude, while making reference to the dis-
tinctions introduced by Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe (2006), that 
a function- or value-oriented identification of an individual self with pur-
poses and/or needs, shared by members of a given social group, is mani-
fested through his or her adoption of discursive practices and discursive 






A Solipsistic Paradigm in Cognitive 






The point of departure in this chapter is the individual human being con-
sidered as a monolingual self who is embedded into a collective multilin-
gual world. From this viewpoint, the epistemological perspective of solip-
sism, which stands as a rule in opposition to collectivism, is consequently 
discussed under the label of collective solipsism. In connection with the 
cognitive theory of language, a phenomenological stance is adopted that 
objective reality does not exist independently of cognition and that lan-
guage is only partly accessible in speech, being embedded as a whole 
within the consciousness of a speaking individual. However, this stance is 
supported also with a belief that the mental contents of the monolingual 
self, assumed as a principal object of study of linguistic semiotics, are 
accessible solely through concrete texts sent and received in interpersonal 
communication. In such a panmentalist conception, texts are considered as 
extensions of the minds of human individuals, which thus constitute parts 
of a general human mind exposed through speech. Investigating language 
as a mental system located within the brain of individuals by describing 
their speaking activities, practitioners of cognitive studies are interested to 
find out how this overall human mind in question works.  
 However, what is accessible to sign- and meaning-oriented scholars 
studying human knowledge constitutes the investigative domain of de-
scriptive semiotics, which deals with the ways of how the extraorganismic 
information structures are processed when they involve signs of facts and 
events of the real world. Nevertheless, the sensory experience of the so-
called external world is introspectively filtered through conceptual and 
perceptual systems of semiotic means which are united into the networks 
of relations and sign-processing activities within the cognitive systems of 
experiencing individuals as their only direct source of knowledge. 
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 The chapter ends with a solipsistic understanding of the investigative 
object of neosemiotics, which merges existential phenomenology with 
transcendental phenomenology within the framework of so-called existen-
tial semiotics. The objects of interest constitute here verbal exponents of 
the distinction between the existence of organismic forms of being “in 
itself” and “for itself”, realized in particular languages discussed by re-
spective philosophers. Hence, the opposition between the two parts of “I” 
and “Me” in the individual “Self” and the “Other” as an observer’s part of 
the social “Self” appears to be applicable in the study of existential aspects 
of human individuals as members of society. Subsequently, followers of 
existential semiotics are made aware that human individuals manifest in 
two existence modes as real persons with sensible qualities and rational 
subjects with intelligible qualities. 
 
 
The Monolingual Self in a Multilingual Reality 
of Everyday Life 
 
In pursuit of the empirical accessibility of the object of subject-centered 
semiotics, it is worthwhile to examine the epistemological positions of 
Sydney MacDonald Lamb’s cognitive theory of language, as expressed in 
some of his representative works (cf. Lamb 1984, 1991, as well as Halli-
day, Lamb, & Regan 1988, and Regan, Lamb, Cobb, Jr., Griffin, & Basu 
1982/1987). Primary attention is given to the cognitive aspect of the mono-
lingual self in addition to the views of Lamb, which have been just confront-
ed in Chapter Seven (pp. 124–129) with the conceptions of those linguists 
who adhere to the positions of individualism vs. collectivism and mono-
lingualism vs. multilingualism in their theoretical modeling of language. 
 
 
The Minds of Individuals as Parts of a General Human Mind 
 
Lamb’s theory of language is formulated against the background of a sub-
jectivist view that reality does not exist independently of cognition, and 
that only some parts of language localized inside of the human brain are 
available to outside observers through the speaking activities of individu-
als. However, his subjectivism is flavored also with a solipsist belief, as-
suming that the mental contents of the “self”, which are considered to exist 
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really, constitute an empirical object of study. At the same time, Lamb 
speaks in favor of panmentalism, being convinced that the minds of indi-
viduals constitute parts of a general human mind, which is exposed 
through communication. The followers of Lamb advocate this attitude, 
labeled as “collective solipsism” (cf. Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 12 and 
18–19). They propose to study language as a semiotic system located in 
the minds of individual selves by describing their speech acts in order to 
reveal one part of the work performed by this overall human mind. Lamb’s 
solipsist approach to language along with his collective view of Mind, God 
and the individual Self is especially manifest in his extensive discussion 
with Thomas A. Sebeok (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 19):  
 
 The only thing we experience directly is mental activity. Anything else 
is hearsay, it is faith. There are hardheaded scientists who do not want to 
believe in God, because we do not have direct evidence. But they do want 
to believe in the world, because they think they do have direct evidence of 
that. They really only have direct evidence of their own mental activity. In 
what I consider the more sophisticated religious views, God is nothing but 
Mind. The only thing that we have direct evidence of, therefore, is God. 
Anything other than that is hearsay. That is one way to look at it. 
 Now I am going to go as far as Professor Sebeok and say I am a 
solipsist and proud of it. From my point of view, my own mind is more 
directly present than his, and yet if you take the religious point of view I 
was just referring to, that there is nothing but Mind, then Tom’s mind and 
my mind are parts of the overall Mind in which we all share. This view 
might perhaps be called collective solipsism, if that term is not self-
contradictory.  
 
How to appreciate Lamb’s contribution to the subject-centered object of 
human semiotics, one has to ask for the ontological status of his conceptu-
al and methodological apparatus with reference to the multidimensionality 
of language manifested in concrete speech products in relation to its men-
tal existence modes.  
 
 
Formalist Connectionism in the Domain of Cognitive Semiotics 
 
Lamb’s theory of language has been developed within the broader context 
of the sign- and meaning-oriented theory of cognition. David R. Griffin 
points out that Lamb is, in the first instance, interested in the mind, i.e., 
“how the mind interacts with the brain, and with the rest of the body, and 
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how meanings are structured within those levels” (see Regan, Lamb, 
Cobb, Jr., Griffin, & Basu 1982/1987, 12). For Lamb assumes that (see 
Regan, Lamb, Cobb, Jr., Griffin & Basu 1982/1987, 6): 
 
… our thinking about the world is based upon our internalized models of 
that world. We all ago around with these cognitive systems, these mental 
relational networks, that mediate between us and the world. When we think 
we are dealing directly with the “world” that appears to be out there, we 
are deceiving ourselves. We are dealing directly only with our internal 
microcosms, the mental representations that we have of the world. … We 
find the view that the most direct source of knowledge we have in sensory 
experience is mistaken. That experience is not direct at all; it is indirect. 
There is something more basic than sensory experience, namely, our 
mental experience. What we think of as our direct sensory experience of 
the world has actually been filtered through our conceptual and perceptual 
systems, which are networks of relations and it is the processing that goes 
on within these cognitive networks, which we call our minds, that is, the 
only direct experience. Indeed, to a large extent, what we naïvely think of 
as our knowledge of the world gained through perception actually turns out 
to be false, that is, out of correspondence with reality, because the filtering 
process of our conceptual system has distorted the information as it filters 
through.  
 
Thus, the objects to be investigated by cognitive linguistics belong in 
Lamb’s specification to the domain of cognitive semiotics. And the do-
main of semiotic objects, as he maintains, encompasses the whole sphere 
of human knowledge and the network of relationships between language 
and other means with which humans memorize, think, learn and make 
meaning.  
 Such a sign- and meaning-oriented discipline studying human knowledge 
is to be divided, according to Lamb, into descriptive semiotics, which deals 
with the processing of extraorganismic information structures as they in-
volve signs of facts and events of the world and cognitive semiotics, which 
focuses upon the mental information structures developed within individu-
als in the form of connections between the exponents of signs and their 
conceptual counterparts. Introducing his students into a semiotic view of 
the world as made of information and not of things, “the essence of infor-
mation being relationships”, Lamb (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan, 1987, 10) 
argues in the first instance that “[t]he knowledge that individuals have in 
their processing systems about social institutions, the world, and the ways 
of behaving makes up a culture, an information system”. In the second 
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instance, Lamb makes them aware of the educational modifiability of 
cognitive structures in the minds of the billions of people in our planet 
stating that (see Sebeok, Lamb & Regan 1987, 11–12):  
 
In cognitive semiotics, we study the individual semiotic systems people 
have that are their internal representations of the world. It is these we are 
most concerned with in the field of education. They are constantly changing 
especially during childhood. Any adult who reads a book is getting new 
information, and, thus modifying his or her information system. … So, an 
important principle of cognitive semiotics is that every cognitive system is 
constantly changing. In education we are concerned with trying to make 
those changes as effective as possible. We would like those who are being 
educated to build internal information structures that are more or less in 
correspondence with reality.  
 
In an attempt to figure out how the human mind works by investigating the 
extensions of verbal capabilities of individuals, Lamb defines his subject 
matter as a continuous mental phenomenon. Accordingly, one can agree 
that language as a cognitive system exists within the brain as one of the 
extensions of man in conformity with Marshal Mcluhan’s view (1964).  
 
 
Observable Texts as Extensions of an Inferable Language 
 
To sum up, the first subpart of this chapter, discussing the solipsistic para-
digm of cognitive semiotics, has presented a subject-centered theory of 
language located within the consciousness of signifying and communi-
cating individuals which constitutes a particular part of a general human 
mind. Specially exposed is here the monolingual self as a principal object 
of linguistic semiotics.  
 According to the monolingualist and panmentalist attitude in question, 
which accepts a phenomenological stance that the reality of everyday life 
is cognized and constructed through communication, language has been 
illustrated as only partly accessible to cognition when it is realized in spo-
ken texts. Empirically observable texts, as semiotic devices, have been 
specified, within the conceptual and methodological framework of cogni-
tive and descriptive semiotics, as extensions of the rationally inferable 
language situated in the mind of speaking selves that allow one to reveal 
how the assumed overall human mind in the terrestrial world works.  
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Phenomenology of the Self in the Humanistic Turn 
of Neosemiotics 
 
This subchapter will take as a point of departure the idea of existential 
semiotics which has been launched by Eero Aarne Pekka Tarasti (born 
1948), in 2000. Related to the former, Tarasti’s (2011) “Existential Semi-
otics and Cultural Psychology” published in The Oxford Handbook of 
Culture and Psychology, will be pondered as a more comprehensive for 
the subject matter in question. Attention will be paid also to his recent 
books, namely, Semiotics of Classical Music: How Mozart, Brahms and 
Wagner Talk to Us (Tarasti 2012), and Sein und Schein. Explorations in 
Existential Semiotics (Tarasti 2015).  
 The objects of an analytical approach will comprise here verbal expo-
nents of the distinction between the existence in itself and for itself, ex-
pressed in the personal languages of discussed authors, German and French 
in particular. What is relevant for the existential aspects of humans as 
individuals and as members of society is the opposition between “I” and 
“Me” and the “Self” in group encounters. That’s why one has to bear in 
mind that the so-called “turn to subject” does in reality mean the “turn to 
man” if one considers that human individuals appear in two existence 
modes as real persons with sensible qualities and rational subjects with 
intelligible qualities. In this context, special attention will be paid to the 
influence of Jacques Fontanille (2004) upon Tarasti’s distinction between 
Moi and Soi as a first person and a third person existence of the individual 
and social “Self”. 
 
 
Historical Roots and the Development of World Semiotics 
in Postmodern Times 
 
To begin with, the heritage of semiotics should be considered in a histori-
cal presentation as oscillating between the Old-World semiotics and the 
Modern-World semiotics. The concept of Old-World semiotics pertains to 
the first inquiry into the resources, which the practitioners of sign- and 
meaning-oriented disciplines have inherited from the periods of Antiquity, 
the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Romanticism and Positiv-
ism, including the movements of Phenomenology, Functionalism, and Struc-
turalism, especially from Plato (427–347 B.C.) Aristotle, (384–322 B.C.), 
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the Stoics (a group of philosophers who acted in the early 3rd century B.C.), 
St. Augustine (Lat. Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis; 354–430 A.D.), René 
Descartes (Lat. Renatus Cartesius, 1596–1650), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646–1716), John Locke (1632–1704), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), 
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859–1938), Karl Ludwig Bühler 
(1879–1963), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Alfred Schütz (1899–1959), 
and their followers.  
 To recent times of earlier semiotics belong: William James (1842–1910), 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), Charles William Morris (1901–1979), 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Louis Trolle Hjelmslev (1899–1965), 
Jakob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944), and others. Not to be omitted are 
also the phenomenological existentialist philosophers of earlier times, influ-
enced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, such as, Jean-Paul 
Charles Aymard Sartre (1905–1980) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–
1961).  
 In turn, the second query is related to the scope of Modern-World semi-
otics that has been given by three main representatives who proposed their 
own philosophical frameworks: Thomas Albert Sebeok (1920–2001), the 
originator of biosemiotics, Yuri Mihailovich (Jurij Mihailovič) Lotman 
(1922–1993), the promoter of a textual view of culture as a semiosphere, 
Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917–1992), the originator of the semiotic square 
as an analytical tool for semantic analyses, and Eero Tarasti, the founder 
of existential semiotics. To be added is that the epistemological back-
ground of semiotics of our times has been formed by postmodern and post-
structuralist philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists who came to 
the foreground of the 1960s and 1970s, such as, inter alia, Jacques Marie 
Émile Lacan (1901–1981), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Michel Foucault 
(1926–1984), Pierre-Félix Bourdieu (1930–2002), Jean Baudrillard (1929–
2007), Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), and Julia Kristeva (born 1941).  
 Among modern semioticians mostly acknowledged are Roman Osipo-
vich (Osipovič) Jakobson (1896–1982), Émile Benveniste (1902–1976), 
André Martinet (1908–1999), Roland Gérard Barthes (1915–1980), Um-
berto Eco (born 1932), Roland Posner (born 1942), John Deely (born 
1942), Winfried Nöth (born 1944), Göran Sonesson (born 1951), Kalevi 
Kull (born 1952), Peeter Torop (born 1950) and others. Within the scope 
of inherited riches, separately discussed and evaluated should be the inter-
national world of publications, encyclopedias, anthologies, monographs 
and journals. 
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Phenomenology as a Background of Existential Semiotics 
 
To speak about the emergence of the philosophical tradition called phe-
nomenology, it is unavoidable to have a word about Kant’s distinction 
between phenomenon as the appearance of reality in human consciousness 
and noumenon as the being of reality in itself, i.e., the reality being cog-
nized and existing independently of cognition. Although Kant did not 
develop phenomenology in its modern sense, his Critik der reinen 
Vernunft of 1781 (trans. Critique of Pure Reason, 1838) recognizes scien-
tific knowledge as derived only from phenomena and not at all from nou-
mena, his critical approach may be treated as phenomenological (cf. Kant 
1838 [1781]). Whatever is known is phenomenon. To be known is to ap-
pear in consciousness in a special way by the mediation of senses. Con-
versely, what does not in any way appear is not known. Hence, it is obvi-
ous that any description of what is observable is phenomenological in 
nature. 
 The first philosopher who characterized his approach to reality as phe-
nomenology with reference to Kant was the German philosopher Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). But this reality was for him spir-
itual or mental, as one may learn from two translations of his Phänome-
nologie des Geistes of 1807 which appeared in 1910 as Phenomenology of 
Mind and subsequently in 1977 as Phenomenology of Spirit (cf. Hegel 
1910/1977 [1807/1952]). Unlike Kant, Hegel expressed his conviction that 
phenomena constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being. 
They reveal all that is necessary to be revealed, not necessarily “in them-
selves” but through the dialectical process which is typical of human 
thought. This process begins with the simplest form of consciousness, 
connected with a sense perception, and arrives through the consciousness 
of an individual human self, reflecting the historical and social nature of 
knowledge, to reason, constituting an ultimate unity of the Absolute Idea, 
Absolute Sprit, or Absolute Mind, which permeates, and is all of, reality.  
 Among those who have contributed to transcendental phenomenology, 
being frequently identified with the work of Husserl (1900/1913 [1970], 
1901/1913 [1970], 1901/1921, 1913 [1931/1962], and 1952 [1989]), and 
his collaborators and interpreters, are Eugen Fink (1905–1975), Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (1923–2014), and Hermann Van Breda (1911–1974, 
born as Leo Marie Karel), as well as Edith Stein (1891–1942, known also 
as Saint Teresia Benedicta of the Cross). Existential phenomenology is 
associated with the names of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone 
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de Beauvoir (1908–1986, born as Simone Lucie Ernestine Marie Bertrand 
de Beauvoir), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Honoré Marcel. (1889–
1973)  
 The concept of mundane phenomenology (the phenomenology of eve-
ryday life), in turn, is related mainly to the works of Alfred Schütz (1932),  
continued (cf. Schütz & 1975 [1973]) later (Berger & Luckmann 1966) in 
the works of social constructivists, Thomas Luckmann (born 1927), and 
lately also Peter Ludwig Berger (born 1929). However, there are some 
other kinds of designations or orientations, as one may learn from Phe-
nomenology Online. A Resource from Phenomenological Inquiry, above 
all, transcendental phenomenology, existential phenomenology, hermeneu-
tical phenomenology, linguistical phenomenology, ethical phenomenology 
and phenomenology of praxis.  
 Interestingly is that among phenomenologists of linguistics such names 
are included as the French-language-oriented works of Maurice Blanchot 
(1907–2003), Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, despite the fact the 
latter has denied that he is a phenomenologist. Considering the postulate of 
Richard L. Lanigan (born 1943) of 1984, popularized by Jacqueline M. 
Martinez (born 1950) in 2006 and 2008, semiotic phenomenology in rela-
tion to discourse studies ought to be added here too.  
 
 
The Existence Modes of Human Individuals 
in Themselves and for Themselves 
 
What Husserl (1900/1913, 1901/1913, 1901/1921), 1913 and 1952), and his 
continuators have elaborated regarding the conception of phenomenology 
as the study of “phenomena”, i.e., of things, or things as they appear in 
human experience, or the ways how human individuals experience things 
and the meanings of things, are three kinds of phenomenology, namely, 
transcendental phenomenology, existential phenomenology, and mundane 
(Germ. Lebenswelt ‘the life-world’) phenomenology (As to the origins of 
the term Lebenswelt, see Husserl, 1970 [{1935–1936} 1956/2012]: § 34–
37). Husserl’s phenomenological method concentrated on the assumption 
that consciousness is intentional, i.e., it is always the consciousness of an 
object, even if the object does not exist at all. At this point, if one argues 
that the subject’s capacities for being conscious of something and behav-
ing or acting intentionally toward the object of consciousness are manifest 
in those acts which might be called acts of transcendence, special attention 
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should be paid to polemics with Edmund Husserl regarding the conception 
of the subject as the transcendental ego. 
 In keeping thus with Husserl’s phenomenology (1900/1913, 1901/1913, 
1901/1921, 1913 and 1952), it is worthwhile to confront the existentialist 
stance of Martin Heidegger (1927 [1962]), with its respective understand-
ing by Jean-Paul Sartre (1936–1937 [1960/1991: 37], as well as 1943 
[1956]). Interesting is that Sartre, while disagreeing with Heidegger, has 
interpreted Hegel’s distinctions of “being-in-itself” (An-sich-sein) and 
“being-for-itself” (Für-sich-sein) as an opposition between empirical ex-
istence vs. rational transcendence. Besides, in line with Sartre, but contrary 
to Heidegger as relevant for the observation of the corporeal existence 
mode of humans appears to be here Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménolo-
gie de la perception, 1944 [trans. Phenomenology of Perception, 1956] (cf. 
Merleau-Ponty 1944/1945 [1962])  
 Referring however to their achievements, it should be remembered 
that, in Phänomenologie des Geistes (see chapter IV. Die Wahrheit der 
Gewißheit seiner selbst, as well as chapter V. Gewißheit und Wahrheit der 
Vernunft), published in 1807 as the first part of his System der Wissen-
schaft, Hegel interprets An-sich-sein as an absolute notion, denoting „das 
Jenseits seiner selbst” ‘on the other side of himself’, which is for him the 
same as Für-ein-anderes-sein ‘being-for-another’, and Für-sich-sein ‘for 
itself/himself/herself sein’ in turn, which might be equated also with Für 
uns sein ‘being-for-us’, Für-mich-sein ‘being-for-me’, as a second kind of 
subjective relationship.  
 The ontological and gnoseological positions of Sartre (1936–1937 
[1960/1991]), against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, are 
related to the exposure of the difference between an empirical ego and 
transcendental ego. In this position, while rejecting the claim that the sub-
ject’s capacities for being conscious of something, and behaving or acting 
intentionally toward the object of consciousness, are manifest in the acts, 
which might be called acts of transcendence, Sartre proposed to study the 
human individual, viewed as psycho-physical person in its own right, as 
both a mental subject and a concrete object.  
 Disagreeing with the assumptions of phenomenology as the study of 
intentional objects or products of the activity of a transcendental ego, 
Sartre has been interested in man with his psycho-physical properties as a 
person existing in the world. Therefore, he has rejected the understanding 
of the transcendental ego Husserl opted for in his work Ideen zu einer 
reinen Phänomenologischen Philosophie, namely the “Ego” standing 
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behind consciousness whose rays (German Ichstrahlen) supposedly throw 
light upon phenomena presenting themselves in the field of the individu-
al’s attention (cf. Sartre ([1991, 37]). It has to be remembered that already 
in his earlier work Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl determined the 
“Me” as the synthetic and transcendent product of consciousness.  
 Sartre ([1991, 37–38]) has managed thus to establish inconsistencies in 
Husserl’s phenomenological thought when he states that consciousness 
does not need to refer to an “I” which is unifying and individualizing (and 
is therefore a condition of consciousness). According to Sartre ([1991, 
39]), consciousness is the perceptual syntheses of past consciousnesses 
and present consciousness, and it (i.e., consciousness) unifies itself by 
itself, so that the transcendental “I” has simply no raison d’être, or point-
edly, if there were a transcendental “I”, it would mean the death of con-
sciousness (cf. Sartre [1991, 40–41]).  
 In the context of Sartre’s position to the existential work of Hegel, the 
study An-sich-Sein, Für-sich-Sein und der Andere bei Sartre und seine 
Bezüge auf Hegel by Christian Walter (born 1957) appears to be worth 
noting. The worth of this inquiry (cf. Walter 2009) lies in the account of 
Satre’s understanding of “being-in-itself” (être-en-soi) and “being-for-
itself” (être-pour-soi) against the background of Hegel’s view of Für-sich-
sein ‘being-for-itself’ (interpreted as Für-sich-selbst-sein ‘being-for-itself-
alone’). Besides, Walter has confronted Hegel’s “being-for-others” (Für-
andere-sein), with its critical reception by Sartre (être-pour-autrui). In 
conclusion, while acknowledging the idea of non-existence, Walter’s study 
has shown where Sartre’s point of view in the domain negation appears to 
be logical, and where his intersubjective criticism of Hegel is sufficiently 
grounded.  
 With reference to further discussions on existentialism, it has to be added 
that Sartre proposed to differentiate between existence of things and per-
sons, i.e., non-conscious and conscious forms of being, on the one hand, 
and between objective and subjective existence modes of human beings as 
such, on the other hand. This topic demands, however, a more thorough 
insight while evaluating the existential phenomenology of Martin 
Heidegger (1927 [1962]) in confrontation with its idealist understanding 
by Jean-Paul Sartre (1943 [1956]) and realist position of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1944 [1962]) against the background of Edmund Husserl’s phe-
nomenology in general along with his opinion on Immanuel Kant’s (1781 
[1838]) view of the object-subject problem in particular (cf. also Azeri 
2010).  
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Individual and Social Existence of the Self in Neosemiotics 
 
Foundations for a human-centered paradigm of existential semiotics have 
been laid by Eero Tarasti at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS – Helsinki–
Imatra, 11–17 June 2007 (cf. Tarasti 2007, 2009). To understand the con-
tribution of Eero Tarasti (2007, 2009, 2011, 2012) one should specially 
expose the relationship and difference between the understanding of exis-
tentialism in the works of Heidegger and those of Sartre. The sources and 
direction of reasoning of the former and the latter are completely unrelat-
ed. The way of Heidegger is leading from Søren Aabye Kierkegaard 
(1813–1855) and Karl Theodor Jaspers (1883–1969) (cf. Kierkegaard 
1846 [1941], and Jaspers 1913/1946 [1962].) and that of Sartre from the 
speculative philosophy of Kant and Hegel.  
 Having departed from phenomenology as the study of human experi-
ence being consciously realized by the senses (or lived through) from a 
subjective or first person point of view, Tarasti concentrated on rethinking 
the layouts of human-centered semiotics in the light of selected philoso-
phers who paid attention to such notions as, inter alia, “subject”, “exist-
ence”, “transcendence”, and “value”. These selected concepts grounded on 
semiotics were placed against the philosophical background of such no-
tional categories of existential phenomenology as Umwelt, Lebenswelt and 
Dasein. In search of the roots of existential semiotics, the founder of ne-
osemiotics went back to the logics of Hegel, the first philosopher who 
characterized his approach to reality as phenomenology with reference to 
Kant, but who, unlike Kant, expressed his conviction that phenomena 
constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being.  
 The primary point of reference in Tarasti’s inquiry consisted of Hegel’s 
categories of An-sich-sein ‘being-in-itself’ and Für-sich-sein ‘being-for-
itself’. These categories subsequently turned into subjective and objective 
being in the philosophy of Kierkegaard (1846 [1941]) when he spoke 
about an individual as an observer of him- or herself or the observed one, 
‘who was said to be a subject or such an individual who was what he/she 
was because he/she had become like it’.  
 Sartre, an attentive reader of Hegel and Kierkegaard in line, has re-
ferred to Hegelian concepts using French terms, être-en-soi and être-pour-
soi. For Sartre (1943, 124–125), the being as such becomes aware of itself 
through an act of negation, and when becoming an observer of itself, it 
shifts its interest into the position of being for itself. Having noticed a lack 
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in its reality, the being begins with the first act of transcendence as far as it 
strives to fulfill what it lacks.  
 In his studies on Hegel, Tarasti has been influenced by Jacques Fon-
tanille (born 1948), one of the main representatives of the Paris School of 
Semiotics. Following Fontanille’s corporeal semiotics, Soma et séma. 
Figures du corps (2004, 22–23), Hegelian categories An-sich-sein and 
Für-sich-sein, have been further extended in Tarasti’s existential semiotics 
(2011, 327–329) through An-mir-sein and Für-mich-sein (être-en-moi 
‘being-in-myself’ and être-pour-moi ‘being-for-myself’).  
 In the reconstruction of Hegelian categories, Fontanille presents a dis-
tinction between individual and social being forms of human body (soma) 
in an entirely new phenomenological sense (séma). Accordingly, he pro-
poses to detach two kinds of body-related meanings for human agents 
(actants) while separating the body experienced inside of their organism as 
flesh, which forms the center of all physiological and semiotic processes, 
from the body observed outside of their organism, which shapes their 
uniqueness and behavioral characteristics.  
 In fact, Fontanille deals with corporeal semiotics but presents a distinc-
tion between Moi and Soi as two categories referring to the same acting 
individual. According to Fontanille (2004, 22), the body as flesh consti-
tutes the totality of the material resistance or impulse to semiotic process-
es. The body is thus a sensorial driving support of all semiotic experiences. 
Hence, on the one hand, in Fontanille’s view (2004, 22–23), there is a 
body that constitutes the identity and directional principle of the flesh, 
being the carrier of the personal “me” (Moi), and on the other hand the 
body that supports the “self ” (Soi) while constructing itself in a discursive 
activity. As Fontanille reasons, the Soi is that part of ourselves which me, 
Moi, projects out of itself to create itself in its activity. Likewise, the Moi 
is that part of ourselves to which the Soi refers when establishing itself. In 
Tarasti’s (2015, 23) interpretation: “The Moi provides the Soi with im-
pulse and resistance whereby it can become something. In turn, the Soi 
furnishes the Moi with the reflexivity that it needs to stay within its limits 
when it changes. The Moi resists and forces the Soi to meet its own alteri-
ty.” Hence, Moi and Soi are to be seen as inseparable.  
 Although Fontanille departs from the viewpoint of semiotics, his rea-
soning fits well with the phenomenological categories of Hegel. In accord-
ance with his proposal, a new interpretation of an sich and für sich is to be 
applied, the first corresponding to bodily ego and the second its stability 
and identity and its aspiration outward, or the Sartrean negation. The Soi 
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functions as a kind of memory of the body or Moi; it yields the form to 
those traces of tensions and needs that have been inserted into the flesh of 
the Moi. Anyhow, before pondering what consequences this distinction 
has tor existential semiotics, it is necessary to scrutinize the principles of 
Moi and Soi as such. Consequently, anything belonging to the category of 
Mich, ‘me’, concerns the subject as an individual entity, whereas the concept 
of Sich ‘him-/her-/it-self” has to be reserved for the social aspect of this 
subject.  
 When one thinks about the identity and individuality of an organism, 
one can distinguish in it two aspects: Moi and Soi. In “me,” the subject 
appears as such, as a bundle of sensations, and in “himself”, “herself” or 
“itself”, the subject appears as observed by others or socially determined. 
These labels, Moi and Soi connote the existential and social aspects of the 
subject or, rather, the individual and communitarian sides of the whole self 
as an investigative object of neosemiotics. 
 
 
Human Individual as a Person and a Subject 
 
Summarizing the existential aspects of a human individual, one can refer 
to the following interpretation of Eero Tarasti’s view of the investigative 
object of neosemiotics, who treats de facto the corporeal and mental “self” 
in his writings as a synonym for a human “subject”. 
 
(1) Being-in-myself—An-mir-sein—être-en-moi expresses the human indi-
vidual’s bodily self-worth, which appears in his, hers or its verbal and 
nonverbal behavior. I represents bodily ego of human self, which ap-
pears as kinetic energy, expressions of needs, wants or desires through 
gestures and intonations. 
(2) Being-for-myself—Für-mich-sein—être-pour-moi reflects the attitude 
of an “observer” shifting, for the lack of his, her or its existence, to the 
awareness of transcendence. This way of thinking corresponds to tran-
scendental acts of an ego discovering his, her or its existential identity, 
reaching a certain kind of stability through permanent corporeality in 
habitual activities. 
(3) Being-in-itself—An-sich-sein—être-en-soi, in turn, is a transcendental 
category referring to norms, ideas, and values, which are purely con-
ceptual and virtual. As such they are the potentialities of an individual, 
which he can either actualize or not actualize. 
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(4) Being-for-itself—Für-sich-sein—être-pour-soi means the aforementioned 
norms, ideas, and values as realized by the conduct of our subject in 
his/hers/its world of existence. Those abstract entities appear here as 
distinctions, applied values, choices, and realizations that often will be 





To conclude, the followers of a self-oriented view of the object of new 
semiotics, recently discussed as the main topic at the 12th World Congress 
of Semiotics: New Semiotics Between Tradition and Innovation, Sofia, 16–
20 September 2014, should be made aware that the image of the human 
self, treated as a social “subject”, is to be supplemented through the corpo-
real counterpart of the human subject (hitherto limited to the mental sphere 
of the human organism). As a matter of fact, the entry word soi functions 
in French, firstly, as a reflexive personal pronoun of the third verb form, 
secondly, as an emphatic pronoun used for unspecified persons, and third-
ly, as a translational equivalent of the psychological term self in English. 
To say more precisely,, subject-centered semioticians should take into 
consideration also the concept of a (physical) person manifested in an 












Towards a Poststructuralist Understanding of Discourse  
 
This chapter deals with the notion of discourse connected with the theoret-
ical framework of discourse analysis which has been developed in anthro-
pological linguistics, foreign language pedagogy, social psychology, soci-
ology of communication, philosophy of science, geography and area stud-
ies, cultural studies, political sciences, cognitive studies, and translation 
studies, starting from the 1960s. It concentrates on the methodological 
assessment of discursivism as an investigative perspective from the view-
point of its applicability to the context of human competence. With reference 
to the semiotic-communicational aspects of human competence, it propos-
es to restrict the understanding of discourse to the realization of language 
and culture in human interactions which are responsible for the formation 
of ecologically determined systems of communication (cf. Wąsik 2014, 156–
168). Accordingly, the definition of discourse has been developed at this 
point in terms of relational properties of meaning-bearers or meaning-
processing activities embedded into the social roles of communication 
participants depending upon the rules of language and culture. Considered 
in conformity with the proposals made by philologists, the notion of dis-
course has been thus applied to a broader context of social sciences.  
 
 
Discourse as a Textual Construction  
Above the Level of the Sentence  
 
In view of the human-centered semiotics of language and culture, a sharp 
caesura must be introduced for separating the conception of discourse 
analysis as such from that of which has been defined by the theoretician of 
structural linguistics Zellig Sabbettai Harris (1909–1992). In his works of 
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1952, Harris (1952a, 1952b, 1952c) proposed to extend the limits of sen-
tence grammar by introducing grammar on the textual level. He consid-
ered discourse as the next level in the hierarchy of morphemes, clauses 
and sentences. Having applied purely structural methods to separate dis-
course on a higher level of text, he worked out such principles for the 
distinction of language units of a lower level of sentence analysis, as seg-
mentation, classification and distribution. These methods were based on 
formal procedures of breaking a text down into relationships, such as 
equivalence or substitution, and revealing the structural role of text-elements 
among its lower-level constituents without considering their referential 
meaning. In Harris’ order of text analysis, the initial step constituted the 
selection of individual text-elements or groups of text-elements, which 
usually appeared in identical or equivalent contextual surroundings. The 
next step was devoted to the examination of rules how the selected ele-
ments were combined into particular classes of equivalence. In conclusion, 
the question had to be answered how the consecutive combination of these 
classes of equivalences made up the whole of the text.  
 
 
Internal and External Criteria for Qualifying  
the Textual Stretch of Language as a Discourse 
 
The grammatical endowing of text linguistics has been internationally pio-
neered by Teun Adrianus van Dijk (born 1943) in his version of “text 
grammar” from 1972. This fact has been emphasized by Robert-Alain de 
Beaugrande (1946–2008) and Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler (born 1939) in 
their historical account of 1981: “An important notion which sets van 
Dijk’s work apart from studies of sentence sequences is that of MACRO-
STRUCTURE: a large-scale statement of the content of a text. Van Dijk 
has reasoned that the generating of a text must begin with a main idea 
which gradually evolves into the detailed meanings that enter individual 
sentence-length stretches” (1981 [1981, 26]). Hereto belongs also the work 
of Text and Context, in which van Dijk (1977) describes the basic opera-
tional steps that need to be undertaken when a text is presented, such as 
deletion—connected with an elimination of the textual material, generali-
zation—modification of material in a more broadest sense, and construc-
tion —creation of new material to subsume the whole of presentation  
 Anyhow, it is the concept of text and its composition, rather than dis-
course, which constitutes the true heart of text linguistics, as indicated by 
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Beaugrande in his book Text, Discourse and Process: Toward a Multidis-
ciplinary Science of Texts (1980), repeated then in Text Production: To-
ward a Science of Composition (1984). One step forward in the direction 
of a discursive view of human communication exposing the properties of 
text in relation to their producers has been made by Beaugrande and Dress-
ler in their Introduction to Text Linguistics (1981 [1981]). With reference 
to their earlier works on text grammar (Dressler 1972) and text production 
as the science of discourse composition (Beaugrande 1980, 1984), they 
have elaborated seven criteria that must be fulfilled by the spoken or writ-
ten text to be qualified as a discourse. These criteria, specified as standards 
of textuality, include: cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, 
informativeness, situationality, and intertextuality. 
 In detail, the term cohesion pertains to a grammatical connection be-
tween sentence parts, which give the participants in discourse communica-
tion a feeling that a stretch of language they produce or receive has a unity 
essential for its interpretation. Cohesion is the basis that forms the text 
elements and categories, such as conjunction, ellipsis, anaphora, cataphora 
or recurrence, by means of which the syntactic interconnection is achieved. 
Coherence, in turn, is the order of statements which relates one to another 
by sense. It entails also presuppositions and implications connected with 
general knowledge of reality or with cognitive structures that do not have a 
linguistic realization, but are implied by the language itself, and thus influ-
ence the reception of a given message. Beaugrande and Dressler (1981, 
84) have defined coherence as a “continuity of senses … being the mutual 
access and relevance within a configuration of concepts and relations”. 
 The principle of intentionality relates to the position and purpose of a 
text producer, demanding that a message has to be conveyed deliberately 
and consciously. It involves the text-producer's attitude that the set of 
respective text-constituents form a cohesive and coherent discourse type 
useful in fulfilling the producer's purposes or satisfying his/her needs, for 
example, to distribute or to acquire knowledge and/or to attain a certain 
communicative goal. Acceptability might be determined as a mirror of 
intentionality since it is audience-oriented. It means that the communica-
tive product has to be satisfactory so that the addressees can approve it. 
The listeners or readers must recognize a given text in a particular context 
and be prepared to estimate its content whether it is suitable or relevant. 
 The next criterion, informativeness, means that some material evidence 
of new knowledge has to be included in the discourse. It refers to the 
quantity and quality of new or expected data in accordance with the prin-
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ciple that every text should be informative. Situationality points to the fact 
that the circumstances in which the text is produced play a decisive role in 
the production and reception of the communicational message. This crite-
rion leads to the description of discourse as a “text in context”. Finally, 
there is intertextuality, which refers to two things. Firstly, a text is always 
related to some previous or simultaneous discourse types and secondly, 
texts are always linked and grouped in particular text varieties or genres 
(e.g., narrative, argumentative, descriptive, etc.) by formal criteria.  
 In fact, it is only cohesion and coherence that make up the inherent prop-
erties of the text. Informativeness, situationality and intertextuality refer to 
extratextual reality, their contextual arrangement, and their relationships to 
other text types. What thus constitutes the relational properties of their 
producers and recipients forms the intentionality and acceptability of texts.  
 Less known in the English West was discourse analysis from France, 
which arose on the philological tradition of stylistics, applying grammati-
cal methods to the detection of linguistic phenomena as an obligatory step 
in the interpretation of texts. In the 1970s the most influential in the devel-
opment of the French school was Michel Pêcheux (1938–1983) who pro-
posed an automatic decomposition of discourse (cf. Pêcheux 1969). 
 
 
Discourse as the Use of a Text in the Context of Situation 
 
Another tradition of discourse analysis evolved both in France and in other 
West European countries. It was connected with the rise of the ordinary-
language philosophy directed by John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960), 
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) and Herbert Paul Grice (1913–1988), 
which was extensively discussed and enriched by Geoffrey Neil Leech 
(1936–2014). What they introduced into the study of language-in use, 
called pragmatic linguistics or pragmalinguistics, and subsequently to 
interpersonal rhetoric as opposed to textual rhetoric, called sociological 
pragmatics or sociopragmatics, were the distinctions, inter alia, between: 
direct and indirect speech acts; propositions and concepts; utterances or 
statements and locutions; locutionary meaning, illocutionary force and 
perlocutionary effects; performative (doing things with words) and asser-
tive (stating the true existence of things) utterances, introduced by Austin 
(1962/1975) and continued by Searle (1969), conversational implicatures, 
principles of cooperation and linguistic politeness, natural and convention-
al meaning proposed by Grice (1975), which was advanced to a higher 
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level of critics and extensions by Leech (1983/1990) and a pleiad of their 
followers in the last three decades. Among other intellectual directions of 
study, the linguistic analysis of texts above the level of the sentence was 
largely influenced by the ethnography of speaking and, subsequently, eth-
nography of communication, initiated by Dell Hathaway Hymes (1962, 
1971a) and revived by Muriel Saville-Troike (1982).  
 On the basis of these new trends in the development of pragmatics,  
interpersonal rhetoric and conversational analysis, the domain of discourse 
analysis was fertilized by fresh terms and methodological tools. Hereto 
belonged mainly the early work of Teun Adrianus van Dijk Studies in the 
Pragmatics of Discourse (1981) who specialized initially in text linguistics 
and pragmatic discourse analysis, and then switched to critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) starting from the late 1990s.  
 The logical and philosophical aspects of pragmatics were visible espe-
cially in the theoretical output of Michel Foucault (1966 [1970], 1969 
[1972]), a French philosopher and historian of humanistic ideas. Foucault’s 
approach benefited both from the language-in-use and utterance-centered 
turn (called in France pragmatique énonciative “enunciative pragmatics”), 
which took place in post-structuralist linguistics and social sciences.  
 To understand the importance of a discursive-analytic approach to 
verbal texts and text-formation acts of verbal communication implemented 
by social scientists, it is essential, in allusion to the enquiry of Sara Mills 
(1997, 40, and 55–67) to discuss in the first instance Foucault’s Archaeol-
ogy of knowledge (1972). In the second, one should cite the understanding 
of discourse from his book History of Sexuality (1976 [1978]) and subse-
quently his lecture “The Order of Discourse” (1971 [1981]).  
 Foucault departs from a summarizing description of discourse that 
allows him to treat “it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a 
regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1972, 80). In 
the individualized sense, a discourse can be also analyzed according to 
some linguistic rules governing all the utterances of a determined language 
in terms of a specific formation that groups the enunciation of statements 
similar in kind. In this sense “discourse is constituted by a group of se-
quences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they 
can be assigned particular modalities of existence” (Foucault 1972, 107).
 What constitutes a statement, Foucault (1972, 107–108) labels a group 
of signs which exist in a materialized way within various verbal perfor-
mances referred in relation to the same domain of objects and possible 
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subjects creating a specified discursive formation. Advocating a philo-
sophical perspective Foucault sharply distinguishes between the facts, 
which belong to the domains of discourse studies, on the one hand, and the 
domain of linguistics and logic, on the other, in the following declaration:  
 
A statement belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a 
text, and a proposition to a deductive whole. But whereas the regularity of 
a sentence is defined by the laws of a language (langue), and that of a 
proposition by the laws of logic, the regularity of statements is defined by 
the discursive formation itself. (Foucault 1972, 116).  
 
Under the term discursive formation Foucault means, in general, the enun-
ciative principle that governs a group of verbal performances and, in par-
ticular, the historical, thematic or institutional distribution of limited 
groups of statements that share the same patterns of concerns, perspec-
tives, concepts, or themes. In other words, the discursive formation is an 
abstract set of conditions that should guide language use within such as-
pects as topics, originators of the linguistic performance, interrelation and 
inter-changeability with other linguistic acts. When these conditions are 
fulfilled, one may speak of various kinds of discourses, such as economic, 
medical, academic, etc. Cf. his concise definition:  
 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the 
same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, 
endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be 
indicated (and if necessary explained), it is made up of a limited number of 
statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. 
(Foucault 1972, 117). 
 
Thus, a discursive practice may be characterized as regulating the enun-
ciation of statements by imposing upon an enunciating subject “a body of 
anonymous, historical rules, always determined in a time and space that 
have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geograph-
ical, or linguistic area, the condition of operation of the enunciative func-
tion” (Foucault 1972, 117). Though there is a plurality of discourses at any 
given time, a single discourse is limited to the definite number of possible 
statements.  
 In addition to Archéologie du savoir of 1969, in his Inaugural Lecture 
delivered at the Collège de France given on December 2, 1970, titled L'or-
dre du discours, which was translated ten years after its first French publi-
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cation (in a booklet of 84 pages) into English as “The Order of Discourse”, 
Foucault describes his analytical approach, explaining how it is regulated: 
“[I]n every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, select-
ed, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose 
role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance 
events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (Foucault 1981, 
52). In this way, he proposed to think of discourse as existing in the form 
of a complex set of practices which are kept in circulation and other prac-
tices which are contested and kept out of circulation. 
 Having exposed the methodological requirements for the existence of 
discourses, Foucault contends that: “Discourses must be treated as discon-
tinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with 
one another, but can just exclude or be unaware of each other” (1981, 67). 
In his further arguments, he states: “We must conceive of discourse as a 
violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we 
impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of discourse find 
the principle of their regularity” (Foucault 1981, 67). As to regularities 
that experiencing subjects might observe, Foucault argues that discourse is 
to be seen as something which constrains the perceptions of reality. Alt-
hough discourse seems to encompass almost everything, there does exist 
the field of non-discursive practices (Foucault 1972, 68).  
 The reason that sociologists have found Foucault’s theory attractive is 
that he stresses that discourse is associated with the interrelationships 
between power, ideas or ideology. However, the notion of discourse ap-
pears to be more sophisticated than the notion of ideology in the political 
sense. In the first volume of his Histoire de la sexualité, 1976 [trans. His-
tory of Sexuality, 1978], Foucault asserts even that “discourse can be both 
an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. 
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also under-
mines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart 
it” (1978, 100–101).  
 In sum, when theorizing about the notion of discourse and its related 
terms, Foucault has used in addition to statement, discursive formation, 
discursive practices also some other terms, like épistèmé (1966 [1970]), 
archive or historical a priori (1972, 127), discursive event, discursive 
series (1981, 68), discursive regularities (1981, 72), which have formed 
points of reference to his work and which have helped scholars to outline 
the terminology of discourse studies as a whole. 
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 To the well-known scholars in France who have associated a pragmatic 
outlook on discourse with linguistic theories of “enunciation” and Michel 
Foucault’s concept of “archaeology of knowledge” belongs Dominique 
Maingueneau (born 1950). For Maingueneau (1976, 1984), discourse analy-
sis is interested in: (1) discursive genres of social activity which play a deci-
sive role in the construction of social reality; (2) discursive interactions 
between communicational settings and of the “enunciative scenes”, being 
determined by social nature of communicational events; (3) the description 
of discursive practices with the application of concepts and methods, which 
are borrowed from systemic linguistics and from the sociology of commu-
nication. Worth noting is that since the end of the 1990s Maingueneau (1999) 
has propagated the idea of “self-constituting discourses”, being interested 
in the legitimation of the entire discursive production in the domains of the 
human life-world, such as philosophy, religion, science, art, politics, litera-
ture, etc. 
 Among discourse analysts of the 1980s, it was Michael Stubbs (born 
1947) who distinguished himself by uniting in his study Discourse Analy-
sis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language (1983) several do-
mains of language-in-use-oriented discursive studies, such as, inter alia, 
natural and recorded conversations, fieldwork observations, narrative organi-
zation of texts, data collection from spoken and written texts, ethnographic 
data, communicative problems in the classrooms, language variation, lan-
guage functions, descriptive rules of language use, medium as message, 
object language and metalanguage, language-systemic level, language-
pragmatic level, tests for speech acts, well-formedness and grammaticality, 
predictability and idealization, truth and certainty, knowledge and beliefs, 
surface cohesion and underlying coherence, utterances as actions, dis-
course acts and speech acts, indirection in speech acts, social roles, formu-
lating turns of talk, the propositional analysis of texts, narrative structures, 
stories and plots, entailments of propositions and presuppositions, jokes 
and lies, conversational maxims and implicatures, and the like. 
 What subsequently has given an impetus for doing discourse analysis, 
in the opinion of Stubbs (1983, 1), is the recognition that language, action 
and knowledge are inseparable. Stubbs observes that when thinking about 
discourse, one should take language into consideration, and at the same 
time he points out that “language, action and knowledge are inseparable” 
(1983, 1). Additionally, for Stubbs (1983, 1) communication between 
people would be impossible if they did not share common knowledge and 
assumptions about the surrounding world, while interacting with others dur-
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ing different social occasions. According to Stubbs, language used by an 
individual is highly contextualized by the situation in which a person par-
ticipates. In Stubbs’ assessment “[a]ny choice of words creates a mini-
world or universe of discourse, and makes predictions about what is also 
likely to occur in the same context” (1983, 2). As he observes, it is quite 
normal for people to have some expectations concerning the language that 
is used in one context, but will not be recognized as appropriate in another. 
Thus, Stubbs maintains that there is a great variety of social roles and 
“[w]e can talk about intuitively recognizable social roles such as ‘teacher’ 
and ‘doctor’“(1983, 8). Moreover, by this point Stubbs clarifies that when 
a person is a participant of a given discourse, for instance a teacher, there is a 
specific discursive behavior that is expected of this person, which at the 
same time is different from the discourse of a doctor or a lawyer. As he 
adds, “there is no use of language which is not embedded in the culture; on 
the other hand, there are no large-scale relationships between language and 
society which are not realized, at least partly, through verbal interaction” 
(Stubbs 1983, 8). In his view, every human action, even non-verbal, com-
municates something to the surroundings. What is more, a member of a 
society is always a part of a determined culture being aware of social con-
ventions which are represented through discourse. 
 
 
Discourse as a Communicative Praxis in Social Interactions  
 
To the most prominent founders of critical approaches to discourse as a 
communicative praxis belong Norman Fairclough (born 1941) and Teun 
Adrianus van Dijk, mentioned above in the context of text grammar and 
the pragmatic use of language. This topic, announced by Fairclough in his 
article “Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis” at the Jour-
nal of Pragmatics (1985), has been continued and elaborated in his subse-
quent books, especially of 1989 and 1995.  
 What is relevant for Fairclough’s (1989, 22–24) theory is the differen-
tiation between discourse and text; text is a product of discourse, a singu-
lar, specific realization of discourse, while discourse comprises the entire 
process of social interaction of which the text production is just a part. 
More specifically, discourse has three dimensions simultaneously: text, 
discursive practice (including the production and interpretation of texts, 
that is the interactive dimension), and sociocultural practice (broadly un-
derstood context), which make up a discursive event. According to Fair-
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clough (1989, 22), a discursive approach to language, which entails the 
perception of language as a form of social practice, has a threefold impli-
cation: firstly, language is a part of society; secondly, language is a social 
process; and, thirdly, language is a socially conditioned process.  
 For Fairclough (1995, 6), language is socially constitutive, but at the 
same time it is socially conditioned. Texts are thus social spaces which can 
accommodate two fundamental processes simultaneously: cognition and 
representation of the world, as well as social interaction. In Fairclough’s 
(1995, 73) view “language is a material form of ideology, and language is 
invested by ideology.” Postulating a critical-discursive view of language 
“as social practice”, he assumes “that it is a mode of action”, which is 
“historically and socially situated”, and which is not only “socially shaped 
but it is also socially shaping.” (Fairclough 1995, 131). 
 To sum up, accepting the view of Fairclough that language in use is 
subjected to social conventions, the discourse-analyst may investigate, for 
example, how speaking, writing and reading are performed in the way 
prescribed by society and how they have a social effect. Since discourse is 
a system, those who speak or write in a determined language can realize 
various communicative functions by means of this system. Hence, work with-
in a functional paradigm should focus on characterizing the patterns of 
speaking or writing which are used for certain purposes in particular con-
texts, aiming at discovering in what way they result from the application 
of communicational strategies. 
 Van Dijk announced his first view on “Principles of Critical Discourse 
Analysis” in his article of 1993, formulated then by a programmatic title 
“Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis” of 1995. Mostly cited, howev-
er, are his two consequent articles published in 1997 (van Dijk 1997a and 
1997b). Nonetheless, it is already in his book of 1988 where the attention 
switched to the ideology as the primary object of his study from a multi-
disciplinary perspective (cf. van Dijk 1988).  
 Teun van Dijk has treated discourse as a form of social action, i.e., an 
intentional, controlled, purposeful human activity. Assuming that the pro-
duction or comprehension of sentences, words, styles, rhetoric, or argu-
mentation should also be understood as action, van Dijk suggests to per-
ceive those who assign meanings to discourses as social actors (1997b, 8). 
Studying action presuppose analyzing intentions, plans and purposes of 
speakers or writers in a specific context to which they “adapt what they 
say—and how they say it, and how they interpret what others say—to at 
least some of their roles or identities, and to the roles of other participants” 
Discursive Life-World of Communicating Selves 271 
 
(van Dijk 1997b, 12). With respect to the assumption that social discourses 
are means by which ideologies are persuasively communicated in society, 
and which usually help to reproduce and legitimate the power or domina-
tion of specific groups or classes, van Dijk argues that (1997b, 26): 
 
[P]eople develop ideologies in order to solve a specific problem: ideologies 
thus serve to manage the problem of the of coordination of the acts or 
practices of individual social members of a group. Once shared, ideologies 
make sure that members of a group will generally act in similar ways in 
similar situations, are able to cooperate in joint tasks, and will thus contribute 
to group cohesion, solidarity and successful reproduction of the group. 
 
A more precise description of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a form 
of “social practice” dealing with “language use in speech and writing” has 
been put forward by Fairclough and Wodak (1997, 258): 
 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and 
social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, 
but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as 
socially conditioned—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and 
the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of 
people.  
 
The main characteristics of CDA have been summarized by Fairclough 
and Wodak (1997, 271–280).as follows: CDA addresses social problems; 
power relations are discursive; discourse constitutes society and culture; 
discourse does ideological work; discourse is historical; The link between 
the text and society is mediated; discourse analysis is interpretative and 
explanatory; and discourse is a form of social action.38 
 
 
Discursivism as an Epistemological Perspective 
in the Assessment of Interacting Communities 
 
To begin with, discursivism is regarded here as an epistemological position 
of scientists who analyze their investigative object from a discourse-
oriented perspective. To determine the scope of a selected perspective, dis-
course is defined in terms of the relational properties of meaning-bearers or 
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meaning-processing activities embedded into the social roles of communi-
cation participants depending upon the rules of language and culture.39  
 Thus, against the background of the distinctions made by philologists, 
the notion of discourse is usually placed in a broader context of social sci-
ences. Practitioners of philological studies, linguists and theoreticians of 
literature, refer the term discourse above all to socially and culturally deter-
mined properties of the types of texts or text-processing activities charac-
terizing the domains of language use in human communication. But those 
who aim at studying the semiotics of human communication see discourse 
as a material manifestation of language and culture in sensible meaning-
bearers, which are equated with text-like objects, performing the semiotic 
functions of indicating, signaling, appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e., pictori-
al or mimetic signs in the nonverbal and verbal behavior of communica-
tion participants.40  
 
 
Discursive Ecosystems as Temporary and Long-Lasting 
Aggregations of Communicating Selves 
 
Seen from the perspective of cultural and communicational sciences, dis-
course is specified in terms of semiotic codes and processes that link indi-
vidual communicating selves, taking part in group interactions as observable 
persons and inferable subjects, into interpersonal and intersubjective col-
lectivities when they create and interpret the inferable meanings, which are 
embodied in material bearers forming the nonverbal or verbal means and 
modes of human understanding. Correspondingly, semiotic objects are re-
garded as the realization of language and culture in various domains of 
human communication, determined by the functional circles, interest spheres, 
or thematic preferences of people, etc., such as, e.g., family, neighborhood, 
market, festival or carnival, magazine, school, church, funeral home, ceme-
tery, office, bank, parliament, army, law, courtroom, prison, hospital, com-
munication roads, media, and information centers, feminism, anticolonial-
ism, green peace movements, and the like.41  
 To establish a typology of discursive communities42 as aggregations of 
communicating selves into discursive communities who interact in tempo-
rary or long-lasting encounters, it will be necessary to specify the common 
tasks that they realize for the satisfaction of their survival needs and cul-
tural values, as well as the fulfillment of public requirements and envi-
ronmental conditionings. Accordingly, various occupational domains of 
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social services create the basis for the distinction of discursive communities, 
such as administering, governing, municipality service, food and utility 
supply, commodity and public transportation; manufacturing, industrializa-
tion; advertising, marketing, trading, banking, taxation; canalization, sani-
tation, waste removal; road and shelter building, designing, renovation, 
housing, hostelling, education, health-caretaking, hospitalization, inter-
ment, relaxation, recreation, gardening; defense, execution of penalties, 
controlling of morality or standard conduct, exclusion, elimination, inclu-
sion, incorporation, custody, arrest; civic gathering, public corporation, 
tourisms, and the like. 
 Having in view the role of language and culture in the realization of 
communicational tasks, one may take into consideration a number of the 
so-called functions of speech communication, functions of texts or func-
tions of signs,43 such as argumentative, cognitive, collaborative, communi-
cative, competitive, conative, conflictive, controlling, convivial, deceptive, 
deferential, degrading, delimitative, diacritic, discriminating, distortive, emo-
tional, enculturating, evocative, excluding, experiential, expressive, heuristic, 
ideational, identifying, imaginative; impressive, including, informational, 
informative, instrumental, interactional, intrapersonal, interpersonal, logi-
cal, ludic, manipulative, metalingual, persuasive, phatic, poetic, pragmatic, 
prevaricating, regulatory, representative, ritual, semantic, separating, sig-
nificative, stimulative, symbolizing, textual, transactional, unifying, etc. 
 Moreover, both linguistic pragmatics and the pragmatics of social 
communication expose the interactive goals44, realized by communication 
participants through the content of verbal and nonverbal meaning-bearers, 
such, inter alia, as asking for, giving and/or receiving help, advice, opinion, 
suggestion; showing tension or tension release, solidarity, unity, common-
ality or discord, conflict or accommodation, cooperation or competition, 
contempt, disrespect or admiration, appreciation, approval, disapproval; 
exercising authority, power, control, influence, supremacy, pressure, etc. 
 Bearing in mind the classificatory approach to speech acts, extended in 
a broader context of culture to communicational events, one might take 
into consideration the semiotic properties of communicators that are de-
termined by task- or purpose-, or goal- or aim-in-view-oriented acts, such 
as, e.g., accepting, accusing, admiring, advising, agreeing, announcing, 
appealing, applauding, approving, arguing, asking, asserting, begging, 
calming, cheering, claiming, clarifying, complying, confirming, congratu-
lating, counseling, consoling, cursing, defending, demanding, denying, 
disagreeing, emphasizing, encouraging, evaluating, falsifying, flattering, 
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greeting, illuminating, informing, instructing, inviting, joking, laughing, 
maintaining, mocking, noticing, notifying, obeying, observing, offering, 
ordering, pleasing, praising, promising, pronouncing, proposing, quarrel-
ling, reassuring, recommending, refusing, rejecting, repeating, reporting, 
reprimanding, scorning, stating, suggesting, thanking, threatening, verify-
ing, warning, welcoming, etc.45 Insofar as semiotic-communicational sys-
tems are constituents of human culture, one can expose their properties in 
the light of disciplines that study the ecological46 factors influencing the 
life of human individuals as meaning-creators and meaning-utilizers.  
 While focusing on communicating selves who group into particular 
ecosystems located at various levels of social stratifications, one may 
study their behavior as semiotic properties of individuals and collectivities 
determined by the interrelationships of affinity, ethnicity, occupation, 
religious conviction, political or economic status, etc. Thus, on account of 
various forms of interactions, the societal ecosystems in question might be 
examined within the scope of the so-called ecology of discursive commu-
nities in relation to their constitutive elements as parts of communicational 
systems, individuals playing certain roles of participants in group commu-
nication, nonverbal and verbal means, channels and communicational 
settings. 
 One should stress, however, that the ecological collectivities, as con-
stituents of larger communities united through common tasks, develop due 
to the interactions between its members. The occurrence of interaction can 
be noticed when the products of human behavior and environmental props 
are observable as semantically relevant objects linking participants in 
communication with each other. Nonetheless, the interpretation of observ-
able facts, that is, the ascription of meaning to them in terms of referential 
semiotics, either by communication participants or by researchers, can 
only be based on subjective inferences. 
 Investigating a semiotic network formed within an ecosystem of com-
municating selves and their aggregations into communicating collectivi-
ties, one may notice that the manifestation forms of nonverbal and verbal 
meaning-bearers, which are unequally put into use, appear to be polymor-
phous when they are formed in dependence on their environments. As 
such, in relation to the sources and/or destination of information, these 
meaning-bearers occur on various strata of society in a twofold manner, 
namely, as relatively changeable practices, and also as stabilizing patterns 
of interpreted discourses. 
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Dimensions and Autonomy of Linguistic 
and Discursive Groupings 
 
Against the background of the terminological apparatus of language-centered 
communicational sciences, it is important to consider a distinction between 
two kinds of linguistic and discursive groupings, namely linguistic collec-
tivities and linguistic communities, and discursive collectivities and dis-
cursive communities. The difference between these groupings is based on 
the range of participants taking part in interindividual communication in 
dependence upon the modular view of language as embedded in the cul-
ture, or the holistic view of culture as including language as one of the 
systems of meaning-bearers belonging to the realm of human semiotics. 
The boundaries of linguistic communities are determined by the use of one 
and the same language. Discursive communities, however, may exist even 
if communication participants use different varieties of the same language 
or even different languages functioning as mutually translatable for the 
tasks of communicating selves. Common discourse types are decisive for 
the mutual understanding between individuals and groups taking part in 
more or less organized communities, such as professional or confessional, 
national or international, which are linked by various types of bonds, such 
as, e.g., artistic, banking, commercial, industrial, legal, military, monetary, 
religious, standardized, and the like. 
 The use of a human-centered framework enables researchers to treat 
discursive communities in terms of dynamic systems with core and pe-
riphery, because individual communicating selves as parts of constantly 
changing collective groupings are dependent upon ecological variables 
which determine the modes of their existence and formation into relatively 
self-governing entities. As far as the lower-order communities are often 
subsumed within those of a higher order, any ecologically determined 
community may be described as developing and becoming more or less 
autonomous from any point of view, independently of whether it is incom-
plete or complete with respect to its physical constituents. For example, a 
typology of discursive communities on the basis of their ecological em-
bedding might consider both hierarchy and inclusiveness of their distance; 
stronger discursive communities allow for those which are further from the 
core of society and develop into “autonomous agents”. One could examine 
the direction in which long-lasting discursive communities develop from 
heterogeneous discursive selves into homogeneous discursive communi-
ties with stable bonds. As a result, one could observe what types of inter-
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acting subordinate groups (along with their particular spheres of influence) 
evolve in time and space, eventually becoming ethnic, national, religious, 
professional or natural and cultural ecosystems. 
 Semiotic properties of communicating selves as persons participating 
in discursive communities and as members of communicative collectivity 
are changeable, depending on biological, psychical, social, cultural, and 
other ecological conditionings, which co-determine the modes of their 
functioning and the direction of their development. Because the discursive 
communities of a lower order are situated within the communities of a 
higher order, the autonomy47 principle refers here to the self-government 
of a small-group, applying its own laws, and functioning within the larger 
structures of a particular discursive community. 
 In real life. any ecologically determined community might be observed 
as developing and becoming more or less autonomous from any point of 
view independently of whether it is partial or complete in character. Inter-
preted and described in terms of sign- and meaning-oriented disciplines, 
the relations between communicating selves, as persons and subjects, can 
serve as a basis for the distinction of various types or kinds of interacting 
groups in terms of semiotic properties.  
 As a consequence, a typology of ecologically determined discursive 
communities may consider at least six qualifiers positioned under the three 
stages of their autonomy, as: (1) discreteness and peculiarity; (2) separate-
ness and independence; (3) self-existence and self-reliance. In accordance 
with these qualifiers of autonomy, one may notice that some autonomous 
communities are stronger and some are weaker and that stronger commu-
nities may include those which are weaker; similarly, some autonomous 
collectivities may be considered as less distant or more distant from the 
core of a united discursive community. 
 One may examine the conditionings under which heterogeneous com-
munities with temporary bonds become more or less homogeneous com-
munities with permanent bonds. This means, one can find out what types 
of subordinate groups interacting with each other evolve and establish 
themselves in time and space into autonomous ecosystems on ethnic, na-
tional, international as well as confessional, professional or natural and 
cultural levels. Considered in another dimension, primary discursive com-
munities may merge into discursive communities of secondary, superordi-
nate or subordinate, active or passive, short-lasting or long-lasting, durable 
or non-durable, and loose or compact types. Hence, each individual might 
be seen as a member of various smaller discursive communities and larger 
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discursive communities determined by their communicative domains of life, 
and thematic cynosures or ecological niches in which they are formed. In 
the latter case, each discursive community is externally determined by 
communicational factors depending on ecological conditionings of an 
environment, in which the communicating selves as members of group 
collectivities live. 
 When the theorists of linguistics agree that a determined language and 
a determined culture have autonomized themselves by establishing a uni-
fied system of meaning-bearers, they should bear in mind that it is only a 
relative autonomy. While acquiring a state of autonomy, a determined 
language and a determined culture, or rather their standard varieties, as 
opposed to sublanguages and subcultures, become independent from their 
individual members as shared means of (inter)lingual and (inter)cultural 
communication. What has been recognized and shared as a standard state 
in a determined language or in a determined culture is imposed upon the 
members of linguistic or cultural communities by virtue of social sanc-
tions. The pressure of society expressed, for instance, in rejection and ac-
ceptance, punishment and reward, or stigma and charisma, makes individ-
ual participants in communication adjust themselves to common rules 
without being authorized to introduce any changes in the collective charac-
ter of the semiotic system formed by conventions of discursive communi-
ties. 
 The factor of relativity explains the occurrence of multilingualism and 
multiculturalism while contributing to the differentiation of linguistic and 
cultural communities into minorities and majorities and while indicating 
that a particular language and a particular culture are subjected, in their 
genesis and functioning, to collective customs and conventions. It depends 
upon the agreement of individuals and communities, situated hierarchical-
ly on various societal strata, who contribute to the development of a shared 
means of signification and communication in the domain of language and 
culture proportionally to the degree of their standardization and codifica-
tion. Language and culture as communicational systems must be detached 
from individuals, in order to provide patterns of standard realizations, 
which have to be followed by descendants of those participants in linguis-
tic or interlingual and cultural or intercultural communication, who have 
given rise to its origins and development. The facts that some discursive 
communities get rid, or are deprived of, their own vernaculars or of their 
local cultures, or that a determined foreign language or a determined cul-
ture can become the property of many discursive communities, speaks also 
Chapter Sixteen 278 
 
in favor of the idea of separating languages and cultures from individuals 
and social groups. 
 
 
Existence Modes and Manifestation Forms of Linguistic 
and Cultural Discourses  
 
In determining the autonomous status of language and culture as human-
centered discourses, the most important problem lies in the selection of an 
appropriate perspective concerning their existence modes. On account of 
concrete and mental, static and dynamic, substantial and relational mani-
festations, the semiotics of language and culture may be subsumed under 
at least one of the six existence modes of discourses: 
 
(1) Discourses manifest themselves in collectively accepted patterns of 
sensible meaning-bearers which are transmitted by source meaning-
creators and received by target meaning-utilizers as the nonverbal and 
verbal means of intersubjective signification and interpersonal com-
munication;  
(2) Discourses sustain themselves in the individual consciousness of source 
meaning-creators and target meaning-utilizers as the mental equivalents 
of sensible meaning-bearers, being processed and interpreted as nonver-
bal and verbal means of intersubjective signification and interpersonal 
communication; 
(3) Discourses recur in the concrete sign-transmitting and sign-receiving 
activities of communicating persons, who possess physiological en-
dowments for the production and reception of sensible meaning-bearers 
as the significative means of interpersonal communication; 
(4) Discourses endure in the mental sign-processing and sign-interpreting 
activities of communicating persons, who possess communicational 
abilities which allows them to create and recognize sensible meaning-
bearers as significative means of interpersonal communication being 
distinguishable from each other, formally correct, semantically true 
and pragmatically adjusted to respective contexts and situations; 
(5) Discourses are deducible from the socially abstracted networks of the 
relational values of significative means which are externalized by individ-
ual communicators in their concrete sign-transmitting and sign-receiving 
activities; 
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(6) Discourses are assumable from networks of associations between the 
mental equivalents of significative means and their relational values which 
are internalized by individual communicators in their sign-processing and 
sign-interpreting activities.  
 
It has to be noticed that all the enumerated six existence modes of lan-
guage and culture—in the products of nonverbal and verbal meaning-
creation and meaning-utilization, in the processes of sign-transmission and 
sign-reception, in the processing and interpreting of nonverbal and verbal 
products as meaning-bearers, in the relational values of nonverbal and ver-
bal products being realized in communicative performance and memorized 
through associations in communicative competence48—constitute extraor-
ganismic and intraorganismic properties of communicating selves as ob-
servable persons and inferable subjects. 
 In opposition to communicative performance, communicative compe-
tence or networks of associations, which depend upon the physiological 
and mental capabilities of individual communicators, only the sets of ex-
ternalized patterns of nonverbal and verbal products, as well as their rela-
tional properties, become independent from the will of particular members 
of determined collectivities when they function as a means of social com-
munication. But in the real world, language and culture, as properties of 
collectivity, do not constitute sets of observable data; they may be only 
imagined as consisting of the means and contents of interpersonal commu-
nication and intersubjective signification that are typified from observable 
changes in individuals when they are engaged in communicating activities. 
What can concretely be singled out are no more than referential behaviors 
of communicators, and their interpretational practices have to be mentally 
inferred from the shared knowledge of communication participants. Thus, 
in the physical dimension, communicating selves are linked with each 
other as persons through sensible meaning-bearers carried out in their 
sending and receiving activities. In the logical dimension, intersubjective 
links come into being through the mutual understanding of people when 
the communication participants negotiate and confirm the extrinsic mean-
ing of nonverbal and verbal means through interpretative practices and 
referential behavior on the basis of internally concluded commonalities of 
experience or knowledge about the same domain of reference. 
 Considering the role of semiotic means in the formation of discursive 
communities, on the basis of observable and inferable similarities in the 
referential behavior of human beings and their interpretational activities, 
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one can, in consequence, subsume language and culture under two addi-
tional existence modes of discourse, where: 
 
(7) Discourses unite the communicating selves into concretely observable, 
dynamic interpersonal groupings that become realized between mem-
bers of discursive communities when they produce, emit, perceive and 
receive sensible meaning-bearers through a respective physical chan-
nel; 
(8) Discourses can be deduced from the intersubjective groupings that arise 
between members of discursive communities when they understand or 
interpret received meaning-bearers in the same way, referring them to 
the common extrasemiotic reality known to each communicating indi-
vidual separately. 
 
In keeping with the assumption that there are also interorganismic links 
due to not only linguistic faculties but also cultural faculties inherited 
genetically, according to the ascertainments of biologically and anthropo-
logically inclined semioticians, one may be entitled to assume that dis-
courses exists also in the generational memory of human organisms in the 
form of mental memes or biosemiotic texts (cf. Dawkins 1976/1989 and 
1982, or 2006), Dennett 1995 and 1996), Blackmore 1998 and 1999, with 
special reference to Kull 2000a). As far as this viewpoint is concerned:  
 
(9) Discourses are possible due to an innate semiotic faculty localized in 
genetically specialized neuronal centers of human brains to communi-
cate by using both nonverbal and verbal means of signification through 
the implementation of physiological techniques based on five main 
senses, as sound, sight, touch, smell, and taste.  
(10) Discourses have emerged as a result of evolutionary changes of animal 
organisms adapting to their natural and artificial surroundings through 
the extension of their communicational abilities preexisting in their ge-




Postulating the Concept of (Inter)Discursive Competence 
 
Investigating the semiotic properties of humans in the domain of linguistic 
communication, one can distinguish the skills and knowledge and/or abili-
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ties and expectations of communicators, labeled as their linguistic compe-
tences, which enable them to communicate with others while creating, 
distinguishing, delimiting, recognizing, interpreting and ascribing appro-
priate semantic and pragmatic values to verbal means of communication, 
produced as utterances in respective acts of speech.  
 As it has been pointed out in Chapter Five the term competence owes 
its initial justification through reference to linguistic-grammatical correct-
ness of verbal means used by an ideal speaker and/or listener in a homo-
geneous linguistic community. After some time, with the inclusion of 
phoneme-distinguishing aptitudes, semantic-interpretational knowledge 
and pragmatic-inferential skills of typical speakers and listeners, the notion 
of linguistic competence has been extended to the scope encompassing the 
totality of human abilities and habits of how to effectively function in a 
communicative community which is not necessarily ideal or homogenous 
with regard to commonly known and used language. At first, a competent 
communicator is seen as being able to comprehend all possible textual 
realizations of language used in social practice. Then, in the eyes of socio-
logically trained linguists, it is not enough for competent communicators 
to know the particular language, but to possess such cultural knowledge, 
which enables them to use and interpret not only linguistic means but also 
semiotic means of expression in different situational contexts.  
 Introduced herewith, the notion of semiotic competence as such en-
compasses not only the notion of communicative competence, but is also 
embedded into the notion of cultural competence. Semiotic competence 
includes the total set of human skills and knowledge which communicating 
individuals employ in certain surroundings, or situations of language- and 
culture-related communication. Due to these skills and knowledge, com-
municating selves, as observable persons and inferable subjects, are bound 
through nonverbal and verbal domain of signification with the extralin-
guistic and extrasemiotic domain of reference being conditioned by physi-
cal, biological, psychical and social reality of the human life-world. 
 In general, one can say that semiotic properties of communicating 
selves develop through their participation in different linguistic acts or in 
different cultural events, as members of different discursive communities. 
Developing their linguistic and semiotic competences, they can acquire, 
among others, the abilities to choose appropriate verbal and nonverbal 
means determined by their desired or expected aims in a specific situation. 
Accordingly, competent participants in communication have to know how 
to lead and foster a talk, to conduct a debate or discussion in order to con-
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vince someone of something, to persuade someone of something, to dimin-
ish the impact of an imposition or to mitigate a conflict.  
 One can encounter, for example, some recipients of academic educa-
tion who are able to write a popular or scientific article as well as to give a 
formal lecture. But a special talent is undoubtedly needed to compose a 
poem, a novel or an artistic essay. It is, nevertheless, a matter of special 
training to learn how to formulate a report, to prepare an advertisement, a 
slogan and/or to choose a motto for a particular topic.  
 Participants in social communication who function in the role of clients 
or customers have to possess or acquire practical skills and knowledge of 
how to use professional advice or services of others, for example, of a 
lawyer, a priest, a bank counselor, a therapist or an architect, etc. Success-
ful applicants must possess respective competences, for example, how to 
receive benefits, subsidies from an institution, for example, from a social 
agency, governmental bureau, etc., or how to seek sponsorship or patron-
age from a financial endowment while filling out a special request form or 
writing an applicative letter of intention, and the like. 
 Skilled conversationalists usually know how to choose appropriate 
introductory hedges for certain context-dependent types of utterances. 
Similarly, special aptitudes should be possessed by those individuals who 
are expected to give a ceremonial speech, to make an occasional toast in a 
festive ritual in which a drink is offered as an expression of honor or good-
will, or to deliver a sermon during specific kinds of religious services, etc. 
 To sum up, the conceptual content of a general semiotic competence—
introduced to the domain of discourse studies—could be specified in terms 
of dispositional properties of individuals, which enables them to effective-
ly communicate with other individuals as “the significant others” in task- 
and role-oriented speech acts under the pressure of collective sanctions.  
 As it appears, such attributes of communication participants as effi-
ciency and acceptability are, as a matter of fact, connected with the model-
ing processes of personality traits in the development of their multi-
discursive and inter-discursive competence, governed by the rules of gen-
erationally transmitted traditions and socially construed norms. In search 
of the genus proximum of this human property of being competent, which 
implies possessing a capacity of personal skills and subjective knowledge, 
the original concept of idealized linguistic competence is to be confronted 
with an extended scope of intercultural communicative competence.49  
 Borrowed to the domain of language pedagogy, psychology and soci-
ology, and developed as a pre-constructed set of individual qualities, from 
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the neighboring disciplines of linguistics, such as, psycho- and sociolin-
guistics, linguistic pragmatics, discourse studies or semiotics of communi-
cation, the notion of communicative competence might be broadened, for 
example, through managerial, occupational, instructional, organizational, 
and/or expert competences. Moreover, the general term metacompetence 
appears also to be useful for encompassing the referential characteristics of 
particular types of competences along with their cognitive, affective, ethi-
cal, functional, personal or behavioral aspects.  
 
 
The Communicating Individual as a Cultural Polyglot 
 
To conclude, it could be assumed that a participant of social communica-
tion as such must be able to simultaneously and interchangeably function 
in various discursive environments. While paraphrasing the metaphor of 
polyglotism50 applied to culture, one could finally state that the communi-
cating individual as a “cultural polyglot” must be able to cope with texts 
coming from different cultures, i.e., he must know how to communicate in 
and understand a “multiplicity of cultural languages”. Hence, he must be 
described as possessing so-called intercultural competence. 
 Bearing in mind the principles of effective communication, one has to 
realize that the adequacy of general human competence is also connected 
with the developmental formation of an ego- and group-specific identity, 
considered in terms of collective solipsism, i.e., as the self-determination 
or self-awareness of individuals and groups in their belonging to occupa-
tional, organizational, ethnic, national, or international collectivities, and 
the like. To end with, one can say that explorations in the domain of com-
municative properties and subsumptive attitudes of people may provide 
evidence that both the competence and identity of individuals and groups 
can be judged and measured, pre-defined and designed, rejected and aban-










1  The term metadesignation has a long history. Going back to the antiquity it is 
related to the idea of metalanguage. As Christoph Hubig (in Encyclopedic Dic-
tionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 529–531, entry: meta-) and Jacek Jul-
iusz Jadacki (in in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics, ed. Sebeok 1986, 
445; entry: metalanguage) point out, it comes from Stanisław Leśniewski 
(1886–1939), a Polish logician and philosopher who has introduced for the 
first time in the history of modern semiotics the distinction between język—
metajęzyk ‘language’—‘metalanguage’. This distinction has been popularized 
(in oral presentations of 1931 and widely accessible publications of 1935 and 
then 1956) by Alfred Tarski (1902–1983) with reference to the area of the the-
ory of truth (cf. Tarski 1935 [1956]). A separate study to “The Problem of 
Metalanguage in Linguistic Historiography” has been devoted by Ernst Frider-
ik Konrad Koerner (born 1939). For the discussion and bibliography see: 
Koerner 1993. 
2  Entelechy, recorded in English (1595–1605), according to Random House 
(1992/1995/1997) Webster’s College Dictionary, is derived from Late Latin 
entelechia based on Greek entelécheia = en- ‘to cause’ + tél (os) ‘goal’ + éch 
(ein) ‘to have’ + -eia = y ‘suffix used in the formation of action verbs from 
nouns’. 
3  Worth mentioning is here the position of Jan Toland (1670–1722), an Irish 
philosopher, freethinker and theist, known under the title, Socinianism truly 
Stated, Being An Example of fair Dealing in all Theological Controversys. To 
which is prefix’d, Indifference in Disputes: Recommended by a Pantheist to an 
Orthodox Friend. Totaruit Babylon; disjecit Tecta Lutherus, Calvinus Muros, 
et Fundamenta Socinus. London, 1705. 
4  Sources of this original quotation are provided and discussed inter alia by 
Hans Aarsleff (2007, 197), an American historiographer, referring to the trans-
lated edition of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work (1836, 41 [1988, 48–49]) and 
collected publication of works (1903–1936, 45–46) with modern spelling. 
5  Some of the ideas presented in this chapter are borrowed from the Polish pa-
per: Zdzisław Wąsik, “O wyjaśnianiu pojęcia formy i substancji w dyskursie 
akademickim z lingwistyki (On the explanation of form and substance in the 
academic discourse of linguistics)”. Międzynarodowa konferencja: Dyskurs 
naukowy—tradycja i zmiana, organizowana przez Instytut Filologii Polskiej 
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Uniwersytetu Opolskiego oraz Komisję Stylistyczną Komitetu Językoznaw-
stwa Polskiej Akademii Nauk przy wsparciu Rady Języka Polskiego w Kamie-
niu Śląskim, 19.–20. października 1998 (International Conference: Scientific 
discourse—tradition and change, organized by the Institute of the Polish Phi-
lology, Opole University as well as The Stylistic Commission of Linguistics, 
Polish Academy of Sciences with the support of the Board for Polish Language 
at Kamień Śląski, November 19–20, 1998), and from its English version: 
Zdzisław Wąsik, “Form and Substance in the Academic Discourse on the Na-
ture of Language”. 32nd Poznań Linguistic Meeting: Recent Developments in 
Linguistic Theory, Poznań, April 30–May 2, 1999. 
6 The author’s sources of inspiration are here the works of a postmodern philos-
opher Michel Foucault (1966 [1970], and 1969 [1972]) and a semiotician Um-
berto Eco (1979 /1976/). 
7  The changeability of language, as a relational property of mankind, is present-
ed with popular exemplification in the book Words: An Illustrated History of 
Western Languages, edited by Victor Stevenson (1983). 
8  Worth quoting is the famous slogan title of Leo Weisgerber’s article (1955): 
„Das Worten der Welt als sprachliche Aufgabe der Menschheit“ (‘The wording 
of the world as a task of humanity’); cf. also Weisgerber 1953. 
9  Among the founders of a general theory of terminology to be mentioned is 
Eugen Wüster, an Austrian engineer and lexicographer, one of the pioneers in 
the standardization of scientific terminology. Worth noting are the titles of his 
two books: Einführung in die Allgemeine Terminologielehre und terminologi-
sche Lexikographie (Wüster 1979) and Internationale Sprachnormung in der 
Technik. Besonders in der Elektrotechnik (Die nationale Sprachnormung und 
ihre Verallgemeinerung) (Wüster 1931). 
10 Cf. the title of John Langshaw Austin’s book (1962/1975): How to Do Things 
with Words. 
11  Representative is here a cross-linguistic study of Ian Davies (2005) on “Colour 
terms”. 
12  The term meme has been coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins in his book The 
Selfish Gene aimed at extending the principles of the theory of evolution in or-
der to explain the spread of ideas and cultural phenomena (cf. Dawkins 
1976/1989, and 1982, as well as 2006). This topic has been elaborated also by 
Susan J. Blackmore (1998, 1999). 
13  Lexicostatistics is a statistical technique used in glottochronology for estimat-
ing how long ago different languages have evolved from a common source 
language. Glottochronology refers to historical-comparative methods being in-
terested in the time at which particular languages start to differentiate in lexical 
and grammatical form, departing from the assumption that the basic (core) vo-
cabulary of a language, the so-called Grundwortschatz in German, changes at a 
constant average rate. This assumption has been submitted by Morris Swadesh 
(1955, 1972), against the background of an earlier work of Robert Lees (1953).  
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14  The term substrate has been introduced to the domain of linguistic studies by 
Graziadio Isaia Ascoli in 1876, and elaborated more thoroughly in the first of 
his glottological letters edited in 1881; cf. Ascoli 1876 and 1881/1881–1882. 
The first letter and the two others of Ascoli (1881 and 1886), have been known 
to the international world of science a year later due to the translation of Bruno 
Güterbock, authorized by the author himself; cf. Ascoli 1887. 
15  The term superstrate has been introduced by Walther von Wartburg in 1932; 
see Wartburg 1932, cf. also Wartburg 1936/1978.  
16 The term adstrate comes from the works of Marius Valkhoff in 1932; see 
Valkhoff 1932. 
17  The notification about phenomenon of verbal interference is a heritage of Uriel 
Weinreich’s work of 1953, entitled as Languages in Contact; see Weinreich 
1953/1974. It was Robert Lado (1957) who popularized the notion of interfer-
ence in the context of applied linguistics.  
18  In the view H. Douglas Brown (1994, 90), linguistic transfer is a superordinate 
term for interference. 
19 It is Leonard Bloomfield (1933, 42) who has proposed the term speech com-
munity for the groups of people interacting with each other by means of 
speech. Exposing the notion density of communication (Bloomfield 1933, 46), 
he has delineated sub-groups of people within a speech community, the mem-
bers of which “speak much more to each other than to persons outside their 
sub-group” (Bloomfield 1933, 47) from “[o]ccupational groups, such as fish-
ermen, dairy workers, bakers, brewers, and so on, have, at any rate, their own 
technical language” Bloomfield (1933, 50).  
20 The term Verkehrsgemeinschaften used by Adolf Bach in Geschichte der 
deutschen Sprache (1938) undoubtedly originates from the term Verkehr en-
countered in the writings of Hugo Mario Schuchardt; cf. Sachregister in Leo 
Spitzer’s edition of, Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier (1921/1928). 
21  One should mention here also the Polish term wspólnoty komunikatywne 
‘communicative collectivities’ which Ludwik Zabrocki (1963) has introduced 
for describing the origin and the development of Germanic languages. In a 
more detailed article of 1970 he also uses the German term kommunikative 
Gemeinschaft ‘communicative community’ as opposed to Sprachgemeinschaft 
‘speech community’; cf. Zabrocki (1970/1980, 147). For Zabrocki it is the 
family which forms the smallest natural communicative community. However, 
as he adds subsequently, there are also some other kinds of communicative 
communities which are formed by the school class, factory staff, church com-
mune, scientists, medical doctors, inhabitants of a village, a town’s ideological 
block, inhabitants of a state and, in the end, the inhabitants of the whole world 
(Zabrocki 1970/1980, 147). For relevant quotations and discussions see 
Chruszczewski 2006, 52–53. 
22 The term discourse community, introduced into the scientific usage by Martin 
Nystrand (1982), has been thoroughly elaborated by John M. Swales (1990, 
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25–27) who proposes six characteristics identifying, in his view, a group of in-
dividuals as a discourse community, i.e., sharing public goals, mechanisms of 
intercommunication, information and feedback, one or more genres of speech, 
and a specific lexis. 
23  The tendency of humans to expend a least effort in a frequent communication 
has been noticed by George Kingsley Zipf (1929, 1949) with regard to the ap-
plicability of statistics in linguistic studies. Zipf has discovered that in all lan-
guages of the world: (1) the sounds which are easy in pronunciation are more 
frequent than the difficult ones, (2) the most frequent words are hence short 
words, (3) all words become shortened with time, and that (4) the frequency of 
newly appearing words increases in accordance with the increase of the degree 
of their abstractness. 
24  The term archeology of knowledge, proposed by Michel Foucault (1969 
[1972]), refers to a preceptor oriented study of human discourse. 
25  As an author who sees secondary texts as palimpsests, one has to mention 
Gérard Genette (1982 [1997]).  
26  According to Webster’s College Dictionary (Random House 1992/1995/1997) 
the term palimpsest, documented in English between 1655 and 1665 through 
the mediation of the Latin noun form palimpsestus, originates from the Greek 
palímpsestos, denoting ‘rubbed again’, as a compound word-form of pálin 
‘again’ + psestós ‘scraped’, ‘rubbed’, as an adjectival form from the verb psân 
‘to rub smooth’. Cf. also The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Foreign Terms in 
English (Speake & LaFlaur 1999). 
27  To be mentioned is here the metaphor of “the city as the text”, to which the 
term palimpsest has been referred by Vessela Lozanova and Roland Posner 
(1999). Worth quoting, in this context, is their statement: „In the 20th century 
entire cities were deliberately wiped out. Wars were waged to decide who 
should re-write the areas erased. But everyone could have known from the 
start. Wiped out cities cannot be rebuild by wiping out further cities. Texts that 
have grown over the centuries cannot be re-written in decades. Even the most 
magnificent reconstruction programs are worth less than the lives of those who 
were sacrificed for them” (Lozanova & Posner 1999, 2). An extensive work 
pertaining also to palimpsests as texts in the philosophy of the postmodern city 
represents the monograph of Ewa Rewers (2005).  
28  Grammaire générale et raisonnée, contenant Les fondements de l'art de parler, 
expliqués d'une manière claire et naturelle; Les raisons de ce qui est commun 
à toutes les langues, & des principales différences qui s’y rencontrent; Et plu-
sieurs remarques nouvelles sur la Langue Française. À Paris, Chez Pierre Le 
Petit, Imprimeur & Libraire ordinaire du Roy, rué S. Jacques, à la Croix d’Or. 
M. D C. LX. Au Privilège de sa Majesté. Details are discussed inter alia by 
David Crystal (1987, 84). Troisième Édition revue & augmentée de nouveau. 
Paris : Pierre Le Petit, 1676. Ed. critique présentée par Herbert E. Brekle. 
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Nouvelle impression en facsimilé, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-
Holzboog (Grammatica Universalis, 1), 1966. 
29  A valuable contribution to the discussed topic constitutes here the article of 
Stephen F. Brown (1997), “Sign Conceptions of Logic in the Latin Middle” . 
30  Contemporary views of what cognitive semiotics is are best summarized in an 
exhaustive paper of Jordan Zlatev (2011). 
31  Worth mentioning are here “Theses on the Semiotic Study of Culture” formu-
lated at Tartu University by Boris Andreevič Uspenskij et al. (1973 [1973]), 
and the works of Yuri Mikhailovich (Jurij Mihailovič) Lotman (1874, 1984 
[1989/2005], 1981 [1988], 1981 [1988/1994]) on sign-mechanism of culture, 
which apply the concept of text to the description of culture or the concept of 
the so-called semiospheres of culture having been summarized by Peeter Torop 
(1999). 
32  The origins of the distinction between human labor and exchange value can be 
traced back to Karl Marx's 1857 Grundrisse manuscript, where in “The Chap-
ter on Money (Part II)” he has already distinguished between particular labor 
and general labor, contrasting communal production with production for ex-
change (see Marx 1857/1953 [1973]). 
33  The term praxeology has been first used in 1890 by Alfred Victor Espinas 
(1844–1922), in his article « Les origines de la technologie », and, later on, in 
his book published in Paris in 1897, under a similar title Les origines de la 
technologie : étude sociologique. This information is available in the footnotes 
provided by Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises in Nationalökonomie: Theorie 
des Handelns und Wirtschaftens of 1940, p. 3 as well as in Human Action: A 
Treatise on Economics of 1949, on page 3. For Mises, praxeology, as a general 
theory of human action, deals with a purposeful action of an individual human 
being. It is concerned with an acting man who strives towards the attainment of 
desired ends with the implementation of selected means. Against the back-
ground of Mises, another understanding of praxeology (or praxiology) pro-
vides Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his book of 1955 written in Polish under the title 
Traktat o dobrej robocie (A treatise on a good work), which has been edited in 
an English translation as Praxiology: An Introduction to the Sciences of Effi-
cient Action in 1965. 
34  The term axiology (from the Greek axiā + logia) comes from the end of the 
nineteenth century, introduced by Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842–
1906) in his article of 1890 (L'axiologie et ses divisions), Subsequently, it has 
been popularized in two publications, in French by Paul Lapie in the book of 
1902 entitled as Logique de la volonté and in German by Hartmann in the 
book, Grundriß der Axiologie oder Wertwägungslehre. System der Philosophie 
im Grundriß. 
35  Praxeosemiotics, as a new term, has been used for the first time in the title of 
the Polish book of Tadeusz Wójcik (1969), devoted to the theory of the opti-
mal sign. Its roots are to be found in Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s (1955 [1965]) con-
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ception of praxeology (praxiology in his terminology) as a theory of an effi-
cient action. Nevertheless, the notional content of the term praxeosemiotics, 
utilized by the author of this book (Wąsik, Z. 1997, 348; 1998, 58 and, subse-
quently, 2003, 119), as a parallel term to axiosemiotics, has been merely re-
ferred to a theory of a purpose-oriented action. 
36  The notion of axiosemiotics, introduced by Stanisław Pietraszko (1980) in his 
article “O sferze aksjosemiotycznej (On the axiosemiotic sphere)“., has been de-
veloped by the author (Wąsik, Z. 1992, 1997) in his subsequent publications: 
“On the Axiosemiotics of Postcards” and “Verbal Means as Signs of Human 
Needs” (for details, see Wąsik, Z. 2003, 113–114. and, especially, 119–120). 
37  One has to expose that “constructs”, in Kelly’s framework (1955, 15–20. 46–
77, 95–98; cf. also 1970). are not seen as abstracted from existing realities; ra-
ther, they are imposed upon real events. According to Kelly, all constructs are 
bipolar and dichotomous, and when a construct is used to construe an event, 
only one pole is being activated. Examples of dichotomous constructs include: 
good vs. bad, just vs. unjust, stable vs. unstable, constant vs. changeable, hon-
est vs. dishonest, liberal vs. conservative, healthy vs. sick, flexible vs. dogmat-
ic, warm vs. aloof, heavy vs. light, religious vs. not religious, normal vs. ab-
normal, etc. There are always some alternative constructions available to 
choose among in dealing with the world—even, as measurements will vary de-
pending on which inertial frame it is taken from. Constructive alternativism 
means that a person is capable of applying alternative constructs to any events 
in the past, present or future. This is analogous to different measurements that 
the persons in different frames of reference usually make. 
38 A representative introduction to current trends in discourse studies is provided 
by Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau and Ruth Wodak in their 
editorial collection The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory 
and Analysis (2014). Theories and methods pertaining to discourse analysis 
unifying linguistic, pragmatic and philosophical approaches have been summa-
rized by Patrick Charaudeau and Dominique Maingueneau (2002) in Diction-
naire d'analyse du discours. 
39  Against the etymological roots, from antiquity to modern times, of the term 
discourse, contemporary researchers have adjusted its understanding to the 
contemporary usage of philosophers and philologists, as well as communica-
tionally oriented sociologists and politicians. Discourse, namely, coming from 
the Latin (Middle Latin) discursus, with the meaning in the Late Latin period 
‘conversation’, derives its etymology from the Latin discur (rere), i.e., ‘to run 
about or ‘running to and fro’(where dis- as a prefix from Latin with the sense 
‘apart, asunder’ is combined with the Latin verb currere ‘to run’ and the Latin 
suffix of verbal action –sus, a variant for –tus), has always been applied for 
connoting rather a highly formalized discussion of a subject in speech or writ-
ing, as a treatise, debate, dispute, or official address (cf. Random House 
1992/1995/1997; Speake & LaFlaur 1999). The notions of discourse, in the 
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context of philological and sociological studies and discursivism as an investi-
gative perspective, have been discussed more extensively by the author 
(Wąsik, Z. 2010) in his article “On the Discursive Nature of Human Interac-
tions in Linguistic and Cultural Ecosystems”. 
40 Cf. the program of the workshop “Unfolding the Semiotic Web in Urban Dis-
course” which have been formulated by Richard L. Lanigan, Roland Posner, 
Daina Teters and Zdzisław Wąsik (2009). 
41  The following subparts constitute a slightly modified version of some text-
passages, adapted from the earlier publication of the author under the title “On 
the Discursive Nature of Human Interactions in Linguistic and Cultural Eco-
systems” (Wąsik, Z. 2010, 36–45, and 47–49), which have been additionally 
adapted for the purpose of the article “Towards an Idea of Urbanity as a Dis-
cursive Way of Human Life in the City—Developing a Conceptual Frame-
work” (Wąsik, Z. 2011). 
42  The term collectivity has been introduced here with an intention to cover only 
social ties between communicating individuals. As such, it replaces a much 
broader term linkage adopted from Victor H. Yngve (1996,) and elaborated by 
Z. Wąsik (2000) as well as E. Wąsik (2007, and 2010) as a result of subsequent 
workshops conducted during the Societas Linguistica Europaea Annual Meet-
ings between 2000 and 2004. Participants in these workshops have published 
their contributions in a collective book Hard Science Linguistics edited by V. 
H. Yngve and Z. Wąsik in 2004. The theoretical constituents of the so-called 
linkage includes apart from persons functioning as participants in group inter-
actions also channels, props and settings. As a matter of fact, within the 
framework of Yngve’s human linguistics: channels are understood as represen-
tations of energy and means of energy flow that are linguistically important for 
communicating activities of more than two persons, props are considered as 
material representations of real objects related to the tools of reference-making 
and interpreting activities of communicating individuals, and settings are rep-
resentations of elements of the physical surrounding of a group embedded in 
an assemblage of observable objects that are indispensable for the understand-
ing of communicational contexts. 
43 The enumeration of “of the so-called language functions, which reflect in fact 
the satisfaction of individual needs or the social requirements of people 
through the realization of communicational tasks”, is provided by E. Wąsik 
(2010, 52–53) in Chapter Two, “An Inquiry Into the Functional View of Lan-
guage as a Tool of Communication or a Property of Task-Realizing Communi-
ties”, of her book Coping with an Idea of Ecological Grammar. 
44  In this context, worth mentioning are the three positions of Robert Freed Bales 
(1950, 1950/1951, 1969) on the interaction process analysis, namely, “A Set of 
Categories for the Analysis of Small Group Interaction”, Interaction Process 
Analysis. A Method for the Study of Small Groups. and Personality and Inter-
personal Behavior. 
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45  As an inspiration source for a functional approach to speech acts, the author 
has exploited, in the first instance, the works initiating the investigative domain 
of pragmatics, as How to Do Things with Words by John Langshaw Austin 
(1962/1975), and developing the goal-oriented classification of performative 
utterances, as, for example, Principles of Pragmatics by Geoffrey Neil Leech 
(1983/1990). 
46  The understanding of the term ecology with reference to language and society, 
elaborated earlier and summarized by Z. Wąsik (2003) in Epistemological Per-
spectives on Linguistic Semiotics and E. Wąsik (2010) in Coping with an Idea 
of Ecological Grammar, refers to the works of Einar Haugen (1972), “Lan-
guage Ecology”, and Amos H. Hawley (1950), Human Ecology: A Theory of 
Community Structure. Noteworthy is also here the article of Tim Ingold 
(1996/1999), “Social Relations, Human Ecology, and the Evolution of Culture: 
An Exploration of Concepts and Definitions”. 
47  Some of the ideas regarding the understanding of autonomy, which might 
characterize communicative collectivities, have been initiated in the abstract of 
Z. Wąsik (2000), “On the Heteronomous Nature of Language and its Autono-
mization from the Properties of Communicating Individuals and Linkages”. 
They have found, in turn, their extensions and creative elaborations, including 
also respective bibliographical references, in the book of E. Wąsik, Coping 
with an Idea of Ecological Grammar (2010, 85–86). 
48  A historical survey of the development and understanding of the term compe-
tence is provided by E. Wąsik (2007, 167–175) in her book Język—narzędzie, 
czy właściwość człowieka? (Language—a tool or a property of man?).  
49  Worth reading is the summarizing article of Franz Emanuel Weinert (2001), 
“Concept of Competence: A Conceptual Classification”. 
50 The term polyglot (from the Greek polyglottos denoting ‘many-tongued’, 
where poly- is a combining form—a stem of polys with the sense of ‘much’ or 
‘many’ and glottos with the sense of ‘tongued’—an adnominal adjective of 
glôtta ‘tongue’) is referred to a person who speaks, writes, or reads several 
languages (cf. Random House 1992/1995/1997; Speake & LaFlaur 1999). Un-
der polyglotism, one can understand the competence of an individual who is 
able to speak or write several languages; or the situation in which the same text 
is contained in several languages, similarly as in the polyglossia where multi-
ple languages coexist as means of communication and signification in the same 
area. While matching the idea of cultural polyglotism, which is derived from 
the notion of cultural text, along with the notions of semiosphere introduced to 
the semiotics of culture by Yuri M. Lotman (1984 [1989/2005]) against the 
background of the notions of biosphere and noosphere pertaining to the life 
and activity of human individuals as organisms and members of communica-
tive collectivities, one could ponder the usefulness of term polydiscursivism for 
characterizing the linguistic and semiotic discursivism of social life within the 
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283; ~ sense(s) 161; ~, cultural 
and linguistic practices 218; ~, 
social, and cultural character 
106; linguistic and ~ perfor-
mance(s) 138, 151, 279 
communicativism 107 
community (communities), ~ and 
individual(s) 61; ~ and nation(s) 
103; ~ of (a) higher order(s) 
276; ~ of knowers or believers 
141; ~ of scholars 3, 38, 45, 53; 
~ structure 291; regional ~ 7, 
104; aggregated discursive ~ 
276; autonomous ~ 276; com-
municative ~ 6, 8, 85, 108, 122, 
128, 130, 143, 154, 161, 276, 
279, 281, 286; cultural ~ 277; 
different ~ 41; discourse ~ 144–
145, 286–287; discursive ~ 1, 
17, 143–145, 272–277, 279–
281; discursive collectivity (col-
lectivities) and discursive ~ 17, 
275; ecologically determined ~ 
6, 104, 275–276; heterogeneous 
~ 276; homogeneous ~ 276; in-
dividual(s) and ~ 277; interact-
ing ~ 271; intercourse ~ 136, 
143–144; international ~ 83, 90; 
interpersonal and intersubjective 
~ 9–10, 141; larger ~ 274; lin-
guistic ~ 17, 214, 231, 239–240, 
243, 275, 281; linguistic and 
cultural ~ 109, 277; linguistic 
collectivity (collectivities) and 
linguistic ~ 17, 136, 275; lower-
order ~ 275; means- and pur-
pose-oriented; national ~ 131; 
organized ~ 275; particular ~ 3; 
requirements of ~ 129; scientific 
~ 3, 37, 39, 42, 50–51, 53–54; 
speech ~ 6, 9, 15, 83, 100–102, 
104–106, 132–133, 135, 144, 
214, 286; stronger ~276; task-
realizing ~290 
competence(s), (inter)discursive ~ 
17, 280; ~ and identity (identi-
ties) 283; ~ and immersion(s) in 
the generally available 
knowledge and cultural herit-
age(s) 144; ~ and perfor-
mance(s) 104; ~ as a linguistic 
ability 6; ~ as knowledge of a 
language 96; acquisitional ~ 
107; communicative ~ 17–18, 
97, 105–109, 151, 279, 281–
283; cultural ~ 10, 98; discur-
sive ~ 107; existential ~ 108–
109; expert ~ 283; general ~ 18, 
106, 108; grammatical ~ 107; 
human ~ 1, 16–17, 261, 283; in-
tercultural ~ 283; intercultural 
communicative ~106; linguistic 
~ 18, 97, 104–108, 281, 283; 
linguistic and communicative ~ 
107; linguistic and semiotic ~ 
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281; linguistic, communicative, 
social, and cultural ~ 98; mana-
gerial, occupational, instruction-
al, organizational, and/or expert 
~ 283; meta~ 18, 283; respec-
tive ~ 282; semiotic ~ 281–282; 
social ~ 105; sociolinguistic ~ 
109; strategic ~ 107; the term ~ 
104, 281; type(s) of ~ 283 
conceptualist, ~ psychology 189–
191, 245 
concrete, ~ 5, 161; ~ activity (activi-
ties) of speaking and hearing 96; 
~ and mental 11, 84, 278; ~ and 
mental nature of language 11, 
167; ~ element(s) 115; ~ entity 
(entities) 11, 115, 166; ~ exist-
ence mode(s), 260; ~ fact(s) 
165; ~ form(s) of being; ~ hith-
erto existing language(s) 94; ~ 
manifestation form(s) 87, 200; ~ 
manifestation(s) of the sign(s) 
and its (their) referent 12; ~ na-
ture of language(s); ~ object(s) 
5, 71, 236–237, 243; ~ observa-
tional shape(s) 101; ~ or (an) 
ideal entity (entities) 11; ~ or 
abstract 11, 33, 165, 185, 211; ~ 
part(s) 175; ~ person(s) 236; ~ 
problem-solution(s) 39; ~ prod-
uct(s) 116; ~ proposal(s) 40; ~ 
reality (realities), 166; ~ realiza-
tion(s) 18, 100; ~ referent(s) 
166, 204, 206, 210; ~ sign(s) 13, 
166, 194, 204, 206–207, 210; ~ 
sign-transmitting and sign-
receiving activity (activities) 
278; ~ speaking and hearing ac-
tivity (activities) 84; ~ speech 
product(s) 248; ~ texts 101, 246; 
~ type(s) of (verbal means / the 
sign) 83, 194 
concretism 58–59, 211 
concretist, ~ 213; ~ or mentalist 
connectionism 213 
constructivism, ~ 58, 231, 237; ~ 
cognitivist 242; ~ epistemologi-
cal 238; ~ personal; ~ social 
240–241, 243; ~ sociological 
240; ~ solipsistic 237; the 
framework(s) of ~ 237; radical ~ 
15, 231, 243, 245 
cultural, (inter)~ communication 
277; ~ 235, 276; ~ and commu-
nicational science(s) 272; ~ and 
educational domain(s) 17; ~ and 
linguistic practice(s) 218; ~ and 
social trace(s) 142; ~ anthropol-
ogy 65, 160; ~ aspect(s) 221; ~ 
character 106; ~ community 
(communities) 109, 277; ~ 
competence(s) 98, 105, 281; ~ 
context(s) 21, 32; ~ custom(s) 
142; ~ device of money 221; ~ 
discourse(s) 278; ~ distinctive-
ness 160; ~ domain(s) of life 
277; ~ ecosystem(s) 276, 289–
290; ~ endowments 83; ~ envi-
ronment(s) 106; ~ environ-
ment(s) 15, 218; ~ event(s) 281; 
~ faculty (faculties) 280; ~ 
good(s) 14, 222; ~ heritage(s) 
138, 144; inter~ competence 
283; inter~ communicative 
competence 282; ~ knowledge 
105–106, 281; ~ language(s) 
283; ~ language(s); ~ level(s); ~ 
levels 276; ~ life 108; ~ mean-
ing-creation(s) 220; natural or ~ 
object(s) 14, 22, 140, 220–223, 
231–232, 235–236; ~ or inter~ 
communication 277; ~ or natu-
ral 223, ~ or natural objects 233; 
~ phenomenon (phenomena) 
285; ~ polyglot(s) 291; ~ poly-
glotism 291; ~ practice(s) 107;; 
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~ psychology 251; ~ reality (re-
alities); ~ reference(s) 108; ~ 
sciences 93, 218, 228, 230; ~ 
semiosphere(s) 235; ~ semiotics 
15, 27, 222; ~ sign process(es) 
27; ~ sign(s) 27; ~ significa-
tion(s) 221; ~ sphere(s) 145; ~ 
study (studies) VIII, 1, 261; ~ 
subject(s) 14, 223, 234, 237; ~ 
text(s) 219, 223, 291; ~ tradi-
tion(s) 9, 132, 144; ~ trait(s) 
155; ~ transfer(s) 142–143; ~ 
transmission(s) 109, 124, 152, 
159–160; ~ value(s) 17, 109, 
272; ~, and (an) other ecological 
conditioning(s) 274; ~, political, 
and/or matrimonial 143; anthro-
pological-~ 216; communicative 
and ~ code(s) 25; cross-~ study 
(studies) 218, 223; ethnic-~ 
manifestations 81; inter~ com-
municative competence 282–
283; phenomenon (phenomena) 
285; social, ~, natural and per-
sonal conditioning(s) of com-
munication 33 
culture(s), ~ 14, 133, 219, 221, 223, 
232; ~ and nature 14, 216, 230, 
232; ~ as an integrated system 
of human activity… 218; ~ of 
communicative community 
(communities) 109; ~ as a class 
of rules generating the sphere of 
so-called cultural texts with 
their significative and commu-
nicative functions 223; ~as a 
whole 219; ~as final effect of 
learning 218; ~-centered con-
ception 13, 15; ~-centered con-
ception of subjective signifi-
cance 13, 230; ~-creative nature 
179; ~ of the first and second 
language(s) 109; ~-proper 219; 
~-scientific faculty XII; acade-
my (academies) of ~ XIII; 
across ~ 10, 159; alien ~ 106; 
anthropologist(s) of ~ 186; ap-
plied to ~ 283; approach(es) to ~ 
216, 223; book on ~ 218; collec-
tive character of ~ 244; concep-
tion of ~ 233; communication 
and ~ VIII; context(s) of ~ 273; 
definition(s) of ~ 218; depiction 
of ~ 223; determined ~ 269, 
277; different ~ 109, 144, 283; 
distinctive ~ 132; domain of ~ 
17; embedded in the ~ 17, 269, 
275; epistemology (epistemolo-
gies) of ~ 230; evolution of ~ 
291; foreign ~ 106–107; func-
tion- and purpose-oriented 
view(s) of ~ 14; good(s) of ~ 14, 
230, 232; human ~ 219, 223, 
235, 245, 274; human-centered 
theory (theories) of ~ 14; lan-
guage- and ~-related communi-
cation 281; language(s) and ~ 1, 
16–17, 97, 185, 232, 235, 244, 
261, 278; local ~ 277; manifes-
tation(s) of ~ 219; nature and ~ 
2, 216, 233, 236; nature or ~ 
219, 233, 236; no ~ 219; ob-
ject(s) of ~ 14, 231, 234–235; 
participation in ~ 124, 159; par-
ticular ~ 221, 277; past and 
~132; proper ~ 219; real world 
and ~ 108; realm of ~ 216; rep-
resentation(s) of ~ 221, 228; 
science(s) of ~; sign and ~ 235; 
semiotician(s) of ~ 219; semiot-
ic approach(es) to ~ 223; semi-
otics of ~ XII–XIII, 14, 218, 
220, 224, 229, 232, 291; social 
role(s) and ~ 148; society (soci-
eties) and ~ 109, 144, 271; 
sphere(s) of ~ 14, 232, 234; 
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study (studies) of ~ X, 288; sub-
ject(s) of ~ 223, 234–235; sys-
tem(s) of ~ 14, 223, 231, 235; 
the same ~ 239, 243; theoreti-
cian(s) of ~; theory (theories) of 
~ XI, 14, 227, 231, 233; value- 
and need-oriented view(s) of 
~14, 230, 232; view(s) of ~14, 
217–219, 230, 232, 275 
culturology, institute(s) of ~ VII 
E 
ecosemiotic, ~ system(s) of (a) 
communicating self (selves) 1 
ecosemiotics, biosemiotics and ~ 
224 
epistemological, ~ and vocational 
awareness 109; ~ analysis 
(analyses) 4, 56, 184; ~ ap-
proach(es) 4, 57; ~ assess-
ment(s) 4; ~ attitude(s) 106; ~ 
awareness 5, 32, 79, 183; ~ 
commitment(s) 35, 64, 82, 185; 
~ connotation(s) 12, 183, 196; ~ 
constructivism; ~ controversy 
(controversies); ~ distinction(s) 
190; ~ equivalence(s) 12, 183–
184; ~ formation(s) 136; ~ 
foundation(s) 34, 59, 75; ~, i.e. 
ontological and gnoseological 
(awareness/commitment) 35, 
183; ~ frame(s) of reference(s) 
3, 54; ~ equivalence(s) 183; ~ 
modeling 1; ~ or gnoseological 
sense(s) 69; ~ orientation(s) 56; 
~ overview(s) of signs and their 
referents; ~ paradigm(s) 1; ~ 
perspective(s) XII, 2, 15; ~ posi-
tion(s) 4, 22, 34, 56–57, 60, 62–
63, 67, 165, 188, 191, 196; ~ 
status(es) of linguistics 31; ~ 




epistemology (epistemologies), ~ 
56, 184; ~ as (a) branch(es) of 
philosophy 4; ~ as (a) set(s) of 
investigative perspective(s) X; ~ 
as (a) theory (theories) of 
knowledge 1, 35; ~ of culture(s) 
228; ~ of linguistic semiotics 
53; ~ of linguistics XI, 55, 158; 
~ of science(s) 58; ~ of semiot-
ics XII, 4, 35–36, 58–59; aim(s) 
of ~ 4, 56; conception of ~ X; 
domain(s) of ~ 56; frame-
work(s) of ~ 1, 237; in the light 
of ~ 33; metascientific status(es) 
of ~ 56; notion(s) of ~ 4; task(s) 
of ~ 56; the term ~ 56; view(s) 
on ~ IX 
existence mode(s), ~of language 
79–80, 84–86, 95; ~ of dis-
course 278, 280 
I 
imaginationist psychology 189–191, 
243 
intercultural, ~ borrowings 147; ~ 
communicative competence 
106, 280; ~ communication 275; 
~ competence(s) 281; ~ differ-
ence(s) 109; ~ relationships 109 
K 
Kuhnian, ~ conception(s) 36; con-
cept(s) 51; ~ distinction(s) 42; 
non-~ dimension(s) 53; ~one 
49; ~ paradigm(s) 51; non-~ 
point(s) of view(s) 49; ~ 
sense(s) 37, 43, 49, 51; ~ tenet 
42; ~ terms 42; ~ theory (theo-
ries) 37, 41, 52; ~ understanding 
48; ~ vantage point(s) 51 
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L 
language(s), ~ 6, 8, 15, 46, 60–61, 
84–86, 89, 91, 93, 98–100, 102–
105, 110, 113–115, 124–129, 
132, 138, 143, 153–156, 158, 
160–162, 164, 169, 190, 202, 
231, 240, 246–250, 254, 266, 
268–270, 284; ~ ability (abili-
ties) 89, 107; ~ acquisition(s) 
10, 159; ~ action(s) 268; ~ 
among design features of human 
communication systems 151; ~ 
among other semiotic facts 29; 
~ among the other semiotic sys-
tems 162; ~ among the other 
systems of meaning bearers 17; 
~ and behavior 214; ~ and cul-
ture(s) 16, 97, 185, 232, 235, 
244, 261, 272–273, 277–280; ~- 
and culture-centered concep-
tion(s) 1; ~ and its (their) indi-
vidual speaker(s)/listener(s) 
125; ~ and other means with 
which humans memorize, think, 
learn and make meaning 249; 
semiotics of ~ 27; ~ and society 
(societies) 269, 291; ~ and 
speech 98–99; ~ and text(s) 98; 
~ and the game(s) of chess 114; 
~ among some animals 154; ~ 
as (a) semiotic system(s) 77; ~ 
as (a) trace(s) 142; ~ at the (in-
ter)national level; ~ attrition(s) 
10, 144, 159; ~ change(s) 81, 
135; ~ commission(s); ~ com-
munication; ~ in contact 286; ~ 
contact situation(s) 137, 142; ~ 
doer(s) 124, 135, 160; ~ ecology 
(ecologies) 291; ~ element(s) 
163; ~ exploration(s); ~ faculty 
(faculties) 61, 82; ~ family 
(families) 135; ~ form(s) 127; ~ 
function(s) 120, 164, 268, 290; 
~ in a triadic sequence; ~ in con-
tact(s) 88; ~ in particular 90, 95; 
~ in relation to thought(s); ~ in 
use 10, 90, 264, 270; ~ itself 
112, 263; ~-in-use and utter-
ance-centered turn 265; ~-in-
use-oriented discursive studies; 
~ knower(s) 124; ~ knowledge 
107; ~ loyalty 88; ~ majority 
(majorities) and minority (mi-
norities) 129; ~ teaching 106–
107; ~ of (an) ecologically de-
termined community (communi-
ties) 104; ~ of (an) ethnic mi-
nority (minorities) 132; ~ of 
(an) invader(s) 142; ~ of Europe 
43; ~ of indigenous population 
142; ~ of mankind 145; ~ of of-
ficial communication 132–133; 
~of painting, music, sculpture, 
… 29; ~ of the state 132; ~ of 
the world 43, 80, 82, 88, 90, 95, 
125, 129–130, 131, 135, 137, 
151, 156, 287; ~ or speech 97; ~ 
pedagogy 17, 108, 261, 283; ~ 
phenomenon (phenomena) 8, 
82, 101, 123, 137; ~ planning 
90; ~ policy 90, ~ politics 91; ~ 
potential; ~ program(s); ~ prop-
erty (properties) 95–96; ~ sci-
ence(s) XI, 5, 10, 31, 36–37, 41, 
45, 51–52, 81, 91, 93, 105–106, 
110, 158, 208; ~ sign(s) 12, 27, 
46; ~ sign-process(es) 27; ~ 
skill(s) 107; ~ source(s); ~ 
speaker(s) 9–10; ~ speaker(s) 
and listener(s) 100, 105, 108, 
144; ~ standardization(s) 91; ~ 
structures 90; ~ study (studies) 
28, 43, 48, 82, 93; ~ system(s) 
81, 92, 99, 106, 123, 128, 136; ~ 
target(s); ~ teaching 91, 106, 
108; ~ test(s) 107; ~ text(s) 32, 
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184; ~ understanding(s) 94; ~ 
unit(s) 262; ~ universal(s) 154, 
156; ~ use(s) 16, 82, 105, 108, 
134, 137, 266, 268, 271–272; ~ 
user(s) 108, 124, 126, 135, 160; 
~ utterance(s); ~ variability 126, 
137; ~ variation(s) 106, 268; ~ 
variety (varieties) 108, 135–136; 
~ with universal lexis 129; ~ 
within the species; ~ wording(s) 
185; ~, action and knowledge 
268; ~, thought(s) and reality 
(realities) 171; ~- and culture-
related communication 281; ~-
and-context-specific 148; ~-
centered communicational sci-
ence(s) 17; ~-centered commu-
nicational science(s) 275; ~-
centered sign and meaning study 
(studies) 229; ~-distinguishing 
peculiarity (peculiarities) 128; 
~-oriented work(s) 254; ~-
related concept(s) of (an) indi-
vidual monolingual self (selves) 
15; ~-pragmatic level 268; ~-
related sciences 160; ~-specific 
88, 114; ~-systemic level 268; 
actual ~ 125; adjacent ~ 143; all 
~ 80, 116; another (other) ~ 118, 
144; anthropology of ~ 91–92, 
160; any ~ 83, 156, 177; ap-
proach(es) to ~ 3, 42, 46, 50–49, 
53, 61, 64, 80, 121, 178, 248, 
270; approachability of ~; artifi-
cial ~ 28; aspect(s) of ~6, 63, 
67, 96, 123, 247; assumption(s) 
about ~ 60; attitude(s) toward ~ 
88, 177; body ~ 109; borrowing 
~ 131; center(s) for ~ IX; 
changeability and variability of 
~ 9, 122; changeability of ~ 142, 
285; character of ~ 46; cognitive 
approach(es) to ~ 55, 248; 
common ~ 134; conception(s) of 
~ 11, 97, 124–125; conceptual 
level(s) of ~ 5; concrete and 
mental, static and dynamic, sub-
stantial and relational manifesta-
tion(s) of ~ 84; construction(s) 
of ~ 136; content in ~ 117; cul-
tural ~ 283; defining character-
istics of ~ 10, 124, 152, 154–
157; defining property (proper-
ties) of ~ 158; defining set(s) for 
~ 153; definition(s) of ~ 181; 
definitional and abstract proper-
ty (properties) of ~ 90; defini-
tional model(s) of ~ 29, 91; de-
sign-feature(s) of ~ 5, 154, 156; 
described ~ 131; description of 
~ 123; determined ~ 6, 8–10, 61, 
86, 88, 128, 133, 135, 144, 156, 
161, 265, 270, 277; different ~ 
116–118, 123–124, 143–144, 
161, 275, 285; differentiation of 
~ 8, 132; differentia specifica of 
~ 164; discourse—text—~ 291; 
discursive approach to ~ 270; 
distant ~ 8; diverse ~ 7; diversi-
ty (diversities) of ~ 81; do-
main(s) of ~ 65, 277; duality of 
~ 168; each ~ 117; ecologically 
determined ~ 29, 90, 118; eco-
logical history (histories) of ~ 
90; ecological property (proper-
ties) of ~ 90; ecological-
relational property (properties) 
of ~ 88; ecological typology 
(typologies) of ~ 90; ecology of 
~ 132; educational discourse on 
~ 110; element(s) of ~ 7, 101; 
English ~ XIII; entity (entities) 
of ~ 47; environment(s) of ~ 82; 
every ~ 119, 124; essence(s) of 
~ 61; ethnic ~ 28; every ~ 153, 
161; evolution of ~ 136; exist-
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ence mode(s) of ~ 5, 79–80, 84–
86, 95–96, 279; existence 
mode(s) of ~ and culture 279; 
existence of ~ 154; existing ~ 
125; expression(s) in ~ 128; ex-
ternal fact(s) of ~; extension(s) 
of ~ 157; extralinguistic fact(s) 
of ~ 87–88; extrasystemic prop-
erty (properties) of ~ 80, 154, 
159, 158–160; every ~ 124, 161; 
faculty (faculties) of ~ 86; fa-
miliar ~ 118; feature(s) of ~ 9, 
79, 103, 142, 164; foreign ~ 91, 
106, 109, 277;; foreign-~ learn-
er(s) 143; formalized ~ 25; 
form(s) of ~ 114, 117; func-
tion(s) of ~ VIII, 9, 50, 61, 116–
117, 141, 179; functional envi-
ronment(s) of ~ 82; functional 
nature of ~ 83; future ~ 95, 125; 
general study (studies) in ~ 82; 
geography of ~ 93; genetically 
related ~ 131; Germanic ~ 286; 
group(s) of ~ 128; heteronomy 
(heteronomies) of ~ 5, 30, 80, 
89, 95; historical ~ 125; history 
(histories) of ~ 90; human ~ 87, 
153–154, 156; individual ~ 129; 
inferable ~ 250; indigenous ~ 
133; Indo-European ~ VIII, 46; 
interpretations in ~ 185; intel-
lectual property (properties) of ~ 
160; instrumental model(s) of ~ 
179–180; instrumentalist 
view(s) of ~ 178; intralinguistic 
facts(s) of ~ 88; intrasystemic 
property (properties) of ~ 154, 
158–160, 162; interest in ~ 50; 
investigated ~ 82; key property 
(properties) of ~ 152–153, 156; 
knowledge of ~ 91, 96, 108; 
learnability of ~ 157; level(s) of 
~ 8, 123; lexical-inherent prop-
erties of ~ 159; lexical-relational 
properties of ~ 159; linguistic 
theory (theories) of ~ VII, 83, 
180–181; major (and small) ~ 
129–130; manifestation form(s) 
of ~ 102, 247; manifestation(s) 
of ~ 81, 84, 100, 272; master-
ing(s) of ~ 90; mediated through 
~ 15; meta~ 268, 284; 
metadesignational nature of ~ 
28; minority (minorities) ~ 132; 
mixed ~ 131, 136, 161; mod-
el(s) of ~ 82, 91–92; modelling 
of ~ 247; modular view(s) of ~ 
275; monolingualist concep-
tion(s) of ~ 124; multiaspectual-
ity of ~ 88; multidimensionality 
of ~ 248; multiple ~ 130, 291; 
national ~ 81, 132–133; native ~ 
108, 132, 143, 146, 177; nature 
of ~ 2, 8, 11, 22, 28, 31, 47, 55, 
81–82, 122–124, 127, 167, 176, 
285, 291; natural ~ 25, 28, 48–
49, 80, 83, 87, 92, 101, 125–
126, 268; neighboring ~ 131; 
neighboring science(s) of ~ 88; 
non-defining characteristics of ~ 
156–157; non-~-like object(s) 
29–30; non-~-like semiotic sys-
tem(s) 28; non-~-specific 88; 
non-linguistic science(s) of ~ 
30, 88, 91, 99, 164; non-
systemic fact(s) of ~ 87; non-
systemic property (properties) 
of ~ 88, 122; object ~ 268; ob-
jectification(s) of ~ 9, 138, 141; 
observational ~ 71; ordinary ~ 
134; ordinary-~ philosophy 264; 
origin(s) of ~ 99; other ~ 9; out-
put(s) of ~ 103; overall ~ 137; 
overall human ~ 87, 95; own ~ 
132; parental ~ 135; particular ~ 
5, 80, 81–82, 87, 95, 100–102, 
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104, 109, 114, 117–118–119, 
123–124, 126, 130–132, 136–
137, 143, 161, 247, 277, 281, 
285; part(s) of ~ 247; perfor-
mance(s) of ~ 179; personal ~8, 
126, 128, 251; philosopher(s) of 
~ 158; philosophy of ~ 82–83, 
160, 170; phonological and se-
mantic plane(s) in ~ 110; private 
~ 134; Polish ~ 285; potential ~ 
190; property (properties) of ~ 
5, 8, 10, 79, 81, 87–88, 90–93, 
123, 136, 141, 152–154, 156–
160, 162, 164; proto-~ 44; pro-
prietorship of ~ 6, 104, 128; 
psychology of ~ 61, 92, 160; 
quality (qualities) of ~ 112; real-
ity (realities), thought(s) and ~ 
171; realization(s) of ~ 16, 96–
97, 100–101, 126, 168–169, 
272, 281; reference(s) for ~ 108; 
relational property (properties) 
of ~ 154; relational and inherent 
property (properties) of ~ 88; re-
lational feature(s) of ~; role(s) 
of ~ 31, 85, 112, 273; rule(s) of 
~ 100, 114, 272; Scandinavian ~ 
147; science(s) of ~VIII, XI–
XII, 11, 30, 43, 49, 52, 55, 61, 
62, 65, 87–91, 93–94, 99, 134, 
164, 185, 208; semiotic ap-
proach(es) to ~ 178; semiotic 
nature of ~ 176; semiotic prop-
erty (properties) of ~ XI, 8, 10, 
122, 158, 162, 164; semioti-
cian(s) of ~ 212; semiotics of ~ 
30, 261, 278; separate ~ 131; 
several ~ 104, 291; sign-
communicational role(s) of ~ 
31; similar ~ 131; social ~ 127; 
social character of ~ 83; sociol-
ogy of ~ 89, 92, 134; source ~ 
184, 285; speech and ~ 99–100; 
speaking vs. ~ 96; spoken ~8, 
133; standard ~ 133–134; 
state(s) of ~ 91; stretch(es) of ~ 
263; structure(s) of ~ 10, 81, 
125, 158–159; study (studies) of 
~ 29, 99, 122, 124, 264; sub-
set(s) of ~ 137; substance(s) of 
~ 120, 169; substrate(s) ~ 131; 
superimposed ~ 142; super-
posed ~ 131; system(s) of ~ 88, 
101, 117, 123, 125, 131, 143; 
systemic fact(s) of ~ 87, 106; 
systemic property (properties) 
of ~ 11, 81, 91–92; systemic and 
structural property (properties) 
of ~ 90; target ~ 184; technical 
~ 286; text(s) of ~104; the same 
~ 7–8, 104, 126, 131, 135, 144, 
146, 172, 275; theoretical ~71; 
theoretical modelling(s) of ~ 
247; theory (theories) of ~ XI, 
15, 31–32, 45, 125–126, 180–
181, 246–248, 250; theory (the-
ories) about ~ 125; translatabil-
ity of ~ 157; two ~ 118; typolo-
gy (typologies) of ~ 90; under-
standing(s) of ~ 94; universal(s) 
of ~ 1, 10–11, 151, 164; used ~ 
281; use(s) of ~ 6, 86, 99, 104–
105, 269; user(s) of ~ 8, 122; 
variability of ~ 129–130; vari-
ants of ~ 132; variety (varieties) 
of ~ 126, 133–134, 137; various 
125; vehicular ~ 91, 130; West-
ern ~ 285; view(s) of ~ 17, 178, 
275; view(s) about ~ 125; vo-
cabulary (vocabularies) of ~ 
285; written ~ 25 
language, ~ as a carving pattern 
113; ~ as a codified system of 
verbal signs used for cognitive 
and communicational purposes 
10; ~ as a correlation between 
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thought and sound in “parole”; 
~ as a dialectal continuum in the 
collective sense 9; ~ as a do-
main of articulation 113; ~ as a 
defined object; ~ as a defini-
tional model 87, 90, 94; ~ as a 
(created) structure 6, 96, 98; ~ 
as a domain of articulation 113; 
as a functional unity 122; ~ as a 
form of social practice 270; ~ as 
a form, realized substantially in 
individual acts and products of 
communicational processes 122; 
~ as a game of chess 114; ~ as a 
heteronomous idiolect 80; ~ as a 
mental system located within 
the brain of individuals 15, 246; 
~ as a natural organism 45; ~ as 
a principal investigative object 
mainly in relation to its signifi-
cative properties 30; ~ as a prin-
cipal object solely with regards 
to its systemic structural proper-
ties 30; ~ as a property of col-
lectivity 85; ~as a property of 
human beings 84; ~ as a rela-
tional property of (other) objects 
(studied by other disciplines) 5, 
80, 89; ~ as a semiotic system 2, 
21–22, 67, 77, 91; ~ as a seman-
tic system with grammar and 
universal lexicon 181; ~ as a set 
of inborn lexical ideas and 
grammatical rules 97; ~ as a set 
of intraorganismic and extraor-
ganismic properties of its speak-
ers and learners 79; ~ as a so-
cially actualized system of sym-
bols having a certain meaning 
99; ~ as a social feature of hu-
man speech 6; ~ as a social as-
pect of human speech 104; ~ as 
a social means of communica-
tion; ~ as a synonym of the fac-
ulty or power of speaking 98; ~ 
as a system of associated types 
of mental signs consisting of 
two parts, the concepts of word 
meanings and sound patterns of 
word forms that mutually imply 
each other 97; ~ as a personal 
property of him- or herself 6; ~ 
as a semiotic system located in 
the minds of individual selves 
248; ~ as a system of pure val-
ues 7–8, 113, 122; ~ as a system 
of shared means of communica-
tion 95; ~ as a system of signs 
having both an abstract and a 
social character 100; ~ as a sys-
tem of signs VII, 11, 165; ~ as a 
system of values 120; ~ as a 
system of vocal signs 6; ~ as a 
oneness 135; ~ as a principal 
object 89; ~ as a real object 94; 
~ as a theoretical construct 80, 
94; ~ as a tool of communica-
tion 8, 123, 290; ~ as a tool of 
communication or a property of 
task-realizing communities 290; 
~ as a tool halted at a certain 
stage of development 100; ~ as 
a verbal means of signification 
30; ~ as a whole 126, 135; ~ as 
an autonomous object of study 
in abstraction from its external 
conditionings.83; ~ as an auton-
omous sociolect 80; ~ as an in-
ductive generalization 80; ~ as 
an ecologically determined 
specimen 87; ~ as an extraor-
ganismic system of verbal 
means of signification and 
communication 124; ~ as an ob-
ject of study (is indivisible) 5, 
80–81, 89, 92; ~ as one of the 
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systems of meaning bearers be-
longing to the realm of human 
semiotics 275; ~ as obiectum 
formale 86–87; ~ as obiectum 
reale 86–87; ~ as work 6, 96, 
98; ~ ex definitione 80, 95; ~ ex-
ists also in the generational 
memory of organisms in form of 
mental memes or biological-
semiotic texts 86; ~ exists even 
in the form of a capability 6; ~ 
exists only as an organized sys-
tem in the consciousness of its 
individual users 8; ~ in a triadic 
sequence or a unified triangle 
11, 170; ~ in abstracto 80, 95; ~ 
in concreto 80, 95; ~ in general 
80, 95, 101–102, 126, 137; ~ in 
its entirety; ~ in itself 82, 90, 
162; ~ in particular 80, 95–96, 
102, 116, 126, 137; ~ in terms 
of a living organism that may be 
born and may die, that lives and 
grows, has ancestors and de-
scendants just like any man, an-
imal or plan 61; ~ in the light of 
sign conceptions; ~ in the col-
lective sense is an illusory ob-
ject 124; ~ is a form and not a 
substance 112, 114, 120, 169; ~ 
is a phonic and articulated form 
of the psychic interior of an in-
dividual 127; ~ is a material 
form of ideology 270; ~ is a 
spiritual force 103; ~ is energeia 
and not ergon 103; ~ is a pro-
cess or a product 103; ~ is both 
a social activity and a social fact 
96; ~ is located within the 
broadly understood systems of 
communication 22; ~ is not a 
ready-made product but an unin-
terrupted process 6, 96; ~ is on-
ly partly accessible in speech 
being embedded as a whole 
within the consciousness of a 
speaking individual 246; ~—a 
tool or a property of man 291 
linguistic, ~ ability (abilities) 6, 9, 
97, 106, 108; ~ act(s) 266, 281; 
~ activity (activities) of (a) so-
cial grouping(s) 141; ~ analysis 
(analyses) 48, 265; ~ and cogni-
tive ability (abilities) of hu-
man(s); ~ and communicative 
competence(s) 107; ~ and com-
municative performance(s) 138, 
151, 279; ~ and cultural dis-
course(s) 278; ~ and cultural 
ecosystem(s) 290; ~ and cultural 
community (communities) 109, 
277; ~ and discursive group-
ing(s) 275; ~ and cultural reality 
(realities); ~ and non-~ disci-
pline(s) 83, 87, 91; ~ and semi-
otic ability (abilities) 97; ~ and 
semiotic competence(s) 281; ~ 
and semiotic discursivism 291; 
~ and semiotic study (studies) 
22; ~ approach(es) 29; ~ catego-
ry (categories) 81, 137; ~ area(s) 
266; ~ chain(s) 117; ~ change(s) 
52; ~ character 8, 111; ~ code(s) 
93, 105; ~ collectivity (collec-
tivities) 17, 136, 275; ~ com-
munication 280; ~ community 
(communities) 17, 136, 214, 
231, 239–240, 243, 275, 281; ~ 
competence(s) 17, 97, 104–106–
108, 281–282; ~ custom(s) 145; 
~ datum (data) 82; ~ descrip-
tion(s) 128; ~ determinism in 
human cognition 171; ~ diasys-
tems(s) 135; ~ discipline(s) 2, 
22, 29–30, 37, 80; ~ discus-
sion(s) 135; ~ diversity 164; ~ 
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elements 7; ~ endowment 97; ~ 
ethnosystems(s) 135; ~ “exten-
sion(s)” of (a) monolingual self 
(selves) 95; ~ fact(s) 90–91, 
102, 115; ~ faculty (faculties) 6, 
86, 96, 104, 278; ~ form(s) 7, 
105, 111, 121, 169; ~ function-
alism 178; ~ geography 135; ~ 
historiography 52–53, 122, 284; 
~ in provenance; ~ idea(s) 37, 
41, 45, 52, 55; ~ idiosystem(s) 
94, 127, 135, 137; ~ inquiry (in-
quiries) 144; ~ interference(s) 
142–143; ~ investigation(s) 15, 
30; ~ knowledge 45, 47, 49, 
105; ~ labor(s) 79; ~ means 145; 
281; ~ meeting(s) 285; ~ meth-
od(s) 29; ~ minority (minorities) 
132; ~ model(s); ~ natiosys-
tems(s) 135; ~ object(s) 6, 62, 
81, 87, 96; ~ observation(s) 126, 
129; ~ or interlingual and cul-
tural or intercultural communi-
cation 277; ~ or logical and 
philosophical 26; ~ paradigm(s) 
42; ~ performance(s) 107, 138, 
144, 266; ~ phenomenon (phe-
nomena) 264; ~ point(s) of view 
99; ~ politeness 264; ~ polysys-
tems(s) 135; ~ practice(s) 217; ~ 
pragmatics 273, 283; ~ problem 
99; ~ property (properties) 108; 
~ realization(s) 263; ~ regularity 
(regularities) 156; ~ rule(s) 265; 
~ science(s) 81; ~ semiotics 
XII–XIII, 1, 11, 21, 30–32, 55, 
63, 164, 174, 184–185, 246, 
250, 291; ~ sign process(es); ~ 
sign(s) XII, 12, 113–114, 116, 
129, 164, 167–168, 179–180, 
186, 188, 191–193, 200, 202; ~ 
skill(s) 106; ~ sociosystems(s) 
135; ~ sound(s) 187; ~ struc-
ture(s) 113, 115; ~ study (stud-
ies) XI, 2, 29–30, 50, 80, 82–83, 
87, 89, 95, 125–126, 137, 169, 
285–287; ~ subdiscipline(s); ~ 
substance(s) 7, 111;~ sub-
strate(s), superstrate(s) or ad-
strate(s) 142; ~ system(s) 10, 
28, 81, 87, 124–125, 130–131, 
133, 135–137, 141, 161; ~ 
term(s) and category (catego-
ries) 29; ~ text(s) 94, 102; ~ 
theory (theories) VII, 43, 83, 92, 
104–105, 268, 285; ~ theory 
(theories) of language 180–181; 
~ thought(s) 3, 36, 42, 50–51, 
53, 55, 62–63, 79–80; ~ trans-
fer(s) 286; ~ trend(s) 50; ~ 
unit(s) 113; ~ usage(s) 98; ~ ut-
terance(s) 99, 105, 151, 161; ~ 
value(s), 112, 168; ~ variety 
(varieties) 135, 137; ~ view-
point(s) 92; ~ writing(s) 7, 98, 
110, 202, 286; ~, communica-
tive, social, and cultural 98, 106; 
~, philosophical, logical and an-
thropological (inquiry) inquiries 
into the sign- and meaning-
related issue(s) 1; ~, pragmatic 
and philosophical approach(es) 
289; ~-communicational activity 
(activities) 9, 138; ~-
grammatical correctness 281; ~-
semantic level(s) 222; commu-
nicative-~ performance(s) 97, 
106; “eco~” discipline(s) 89; 
“extra”-~ fact(s) 87; “intra”-~ 
fact(s) 87; extra~ 87–88; extra~ 
fact(s) 127; extra~ reality (reali-
ties) 83, 101; extra~ and ex-
trasemiotic domain of reference 
281; inter~ contact(s) 124; in-
tra~ 87–88; meta~ level 79; me-
ta~ reflexivity 159, 161; non-~ 
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by nature 29; non-~ discipline(s) 
5, 80, 83; non-~ matter 7, 111; 
non-~ or non-language-like se-
miotic system(s) 28; non-~ sci-
ence(s) of language 11, 30, 61, 
88–91, 99, 130, 164; non-~ sci-
ence(s) of sign and meaning 
217; psycho~ performance prin-
ciple(s) 156; socio~ analysis 
(analyses) 268; socio~ compe-
tence(s) 107, 109; socio~ 
knowledge 108 
linguistics, ~ 27–30, 32, 35, 37, 42, 
47, 49, 51–52, 55, 81–82, 87, 
93, 113–114, 137; ~ among oth-
er sciences 55; ~ among the oth-
er sciences of language VIII; ~ 
and literary study (studies); ~ 
and other sciences of lan-
guage(s) XI; ~ and semiotics 
VII, XI–XII, 2, 27, 29–31; ~ and 
the non-linguistic science(s) of 
language 88, 90, 130, 164; ~ 
and the theory (theories) of lit-
erature (… etc.) 25; ~ as (a) sci-
ence(s) of (verbal) signs 28; ~ as 
a “pilot science” 28; ~ as an in-
vestigative object 93; ~ chair 
colloquium(s) VIII; ~ in the 
broadest sense; ~ or psychology 
65; ~ proper 10–11, 30, 82, 89, 
92–93, 137, 158, 160; ~, semiot-
ics and communicology 2; ~, 
sociology, psychology, anthro-
pology, biology, and the like 26; 
adjacent to ~ 61; aim(s) of ~ 
200; academic discourse(s) of ~ 
284; anthropo~ 89, 92; anthro-
pological ~ 218; applied ~ 17, 
107, 286; aspect(s) of ~ 92; au-
tonomous ~ 90–92, 164; chair(s) 
of ~ XI; change(s) in ~ 45, 52; 
commission(s) of ~ 285; com-
parative ~ 44, 82, 90, 136; cog-
nitive ~ 249; conference(s) in ~ 
XIII; context(s) of ~ 31, 64; cul-
tural science(s) and ~ 232; de-
partment(s) of ~ IX; descriptive 
~ 82; development(s) of ~ 3, 42, 
44, 50; diachronic ~ 123; disci-
pline(s) of ~ 62, 91, 129; disci-
plinary-specific perspective(s) 
of ~ 181; domain(s) of ~ 5, 30, 
61, 80, 89, 91, 266; empirical ~ 
61, 181; epistemology (episte-
mologies) of ~ XI 96, 100, 158; 
“external” ~ 87–88; functional ~ 
100; general ~ VII–VIII, 82, 90, 
124–125, 136, 178; hard-science 
~ 84, 290; heteronomous ~ 89–
92, 164; historian(s) of ~ 3, 44; 
historical ~ 90, 123, 133; histo-
riography (historiographies) of 
~ 47; history (histories) of ~ 3, 
35, 41–42, 51, 53, 93; human ~ 
290; innovator(s) in ~ 44; insti-
tute(s) for ~ XII; instrumentalist 
~ 219; instrumentalist function-
alism in ~ 178; integrational ~ 
IX, 125; interest sphere(s) of ~; 
“internal” ~ 87–88; leading 
role(s) of ~ 28; logic of ~ 93; 
meaning in ~ XI; meta~ 92–93; 
methodology (methodologies) 
of ~ 93; modern ~ 37, 51; 
neighboring discipline(s) of ~ 
62, 91, 129, 283; neighboring 
science(s) of ~ 99; object(s) of ~ 
45, 86; para~ 25; paradigm(s) of 
~ X, 217; particular ~ 90; par-
ticular kind(s) of ~ 125; peri-
od(s) in ~ 43; phenomenolo-
gist(s) of ~254; philosophy of ~ 
93; position(s) of ~ XII, 62; 
post-Saussurean ~ 125; post-
structuralist ~ 265; practition-
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er(s) of ~ 8, 10, 126, 132, 151; 
pragma~ 106, 264; pragmatic ~ 
264; pre-1800 ~ 44; psycho~ 61, 
89, 92; psychology of ~ 93; sci-
ence(s) of ~ 93; scope(s) of ~; 
revolution(s) in ~ 46; semio~ 
29–30; semiotic ~ 30, 158; se-
miotic paradigm(s) of ~ X, 217; 
semiotics and ~ 21, 30–31; so-
cio~ 89, 92, 283; sociological ~ 
261; sociology of ~ 93; stand-
point(s) of ~ VII; state(s) of ~ 
37, 42, 51; static ~ 115; sta-
tus(es) of~ IX; structural ~ 127, 
154, 158, 261; subject matter(s) 
of ~ 5, 79, 88, 92, 124; syn-
chronic ~ 123; systemic ~ 268; 
text ~ 17, 262–263, 265; textual 
~ 180; typological ~ 90 
logical domain(s), ~ as (a) counter-
part(s) of the physical domain(s) 
236; ~ being rationally conclud-
ed through shared knowledge of 
social communication 15; ~ of 
(a) rational association(s) 194, 
237; ~ of (an) inferable associa-
tion(s) linking related factual or 
processual phenomena 193; ~ of 
associated mental facts 231; ~ 
of inference 15; ~ of mentally 
associated facts 236; boundaries 
of ~ 236; feature(s) of ~ 15; 
physical and ~ of human semi-
otics 235 
M 
meaning(s), ~ 211–214, 244, 249; ~ 
and manifestation 170; ~ and 
use 79–80; ~ as (a) signified(s) 
181; ~ as (a) subjective and in-
tersubjective subsumption(s) of 
(a) significant object(s) 237; ~ 
as (a) subjective construct(s); ~ 
as (a) thought(s) of (a) thing(s) 
177; ~ as (a) thought(s) or no-
tion(s) 166, 204; ~ as (an) inter-
pretant(s) 166; ~ as enaction 
218; ~ as nomination(s) and 
subsumption(s) of significant 
objects 231; ~ as significance 
244; ~ as significance or val-
ue(s) 65; ~ belonging to ex-
trasemiotic reality (realities) 
238; ~ conception(s) 33, 212; ~ 
for someone 227; ~ of (a) func-
tion(s) 14; ~ of (a) given sign(s) 
172, 176; ~ of (a) phenomenon 
(phenomena) 242; ~ of (a) 
thing(s) 253; ~ of (a) value(s) 
14; ~ of (a) verbal sign(s) 212; ~ 
of (an) abstract correlate(s) 209; 
~ of another (other) sign-
vehicle(s) 222; ~ of another 
(other) subject(s) 229; ~ of an-
other (some other) good(s) 222; 
~ of verbal mean(s) 85, 161; ~ 
or reference 1; ~-bearer(s) 9, 13, 
15–17, 21–22, 32, 79, 84–85, 
143, 182, 199, 215–216, 231–
232, 238–241, 243–244, 261, 
271–275, 277–280; ~-bearing 
fact(s) 9; ~-bearing process(es) 
and product(s) 14; ~-carrier(s) 
138, 140, 143, 148, 227–229; ~-
carrying fact(s) 140; ~-creating 
activity (activities) 9, 140; ~-
creation(s) 14, 21, 225, 231–
232, 238, 279; ~-creator(s) 33, 
234, 274, 278; ~-evaluator(s) 
14; ~-deciphering 238; ~-
indicating function(s) 3, 22; ~-
interpretation(s) 21, 232; ~-
interpreting activity (activities) 
14; ~-negotiating activity (activ-
ities) 242; ~-nomination(s) 14; 
~-processing activity (activities) 
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14, 16, 261, 271; ~-receiver(s) 
227, 229, 234; ~-related proper-
ty (properties) 10, 13; ~-related 
domain(s) 23; ~-signaling 
form(s) 156–157; ~-
subsumption(s) 14; ~-
utilization(s) 14, 225, 231, 279; 
~-utilizer(s) 14, 33, 227, 229, 
234, 274, 278; acquired ~ 220; 
activity (activities) of ascribing 
~ 220; additional ~ 229; ascrip-
tion(s) of ~ 223, 239, 243, 274; 
assign ~ 270; bear certain ~ 32; 
bearer(s) of ~ 32, 100; bearer(s), 
producer(s) or utilizer(s) of ~ 
74; biological understanding of 
~ 225; biosemiotic concep-
tion(s) of ~ 227; body-related ~ 
258; carrier(s) of ~ 229; certain 
~ 227; cognizer(s) and maker(s) 
of ~ 237; conceive, memorize 
and make ~ 22; concept(s) of ~ 
65, 214; conception(s) of ~ 13, 
211, 230, 237; connotative ~ 
107, 134, 170, 189, 192, 202; 
convey ~ 65; create and inter-
pret ~ 17; creating and utilizing 
~ 225; definition(s) of ~ 211; 
denotative ~ 188; detailed ~ 
262; derivational ~ 162; differ-
ent ~ 40, 156; distinguish ~ 155, 
157; distorted ~ 134; essence of 
~ 211; expression(s) of ~ 237; 
extrinsic ~ 227, 229, 234, 239, 
243, 279; form(s) and ~ 126, 
155, 157, 175; form—
<WORD>—… meaning (con-
cept)—… referent 173; func-
tion(s) or ~ 7, 65, 110, 112; fun-
damental ~ 182; generation(s) of 
~ 65; global ~ 164; group-
specific ~ 245; have ~ 226; hav-
ing ~ 212; historical and con-
temporary ~; imputed ~ 194; in-
ferable ~ 170, 219, 272; inten-
tional act(s) of ~ 170; interpreta-
tions of ~ 171; knowledge of ~ 
13, 243; locutionary ~ 161–162, 
264; maker(s) of ~ 242; memo-
rize, think, learn and make ~ 24, 
249; minimum differential ~ 
182; mental ~ 175; natural and 
conventional ~ 264; nature of ~ 
177; negotiate and confirm ~ 
85; need-oriented conception(s) 
of ~ 223; new ~ 223; notion(s) 
of ~ 207; partial ~ 164; particu-
lar ~ 221; personal-subjective ~ 
242; pre-constructed ~ 237; ref-
erence(s) or ~ 199; referent(s) R 
as ~ 181; referent(s) as (a) ~ 
199; referential ~ 182, 185, 200, 
131, 239, 243, 262; relativist 
conception(s) of ~ 214; 
search(es) for ~ 242; semiotic ~ 
199; semiotic and non-semiotic 
conception(s) of ~ 211; sense(s) 
or ~110; sign(s) and ~ X–XI, 1, 
14, 22, 27, 32, 176, 199, 215, 
217–219, 229, 231; sign- and ~-
oriented discipline(s) 64, 167, 
249, 251, 275; sign- and ~-
oriented scholar(s) 246; sign- 
and ~-oriented theory (theories) 
of cognition 248; sign- and ~-
processing and sign- and ~-
interpreting activity (activities) 
14, 230; sign- and ~-related ap-
proach(es) 65; sign- and ~-
related domain(s) 23; sign- and 
~-related nature of language 31; 
sign- and ~-related object(s) 2; 
sign- and ~-related property 
(properties) 10, 14, 230, 235; 
sign- and ~-related issues(s) 1; 
sign(s) and its (their) ~ 1–2; sign 
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and/or ~ conception(s) 33; sign- 
and/or ~-related issue(s) 34; 
sign- and/or ~-related property 
(properties) 23; sign(s) or ~ 21; 
signified ~ 220; sign process(es) 
and/or ~ 63; sense(s) or ~ 7; 
shared ~ 244; something that 
has ~ for someone because of 
something 227; specification(s) 
of ~ 200; specific ~ 99; subjec-
tive ~ 232, 240–242; subjective 
value(s) and ~ 223; subject-
oriented ~ 21, 227; subject-
oriented understanding of ~ 228; 
subject-related conception(s) of 
~ 237; synonym(s) of ~ 65; the 
same ~ 53; the term ~ 200, 211; 
theory (theories) of ~ 65, 199; 
tolerance of ~ 229; transferred 
~; Uexküllian concept of ~ 224; 
universe(s) of ~ 9, 141, 245; uti-
lizer(s) of ~ 74; value(s) and ~ 
74, 223; word ~ 97; word-for-
word ~ 102; word—… ~—… 
referent 173 
mental, ~ 33, 84, 278; ~ act(s) 170; 
~ activity (activities) 189, 238, 
245, 248; ~ association(s) 80, 
162, 190; ~ capability (capabili-
ties) 85, 279; concrete and ~ na-
ture of language 11, 167; ~ con-
cept 212; concrete or ~ entity 
(entities) 11, 166; ~ constitu-
ent(s) 187; ~ configuration(s) 
190; ~ construction 242; ~ con-
tent(s) 15, 246–247; ~ counter-
part(s) 175, 177; ~ entity (enti-
ties) 11, 166; ~ equivalent(s) 84, 
189–190, 196, 278–279; ~ ex-
istence mode(s) 127, 248; ~ ex-
perience(s) 249; ~ fact(s) 120, 
169, 187; ~ fact(s) and event(s); 
~ faculty (faculties) 79; ~ 
form(s) 170; ~ frame(s) of ref-
erence 238; ~ idea(s) 188; ~ im-
age(s) 175, 177, 188; ~ imagina-
tion(s) 1; ~ inductive abstrac-
tion(s) 244; ~ information struc-
ture(s) 249; ~ intuitionism 68; ~ 
manifestation form(s) 200; ~ 
mem(es) 86, 280; ~ meaning(s) 
175; ~ model(s) 237, 242; ~ na-
ture of language 11, 167; ~ 
part(s) 183; ~ pattern(s) of; ~ 
meaning-bearer(s); object(s) 
231; ~ oneness 168; ~ pattern(s) 
143; ~ phenomenon (phenome-
na) 124, 250; ~ product(s); ~ 
processing and interpreting of 
(a) meaning-bearer(s) 244; ~ re-
ality (realities); ~ recollection(s) 
189, 245; ~ referent(s) 204, 206, 
210–211; ~ reflection(s) 166, 
175, 190; ~ relational net-
work(s) 249; ~ representation(s) 
12, 186, 249, 253; ~ scheme 
(schemata) 238–239; ~ sen-
tence(s) 177; ~ self (selves) 259; 
~ side(s) 168, 186–188, 193, 
196; ~ sign(s) 83, 97, 177, 204, 
206–207, 210–211, 213; ~ sign-
processing and sign-interpreting 
activity (activities) 16, 84; ~ 
space(s) 142–143, 278; ~ 
sphere(s) 245, 260; ~ subject(s) 
232; ~ system(s) 15, 246; ~ 
thinking 96; ~ transfer(s) 142; ~ 
world(s) 242; sign(s) as ~ unity 
(unities) 11, 167, 203; physio-
logical-~ faculty (faculties) 97 
mentalism, ~ 63, 211, pan~ 7, 248 
mentalist, ~ concept 3; 246~ con-
nectionism 213; ~ direction(s) 
112; pan~ 15, pan~ concep-
tion(s) 245, pan~ attitude 250 
metacompetence 18, 283  
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metadesignation, ~ (metalinguistic 
reflexivity) 159, 161; ~ i.e., the 
ability to speak in signs about 
other signs, as the main charac-
teristics of human beings 177; 
the term ~ 284 
metadesignational, ~ nature of 
language(s) 28 
metalanguage 268, 284 
metalingual 273 
metalinguistic, ~ level 79 
metalinguistics, ~ 92–93, ~ in par-
ticular 93 
metascience, ~ 34, ~ in general 93 
metascientific, ~ account of the 
research 1; ~ basis 58; ~ inves-
tigation(s) 22, 34; ~ level 2, 56, 
75; ~ or metadisciplinary foun-
dation(s) 4; ~ status(es) of epis-
temology (epistemologies) 56; ~ 
status(es) of semiotics (semiotic 
disciplines) 2; ~ status(es) of 
semiotic disciplines 19; ~ study 
(studies) 34, 92; ~ subdisci-
pline(s) 59; ~ premise(s) 92 
metasemiotic, ~ discourse(s) 31 
metasemiotics, ~ as a network of 
epistemological paradigms 1 
N 
neosemiotics, ~ 251, 257, 259, 
object of ~ 16, 247, 259 
P 
performance(s), ~ as realization of 
language 96, ~ of language 179; 
~ of verbal ability (abilities) 
108; actual ~ 105; communica-
tive ~ 108, 279; communicative-
linguistic ~ 97, 106; compe-
tence(s) and ~ 104; linguistic ~ 
107, 138, 144, 266; linguistic 
and communicative ~ 138, 151, 
279; psycholinguistic ~ 156; 
speech ~ 107; verbal ~ 106; 
verbal and non-verbal ~ 97 
physical domain(s), ~ being empiri-
cally tested with experimental 
methods 15; ~ of (a) concrete 
fact(s) 237; ~ of empirical in-
vestigations 231; ~ of empirical 
observations 194; ~ of observa-
ble concatenations of facts or 
processes 193; ~ of observable 
relational properties of com-
municating selves as concrete 
persons 236; feature(s) of ~ 15; 
logical domain as a counterpart 
of ~ appears to be indispensable 
236; the concept of ~ must be 
counterpoised to that of the log-
ical domain 236  
phytosemiotic, ~ processes 226; ~ 
sign-processes 226, ~ sign(s) 
227 
phytosemiotics 226 
Platonic 11, 112, 119, 167–169 
Platonism 11, 166 
Platonist 112, 120, 168–170, 176 
praxeological, ~ and axiological 
formulation(s) of sign and 
meaning 235; ~ and axiological 
subsumption of (a) semiotic ob-
ject(s) 245; ~ i.e., function- and 
purpose-oriented view of culture 
14; ~ i.e., function-related 232; 
~ or axiological nomination(s) 
and subsumption(s) of (an) ob-
ject(s) under the sign(s) of func-
tion(s) or value(s) 233; ~ or axi-
ological significance as either a 
tool or a good 237; ~ semiotics 
232, 237; ~ significance 2, 233, 
235 
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praxeology 14, 232; ~- and /or 
axiology-oriented model(s) of 
(a) cultural semiosphere(s) 235 
praxeosemiotic, ~ and/or axiosemi-
otic regularity (regularities) 14, 
232; ~ and (an) axiosemiotic 
sphere(s) of culture(s) 234; ~ 
and/or conception(s) of cul-
ture(s) 233; ~ nomination(s) and 
subsumption(s) 14, 232 
praxeosemiotics 233 
praxeosignificate(s) 234–235 
praxeotic act(s) 235 
R 
Research Center for Language and 
Semiotic Studies at Blooming-
ton, Indiana IX 
S 
Sartrean 259  
Saussurean, ~ 11; ~ approach 114; 
post-~ structuralism 49; post-~ 
linguistics 125; three ~ terms 
(langage—langue—parole) 98; 
~ distinction(s) 98; ~ term lan-
gage 99; parole in ~ terms 102; 
speech is specified in ~ terms as 
“the linguistic faculty proper” 
104; Platonic logos and Saus-
surean parole 187; ~ concept 
and image acoustique as ‘con-
cept’ and ‘sound pattern’ in Roy 
Harris’ translation 168; ~ bilat-
eral sign within the scheme of a 
semantic triangle 174; bilateral 
sign in ~ outlining 175 
Saussureanism 59 
semeion (semeia) 23 
semiocentrism 74 
semiotic, ~ act(s) 223, 235; ~ activi-
ty (activities) 220, 232; ~ and 
linguistic study (studies) 2; ~ 
ability (abilities) 97; ~ and non-
~ conception(s) of meaning 211; 
~ and non-semiotic aspect(s) 31; 
~ and non-semiotic concept(s); 
~ and non-semiotic viewpoint(s) 
58; ~ and structural study (stud-
ies) X, 151; ~ study (studies) 
XII; ~ approach(es) 178, 223; ~ 
category (categories) 28; ~ 
codes 17, 272; ~ collectivity 
(collectivities); ~ communica-
tion(s) VIII; ~ competence(s) 
281; ~ competence(s) 281–282; 
~ concept(s) 200, 221; ~ con-
ception(s) of subjective uni-
verse(s) 13; ~ conference(s) 
VIII; ~ congress(es), confer-
ence(s) and symposium (sympo-
sia) X; ~ consciousness; ~ defi-
nition(s) 164; ~ deliberation(s) 
31; ~ detection(s) 235; ~ de-
vice(s) 250; ~ dimension(s) 220; 
~ discipline(s) 11, 19, 58–59, 
166, 200, 218; ~ discursivism 
291; ~ domain(s) 22, 75; ~ eco-
system(s); ~ experience(s) 258; 
~ fact(s) 28–29; faculty (facul-
ties) 289; ~ function(s) 16, 272; 
~ functionality (functionalities) 
30; ~ inventory (inventories); ~ 
investigation(s) 2, 30–31; ~ lin-
guistics 21, 30, 158; ~ manifes-
tation form(s) 232; ~ meaning(s) 
199; ~ means 238, 247, 279–
280; ~ network(s) 274; ~ nature 
of language 2, 176; ~ niche 224; 
~ nomination(s); ~ object(s) 1–
3, 9, 12, 21–22, 23–24, 26–27, 
30–34, 65, 67–69, 71, 73–75, 
138–140, 149, 164, 185, 199–
200, 202, 207, 212, 215, 232, 
235, 245, 249, 272; ~ order(s) 
223; ~ paradigm(s) of linguistics 
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X, 217; ~ perspective(s) 151; ~ 
phenomenology 254; ~ phe-
nomenon (phenomena) 201; ~ 
practice(s); ~ process(es) 226, 
258; promoter of ~ IX; ~ prop-
erty (properties) XI, 8, 10, 14, 
122, 158, 162, 164, 231, 236, 
273–274, 276, 280–281; ~ reali-
ty (realities); ~ self (selves) 2, 
13, 15, 197, 216, 229, 231; ~ 
seminar(s); ~ situation(s); ~ so-
cial-semiotic sphere(s); ~ socie-
ty (societies) IX; ~ sphere(s) 14, 
216; ~ square 252; ~ structural-
ism 186; ~ study (studies) IX, 
21–22, 24, 30, 57, 141, 167, 
235, 288; ~ subdiscipline(s) 34; 
~ substantiation(s) 138; ~ sub-
sumption(s); ~ symposium 
(symposia) VIII; ~ system(s) 2, 
21–22, 28, 67, 77, 91, 130, 162, 
217, 235, 237, 244, 248, 250, 
277; ~ term(s) 25, 31, 192; ~ 
thought(s) 75, 166, 203; ~ 
threshold(s) 24, 75; ~ trace(s) 
145; ~ tradition(s) 194, 199; ~ 
universal(s) 1, 10–11, 151, 157–
158, 162, 164, 230; ~ varia-
ble(s); ~ view(s) of the world 
249; ~ web(s) 290; ~ writing(s) 
25, 204; ~-communicational as-
pect(s) 261; ~-communicational 
study (studies) 32; ~-
communicational system(s) 274; 
~-communicational view(s) 219; 
biological-~ text(s) 86; in ~ 
term(s) 14; non-~ concept(s) 
200; semiology and ~ commu-
nication VIII; social-~ sphere(s) 
142; subject-centered ~ 13; 
praxeological and axiological 
subsumption of (a) ~ object(s) 
21, 245  
semiotics, ~ 21–22, 24–25, 27–30, 
32, 56, 59, 65, 67, 73, 75, 201, 
215, 222, 257; ~ among the oth-
er scientific disciplines 4, 57; ~ 
and communicology XIII; ~ and 
linguistics 21; ~ and/or (and) 
semiology 25–26, 64; ~ as a sci-
entific discipline 2; ~ as (an) in-
vestigative domain(s); ~ con-
stituent(s); ~ institute(s) X; of 
classical music 251; ~ of human 
communication 141, 272; ~ of 
belonging; ~ of communication 
17, 283; ~ of culture and nature 
14, 230–231; ~ of culture XII–
XIII, 14, 218, 220, 224, 229, 
232, 291; ~ of human communi-
cation 16; ~ of language(s) 27, 
30, 261, 278; ~ of language; ~ 
of nature XII–XIII, 27, 224, 
229; ~-(a) related discipline(s) 
63; ~-related presentation(s) XI; 
anthropological foundation(s) of 
subject-centered ~ 13, 219; as-
sociation(s) of ~ XIII, attention 
in ~ 200; axiological ~ 232, 237; 
background(s) of ~ 252; bound-
ary (boundaries) of ~ 60, 67, 74; 
category (categories) of ~ 200; 
center(s) for ~ XII; cognitive ~ 
XI, 248–250, 288; communica-
tion and ~ VIII; constituent(s) of 
~ 65; corporeal ~ 258; cultural ~ 
15, 27, 222; cultural ~ 27; de-
scriptive ~ 16, 246, 249–250; 
dictionary (dictionaries) of ~ 
120, 169–171, 176, 178, 212–
214, 284; discipline(s) of ~ 5, 
33, 65; domain(s) of ~ 2, 4, 22, 
24, 26, 28–29, 32, 58, 215; edu-
cational ~ 196; educational dis-
course(s) in ~ 11, 183; empirical 
and rational ~ 193; epistemolo-
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gy (epistemologies) of ~ XII, 4, 
35–36, 58–59; epistemology 
(epistemologies) of linguistic ~ 
53; existential ~ 246–247, 251–
253, 257, 259; foundation(s) of 
~ 74, 176; framework(s) of ~ 
218; general ~ 3, 22–23, 31, 33–
34, 64; general linguistics and ~ 
VII; global ~ 151; heritage(s) of 
~ 251; human ~ 14, 17, 151, 
230, 235, 248, 275; human-
centered ~ 14, 231, 235, 257; 
261; in terms of ~ 65; linguistic 
~ and semiotic linguistics 30; 
linguistic ~ XII–XIII, 1, 11, 21, 
30–32, 55, 63, 164, 174, 184–
185, 246, 250, 291; linguistics 
and ~ VII, XI–XII 2, 27, 29–31; 
linguistics and logical ~; lin-
guistics, ~ and communicology 
2; links to ~ IX; medical ~ 25; 
metaphysical and physical ~ 23; 
methodological tool(s) of ~ 32; 
modern ~ 23, 284; Modern-
World ~ 251–252; neighboring 
discipline(s) of ~ 65; new ~ X, 
260; objective ~ 74; object(s) of 
~; older ~ 252; Old-World ~ 
251; physical ~ 23; position(s) 
of ~ 56, 74; praxeological ~ 
232, 237; promoter(s) of ~ 29; 
referential ~ 274; school(s) of ~ 
X, 5, 258; scope(s) of ~ 24; so-
ciety (societies) XIII; solipsistic 
paradigm(s) of ~ 1; specific dis-
cipline(s) of ~ 5; status(es) of ~ 
2, 31; student(s) in ~ XI; subdi-
vision(s) of ~ 34; subject mat-
ter(s) of ~ 23, 64, 171; subject-
centered ~ 216, 219, 247; 
task(s) of general ~ 31; the term 
~ 23; theory (theories) of ~ 219; 
world ~ 251 
semiotiké / semieiotiké 23 
semiotism, ~ called also semioti-
cism 62 
sign- and meaning-, ~- or sign-
processes-related terms 22; ~- or 
sign-product- and sign-
process(es)-related terms; ~-
interpreting activity (activities) 
14, 230; ~-oriented discipline(s) 
64, 167, 249, 251, 275; ~-
oriented scholar(s) 246; ~-
oriented theory (theories) of 
cognition 248; ~-processing ac-
tivity (activities); ~-processing 
and ~-interpreting activity (ac-
tivities) 14, 230; ~-related abil-
ity (abilities); ~-related ap-
proach(es) 65; ~-related do-
main(s) 23; ~-related issue(s) 1; 
~-related nature of language 31; 
~-related object(s) 2; ~-related 
property (properties) 10, 14, 
230, 235 
sign(s), ~ 11, 13, 46, 116, 120, 166, 
169, 172, 175–180, 185, 205–
207, 209, 213–214, 226–227; ~ 
action(s) 171; ~ among other 
types of semiotic objects; ~ 
among things 176; ~ and ~-
processing activity (activities); 
~ and culture(s); ~ and its (their) 
contexts of use 212; ~ and its 
(their) meaning(s) 1–2; ~ and its 
(their) object(s) 171; ~ and its 
(their) object(s) of reference 
162, 166; ~ and its (their) physi-
cal realization(s) 180; ~ and its 
(their) referent(s) 12–13, 182, 
199–200, 206–209, 210–211, 
213; ~ and non-~ 200; ~ and 
meaning(s) X–XI, 1, 14, 22, 27, 
32, 176, 199, 215, 217–219, 
229, 231; ~ and/or meaning 
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conception(s) 33; ~- and/or 
meaning-related issue(s) 34; ~- 
and/or meaning-related property 
(properties) 23; ~ as (a) cog-
nizable, phenomenon (phenom-
ena); ~ classification(s); ~ as (a) 
corporeal phenomenon (phe-
nomena) 12, 176; ~ as (a) dyad-
ic relation(s) 13, 204–205; ~ as 
(a) meaning-bearer(s) 216; ~ as 
(a) oneness 11, 167; ~ as (a) re-
lation(s) 120; ~ as (a) tetradic 
relation(s) 204–205; ~ as (a) 
text-element(s); ~ as (a) three-
fold representamen(s) 171; ~ as 
(a) token and (a) type 209; ~ as 
(a) token(s) 181; ~ as (a) triadic 
relation(s) 12–13, 204–205; ~ as 
(a) twofold entity (entities) 183; 
~ as (a) twofold mental unity 
(unities) 167; ~ as (a) two-sided 
entity (entities) 11; ~ as (a) uni-
ty (unities); ~ as (an) entity (en-
tities) 12, 199; ~ as (an) investi-
gative object(s) 26, 30; ~ as (an) 
object of two sides 120; ~ as ex-
isting materially 176; ~ as (an) 
implicative artificial semantic 
arbitrary phenomenon (phenom-
ena) or (an) associated inten-
tional inferred conventional 
stimulus (stimuli) 202; ~ as (an) 
observable meaning-bearer(s) 
231; ~ as the main object of 
study 30; ~ concept(s); ~ con-
ception(s) X, 13, 175, 178, 180, 
199–200, 203–205, 207, 209, 
211; ~ constituents 191; ~ do-
main(s); ~ for (an) idea(s) 113; 
~ for more than one signifié 
120; ~ function(s) 116–117, 
169; ~ in general 2, 22; ~ in it-
self 74; ~ in particular 120; ~ in 
relation to value(s) 223; ~ in-
ventory (inventories) 129; ~ it-
self 116, 169, 175, 179; ~ 
knower(s) 129; ~ model(s); ~ of 
(an) organismic need(s); ~ of (a) 
human need(s) XII; ~ of (a) 
fact(s) and (an) event(s) 16, 246, 
248; ~ of (an) idea(s); ~ of (an) 
idea(s) 113; ~ of another (other) 
individual(s) 160; ~ of (a) func-
tion(s) 232; ~ of (a) value(s) 
232; of (a) function(s) or (a) 
value(s) 233, 236; ~ of (an) in-
ferable function(s) or value(s) 
236; ~ of God’s creation 74; ~ 
of his/her purpose(s) or need(s) 
14; ~ of its (their) virtual use(s) 
221; ~ or ~ processes 65; ~ pro-
cess(es) 22, 24, 27, 63, 65, 212, 
226; ~ process(es) and/or mean-
ing 63; ~ or meaning 21; ~ pro-
duction(s) 172; ~ property 
(properties); ~ reservoir(s) 129; 
~ science(s); ~ system(s) XIII; ~ 
theory (theories) 177; ~, sense, 
indication 172; ~ user(s) 190, 
212, 214; ~-and-its-referent re-





27; ~-communicational role(s) 
of language(s) 31; ~-
communicational science(s) 17; 
~-communicational system(s) 
272; ~-interpreting activity (ac-
tivities) 16, 84, 213; ~-
processes-related terms 22; ~-
processing activity (activities) 
84, 213, 246, 278–279; ~-
processing and ~-related do-
main(s) 26; ~-related term(s) 
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12–13, 27, 183; ~-structures 
113; ~-system(s) 22; ~-
transmission(s) and ~-
reception(s) 279; ~-transmitting 
and ~-receiving activity (activi-
ties) 278; ~-vehicle(s) 12, 166, 
171, 190, 220–222, 235; all ~ 
25; another (other) ~ 117, 171–
172, 176–177; approachability 
(approachabilities) of ~; bilat-
eral ~ VII, 11–13, 166, 173–
175, 185–188, 190–191, 196, 
199, 203; categorial ~ 119; cat-
egory (categories) of ~ 11, 65, 
166; characteristic feature(s) of 
~; class(es) of ~ 163; classifica-
tion(s) (typology /typologies/) 
of ~ VIII; complex ~; composed 
~ 164; concept(s) of ~ XI; con-
ception(s) of ~ X, 1, 12, 14, 
166; conception(s) of ~ and 
meaning 231; conceptual fea-
ture(s) of ~; concrete ~ 13, 166, 
194, 204, 206–207, 210; conno-
tation(s) vs. denotation(s), in-
tensions vs. extension(s) of ~ 
213; constituent(s) of ~ 117; 
conventional ~ 25, 178; conven-
tionalized ~ 25–26; cultural ~ 
27; cultural ~ process(es) 27; 
definition(s) of ~ 11, 168, 177; 
detachment(s) of ~ from its 
(their) referent(s) 12, 176; doc-
trine(s) of ~ 23; domain(s) of ~ 
26; duality (dualities) of ~ 116, 
169; effect(s) of ~ 212; embod-
ied ~ X; entitative ~ 119; epis-
temological foundation(s) of ~; 
extraorganismic~ 206; every ~ 
171; feature(s) of ~ 178, 182, 
190; function(s) of ~ 273; for-
eign ~ 160; generating one or 
more ~ 166; genus proximum of 
(linguistic) ~; given ~ 171–172, 
176, 194, 208; group(s) of ~ 
265; how to react to ~ 214; how 
to use ~ 214; iconic, i.e., picto-
rial or mimetic ~ 272; implica-
tional nature of ~ 176; indicat-
ing ~ 140; indicating, signaling, 
appealing, symbolic, iconic, i.e., 
pictorial or mimetic ~ 16; infi-
nite number(s) of ~ 164; intelli-
gible ~ 175; intelligible intraor-
ganismic ~ 206; intermediating 
~ 171; interpretant of ~ 171; in-
traorganismic ~ 206; language ~ 
12, 27, 46; language ~-
process(es) 27; language-
centered ~ and meaning study 
(studies) 229; linguistic ~ XII, 
12, 113–114, 116, 129, 164, 
167–168, 179–180, 186, 188, 
191–193, 200, 202; manifesta-
tion form(s) of ~ 11, 185, 200, 
203, 208; manifestation(s) of ~ 
12; material ~ 111; mental ~ 83, 
97, 177, 204, 206–207, 210–
211, 213; mental image(s) of ~ 
175; mental reflection(s) of ~ 
166; model(s) of ~ 183, 185; 
natural ~ 25, 27, 177; natural 
and conventional ~ 178; natural 
~-process(es) 27; nature of ~ 
176; non-linguistic science(s) of 
sign and meaning 217; non-
verbal ~ 163, 202, 208; non-
verbal and verbal ~; notion(s) of 
~ VIII, 207, 215; notional 
scope(s) of ~; observable ~ 218; 
olfactory ~ 24; ontological sta-
tus(es) of ~ 65; own ~ 160; par-
ticular ~ 117; part(s) of ~ 11, 
167; perceptual ~ 226; perfused 
with ~ 74; philosophy of ~ IX; 
phytosemiotic ~ 227; phytose-
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miotic ~ processes 226; poten-
tial ~ 23, 28; prior ~ 171; pro-
ducer(s) and receiver(s) of ~ 
216; process(es) of creating ~, 
called semiosis (semioses) 65; 
property (properties) of ~ 201; 
quadrilateral ~ 204–205; ration-
alistic presentation(s) of ~ 168; 
referent(s) of ~ 166, 213; root(s) 
of ~ 165; science(s) of ~ VII, X; 
scope(s) of ~ 200; sensible ~ 
175; sensible extraorganismic ~ 
206; sequence(s) of ~ 265; sim-
ple~ 163–164, 181–182; spoken 
or written ~ 6; status(es) of ~ 
65, 166; study (studies) of ~; 
subsumption(s) of (an) observa-
ble object(s) under the ~ of (an) 
inferable function(s) or value(s) 
in nature and culture 236; sys-
tem(s) of ~ VII, 11, 28, 97, 165; 
the term ~ 23, 195, 201; the 
word ~ 194–195; text(s) and ~; 
theory (theories) of ~ 30–31, 63; 
token(s) and type(s) of ~ 190; 
translatability of (a) sign into 
another (other) sign(s) 213; tri-
adic ~ 213; trilateral ~ 12–13, 
166, 171, 199, 204–205; two 
classes of ~ 163; two sides of ~ 
186; twofold mental ~ 213; two-
sided ~ 189, 193; type(s) of ~; 
ultimate interpretant(s) of ~ 171; 
unilateral ~ VII–VIII, 12, 166, 
175, 199, 203, 205, 209, 211; 
unity (unities) of ~ 2; universal 
~ 221; various ~ 171; user(s) of 
~ 212–213; utilization(s) as ~ 
241; verbal ~ 10, 21, 28, 31–32, 
97, 114, 116, 124–125, 130–
131, 137, 140, 158, 160–162–
163, 170, 200, 212, 214; verbal 
~ in particular 2, 22; view of ~ 
119, 169; vocal ~ 6; written ~ 6; 
zero-~ 111 
significance, anthropological and 
biological conception(s) of sub-
jective ~14; axiological ~ 233; 
biological conception(s) of sub-
jective ~ 230; culture-centered 
conception of subjective ~ 13, 
230; meaning as ~ 65, 244; 
praxeological ~ 2, 233, 235; 
praxeological or axiological ~ as 
either a tool or a good 237 
signification, ~ and communication 
22, 24, 79, 88, 94–95, 104, 124, 
136, 140, 158–159, 162, 231, 
277; ~ and indication 178; ~ and 
signal(s) 167, 194–195; ~ and 
significate(s) 196; ~, that is, the 
human production of (a) sign(s) 
241; cultural ~ 221; domain of ~ 
208; human ~ 79; human ~ and 
communication system(s) 244; 
individual ~ 84; interpersonal ~ 
and communication 22, 24; in-
terpersonal communication and 
intersubjective ~ 279; intersub-
jective ~ 2, 97, 162, 164; lev-
el(s) of ~ 208; level(s) of indica-
tion, signalization, symboliza-
tion, or ~ 208; means of ~ 30, 
80, 83, 94, 280; means of ~ and 
communication 104, 124, 140, 
158–159, 162, 231; means of 
individual ~ and interindividual 
communication 84; means of in-
tersubjective ~ and interpersonal 
communication 278; means of 
verbal ~ and communication 
94–95, 136; non-verbal and ver-
bal domain of ~ 281; non-verbal 
and verbal means of ~ 280; pur-
pose(s) of ~ and communication 
162; solipsistic ~ 239; subjectiv-
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ity of solipsistic ~ and intersub-
jectivity of collective communi-
cation 239; system(s) of ~ 24, 
88, 135, 219; system(s) of ~ and 
communication 88; system(s) of 
cultural ~ 221; the word ~ 194  




zoosemiotic, ~ sign-process(es)  
zoosemiotics 226 






Od gramatyki do dyskursu.  





Od gramatyki do dyskursu. W stronę solipsystycznego paradygmatu se-
miotyki jest pierwszą monografią akademicką, która umiejscawia semioty-
kę lingwistyczną w ramach teoretycznych i metodologicznych epistemo-
logii jako teorii wiedzy jak przedmioty badań naukowych istnieją i jak 
mogą one być poznawane w podejściach badawczych. Wykorzystywany 
jako podręcznik może zaoferować co najmniej trzy korzyści, które każdy 
pracownik nauki prowadzący seminaria specjalizacyjne lub student zgłę-
biający tajniki lingwistyki, semiotyki i komunikologii może przyjąć z 
aklamacją jako własne źródła inspiracji: po pierwsze, że obiekty semio-
tyczne są wieloaspektowe, po drugie, że właściwości przedmiotu badań 
semiotycznych można wydobyć poprzez wybór perspektyw epistemolo-
gicznych i po trzecie, że wszystkie podejścia ontologiczne i gnozeologicz-
ne są równorzędne do przedmiotu badań na poziomie metanaukowej. 
Łącząc poszukiwania odnoszące się do istoty znaku i znaczenia (czyli 
odniesienia poza-znakowego) prowadzonych przez przedstawicieli lingwi-
styki, filozofii czy logiki, autor postuluje, aby zjednoczyć domeny badań 
biologicznych i antropologicznych, zajmujących się naturą i kulturą czło-
wieka, w jeden wspólny paradygmat naukowy badań nad językiem. 
 Niniejsza książka składa się z szesnastu rozdziałów podzielonych na 
cztery części dotyczące statusu semiotyki wśród nauk o nauce, aspektów 
języka jako system semiotycznego, badań nad naturą obiektów semiotycz-
nych, i semiotycznej jaźni w dyskursywnych domenach życia codzienne-
go. Oddzielnie części stanowią bibliografia prac omawianych i konsulto-
wanych, uwagi odnoszące się do zagadnień omawianych w wybranych 
rozdziałach oraz indeksy odnoszące się do autorów i wybranych terminów 
z tekstu głównego. Jako taka stanowi przyczynek do pięciu dziedzin, ta-
kich jak (1) epistemologia jako sieć perspektyw badawczych, (2) semio-
Od gramatyki do dyskursu 365 
 
tyczne uniwersalia języka, (3) modelowanie relacji między znakami a ich 
desygnatami, (4) solipsystyczna koncepcja znaczenia subiektywnego oraz 
(5) społeczny dyskursywizm w relacji do kompetencji jednostkowej. 
Główną uwagę zwraca się tu na rolę jednostki ludzkiej biorącej udział w 
kształtowaniu społeczności dyskursywnych poprzez interpersonalną 
transmisję przekazów i intersubiektywne rozumienie przekazów. 
 Rozdział Pierwszy rozważa, jak oddzielić domeny badawcze lingwi-
styki i semiotyki. Dla uchwycenia semiotycznej natury języka wyjaśnia 
relację dyscypliny, której obiektem są znaki w ogóle, do jednej z dyscy-
plin lingwistycznych, której obiektem są znaki werbalne w szczególności. 
Celem Rozdziału Drugiego jest rozważenie możliwości zastosowania 
pojęcia paradygmatu jako następstwa przekonań poznawczych i metodo-
logicznych ludzi nauki wynikających z rewolucji naukowych wywołanych 
przez nadzwyczajne osiągnięcia wyjątkowych jednostek do minionego 
i obecnego stanu myśli lingwistycznej. Rozdział ten kończy się stwierdze-
niem, że historycy językoznawstwa są w stanie wyróżnić jedynie hetero-
geniczne tradycje zróżnicowanych podejść do języka z ich własnymi zapi-
sami dokumentacyjnymi, przerwami and powrotami. Rozdział Trzeci wy-
chodzi od epistemologii jako gałęzi wiedzy, która studiuje naturę i podstawy 
wiedzy w odniesieniu do granic i funkcjonalnej istotności różnych podejść 
badawczych używanych w poszczególnych dyscyplinach naukowych dla 
określenia ich przedmiotu badań. Istotą dociekań jest, jak dalece aktualnie 
wyznawane poglądy badaczy co do natury przedmiotu odpowiadają ich 
dostępności badawczej. Uwaga Rozdziału Czwartego skupia się na języku 
jako głównym obiekcie badań naukowych i jako aspekcie obiektów sąsia-
dujących będących rozpatrywanych z interdyscyplinarnych punktów wi-
dzenia. Jego celem jest wyeksponowanie świadomości dyscyplinowej uczo-
nych w podziale ich pracy badawczej na styku podejść izolacjonistycznych 
i integracyjnych. W obrębie ramy odniesienia wprowadzonej w Rozdziale 
Piątym właściwości języka omawia się w kontekście uwarunkowań fizjo-
logicznych i psychologicznych mowy jednostek komunikujących się jako 
członków społeczności. Ośrodkiem takich rozróżnień jest pojęcie języka 
jako systemu i realizacji języka w tekstach w konfrontacji z pojęciami 
kompetencji i wykonania. Rozdział Szósty zajmuje się kwestią, jak wyja-
śnić pojęcie formy w korelacji z pojęciem substancji. W gramatyce opiso-
wej forma bowiem jest albo przeciwstawiana albo umieszczana w relacji 
do funkcji lub znaczenia. Jednakowoż, w odniesieniu do tekstowej realiza-
cji języka zakłada się, że forma jest czymś, co działa jako wzorzec wy-
krawający na bezpostaciowej materii substancję, dając w ten sposób sieć 
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relacji. Przedmiot Rozdziału Siódmego dotyczy zmienności i zróżnicowa-
nia języka wynikających z charakteru jego środowiska, związanego z 
czasem i przestrzenią, w którym funkcjonuje jako generacyjnie przekazy-
wany środek komunikacji interpersonalnej. Te poglądy biorą pod uwagę 
takie właściwości języka jako konwencjonalność, możliwość nauczenia się 
i podatność na zapominanie. Rozdział Ósmy zwraca uwagę na metamorfo-
zy w świecie życia człowieka wynikające z działalności komunikacyjnej 
pojedynczych jednostek, które w nim funkcjonują. Te metamorfozy nabie-
rają kształtu w postaci „uwyrazowienia świata” poprzez nazywanie i po-
rządkowanie rzeczywistości, i poprzez urzeczowienie języka, gdzie mó-
wiący nim wiedzą „jak uczynić rzeczy z wyrazów”. Rozdział Dziewiąty 
podnosi kwestę semiotycznych właściwości języka. Jego przedmiotem są 
badania nad tzw. uniwersaliami języka, jeśli chodzi o właściwości znaj-
dowane albo we wszystkich języka świata, albo w komunikatywnych 
kompetencjach jego mówców i/lub słuchaczy, albo też w cechach defini-
cyjnych mowy wyprowadzanych z werbalnych i niewerbalnych środków 
komunikacji używanych w świecie człowieka i zwierząt. Zagadnienia 
poruszane w Rozdziale Dziesiątym są związane z pochodzeniem koncepcji 
języka jako systemu znaków. W szczególności odnoszą się one do różnych 
interpretacji sposobów jego istnienia w subiektywnych i obiektywnych 
formach przejawiania się. Najwięcej uwagi poświęca się tu źródłom róż-
nych tradycji filozoficznym od starożytności do współczesności w rozu-
mienia koncepcji znaku jako bytu jednostronnego, dwustronnego i trój-
stronnego. Rozdział Jedenasty eksponuje na tle różnych rodzajów ekwiwa-
lencji translacyjnych również ideę ekwiwalencji epistemologicznej, która 
winna być osiągana w praktyce przekładowej. Mając na względzie świa-
domość ontologiczną i gnozeologiczną tłumaczy, przedkłada pod rozwagę 
sprawdzanie, jak równe konotacje terminów odnoszących się do znaków 
wyekscerpowanych z Kursu językoznawstwa ogólnego Ferdinanda de 
Saussure’a mogą wywierać wpływ na odbiorców dyskursu edukacyjnego z 
semiotyki. Sfera zainteresowań Rozdziału Dwunastego obejmuje analizę 
epistemologiczną heterogenicznych koncepcji znaku i ich przedmiotu 
odniesienia, które wydobywają różnice w użyciu ich terminologii i wizua-
lizacji. Stąd przedkłada się propozycję, aby wypracować taką matrycę 
parametryczną, która zawierałaby cechy i składniki specyficznej dla po-
szczególnych podejść do sposobów ich bycia i środków wyrażania. Roz-
dział Trzynasty rozszerza koncepcję jaźni semiotycznej, odnoszonej wyj-
ściowo do organizmu, który rozpoznaje i wytwarza sygnały z otoczenia 
jako znaczące dla swojego funkcjonowania, poprzez pojęcie jaźni sygnifi-
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kującej i komunikującej, która wysyła i odbiera jako osoba obserwowalna 
zmysłowo-postrzegalne nośniki znaczenia i która kształtuje i interpretuje 
jako podmiot wnioskowany owe mentalnie pojmowalne nośniki znaczenia 
na potrzeby komunikacji intersubiektywnej. W ramach Rozdziału Czterna-
stego eksponującego koncepcję znaczącości subiektywnej w świecie ota-
czającym organizmy ludzkie i zwierzęce w połączeniu z koncepcją tworze-
nia intersubiektywnego świata życia ludzi poprzez komunikację codzienną, 
domena semiotyki człowieka jest zakreślona poprzez procesy tworzenia 
znaków i czynności interpretacyjne podmiotów kultury, którzy spożytkowu-
ją obiekty natury i kultury napotykane w ich uniwersum subiektywnym 
jako funkcjonalne narzędzia i wartościowe dobra kultury. Rozdział ten 
wieńczą teorie konstruktów osobisto-subiektywnych i społecznego two-
rzenia rzeczywistości, podkreślające fakt, że język obiektywizuje do-
świadczenia jednostek, stając się własnością społeczności komunikatyw-
nych. Rozdział Piętnasty jest poświęcony solipsystycznemu rozumieniu 
przedmiotu semiotyki egzystencjalnej. Punktem odniesienia, mającym 
swoje źródła w fenomenologii, są tutaj werbalne wykładniki istnienia form 
organizmów jako „bytów samych w sobie” i „bytów dla siebie”, wyrażone 
w odnośnych językach omawianych autorów. Rozdział Szesnasty skupia 
się na metodologicznej ocenie dyskursywizmu jako perspektywy badaw-
czej z punktu widzenia jej potencjalnego zastosowania w kontekście kom-
petencji człowieka. Badając znakowo-komunikacyjne aspekty kompetencji 
człowieka, wydobywa rozumienie dyskursu jako realizacji języka i kultury 
w interakcjach międzyludzkich, które przyczyniają się do tworzenia sys-
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